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This thesis will examine the representation, consequence and transformation of the 
idea of authorship in the work of James Joyce and suggest a way of re-addressing the 
contentious question of authorship. While postmodern criticism has emphasised the 
“revolutionary” cultural and political ramifications of Joyce’s response and the ways that his 
work has helped to deconstruct this question for modernity and postmodernity, this thesis 
will trace the ideas and ideologies, individuals and characters, historical, cultural and 
biographical circumstances that contributed to both the prominence and the hermeneutical 
consequence of the question of authorship in Joyce’s work. Highlighting Joyce’s awareness 
of and fascination with the multivalency of a question shaped by theological, historical, 
political, philosophical, philological, epistemological, methodological and hermeneutical 
ideas as well as literary representations, it will examine Joyce’s reformulation and response 
to this question through four pervasive models of authorship in his work: critic, philosopher, 
bard and theologian. While each chapter will make a distinction between these models in 
order to analyse their characteristics and significance, as a way of tracing not only the 
evolution of these models but also the complex network of interrelation that is established 
between these distinctive but also intertwining ideas of authorship, the thesis will be 
structured historically, biographically and “ergographically” (in Barthes’ definition of an 
‘ergography’) as well as thematically.  
As a way of approaching the ideologically overdetermined concept of authorship, 
but also avoiding another postmodern “renaming” of this concept, these models will be 
proffered in order to examine the construction, fabrication and invention as well as the 
deconstruction of the idea of authorship and the representation of the role of the author in 
fiction, culture, society and history in the work of Joyce. The “drama” of authorship will be 
interpreted in terms of Joyce’s fictional and hermeneutic dramatisation of the role and idea 
of the author, but also in terms of the consequence of Joyce’s interest in and early 
idealisation of the genre of drama. This thesis will finally suggest that Joyce’s “failure” to 
become a dramatist and engagement with philosophical analyses of this genre contributed 
significantly to his deconstruction, reconstruction and dramatisation of the role and 
“exagmination” of the author.  
The thesis as a whole will delineate how each of these four models gradually 
becomes more distinctive but simultaneously also inextricable from a variegated template 
that is only methodologically divided into four parts; the four exegetes in Finnegans Wake 
inconspicuously multiply. The first three chapters will follow the attempt outlined in Joyce’s 
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early draft of the Portrait ‘to liberate from the personalised lumps of matter that which is 
their individuating rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts’- the growing self-
consciousness of the artist’s understanding of his role(s) as an artist and of the idea(s) of 
authorship. In the last two chapters that will look at Ulysses and Finnegans Wake these four 
models will be more clearly differentiated although the growing theatricality in their 
portrayal and widening nexus of relations will complicate and indeed undermine the idea of 
a “model”. 
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Joyce’s views on the role, characteristics and temperament of the artist were from 
the beginning of his writing career distinctive and emphatic, but also largely antagonistic. He 
defended his own artistic premises against assaults real and imaginary, and delineated the 
features of his ideal artist - most frequently through a negative foil - implicitly and explicitly, 
exposing at the same time the errors and shortcomings of both past and contemporary 
authors. But as a consequence of the polemic declarations echoed also by Joyce’s artist-
heroes and the prominence of the endeavour to redefine a wide and frequently abstract field 
of aesthetics prior to any creation of works of art, the role of the literary author appears to be 
confused with that of the philosopher. Artist and philosopher are related in their mutual quest 
for an “epiphany” of the truth and even share the same vocabulary. The persistence and 
relentless dramatisation of this alliance has puzzled, troubled, divided and multiplied Joyce’s 
critics. Indeed, just as the artistic compositions of Stephen Dedalus pale in comparison to his 
endless philosophical ruminations and theories, and Shem’s “alshemical” production 
‘through the bowels of his misery’ of ‘a no uncertain quantity of obscene matter’ is a 
bewildering and unsettling creative act, ‘The false pretence of eliminating the genre 
distinction between philosophy and literature’ that Joyce’s work appears to share with 
deconstruction, led his early critics to question whether the honorific title “artist” could be 
ascribed to someone who so impetuously and disrespectfully disdains the rules of art (FW 
184; Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 210). 
The question “is it Art?”, which was posed by Joyce’s early critics with growing 
urgency and frequency, assumed a modulating significance. The question was first voiced in 
a rather disparaging unsigned review of the Portrait in the Irish Book Lover in 1917. The 
reviewer confesses that the ‘pseudo autobiography of Stephen Dedalus, a weakling and a 
dreamer, makes fascinating reading’, but complaining that Joyce’s ‘unsparing’ realism ‘jar[s] 
one’s finer feelings’, he begins to doubt its value as Art (CH 102). Despite the fact that ‘Mr. 
Joyce is a master of brilliant descriptive style’, ‘no clean-minded person could possibly 
allow it to remain within reach of his wife, his sons, or daughters’. The scandalous morality 
of Joyce’s work is silenced by refusing his work the honorary title of ‘Art’: ‘Above all, is it 
Art? We doubt it’, the reviewer sighs with relief. Art is here defined not by formal and 
technical standards, but rather disappointingly for Stephen Dedalus, aesthetic judgement is 
determined through the sacrifice of beauty to the morally “good”. 
What is a question of value and morality among reviewers who highlight the 
“obscenity” of Joyce’s work and worry about the sanity of its author, gradually becomes a 
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question of genre and hermeneutics: the question “what is Art” emerges out of the derisive 
doubt ‘is it Art?’, as the mockery turns against the mocker, and Joyce’s critics find 
themselves trying to answer this “metaphysical” question. This theoretical enigma does not 
trouble the Irish Book Lover reviewer for all his professed doubt; for him the particular 
example of Joyce’s art does not fit the rule, whereas the rule itself becomes increasingly 
ambivalent among reviewers following the publication of Ulysses. The anonymous critic 
from the Dublin Review who recommends in 1922 that Ulysses should be placed on ‘the 
Index Expurgatorius’, does not fear for the ‘general reader’: ‘it is, as it were, so much rotten 
caviare’ that ‘the public is in no particular danger of understanding or being corrupted 
thereby’ (202). Once again, the enigmatic interpretation of art safeguards the corrupting 
force of his work. In order to grapple with ‘the dreary muck-ridden tide’, the critic attempts 
to place Joyce within a specific tradition, and goes through the Irish literary movement, ‘a 
French sink’, ‘a Cuchulain of the sewer’, ‘an Ossian of obscenity’, the English tradition of 
the controversial Samuel Butler, a Paris or London dilettante, an errant Catholic, even Satan 
himself (201). Failing in this enterprise, he examines a passage from “Cyclops” and 
admiring Joyce’s ‘rare or new words’, concludes that, ‘This may, or may not, be literature. It 
is certainly good cataloguing’ (202). Joyce’s work is not only obscene, but also violates the 
formal rules of art. In the difficulty of disengaging his work from the broad field of “art”, 
Joyce’s deviance from the more specific field of “literature” begins to be questioned. 
Critics find that his work deprives them of the very ability to criticise: ‘Our opinion 
is that a gigantic effort has been made to fool the world of readers and even the Pretorian 
guard of critics’; the book is ‘unreadable and unquotable, and we must add, unreviewable’ 
(207). ‘It should be companioned with a key and glossary like the Berlitz books’, 
recommends an American reviewer (222). Edmund Wilson seems to prophetically discern 
and define the “genre” of the all-encompassing text of deconstruction when he responds to 
this critical bewilderment by saying that the 730 pages of Ulysses ‘are probably the most 
completely ‘written’ pages to be seen in any novel since Flaubert’ (227). Similarly, the great 
modernist critics Eliot and Pound, distinguish their reviews through their ability to interpret 
the nature of this original form: ‘If it is not a novel, that is simply because the novel is a form 
which will no longer serve’, Eliot explains; it is the very idea of literature and our genre 
distinctions that are at fault (268). ‘Ulysses is not a book everybody is going to admire, any 
more than everybody admires Bouvard et Pécuchet, but it is a book that every serious writer 
needs to read in order to have a clear idea of the point of development of our art’, Pound 
argues; the work appears significant in terms of the history of art, it is not a book to be 
simply aesthetically admired as a work of “art” in itself (266). 
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But if Joyce’s work is not art, ‘not sane enough to be literature’, not a novel, not 
readable, not language, not invention, what is it? (397) ‘Mythos? Metamorphosis?’ (497) Is 
it ‘a new mode of art’, or simply ‘a fundamental assertion of it’, as Edwin Muir argued in 
1925? (334) Joyce is a ‘craftsman’ rather than a genius, Wyndham Lewis explains, 
reproducing Plato’s distinction between techne and inspiration: ‘there is not so much an 
inventive intelligence as an executing’ (359). He has misunderstood the role of the artist: 
‘What stimulates him is ways of doing things, and technical processes, and not things to be 
done’, and he has fallen in with the wrong crowd of modern ‘time-philosophers’, finding in 
‘the mental world of time’ a solution for his dissatisfaction with reality. This time-
philosophy, a ‘mechanistic’ ‘system of abstract truth’ that ‘overshadows all contemporary 
thought’, potentially ‘destroys our human arts’. Joyce’s dialogue with philosophy has a 
detrimental effect on art (Time and Western Man 110). Not only is Joyce’s work influenced 
by philosophy, but further requires a philosophy to be explained: according to Padraic 
Colum, his innovations ‘would require the exposition of a theory to be properly explanatory’ 
(CH 390). 
The inexhaustible metacritical compulsion of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, begins 
to make critics wonder along with Stanislaus Joyce whether the books were written ‘with the 
deliberate intention of pulling the reader’s leg or not’ (387). The relentless reflection upon 
‘ways of doing things’, upon the craft of art and questions of aesthetics seems to breach the 
domain of art and claim the critic’s and philosopher’s role for the artist (359). In an autotelic 
work like Finnegans Wake such a drive seems perverse: ‘He is doing an intellectual and 
imaginative labor gigantic in its proportions, obdurate in its persistence, with no practical 
end in view whatever, not even that of communicating experience, but solely to perfect 
himself in the art of playing by himself in public’, according to the reviewer of Harper’s 
Magazine (418). Self-interpretation closes the hermeneutic circle and denies communication. 
‘In his effort to bring together the interior life with a simple series of terms, Mr Joyce 
succeeded in confounding entirely the psychic language with the social language; or at least, 
does not take enough account of their difference’, complains a critic from the Revue Anglo-
Américaine in 1924 (318). There is no “outside” to the circle; all interpretations are 
“groundless”. 
His work seems suspended between total critique and meaninglessness. This 
cataclysmic drive is seen as an attack against not only critics, but also the very idea of art. 
Work in Progress is seen not so much as innovation and experimentation, but as an attempt 
by Joyce to explode the very idea of art, literature and language: a ‘witless wandering of 
literature before its final extinction’, as Stanislaus laments (387). Few are willing to accept 
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with Beckett that ‘His writing is not about something; it is that something itself’ (14). That 
“thing-in-itself” appears to require prodigious philosophical and theological analysis in order 
to penetrate its essence. For Sean O’Faolain, Joyce keeps the promise made to his mother in 
1907 to publish an ‘Esthetic’, as the Wake ‘raises almost every possible kind of problem in 
the philosophy and psychology of aesthetics’, while a writer from the TLS wonders whether 
‘As in Ulysses, the key to the new work may be found in a philosophical concept’ (Letters II 
38; CH 411). 
This critical indignation is both anticipated and thematised in Joyce’s work, but also 
increasingly dramatised. The quest to discover what kind of ‘metandmorefussed’ ‘Leaper 
Orthor’ this ‘hybrid’ and ‘tuttut toucher up of young poetographies’ who ‘laid low’ the 
‘mothersmothered model’ and exposed the ‘horrible poverty of mind’ ‘for the boob’s 
indulligence’ [the pope’s rather unflatteringly] rather than his lay audience’s is, is reflected 
in the cornucopia of ‘poetesser[s]’ in Joyce’s work who seem to have ‘mardred’ the true 
‘Arthor’ (FW 513, 8, 169, 242, 191, 192, 531, 232, 517, 52). The apparent confusion 
between poetry and philosophy and its consequence for the role of the artist and the nature of 
his art are explored and interrogated, but also explicitly exploited. The philosophical 
ruminations of Stephen Dedalus, a victim of the philosophical predilections, enthusiasms and 
eccentricities of his author, for all their ardour and fervour, do not elevate his cultural 
standing, but distance him from reality and from his peers who view his philosophy as 
‘Intellectual crankery’ (P 215). The inexorable demand to outline and expound the 
configuration and meaning of art prior to any creative composition seems to bring the 
downfall of Stephen’s career who increasingly resembles a ‘tragic jester’ rather than a 
philosopher, while Joyce himself relinquishes the promise to publish an ‘esthetic’ and 
appears to avoid the pitfalls of abstract speculation and ‘danger of perishing of inanition’ the 
dean of studies warns Stephen of in the Portrait (205). 
However, Joyce’s work bears the marks of his continuous engagement with 
“philosophy”, a prescriptive but also equivocal term that needs to be defined in terms of 
Joyce’s own understanding, interpretation and application of it as both a metaphysical “love 
of wisdom” and nebulous world of thoughts, and as a specific discipline defined 
academically and historically through individual schools of thought and thinkers. The history 
of Joyce’s reception indicates the lasting impression of philosophical ideas and specific 
philosophical traditions in Joyce’s work and on the conception of Joyce’s role as an author. 
Most influentially, Joyce’s work has been presented as the arch paradigm for and of the 
philosophical tradition of deconstruction. The identification of Joyce’s work with this 
particular philosophical tradition has distinguished both the work and its author as 
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“philosophical”, an epithet that is not always complementary and has reinforced the 
preconception of Joyce’s work as unliterary, obscure and elitist.  
Although wary of hierarchies and prescriptions - Alan Roughley highlights that 
deconstruction denies the ‘pigeonholing’ of such ‘categorizing and classification’ of genres - 
this school of thought has nevertheless linked Joyce’s work with specific philosophical 
traditions most pertinent to its ideas and concerns (xii). Jean-Michel Rabaté’s ‘attempt to 
place Joyce within the philosophic tradition of scepticism’ is qualified with his assertion that 
‘Joyce is no ‘philosopher’ in the classical sense, but a writer concerned with letters, words 
and languages’ (Joyce upon the Void xiii). Cheryl Herr’s tentative confession ‘These days I 
view Joyce as a philosopher’ is conversely substantiated by locating Joyce in the tradition of 
the pre-Socratics and Heidegger’s separation of epistemology from ontology (Joyce and the 
Art of Shaving 3). Whereas Don Byrd’s quest to evaluate whether Joyce is ‘a philosophic 
novelist’ ends with the conclusion that while ‘Ulysses is a myth of a self-conscious, educated 
age’, ‘Joyce uses the methods of the myth-maker, not the philosopher’, deconstruction has 
not wanted to allow the critical perspective of Joyce’s work to be lost through such 
identification with myth (9, 20). 1 Wary of identifying his work with specific philosophies or 
philosophers, deconstruction nevertheless emphasises the world-disclosive capacity of 
Joyce’s work. “Philosophy” (deconstruction) emerges as the consequence of Joyce’s work, 
while philosophical ideas, traditions and philosophers are just another text in the web of 
intertexts.  
The quest of deconstruction to deliver ‘rhetoric (or writing) from its age-old 
subjugation at the hands of philosophic reason’, moreover, has not only complicated the 
bifurcation of literature and philosophy, but also brought to the forefront their shared ground 
of textuality and corresponding ‘textual activity’: the “coincidence” of artist and theorist in 
their shared role as ‘functions of the traverse of the material of language’ (Norris, The 
Contest of Faculties 73; MacCabe, Revolution 165). As ‘the only locus for this neutralization 
of differences in an ontological sense is language’, however, this function is haunted by what 
Nietzsche in 1869 described as the ‘sham monarchy’ of the ‘wholly different scientific and 
aesthetico-ethical impulses’ that ‘have been associated under a common name’- philology 
(Rabaté, Joyce upon the Void 17; Homer and Classical Philology 1).  
The figure of Vico, who ‘himself could not resist the attractiveness of such 
coincidence’, is key to this new vocation ascribed to the modern artist, as it is Vico who 
facilitates Joyce’s elusion of the Hegelian theoretical predicament for Rabaté: ‘Vico brings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Byrd’s inference was echoed in Goldberg’s Classical Temper, published in 1969. Joyce’s work, 
Goldberg argued, is an ‘affirmation not of any doctrine superhuman or supernatural, but of the 
mythopoetic imagination itself’ (203). 
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the dynamics of language lacking in Aquinas and Hegel’, while his ‘historical philosophy 
allows Joyce to dispense with (not overcome, his move is much more economical) the 
speculative system altogether and to advance toward the dialogism of interpretations’ 
(Beckett 6; Authorized Reader 179). The ‘shift from Hegel to Vico’ “authorises” ‘the 
reader’s divinisation’: ‘The philosopher transformed into a philologist, equipped with a 
sound theory of language, now engaged into the hermeneutics of human reality, can become 
the Creator of the History he narrates. The “divine pleasure” is not set aside for the end of 
history as in Hegel’s apocalyptic progression toward absolute knowledge; it is available to 
any reader, who must only superimpose his interpretive action onto the creative gesture in 
order to become god himself’ (179, 182). The ‘death of the Artist … in the name of the birth 
of language’ not only sanctions, but also consecrates the ‘systematic dismemberment’ of 
criticism: the reader becomes ‘the “hero” of a drama involving the editing and deciphering of 
texts’ (Politics of Egoism 125, 194; Authorized Reader 191). 
Genetic criticism has indeed allowed the philologist to become the sole “subject” of 
Joyce’s text; in order to be a legitimate heir, the new reader ‘has to approach [the Wake] less 
with hundreds of glosses and annotations than with the material evidence of the notebooks, 
drafts, corrected proofs reproduced by the Archive’ (Rabaté, “Pound, Joyce and Eco” 495). 
While ‘Any theoretical aloofness meets its own dissolution in the tide of puns’, the critic 
must nevertheless develop ‘a sound theory of language’ (Authorized Reader 128, 182). 
Deconstruction paved the way for this new philological function by reconfiguring ‘The 
peculiar mode to which artistic production and works of art belong’ (Hegel, Aesthetics 12). 
The inauguration of a different type of “act”, a new “method”, an oxymoronic “theory”, 
signalled the displacement of ‘an infinite accumulation of meanings’ by ‘the mechanisms of 
its infinite productivity’; not only of the text, but also of the critic: ‘the infinite productivity 
of interpretative activity’ (Post-structuralist Joyce 10, 7).  
Deconstruction’s focus on ‘an activity of assemblage ... in which activity the writing 
subject itself is dispersed in a plurality of possible positions and functions’, an ‘activity of 
reading’ that Joyce’s text ‘demands’, is reflected in ‘the acts of writing’, ‘the writing 
processes’ and the ‘procedures of the writer and the text’ that necessitate and legitimise 
genetic criticism’s focus on the ‘author’s method’ (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 39; 
MacCabe, Revolution 16; Fordham, I do I undo I redo 60, 7; Hayman Genetic Studies 5, 10). 
Sharing with deconstruction the ‘notion of reading as a textual activity which stresses how a 
text is materially produced’, genetic criticism’s ‘practice of editing dispels any 
transcendental illusion as to the connection between meaning and the material but unstable 
nature of texts’ (Rabaté in Hayman and Slote eds. 77-8). Lernout’s ‘radical philological 
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approach’ distinguishes itself from genetic criticism in its refusal to view the notebooks ‘as a 
literary text which is at the same time a record of the creative process and that process itself’, 
emphasising instead the significance of ‘correcting misprints’, but similarly signals ‘the end 
of a certain type of theory and the beginning of a practice’ (48, 33, 45, 48).  
Introducing Genetic Studies in Joyce, David Hayman warns that while ‘it would be 
wrong to think that simply by discovering printed sources for materials in the notes and 
manuscripts, we can unlock the secrets of creation’, genetic criticism nevertheless allows the 
disclosure ‘by the scrupulous use of evidence and theory what manuscripts have to tell us 
about the composition process and hence the creative procedures’ through ‘a method that 
approximates scientific procedures in that it generates and discards hypotheses’ (7, 10). The 
subject of creativity is broached with vigilance, with the aid of a scrupulous methodology to 
avoid deception by the ‘mirage in a merror’ of representation (FW 310). Mindful of Laurent 
Milesi’s call to pay ‘heed to the specifically Joycean exempla, which not only ‘oblige’ us to 
devise methodological tools from the Irish writer’s own verbal arsenal (rather than the stock-
in-trade of academic ‘-isms’) but also empower us to do just that to creative and critical ends 
for theory ‘itself’, in ways that overreach the usual osmotic moulding of one’s critical 
language on the chosen writer’, Finn Fordham argues that practice elucidates theory in 
Joyce’s work, insofar as it reveals that modernist and postmodernist ‘Representations of the 
self and theories of the self issue from the processes behind textuality and they often take 
their form from processes of composition’: ‘the work is a determinant for the shape of the 
life – and produces therefore what we might call, using Barthes’s phrase, an ergography – a 
study of the nature and the effects of work’ (Lots of Fun 10, 16, 28). ‘Joyce’s risk’, Fordham 
argues, ‘was to generate a new method of writing: not what, but how’ (6). 
Undertaking Foucault’s ‘much more modest task’ of determining ‘the functional 
conditions of specific discursive practices’, the model of authorship that Joyce has proffered 
for postmodern criticism is that of an “initiator” ‘of discursive practices’: ‘The distinctive 
contribution of these authors is that they produced not only their own work, but the 
possibility and the rules of formation of other texts’ (114, 131). Like the Kantian genius, 
Foucault’s initiators  “give the rule to art” even though their own practice is unrepeatable: 
‘the initiation of a discursive practice is heterogeneous to its ulterior transformations’, in 
contrast to ‘the founding of any scientific endeavor’ that is ‘on an equal footing with its 
future transformations’ (133). Calling for the study of ‘not only the expressive value and 
formal transformations of discourse, but its mode of existence’, and for ‘the subject (and its 
substitutes)’ to ‘be stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable 
function of discourse’, Foucault dispels the mystery of the creative act through this 
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“initiation” (137-8). The ‘murmur of indifference’ ‘clear[s] a space for the introduction of 
elements other than [the initiators’] own’ (138, 132). 
While deconstruction has celebrated the ‘infinitization of fictions, of possibilities’ 
that Joyce’s writing facilitates, his role as an ‘initiator’ of the philosophical and philological 
practice of postmodernism and sacrifice for the birth of the reader have indicated the rebirth 
of the author in the likeness of the critic (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 39). Whereas, as 
Hugh Kenner has emphasised, ‘Joyce spent his life playing parts’ and his ‘perpetual 
assumption of roles is central to his work’, the ‘ideal reader’ of Joyce’s text, ‘the one who 
accedes to the play of this incompletion, placed in ‘a situation of writing’, ready no longer to 
master the text but now to become its actor’, is rather the ideal postructuralist reader 
(Dublin’s Joyce 354; Heath 32). Rabaté’s “ideal genetic reader” who is ‘offered a choice 
between varieties of error, and typologies of pathological readings’ is open to philological 
possibilities (“Pound, Joyce and Eco” 494). The ‘pervasive sense of sin or faute’ that haunts 
this reader may contrast the ‘“ideal reader” who arrives at a single truth’ or ‘final algorithm’, 
but like Barthes’s “scriptor” resembles the Holy Writer who accepts his scholarly role with 
humility (499; Lawrence 7).  
Barthes’s objection that ‘Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader’ 
as ‘for it, the writer is the only person in literature’, rhetorically exaggerates the disregard of 
the reader in the history of literary criticism (Image-Music-Text 148). This history is not only 
deliberately ambiguous as ‘classic’, but also suggests the danger of the reader’s comparable 
delimitation following the scrupulous scholarly quest to demarcate his position and delineate 
his role, despite the insistence that he is ‘simply that someone’. Rather than ‘dispersed in a 
plurality of possible positions and functions’, the ‘writing subject’ is confined to the function 
that the most influential reader or critic ascribes to it (Heath 39). The role of the philologist 
as it features in Joyce’s writing is neither “inevitable” for the modern artist nor an ideal to 
aspire to; the critic is not an antithesis of the Poet nor does the ideal union of the critical and 
the creative spirit give birth to the ideal artist. Following the death of author, however, the 
monopoly of the reader-critic has suppressed the various models of both authorship and 
readership in Joyce’s work, in favour of a position suggestive of sublimation rather than 
deconstruction. 
The ‘positions offered to the subject within language’ are locked up in philology. 
Symptomatic of this monopoly is that whereas the significance of Vico’s philosophy in 
Joyce’s poetics has been emphasised, that of Bruno who scathingly satirizes grammarians 
who draw ‘on the sap of words’, has largely been dismissed as simply structural (Cause, 
Principle, Unity 52). While Joyce’s reference to ‘a trellis’ is used to describe the significance 
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of Vico’s cycles in the Wake, MacCabe associates Joyce’s structural use of theories with 
Bruno’s philosophy: ‘Bruno is important insofar as he provides a philosophical trellis on 
which the philosophical and linguistic presuppositions of identity can be unpicked’ (New 
Perspectives 34). 2 ‘In 1903’, Rabaté argues, Joyce ‘was still intent on delineating Bruno's 
destruction of Aristotelian categories, and his heady ‘mysticism’ appealed to his sense of 
‘creative intoxication’ with a concept unifying the entire universe, rendering it available for 
creative digestion and regurgitation’; ‘Twenty years later’, however, ‘Vico’s convoluted 
puns have become the real text to be studied closely; Bruno is closer to a blurred memory; 
and monism can be seen as inverted dualism, as long as the preeminence of ‘indifference’ in 
the identity of the contraries is asserted’ (Joyce upon the Void 17). 
 
In order to disentangle this association of the significance of philosophy and 
philology in Joyce’s work with deconstructive premises, we must take a detour through the 
ruptures of history, and examine how Joyce understood and interpreted these concepts and 
their consequence for the role of the artist and the nature of his work. Philosophy is never 
allowed to stand on its own in Joyce’s work (a criticism that Joyce frequently directed 
towards contemporary writers, but was also accused of himself), and both the philosophical 
and the scholarly aspirations and theories of characters are frequently parodied and 
criticised. However, Joyce’s aspiring artists from Stephen Hero to Finnegans Wake assert the 
necessity for a philosophy, which moreover has or intends to have a “revolutionary” 
consequence. They are embroiled in the contradictions and antagonisms of philosophical 
traditions through the claim of these traditions to a vocabulary that they want to wrest for 
their art. Stephen’s explication of the meanings of truth, beauty and the good is an example 
of this need to “translate” philosophical concepts that are delimited not only through their 
philosophical implications, but also theological, historical, cultural, and in the context of 
Irish nationalism, political. These artists lack not only divine inspiration, but also a stable 
form of community that will receive, legitimize and preserve their work. It is a predicament 
of the modern author who feels in the midst of ‘heaps of dead language’ and lacks a living 
tradition, but also a specifically Irish predicament of a servant of the Catholic Church and 
England; and further in the case of Joyce, of the constrictions imposed by Irish nationalism 
and the Irish Literary Revival (P 193).  
The alienation, melancholy and theoretical predicament that distinguish Stephen as 
an artist, who as Wyndham Lewis remarked ‘does almost everything ‘wearily’’, was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In contrast, ‘What Vico’s theory offers is both an initial articulation of language, sexuality and 
society and, more importantly, a theory to oppose the dominant historicist accounts of history’ (New 
Perspectives 35). 
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avoided- or at least masked, by Joyce’s leading contemporary Irish artists and intellectuals 
united in the endeavour to stage a Revival of Irish culture, through their resurrection of the 
figure of the bard as a model for the modern artist (95). Inspired by a ‘tumultuous life’ and 
emblem of a collective memory, the bard held the promise of the revival of the nation’s 
divided, weary and bedimmed consciousness in his ability to effect a coincidence of the one 
with the many (Collected Works of W.B. Yeats Volume IX 348). Joyce, however, identified 
the metaphysical foundation of this desire for coincidence and exposed its theological, 
political and cultural exploitation. ‘The metaphysical desire’, as Levinas has argued, is 
insatiable: it ‘desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness - the 
Desired does not fulfil it, but deepens it’ (34). Positing, an artificial “whole” that would 
extinguish rather than quench this desire, most conspicuously in art through the ideal of 
beauty and in theology through the ideal of perfection, is presented as a precarious 
sublimation. 
As Finnegans Wake dramatises and deconstruction has highlighted, Joyce 
emphasises the inadequacy of language as a medium of expression to indicate the nature of 
this desire, which results in the renewal, however, rather than renouncement of metaphysical 
questions. But as the survey of Joyce’s early writing and Stephen’s theories will reveal, the 
allure of such metaphysical questions for Joyce springs not only from his interrogation of 
philosophical, theological, philological and political ideas and ideals, but also from his own 
early idealisation of the genre of drama and his delineation of a dramatic theory heavily 
influenced by German Romanticism as well as Naturalism. Drama indeed appears to hold the 
promise of resolving the ‘paradoxes of Joyce’s esthetics’ that are also, as Rabaté argues, 
‘esthetic paradoxes of egoism’ (Politics of Egoism 70-1). Insoluble esthetical but also ethical 
and metaphysical questions are repeatedly dramatised in an antagonism of forces that seek 
the annihilation of the individual whose refusal of sacrifice exposes the drama to be a farce; 
in Finnegans Wake, more convivially, a comedy. 
The bardic model is not dismissed in Joyce’s work; Joyce indeed brazenly presents 
himself as a modern Homer, but reconfigured through the Romantic Bard, Shakespeare. The 
question of authorship is approached through the accusations of forgery that have plagued 
both the modern and the ancient bard. Implicit in Joyce’s interpretation of the idea of 
authorship, the leading philological and critical debate and “myth” of Western culture, the 
“Homeric question”, that had for centuries divided the scholarly world in an interminable 
debate between the one bard and the many, moreover, further complicates the Irish debate on 
the identity and characteristics of the ideal national bard, and simultaneously opens new 
possibilities for the modern author. In contrast to the delimited representation of the role of 
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the bard in the Revival, Joyce reflects in his work and in his depiction of the role of the artist 
that the ancient bard ‘had been at once poet, musician, historian, and philosopher’, rather 
than simply a poet and performer (Thuente 57). Exploiting the popular appetite for scandal, 
gossip and what Yeats had called ‘The antagonist of imaginative writing in Ireland’- ‘our 
interest in matters of opinion’, Joyce turned to this protean personality, detectable only as ‘a 
hollow, shaky name’, according to Nietzsche, who referred to the law of gravity to highlight 
the difficulty of locating him (Explorations 197; Homer and Classical Philology 11). He 
deployed this polytropic figure as a commercial as well as a literary device to raise the 
interest in and of his work by appealing to an audience both erudite and “popular”, united in 
their common quest for the discovery of the “true Author”.  
In his staging of an almighty quest to answer what Nietzsche had called the 
‘question of the personality of Homer’ (‘Was the person created out of a conception, or the 
conception out of a person?’), Joyce criticised the narrow conception of personality that 
Yeats considered lost in modern literature (6, 11). Like Nietzsche, moreover, he highlighted 
‘both the insufficiency and the ineluctability of the subject (the philosophical category and 
fiction of the person)’, ‘against the modern and philological ‘quasi-demolition of this entity’ 
(Bishop 19). Examining and dramatising the idea of authorship through its historical, 
philosophical, philological, political and theological “mysteries”, the paradoxes of 
authorship did not only expose their metaphysical underpinnings, but also allowed Joyce to 
reinterpret the idea of authorship and the role of the author. 
‘Historia’, Gadamer argues referring to the humanist tradition of Vico, ‘is a source 
of truth totally different from theoretical reason. This is what Cicero meant when he called it 
the vita memoriae. It exists in its own right because human passions cannot be governed by 
the universal prescriptions of reason. In this sphere one needs, rather, convincing examples 
as only history can offer them’ (21). It is through this distinction which Gadamer ascribes to 
the study of history and distinguishes as most germane to the human sciences that the 
significance of various models of authorship in Joyce’s work will be explored, in an attempt 
to broach both the subject of authorship and the idea of ‘theory’ in our understanding and 
interpretation of works of art and the role of the artist. 
Through reference to the humanist tradition of Vico, but also to the schematism of 
Kant, Gadamer gives the example of the relation between a painter and his model, to define 
the artistic ‘model’ as ‘a disappearing schema’: ‘The relation to the original that served the 
painter must be effaced in the picture. […] The interpreter who reads works of literature in 
terms of their biographical or historical sources is sometimes no better than the art historian 
who examines the works of a painter in terms of his models’ (139). He explains the 
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consequence of this disappearance by emphasising the ‘occasionality’ of art; the work of art, 
he argues, ‘experiences a continued determination of its meaning from the “occasion” of its 
coming-to-presentation’ (141). The ‘models’ of authorship that will be examined and the 
detour through various traditions- critical, philosophical, theological and bardic, will be 
exemplary in this sense of a ‘disappearing schema’, while inquiring about ‘originals’ will 
allow the hermeneutic implications of the multifocal intersection of traditions in Joyce’s 
work to emerge.  
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Chapter 1: The Age of Criticism 
 
i. A blind patch in his mind: Joyce, Moore and the temperament of the artist 
 
The association of Joyce’s work with philosophy in the early reception of his work 
was rarely complementary; at best it was proffered as an apologetic. Having fallen away 
from the Romantic ideal of the philosophical poet of Shelley, the title “philosopher” bears 
the negative associations of the Aesthetic tradition of the Victorians in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The complex relation between art and philosophy in Joyce’s work was 
most compellingly addressed in a private review of Ulysses by one of Joyce’s compatriots 
and fellow author, George Moore. In a letter to Louis Gillet, he expressed his admiration of 
Gillet’s review of Ulysses in “La Revue de Deux Mondes”, which required on the part of 
Moore ‘thought and consideration and reading and re-reading to disentangle Joyce’s 
metaphysics’ (CH 566). Moore explains the meaning of his use of ‘metaphysics’ by 
distinguishing his own role as an artist from that of the metaphysician:  
 
I say metaphysics for Joyce’s book has nothing to do with art, nor yet science, so I 
suppose it must be metaphysics. Art is concerned with what the eye sees and not 
with the thinking mind. To the mind life is but the dreaming of a shade, but our 
actions arise from the belief that it is a great deal more than a shade and history will 
continue to be written notwithstanding Mr. Joyce’s protest. I am by temperament an 
artist, that is to say by temperament one who is interested in appearance; a 
metaphysician only in the belief that the appearance may be illuminated faintly by a 
moral conception, but oh so faintly! With Joyce it is just the opposite. There are no 
appearances in Joyce; it is all syllogism… I always heard of him in Dublin as one of 
the most garrulous of men. Now, he sits as silent as a mummy. […]  I received a 
primer explaining all the mysteries of Ulysses and learnt from it that when Bloom 
smokes a corpulent cigar the reader is obliged to think of the Greek wanderer who 
blinds Polyphemus with a fire-hardened stake. I wrote to Joyce telling him that up to 
the present I had looked upon myself as a competent judge of art and failing 
completely to discover the literary effect aimed at in the analogy of Bloom and his 
cigar and the wanderer’s fire-hardened stake, I concluded that one of us had a blind 
patch in his mind somewhere. Which of us it is would be an affectation for me to 
decide… (566) 
 
The theoretical drive in Joyce’s work, the fissure between symbol and meaning 
which the necessity of a ‘primer’ suggests, is interpreted by Moore as metaphysics. Famous 
for his portraits of Dublin artists, Moore depicts the transformation of a garrulous bard into 
an Aristotelian deity, silently thinking the world into existence. For the realist and painter 
George Moore, this obscure world of thought is philosophical rather than artistic. The 
sombre figure of Joyce betrays for Moore his alienation from the world. Deprived of his 
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ability to “judge” in a world ruled by a confused and gloomy scholastic deity, Moore regrets 
the detrimental effect on art and aesthetics of Joyce’s philosophy. 
 
 
ii. The Man of Letters: Joyce, Yeats and the cult of art 
 
In a letter to Stanislaus in 1905, Joyce had distinguished his role as an artist and the 
objectives of his art in remarkably similar terms with the contrast that Moore had drawn 
between his own work and Joyce’s. Protesting against the censorship and constrictions 
imposed upon his freedom to express himself as an artist by the tyrannical stronghold and 
intellectual and moral authority claimed by journalist critics and Celtic philologists upon the 
work of artists, Joyce relates to his brother how while out for a walk in Trieste, he broke out 
into a supplication to an obscure deity (‘O Vague Something behind Everything!’), 
requesting ‘a pen and an ink-bottle and some peace of mind’ in order to ‘write tiny little 
sentences about the people who betrayed me’ (Letters II 110). Mimicking Renan’s prayer to 
the Acropolis, his polemic invective is turned against the constrictions imposed on him by 
this deus ex machina in coercing him to perform pre-set roles: ‘Whoever the hell you are, I 
inform you that this [is] a poor comedy you expect me to play and I’m damned to hell if I’ll 
play it for you’. In a calmer mood he explains the characteristics of the role he assigns to 
himself:  
 
It is possible that the delusion I have with regard to my power to write will be killed 
by adverse circumstances. But the delusion which will never leave me is that I am an 
artist by temperament. Newman and Renan, for example, are excellent writers but 
they seem to have very little of the temperament I mean. Whereas Rimbaud, who is 
hardly a writer at all, has it. Of course Renan is an artist and must have the 
temperament but it is balanced by the temperament of a philo[lo]gist. Newman must 
have it too but balanced by the temperament of theologian. I am neither savant nor 
saint. (110) 
 
Like George Moore, he claims for himself an artistic ‘temperament’, which he 
distinguishes from the theological and philological temperaments of Newman and Renan. 
Neither scholar nor an inspired mouthpiece for the gods, he is the “pure artist”: ‘my nature is 
artistic and I cannot be happy so long as I try to stifle it’, he told his brother in a letter dated 
a few days earlier (107). His artistic temperament is disassociated from his competency as a 
reader and critic- as Moore’s is when he doubts his capacity to judge Joyce’s work, as he 
requests from his brother to read some English ‘realists’ for him: ‘I can read very little and 
am as dumb as a stockfish’ (111). His idea of what it means to be an artist precludes both a 
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scholarly and a theoretical aptitude, while his polemical engagement with his worldly 
adversaries and disparagement of metaphysical abstractions ground him firmly in reality. 
The role of the artist is critical and revelatory in a different sense. In the same letter, 
claiming originality in his choice of Dublin as the subject matter for his short stories, Joyce 
proclaims his surprise at having landed this role of innovator: ‘it seems strange that no artist 
has given it [Dublin] to the world’ (111). No doubt this would not please George Moore who 
with equal conceit described his own collection of short stories The Untilled Field in the 
preface of a new edition published on the same year as Dubliners, as ‘a landmark in Anglo-
Irish literature’ and ‘portrait of my own country’  (Roberts 305, 317). Indeed, the whole Irish 
Literary Movement is disregarded as Joyce nominates himself the first author of Dublin. 
What allows Joyce to claim this title is his characterisation of the audience that would 
receive this gift as ‘the world’. This presentation of Dublin, as he explains in a letter to a 
potential publisher dated the previous day, would not be ‘a collection of tourist impressions 
but an attempt to represent certain aspects of the life of one of the European capitals’ (Letters 
II 109). It would be a European Dublin, its world modern and cosmopolitan, rather than rural 
and antiquated. His audience would not be limited to a group of Irish intellectuals or the 
romanticised peasantry of the Revival, but would be anonymous, impersonal and 
international. An audience, however, implies participation; there would be no interaction 
between this god-like creator and the world, only a one-way bestowal.  
At stake here, as in Moore’s criticism of Joyce’s representation of life ‘as the 
dreaming of a shade’, is a complex understanding of “realism”. It relates not only to the 
literary tradition of realism (that profoundly influenced also Moore’s career as a writer), but 
also to the dramatic Naturalism of Ibsen, who Joyce singles out as a “heroic” artist, and to 
the philosophical context of Nietzschean and Fichtean ideas about truth and lies, freedom 
and necessity. In these traditions realism is understood not only as a mimesis of reality, but 
principally as an exposition of false ideologies. The artist must remain unencumbered by 
allegiances to particular traditions and philosophies, and maintain like a scientist an open 
mind to new discoveries, keeping a distance from the objects examined, in order ‘to give Art 
– by a pitiless method – all the precision of the physical sciences’, as Flaubert declared (qtd. 
by Baron 46). Like Flaubert’s ideal author, he must be detached ‘like God in the universe, 
present everywhere and visible nowhere’; however, the truth that art will expose will not be 
“metaphysical”, but resembling rather anatomical dissection, will deal with beings in the 
world (WD 248). 
Such an enterprise will be “heroic” and combative, free from moral and didactic 
constrictions, as the reference in the same letter to Lermontoff’s Hero of Our Days betrays. 
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Claiming a ‘likeness in the aim and in the title and at times in the acid treatment’ of this 
book to Dubliners, Joyce, with his characteristic superstitious fascination for coincidences, 
relates to his brother how the duel that takes place at the end of this book was repeated in 
real life and brought the end of Lermontoff (111). Joyce gleefully imagines a similar 
imitation of art by life in a quarrel with Gogarty. Life will imitate art, therefore, not to 
distance art from life as in the aesthetic tradition, but because art and life will share the same 
unfathomable mystery and exert the same powerful influence on their “actors”. A Wagnerian 
Necessity rather than a novelistic plot will compel the fate of events, as in tragedy inspiring 
“divine awe”. 
This heroic venture transforms the hermeneutics of art, in a subversion that appears 
hostile to the spirit of art. The notion of “aesthetics” understood through its Romantic and 
Victorian interpretations assumes negative connotations. The drive for truth is so demanding 
and requires such sacrifices that the quest for this ‘bonum arduum’, an Absolute Spirit, 
seems to turn even against art itself and claim with Plato and Hegel the supremacy of 
philosophy (SH 185). Reason and knowledge rule over the imagination; Joyce indeed 
repeatedly stressed the “weakness” of his imagination. 3 His aim as an artist is greater than 
merely delighting and entertaining his audience: ‘I seriously believe that you will retard the 
course of civilisation in Ireland by preventing the Irish people from having one good look at 
themselves in my nicely polished looking-glass’, he tells Grant Richards who would 
eventually publish Dubliners after nearly ten years of persistent objections (Letters I 64). 
The work of art would compel the spectator to both look through it and reflect upon it, and 
as in drama there would be a transformation at the end as a result of this experience- a 
recognition (anagnorisis). The Irish people would “recognise” themselves, in an 
Enlightenment call for “Sapere aude!”, for freedom through revolt against the tyranny of the 
authority of dogmas and institutions: ‘The points on which I have not yielded are the points 
which rivet the book together. If I eliminate them what becomes of the chapter of the moral 
history of my country? I fight to retain them because I believe that in composing my chapter 
of moral history in exactly the way I have composed it I have taken the first step towards the 
spiritual liberation of my country’, he declared to Grant Richards in response to a previous 
request for editing (62-3). In contrast to the cyclical patterning of history in Finnegans Wake, 
here history is seen as progress towards Enlightenment and the artist is the philosopher who 
will lead the way towards liberation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘My imagination is so weak that I am afraid all the things I was going to write about have become 
uncapturable images’, he complained to his brother in 1906, and regretfully remarked to Pound in 
1917, ‘Unfortunately, I have very little imagination’ (Letters II 202; I 101). 
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Artistic form and genre are questioned from the very beginning, as the looking-glass 
of art must be ‘polished’. Form must not obscure the “truth” communicated. Modern forms 
must be created, and going beyond Stephen’s delineation of his theory of genres, Joyce 
invents “new” artistic genres. The Dubliners stories are named ‘epicleti’, as the material 
“accidents” of the artist must be transformed through a spiritual invocation- an epiclesis, into 
the eternal body and soul, again without any encumberance on the part of the artist (55). 4 
These ‘epicleti’ would ‘betray the soul of that hemiplegia or paralysis which many consider 
a city’ (Letters I 55). 5 The artist is a mere translator; his task is the hermeneutic one of a 
scribe and scholar. He does not change the meaning, but allows it to be revealed in “common 
sense”. The artist is cast as a humble scholar, as a scribe simply “copying” the Word. But it 
is in this role of the scholar that according to Kant man has ‘complete freedom, even the 
calling, to communicate to the public all his carefully tested and well meaning thoughts’, as 
‘Caesar non est supra grammaticos’; through his learning he triumphs over authority (What 
is Enlightenment? 288, 290). 
As a man of letters he assumes a dignity, knowledge and proficiency which the artist 
lacks in the modern world, particularly in the Dublin sense of the “artist” according to 
Gogarty as ‘a quaint fellow or a great cod: a pleasant and unhypocritical poseur, one who 
sacrifices his own dignity for his friends’ diversion’ (WD 7-8). ‘I feel that I should be a man 
of letters but damn it haven’t the occasion yet’, Joyce told his brother in a letter in February 
1905, but feared even for the reputation of the man of letters, wondering in a letter in July of 
the same year whether ‘it is possible that, after all, men of letters are not more than 
entertainers’ (Letters II 83, 99). The significance of the ‘man of letters’, the relation of this 
philologist scribe and scholar, but also sage and custodian of culture to the ‘artistic 
temperament’, and further, the extent to which he might be called “philosophical”, will 
therefore need to be examined. 
Throughout the course of Joyce’s career, this man of letters repeatedly threatens to 
usurp the authority and dignity of the role of the artist, and the struggle significantly impacts 
on the hermeneutics of authorship. For Scholes and Kain, the ‘man of letters’ is not the artist: 
‘To call the Epiphany a “form” is perhaps to dignify it beyond Joyce’s intention, since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Even if these stories were in fact named ‘epiclets’- small epics, rather than ‘epicleti’, as some critics 
argue, it would still betray a dissatisfaction with form (see Fargnoli 2004). The detachment of the 
artist in this case however, would send us to Stephen’s Portrait genre theory and the relation between 
artist and audience in epics, where Stephen says there is mediation between the two. His familiarity, 
however, with the Eastern Orthodox liturgical term ‘epiclesis’ can be supported by his confession to 
his brother that the English teacher at the Berlitz school ‘says I will die a Catholic because I am 
always moping in and out of the Greek Churches and am a believer at heart’ (Letters II 90). This letter 
is admittedly dated a year later than the letter describing the stories as epicleti. 
5 Italics my own. 
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Stephen believed that “it was for the man of letters to record these Epiphanies with extreme 
care”, indicating that this was not a matter of artistic creation but only of apprehension and 
recording – to be done not by an artist, necessarily, but by “the man of letters”’ (3). This 
indeed seems to be confirmed by the declaration of Joyce in the letter to his brother that he is 
‘neither savant nor saint’.  
 
The distinction between the artist and the man of letters is further confirmed in 
another dialogue between Joyce and one of the most distinguished men of letters in Dublin at 
the time Joyce was mapping out his artistic career, W.B. Yeats. Yeats’s account of his 
introductory meeting with Joyce, published by Richard Ellmann in 1950, highlights the 
prominence, urgency and controversy surrounding the question of what it meant to be an 
artist in the beginning of the twentieth century in Ireland. Yeats himself was a key figure in 
this debate, and is famous for his experimentation with various artistic “roles”. A poet, a 
dramatist, an exponent of the Irish literary Revival, an organizer of literary societies, a 
founder of the Abbey Theatre, a hermeticist, a magician, a bard, a folklorist and a 
troubadour, are only some of the titles he laid claim to. The diversity and complexity of his 
interpretation of the artist’s role had a profound influence on Joyce’s own interpretation(s) 
(and parody) of this role. In Yeats’s description of the first meeting between the two great 
Irishmen, however, Joyce’s response to Yeats’s perception of the role of the artist was 
negative and dismissive, and his dismissal was founded on a distinction between the “man of 
letters” and the artist. Moreover, the criticism of Joyce’s “metaphysical” interpretation of the 
role of the artist by George Moore in 1931, was a few decades earlier implicit in Yeats’s first 
impressions of Joyce.  
Yeats’s account of their encounter begins with his regret over the public perception 
of his image and role in the Dublin press: ‘I was wondering how long I should be thought a 
preacher of reckless opinions and a disturber who carries in his hand the irresponsible torch 
of vain youth’ (Ellmann, “Joyce and Yeats” 624). His intellectual allegiances had made him 
an outcast in a society with strict moral codes. Instead of a great orator and leader of an 
intellectual, cultural, national and political movement which seeks to unify and give an 
identity to this society, he is seen instead as a “heretic”: he creates ruptures in the social 
fabric, dividing the young generation from the old. He is a preacher to an indifferent 
audience; Stephen Dedalus’s ideal ‘church without worshippers’ is for him a grim reality (P 
172). Like his great visionaries Robartes and Aherne, he is an outcast and martyr as his 
spiritual allegiances run counter to the ideals promoted by ‘those enemies of life, the 
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chimeras of the Pulpit and the Press’, who challenge the artist’s position at the centre of 
culture (Explorations 119).    
He follows this regretful realisation with an example of an encounter with one of 
these vain youths who appeared to him epiphanically, as Joyce had to George Russell: ‘Yes, I 
recollected his name, for he had been to my friend who leads an even more reckless 
rebellion than I do, and had kept him up to the grey hours of the morning discussing 
philosophy’ (Ellmann 624). 6 The Irish artists, at least those in Yeats’s circle, are shown to 
lead a spectral and underground existence on the periphery of established culture and 
society; although Yeats’s position is here shown to be ambivalent, as he is not quite hermitic 
or hermetic enough. His ambivalence towards the mystical beliefs of this group was 
registered in his essay on Shelley in Ideas of Good and Evil in terms of his own ideal relation 
between poetry and philosophy, which the volume of essays as a whole tries to negotiate 
with great irresoluteness: ‘When I was a boy in Dublin I was one of a group who rented a 
room in a mean street to discuss philosophy. My fellow-students got more and more 
interested in certain modern schools of mystical belief, and I never found anybody to share 
my one unshakable belief. I thought that whatever of philosophy has been made poetry is 
alone permanent, and that one should begin to arrange it in some regular order, rejecting 
nothing as the make-believe of the poets’ (90). Yeats, like Moore and Joyce, distinguished 
his role as an artist through his unqualified homage to art, and for him too this ‘belief’ 
marked his role as an artist and the nature of his art.  
Allegiance to or abstinence from philosophical ideas defined in many ways the 
literary scene in Dublin in the beginning of the century. Yeats himself was poised between 
this mystical philosophical group and the Revival’s bardic endeavour to inspire and be 
inspired by the mythical folk imagination, but also between a private and a public role. The 
contest between reason and imagination, moreover, is intensified as the mythical world of 
ancient Ireland does not only claim the primacy of the imagination over the reasoning 
faculty, but demands forgetfulness; it does not only entail a “metaphysical” or scholarly 
effort to “remember” the past, but also the repression of history and its analysis through art 
and philosophy. The mythical world demands the poet’s surrender to the claims of tradition, 
in contrast to the detached “scientific” interrogation of philosophy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The impression Joyce made on this famous Irish mystic is reflected in a letter addressed to the 
Dublin artist Sarah Purser by Russell on the 15th of August 1902: ‘I expect to see my young genius on 
Monday and will find out more about him. I wouldn’t be his Messiah for a thousand million pounds. 
He would be always criticising the bad taste of his deity’ (Letters I, 13). 
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In order to reclaim the critical authority of the artist, Yeats turns in “The Symbolism 
of Poetry” to the tradition of German Romanticism that had reconciled poetry and 
philosophy and enabled Shelley to place the ‘civic crown’ on the heads of poets (94). 
Amending Goethe’s aphorism, ‘a poet needs all philosophy, but he must keep it out of his 
work’ by adding ‘though that is not always necessary; and certainly he cannot know too 
much’, he denounces once again journalists who threaten the authority of the role of the 
artist (239). These newspaper critics paint a romanticized but also crude portrait of the artist 
as genius based on a misguided historical reconstruction of Shakespeare’s time through 
‘formulas and generalizations’ heard in ‘comfortable dinner-tables’, in order to claim that the 
true artist does not theorize about art: ‘no one, who had a philosophy of his art or a theory of 
how he should write, has ever made a work of art, that people have no imagination who do 
not write without forethought and afterthought as he writes his own articles’ (238). The 
journalist will indeed emerge in Ulysses as the “antithesis” of the artist. 
To vindicate the doubtful ‘poet’s right to exist’ in modernity, Yeats proffers Wilde’s 
argument on the supremacy of criticism (supported also through reference to Goethe) and his 
dissolution of the antithesis between the creative and critical faculties, in order to contrast 
the ideological autonomy of Ireland to England ‘where journalists are more powerful and 
ideas less plentiful than elsewhere’ (1; 239). As in Kant and the German Romantic tradition 
that he influenced, moreover, philosophy is made synonymous with critique: ‘All writers, all 
artists of any kind, in so far as they have had any philosophical or critical power, perhaps 
just insofar as they have been deliberate artists at all, have had some philosophy, some 
criticism of their art’ (239-40). The continental heritage of Symbolism, although like myth 
dependent on the cryptic “symbol”, reminds Yeats of the significance of the critical force of 
art. 
In Yeats’s account of his encounter with Joyce, this critical force is shown to be 
discredited by his successor. Following Yeats’s invitation to a restaurant, Joyce read to him 
some of his verses which Yeats describes sympathetically as ‘a beautiful though immature 
and eccentric harmony of little prose descriptions and meditations’ (Ellmann 624). To 
Yeats’s surprise, Joyce, we are told, responded by claiming impudently that it made no 
difference to him if he liked them or not. As well as being an example of youthful arrogance, 
there are many instances of Joyce’s dismissal of the value of criticism throughout his career, 
which appear to manifest his ‘anti-intellectualism’ (Block 174). He repeatedly stressed that 
he was a ‘bad critic’, presumptuously advised Grant Richards in 1906 to ‘Buy two critics’ to 
make Dubliners appealing to the public, and repeated in his early essays that drama 
‘transcends criticism’ and that ‘it is doubtful if any good purpose can be served by 
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attempting to criticise it’ (Ellmann 488; Letters I 101; Letters II 140; OCPW 26, 48). 
Particularly when faced with one of ‘the world’s great men’ like Ibsen, criticism ‘can make 
but a feeble show’: ‘Appreciation, harkening is the only true criticism’ (48). 
 In response to Yeats’s ‘Appreciation’ and ‘harkening’ however, Joyce listed his 
own scathing assessment of Yeats’s work: ‘Why had I concerned myself with politics, with 
folklore, with the historical setting of events and so on? Above all why had I written about 
ideas, why had I condescended to make generalizations? These things were all the sign of 
the cooling of the iron, of the fading out of inspiration’ (625). ‘Formulas and generalizations’ 
are not made by poets, Joyce appears to agree with the journalists. Moreover, Yeats’s efforts 
to create a “popular” culture and tradition were censured by this vain youth. Yeats is cast as 
a political exponent, folklorist, historian, and philosopher, while Joyce is shown to reserve 
for himself the ideal of an aloof inspired genius, as described also by Russell. This 
impression was confirmed for Yeats when Joyce proclaimed to him that ‘his own little book 
owed nothing to anything but his own mind which was much nearer to God than folklore’ 
(625). As the unsuspecting reader of Stephen Dedalus’ theories might conjecture, Yeats 
thinks that he is in the presence of a hubristic theologian: ‘He is from the Royal University, I 
thought, and he thinks that everything has been settled by Thomas Aquinas, so we need not 
trouble about it’ (625). Yeats too surmised that for Joyce philosophical ideas had been 
settled metaphysically, and that he was a representative of dogmatic institutions; but when 
Joyce mentioned his regret about Aubrey Beardsley’s conversion to Catholicism before his 
death, he saw in Joyce a fellow heretic. 
In his defence, Yeats presented Joyce with a lengthy exposition of ‘the dependence 
of all good art on popular tradition’: the superiority of folk imagination full of ‘endless 
images’ to the ‘world of ideas pure and simple’ of the individual artist, the civilization of the 
country to that of the town (625-6). The plight of the artist in modernity and the idea of 
tradition in modern society were for Yeats linked to a problem of community- the lack of 
any community in the towns. In towns there are ‘a few highly cultivated, highly perfected 
individual lives’ grossly imitated by uncultivated ‘multitudes’ who ‘cheapen them’, whereas 
in the country there are instead ‘what old writers used to call the people’. In the towns the 
multitudes are distinguished by their technical proficiency in a world of mechanical 
reproduction- by their ingenuous ‘capacity for doing all kinds of things’, whereas in the 
country the people are endowed with an ingenious imagination and possess the art of telling 
tales. The artist is in danger of becoming a mere “craftsman”, a “producer” like Benjamin 
prophesied, with this emphasis on “techne” rather than “episteme” (“The Author as 
Producer”).  
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The “aesthetic” problem for Yeats is linked to a fall from nature, tradition and 
community which gave birth to the great national artists and art ‘of Homer, and of 
Shakespeare, and of Chartres Cathedral’, into the ‘ugliness of the modern world’ (626). 
Yeats laments the fragmentation and loss of tradition, whereas Joyce, through his emphasis 
on the supremacy of the illustrious ‘individual mind’, rejects the influence of tradition 
altogether. The artist’s role is modelled on a Godlike ex nihilo creativity rather than the 
national bard’s dependence on community and tradition. Joyce’s response to Yeats’s fervent 
apology distances the artist from his role as a custodian of culture and from the scholar’s 
dedication to the analysis and preservation of tradition: ‘I looked at my young man. I 
thought, “I have conquered him now,” but I was quite wrong. He merely said, 
“Generalizations aren't made by poets; they are made by men of letters. They are no use”’ 
(626). This ‘man of letters’, however, is not the dilettantish journalist; by warning Yeats 
against the danger of becoming a ‘man of letters’ following Yeats’s dualist analysis of 
culture, Joyce is implying that he has been seduced by the role of the sage. The most 
contemporary historical manifestation of this wise man was the Victorian cultured scholar 
and public spokesman who was guardian and apostle of nationality and civilisation, and who 
under the guise of detachment, impassivity and asceticism concealed moral, racial, 
nationalist and ethnological generalisations, and created a religion of art. 
This role is not philosophical or critical in a radical sense, as the man of letters 
consolidates his ideas with the ideologies of institutional and state structures and absorbs 
their authority to enhance his role in society and the value of his art. The struggle for the 
autonomy of both literature and philosophy had been fought in Germany and France by 
Romantic writers who cast doubt on the idea of an aristocratic republic of letters, while in 
Britain the Kantian method of philosophy as “critique” was introduced by Coleridge who 
exhorted the writer in Biographia Literaria to ‘be not merely a man of letters! Let literature 
be an honourable augmentation to your arms; but not constitute the coat, or fill the 
escutcheon!’ (138). According to Jon Klancher, ‘understanding modernity as a process of 
differentiation entailed forging an idea of ‘vocation’ distinct from the market-based ‘man of 
letters’ who was fast losing whatever philosophical credentials he had acquired in the mid-
eighteenth century’ (M. Brown ed. 315). In Victorian society, however, the isolation of the 
artist was viewed with suspicion, and the conflict ‘between the public conscience of the man 
of letters who comes forward as the accredited literary spokesman of his world, and the 
private conscience of the artist who conceives that his highest allegiance must be to his own 
aesthetic sensibilities’ was dramatised in both literature and the press (Johnson ix-x). 
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In the beginning of the twentieth century this conflict was still very much in 
existence and was polarised between the examples of the figures of Arnold and Wilde, as the 
extremes of a nationalistic and individualistic impulse respectively. The great modernist men 
of letters Eliot and Pound found a solution in the doctrine of impersonality, while nation and 
culture were transfigured into a universal and transhistorical “tradition”. It is indeed the 
overwhelming endeavour to interpret this term that differentiates modernist writers from 
their predecessors, and their interpretation and positioning in relation to this term transforms 
in turn the idea of authorship. In modern philosophy too there was a concomitant reaction, 
with Nietzsche at the close of the nineteenth century calling for a ‘Revaluation of all 
values!’, and Heidegger at the outset of the twentieth urging the necessity of the 
investigation of our “prejudices”- the ‘sclerotic’ tradition that has ‘ensnared’ Dasein 
(Twilight of the Idols 199; Heidegger 42, 66, 65). The endeavour threatened the very 
legitimacy of both art and philosophy, and it is in his sense of the gravity and precariousness 
of this struggle - but also its creative and parodic possibilities - that distinguishes Joyce as a 
modern writer and reflects his philosophical and historical understanding of art and of the 
concept of modernity. 
Yeats was keenly aware of the Victorian artist’s conflict and of his perception by the 
public as a man of letters rather than poet in his efforts to revive Irish culture, but felt that the 
situation in Ireland demanded the creation of such a republic of letters. 7 It is in defiance of 
this republic, created as an alternative to Victorian culture, but seen by Joyce as repeating 
some of its worst offences, particularly in their shared emphasis on morality and 
ethnography, that Joyce maps out his career as a writer. The ghost of Arnold appears in 
“Telemachus”, a chapter swamped by the ideals of Hellenism and the Celtic Revival, 
masked as a gardener of the “Untilled Field” of Irish culture; but the ghost of Shakespeare in 
“Scylla and Charybdis” will proffer through Wilde’s deviant critical paradigm and 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In an early letter to Joyce offering him again his praise and guidance, Yeats tells Joyce that ‘The 
work which you have actually done is very remarkable for a man of your age who has lived away 
from the vital intellectual centres’ (Letters II 13). 
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iii. The quest for certitude: the artist and ‘what is called modern philosophy’ 
 
In his denunciation of this model of the author as a man of letters, Joyce reserves for 
himself a more critical philosophical model that aims to transcend the impediments of 
tradition. The ‘cooling of the iron’ is not only synonymous to ‘the fading out of inspiration’, 
but is also a warning against complacency: ‘The iron hand crush’d the Tyrant's head / And 
became a Tyrant in his stead’ (Blake, “The Grey Monk”). Joyce censures Yeats’s docility, 
his uncritical acceptance of tradition and imitation of ‘popular poetry’. The scientific 
language that Joyce uses to describe his art: the ‘nicely polished looking-glass’, the ‘style of 
scrupulous meanness’, the ‘lancet’ of Stephen’s art, his ‘struggle against conventions’ and 
concern voiced to his brother ‘Is it possible that, after all, men of letters are not more than 
entertainers?’, cast him in the role of an Enlightenment philosopher striving for truth in a 
battle against ‘old idols’ (Letters I 64; U 6; Letters II 134, 99, 187). 
These are of course characteristics of the literary traditions of realism and 
naturalism, but it is in his understanding of the philosophical foundations of modernity and 
its link to the ideal of freedom that Joyce distinguishes both his role as an artist and the 
nature of his art. 8 His critical theories regulate and define the yet uncreated art of his heroes 
(and his own) in terms of philosophical rules and ideas, and distinguish his “aesthetic” from 
the ineptly or inaptly formed art of his contemporaries. Most conspicuously in his early 
years, this philosophical tradition enables him to assume a polemical and sceptical stance, 
but also to scrutinize his role and his art, and recognise, dramatise and satirise his and others’ 
predicament as modern artists. Although his admiration of the dramatist Ibsen is most 
pronounced during this period, it is predominantly through figures of philosophers, 
enactment of philosophical postures and embodiment of philosophical ideas that Joyce and 
his artist-heroes distinguish their position. 
The era of the Enlightenment has a distinct significance for the Irish artist, as 
although individual Irish thinkers played a pivotal role in the debates that marked this era, its 
defining philosophical, political, economic, social and cultural movements and ideas were 
conspicuous in their absence in Ireland, as scientific investigations were being pursued 
through ‘The cracked looking-glass of a servant’ (U 6). As the situation is dramatized by the 
young Joyce, the artist must not only revolt against romanticism and bourgeois society like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 ‘[T]he issue of modernity originally came to be not so much a cultural or social or political but a 
philosophical problem’ (Pippin 8). This distinction would be inadmissible in the work of Joyce as 
modernity is not a single historical event of the past, but a constant process that requires perpetual 
renegotiation. Joyce understood moreover that there were many “modernities” with an 
overdetermined series of causes. Nevertheless, philosophical ideas and problems are definitive in 
Joyce’s interpretation of the notion of modernity.   
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the French and English realist writers, but must inaugurate an enlightenment revolution 
which gave birth to that society and precipitated the Romantic movement that was both its 
continuation and its antithesis. In the exclusion of Ireland from this ‘feast of the world's 
culture’, ‘The Irish proletariat’ that would generate a counter-revolution, ‘has yet to be 
created’ (P 194; Letters II 187). The Romantic Mangan is portrayed by Joyce as a victim of 
this exclusion; he inherits ‘a legend’ which he accepts ‘with all its griefs and failures’, 
unable to revise it, having to rely simply on a swelled imagination (OCPW 58). 
Joyce identifies the need for an insurgence against the forces and authorities which 
denied the Irish subject, and more specifically the Irish artist, spiritual, political, 
philosophical and literary enlightenment. This ostracism that prohibited the Irish subject to 
develop as an individual and understand the progress of continental literary and 
philosophical movements, left them, as Joyce described George Moore and Edward Martyn, 
‘struggling in the backwash of that tide which has advanced from Flaubert through Jakobsen 
to D’Annunzio [sic]’ (51). The ‘two masters’, Britain and the Catholic Church, were the 
ideological, political and geographical barriers to Ireland’s access to the political, 
philosophical and literary revolutions of the continent (U 24). The ideas that did reach 
Ireland, reached her “secondhand”; filtered through English culture, but also as the figure of 
Mulligan betrays, tainted by Nietzsche’s violent counter-Enlightenment.  
The return to the Enlightenment era and its ideas ‘in the original’, however, is 
untenable, precarious, regressive and idealistic (U 3). The genealogical endeavour will 
identify in Ulysses its resemblance to the archaeology and anachronisms of the Revival, and 
the search for “origins” will itself be questioned. The overbearing character of Mulligan will 
betray that radical critique and ‘ineradicable egoism’ suggest after Nietzsche a “will to 
power”- the inflated individual as “superman” (SH 39). Having reached what Habermas calls 
the ‘peripeteia or turning point’ of ‘the drama of Enlightenment’, ‘the critique of ideology 
itself is suspected of no longer producing truths’; the meaning of critique changes: ‘For 
Nietzsche the only legitimate meaning of critique is that of the value judgment which 
establishes a hierarchy, weighs things, and measures the powers with which they are 
endowed. All interpretation is valuation: the “Yes” expresses esteem, the “No” expresses 
contempt’ (27; The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment 20, 25). 
The consequence of the questioning of the notion of “judgement” and the re-
interpretation of the idea of criticism and philosophy instigated by this age is dramatized in 
Joyce’s work, and is significant for Joyce’s interpretation of the role of the artist and the 
nature of his art. Aesthetic and more generally philosophical problems and questions inhibit 
Stephen from being an artist at all. Far from criticism being ‘superfluous’, the critical 
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impulse is simultaneously all-consuming (OCPW 48). In all of his appearances in Joyce’s 
work, Stephen casts himself in the role of a spectator, a theoros rather than a creative artist. 
If this is part of a revolt against the idea of the Romantic inspired genius, it is an extreme 
stance and detrimental for his art. Moreover, from Stephen Hero to Ulysses, this 
philosophical stance undergoes significant transformation. The polemicist and ‘heaven-
ascending essayist’ of Stephen Hero becomes dramatically more passive in the Portrait, 
before turning into an involuntary performer of his own sceptical and doubtful theories in 
Ulysses (85). 
Following his expulsion of metaphysics, prejudice and tyrannical Authorities, the 
quest for truth, certainty and freedom of the young Joyce and Stephen of Stephen Hero is 
suffused with the spirit of the Enlightenment. Philosophy and criticism are synonymous for 
the Enlightenment intellectual. The philosopher is truly a critic in this period; criticism is not 
however moralistic or didactic, but implies above all the autonomous use of reason and 
emancipation from traditional structures of signification: ‘The eighteenth century is very 
fond of calling itself the “century of philosophy”, but it is not less fond of calling itself the 
“century of criticism”’, Cassirer explains; ‘The two phrases are only different expressions of 
the same situation, intended to characterize from diverse angles the fundamental intellectual 
energy which permeates the era to which it owes its great trends of thought’ (Philosophy of 
the Enlightenment 275). Knowledge is not acquired ‘with the aid of the lantern of tradition’, 
as Stephen cautions in Stephen Hero; ‘The function of criticism, people say, is to educate 
one's readers! Whoever wants to be educated, let him educate himself. This is rude: but it 
can't be helped’, declares Schlegel with similar defiance (SH 190; 153). 
The humanist’s reverence for the incontestable authority of great authors that 
guarantees the unity of culture is subverted by the scientific ambition of the Enlightenment 
philosopher: ‘The structure of the cosmos is no longer merely to be looked at, but to be 
penetrated’ (Cassirer 8). The idea of “theory” is transformed into “method”, as the man of 
letters is not content to be a mere spectator; in order to be more than entertainer, he must 
assume a more rigorous, “scientific” approach. He must “transmute” ‘the weapons of the 
prosecution against his accuser’ as Giordano Bruno is shown to have done, in order to 
expose the ‘ill-written, morally obtuse formless caricature’ that is contemporary Irish 
writing, but also awaken an ‘indifferent public’ (OCPW 188; Letters II 98-99, 134). His 
allegiance must lie on the side of truth: ‘he is a very bold man who dares to alter in the 
presentment, still more to deform, whatever he has seen or heard’, Joyce warned Grant 
Richards. 
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The ambivalent status of the man of letters in Joyce’s letters and works that seems to 
be both denounced and upheld as an ideal the artist must aspire to, can therefore be 
interpreted as exemplary insofar as it reflects the demand for self-knowledge and self-
cultivation, which is one of the trademarks of the Enlightenment. The individual ‘Mind of 
the Enlightenment’ becomes itself sublime: ‘For this age, knowledge is its own activity, 
intellectual examination, and foresight are the proper function and essential task of thought’ 
(Cassirer 4). The ‘unity and immutability of reason’ of Enlightenment thought entails an 
egoistic element which is both cause and consequence of its approach (4-5). This is indeed 
the principal charge laid against the Enlightenment- ‘the absence of genuine otherness’ 
(Dupré 15). Whereas ‘For ancient and for most medieval thinkers, reason had involved a 
dialectical relation between the universal and the particular’, the Enlightenment mind is 
characterised by its infinitude (15). 
Cassirer’s interpretation of the mind of this age highlights, however, an element that 
links it to its Romantic successors. The quest for knowledge in this age is not only 
“scientific”, but has also a psychological and an aesthetic dimension, insofar as the self-
centred delight of thought with ‘the form of the process’ rather than its results, entails what 
will come to represent for the Romantics the utmost freedom in the aesthetic education of 
man, the element of play (5). As one of Kant’s most enthusiastic followers, Schiller, 
explains, ‘In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred empire of laws, 
the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a third and a joyous realm, that of play and 
of the appearance, where she emancipates man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all 
that is named constraint, whether physical or moral’ (C. Eliot 310). This Romantic trinity 
appears in Joyce’s criticism of Mangan, where the idea and quest for truth is examined 
through a different temperament. 
Analysis begins with the characteristics and genesis of this temperament, as the self-
legitimating subject requires psychology to play a pivotal role in its epistemology. The 
vindication, preservation and expression of the ego is the overriding objective of Joyce’s 
artist-heroes - above even the creation of art - and characterises Joyce’s early declarations on 
his role as an artist: ‘The struggle against conventions in which I am at present involved was 
not entered into by me so much as a protest against these conventions as with the intention of 
living in conformity with my moral nature’ (Letters II 99). Morality does not have a social 
function but rather sanctions the self-determination of the subject. The trope of the 
Incarnation dramatises the role of the author; his organic relation to his work makes his role 
vital for the life of the work, and the emphasis on psychology heightens the sense of his 
significance. The subject, the artistic subject in particular, therefore comes under pressure to 
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accommodate an expanding web of relations and divisions that it is called upon to embody 
and represent.  
 
 
iv. A mind like Spinoza: Joyce, Synge and the posture of the philosopher 
 
Joyce was delighted in March 1903 to discover that he had come to embody the 
revolutionary and critical spirit of this philosophical modernity through one of its key 
figures. He proudly announced to his brother the impression he had made on Synge: ‘I told 
him part of my esthetic: he says I have a mind like Spinoza’; and he was keen to find out 
how his brother perceived his role: ‘Tell me what you think of all this’ (Letters II 35). The 
request was repeated a few days later to his mother: ‘You will oblige me very much if you 
will write to me and tell what you think of me’, after announcing to her with greater 
enthusiasm Synge’s presentiment: ‘Synge was over here selling out and gave me his play to 
read – a play which is to be produced by the Irish Literary Theatre. I criticised it. Synge says 
I have a mind like Spinoza! (Spinoza was a great Hebrew philosopher)’ (35, 38). 
But Spinoza certainly had no ‘esthetic’, and so Joyce’s “wonder” at Synge’s 
evaluation is understandable. The fact that his esthetic reminds Synge of Spinoza must 
therefore say something about both or either the nature of the esthetic and the manner of its 
presentation and character of the young philosopher. Thinking of Joyce’s esthetic in terms of 
a Spinozian Ethics is perhaps surprising, as criticism has been on its guard about discussing 
moral ideas in relation to Joyce’s work, particularly in the wake of deconstruction’s 
(anti)hermeneutic authority over the Joycean corpus that has emphasised the “mystical” 
ethics of Joyce- an Other that is either ‘transcendent’ or the Reader (Rabaté, Politics of 
Egoism 122). 9  However, an ethical commitment that has a political resonance is apparent in 
Joyce’s early years in his mission to compose a ‘moral history’ and concern about 
compromising his ‘moral nature’ (Letters I 63; II 134, 99).  
Synge’s verdict on Joyce’s redefinitions of desire, beauty, the good, pity, terror, joy, 
proper and improper art, has been overlooked by critics who have instead associated the 
esthetic theory with German Romanticism, Aestheticism and a misguided interpretation of 
Aristotle and Aquinas to negatively characterise Stephen Dedalus. However, as Synge’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rabaté examines Joycean ethics in terms of an ‘“othering process”’ that he argues ‘has replaced the 
issue of authority’, but the relation it establishes is ‘silent’: ‘Like Wittgenstein, Joyce tends to affirm 
the salvation of ethics through silence, since with the loss of any metalanguage, one can only show, 
not enunciate, the possibility of direct action or of mythical contemplation’ (Authorized Reader 11, 
46). Marian Eide has examined the Ethical Joyce through Derrida’s dialogue with Levinas, 
highlighting also, however, the difference of Joyce’s ethics from their modern theories. 
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association of Joyce with the figure of Spinoza reveals, Joyce’s theory has also links with the 
Enlightenment tradition – with rationalism, monism, universalism, the methodological model 
of the natural sciences, emphasis on perception, reflection and sensation, and the prominence 
of ethical questions. The influence of this tradition can be seen in the holism of Joyce’s 
genre theory whereby each genre “proceeds” from one genre to another forming ideal 
“wholes” between the author and his work, his definition of rhythm as a ‘first or formal 
relation of part to part in any whole or of a whole to its part or parts, or of any part to the 
whole of which it is a part’, the organic relation between art and nature (‘the artistic process 
is like the natural process’), the task of setting up universal rules as a standard of appropriate 
reaction and inaction (“stasis”) on the premise of art being a ‘human disposition’, the 
intellectual bias of this theory whereby contemplative thought in a state of ‘rest’ is privileged 
in the ‘arrest’ of desire and loathing for an accurate ‘apprehension’ of art (WD 54, 53). It was 
indeed the Enlightenment that gave birth to “aesthetics”, as Hegel notes, and Joyce seems to 
use the term with the same apprehensiveness as Hegel who complains that the term ‘means 
more precisely the science of sensation or feeling’ and wishes it to designate instead ‘the 
‘Philosophy of Art’, or, more definitely, ‘Philosophy of Fine Art’’ (Aesthetics 3). 
Joyce was clearly delighted with the name, role and characteristics ascribed to him, 
and indeed he regularly assumed the posture of a freethinker: ‘Gogarty wrote to me a day or 
two [ago] and tells me that ‘John Eglinton’ said the other day (Stannie will tell you who he 
is) ‘There is something sublime in Joyce’s standing alone’’ (35). Rationalist philosophers 
like Spinoza as Maritain portrays them,  
 
are of opinion that truth is easy to attain, and therefore undertake to bring all things 
within the compass of reason, a human reason which has no need to submit humbly 
and patiently to discipline, whether of reality itself, a teacher, or a God. In the first 
case they tend to subjectivism, which takes as its criterion of truth the knowing 
subject, not the object to be known; a position which is the dissolution of knowledge. 
In the second they tend to individualism, which calls upon each philosopher to work 
out a philosophy entirely his own, and create an original and novel view of the 
universe (Weltanschauung). In the third, they tend to naturalism, which claims to 
attain to a perfect wisdom by the unassisted powers of nature, and rejects all divine 
teaching’ (Introduction to Philosophy 182-3).  
 
It is easy to see how these negatively portrayed traits would have delighted Joyce as they 
succinctly summarize the characteristics of his work and character(s) during his early years. 
Famous for his zealous and indefatigable commitment to his work, the attainment of truth 
was not exactly “easy” for Spinoza, but it was accessible to mankind. Divine revelation is 
shown to be made possible with man: ‘Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in 
itself and partakes of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form notions 
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explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it follows that we may rightly assert 
the nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary cause of 
Divine revelation’ (13). This mind too ‘was much nearer to God’ (Ellmann 624). 
The calculation of the distance between man and God is a subject of intense 
preoccupation for the aspiring artist Stephen Dedalus whose confusion of ‘a possibility of 
ever approaching nearer’ with ‘a possibility of ever reaching’ God leads to his accusation of 
heresy (P 83). Joyce could indeed see in Spinoza not only a great philosopher, but also a 
great “heretic”; Spinoza was not only Jewish, but had been excommunicated, and later in his 
life even pronounced - perhaps for the first time in the history of modern philosophy - the 
“death of the Author”. As a Hebrew scholar, he set out in Tractatus Theologico-Politicus a 
radical exegetical principle that would outrage even postmodern critical theory: ‘the 
intention of the author(s)’ (Dupré 232). 
Having defined the mind as the locus of divine revelation, Spinoza presents this as a 
principle of literary exegesis: ‘Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from 
Scripture; for what can we affirm about matters transcending our knowledge except what is 
told us by the words or writings of prophets? And since there are, so far as I know, no 
prophets now alive, we have no alternative but to read the books of prophets departed, taking 
care the while not to reason from metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they 
do not themselves distinctly state’ (13-14). For Spinoza as for Stephen Dedalus, history is a 
“nightmare”; delimited by the individuality and prejudices of the figure of the historical 
author who interposes between the reader and God, ‘we have no alternative’ in our want of 
prophets but to try to understand the incomprehensible historically. 
For the philosopher history is an enemy of reason: ‘For Mendelssohn and typical 
Enlightenment philosophy as [Spinoza] embodies it, it remained to the last inconceivable 
that the attainment of the highest human goal could be entrusted to so unreliable a guide as 
history with all its irrationalities, its constant vacillations and errors’ (Cassirer, Symbolic 
Forms 195). The heresy of Stephen Dedalus follows his awareness of his carnal desires and 
enchainment to historical reality: ‘He was conscious of failure and of detection, of the 
squalor of his own mind and home, and felt against his neck the raw edge of his turned and 
jagged collar’ (P 83). The mind of the author is distinguished from the mind of the Author; 
the human author is a cause of heretical contamination, deception and disguise. Analysis of 
the Bible with the aid of this scientific method and emphasis on the historicity of its authors 
exposes the implausibility of their authenticity and “reality”, and ultimately undermines the 
authority of Scripture. Whereas ancient and medieval exegetes had excused the sinful nature 
of these authors by claiming that ‘they sinned as men, but spoke prophetically when inspired 
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by God’, or reassigned to them authority through the gateway of penitence, no such dualism 
or pardon was granted by the rationalist Spinoza (Boldrini 34; Minnis 109).  
Joyce’s criticism of Synge’s play, ‘Riders to the Sea’, was also mentioned in his 
letter to his brother, where he gives more details about his critical method: ‘I am glad to say 
that ever since I read it I have been riddling it mentally till it has [not] a sound spot. It is 
tragic about all the men that are drowned in the islands: but thanks be to God Synge isn’t an 
Aristotelian’ (Letters II 35). He examines the play in his ‘nicely polished looking-glass’ ‘till 
it has [not] a sound spot’, and measuring it against the rules laid down by Aristotle, he 
presents his philosophical judgement that contradicts that of Yeats who had said it ‘was quite 
Greek’. Such ambiguous historical interpretation is censured by Joyce; in the absence of 
historical certainty, in the disfigurement of historical facts, ‘Greek’ denotes a set of formal 
rules that Synge (regrettably) breaks. His brother explains that Joyce ‘objected that, owing to 
the lack of action, it could not be called a tragedy. It did not fit in with the Aristotelian 
definition of tragedy’ (S. Joyce 215-6).  
Joyce indeed shared the scientific outlook not only of the Enlightenment 
philosophers, but also of Aristotle, and indeed prior to his Spinozic performance for Synge, 
he had been diligently studying Aristotle’s Metaphysics. He proudly proclaimed to his 
mother his proficiency as a Greek scholar: ‘I am at present up to the neck in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, and read only him and Ben Jonson (a writer of songs and plays)’ (38). The 
figure of Aristotle will be examined in more detail at a later stage, but his influence as a 
scientist through the complexity of Aristotle’s interpretation of “science” must here be 
mentioned, as it explicates and transforms the Enlightenment ideal. For Aristotle science as 
“episteme” is a comprehensive term that means broadly “knowledge” - both physical and 
metaphysical - and is indeed two-fold: ‘For knowledge, like the verb ‘to know’, means two 
things, of which one is potential and one actual. The potency [dynamis], being, as matter, 
universal and indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actuality 
[entelecheia], being definite, deals with a definite object, being a ‘this’, it deals with a ‘this’’ 
(Metaphysics XIII.10). It is a dynamic concept that must account for change; but it is always 
knowledge of essences, of ‘first principles and causes’ and will offer Stephen in Stephen 
Hero the much prized ‘gift of certitude’ (I.1; SH 81). 
The scientific ideal of detachment is truly represented in Aristotle, as he is free from 
the modern problematics of subjectivity. The Greeks ‘did not try to base the objectivity of 
knowledge on subjectivity. Rather, their thinking always regarded itself as an element of 
being itself’, Gadamer explains (456). Aristotle facilitates therefore knowledge of both the 
subject and the object, of “truth”, while allowing Joyce to avoid the pitfalls of the 
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subjectivism of the Enlightenment. This “anti-subjectivism” is indeed evident in the primacy 
accorded to action in his definition of tragedy that Joyce upheld: ‘most important of all is the 
structure of the incidents. For Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of 
life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality’ (Poetics). 
Although this interposition of Aristotle seems to compromise Synge’s verdict and 
Joyce’s link to the Enlightenment, it is through the dialogue between the two traditions that 
is set up in Joyce’s work that a complex understanding and interpretation of modernity is 
developed. Despite Joyce’s enthusiasm for his likeness to Spinoza, however, it is not 
Spinoza who is shown to personify for him the freedom and rebellion that characterises this 
modern era, nor the renowned Descartes. Instead, as with the choice of Ibsen as a precursor, 
he lays claim to an unorthodox genealogy- or at least he makes sure it appears to be so. 
Spinoza’s name reappears in October of the same year among Joyce’s journalistic writing for 




v. A heroic fable: Bruno and the modern “hero” 
 
From an early age, Joyce, like Stephen, was keen to exhibit his proficiency as a 
philosopher. In the same year that he spent his days in the Bibliothèque Nationale and his 
nights in the Bibliothèque Saint Geneviève, compiling with the aid of Aristotle’s “lamp” 
notes on aesthetics, he undertook the review of J. Lewis McIntyre’s book on the life and 
philosophy of Giordano Bruno as part of his venture into journalism. As the author and co-
publisher of “The Day of Rabblement” that had opened with a foreboding warning to 
Dublin’s “men of letters” in the words of a figure that Joyce hoped would puzzle his 
compatriots- the Nolan, he must have felt equipped to undertake this review for Dublin’s 
Daily Express. In yet another polemical opening statement in this review, after briefly 
corroborating his proficiency as a reader and scholar, 10 Joyce condemns the neglect of 
Bruno in the English history of philosophy and regretfully remarks that McIntyre’s overdue 
compensation ‘cannot but seem somewhat belated now’ (OCPW 93). This alleged neglect, as 
with Joyce’s presentation of Ibsen as an unknown author in Dublin, is slightly misleading, as 
according to Hilary Gatti the nineteenth century witnessed a surge in “Brunomania”: Bruno 
was ‘one of the figures most discussed and commented on during the final decades of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘Except for a book in the English or Foreign Philosophical Library, a book the interest of which was 
chiefly biographical, no considerable volume has appeared in England to give an account on the life 
and philosophy of the heresiarch martyr of Nola’ (93). 
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century’ (232, 229-30). Admittedly, however, Gatti notes that this interest had in fact 
obscured the significance of Bruno’s philosophy, and given birth to what Joyce calls in this 
essay a ‘heroic fable’: ‘in the final decades of the nineteenth century, Bruno in England 
became less part of a properly philosophical discourse, to be assumed as a seductive figure, 
image, or narrative model in a primarily literary context’ (OCPW 93; 240). 
The consequence of Bruno’s philosophy for modernity is emphasised by Joyce in his 
presentation of this Renaissance ‘heresiarch martyr’ as a harbinger of the Enlightenment 
rather than the mystic of theology, theosophy, or aestheticism, or the dualist of Romantic 
idealism: ‘More than Bacon or Descartes must he be considered the father of what is called 
modern philosophy’ (OCPW 93). He is a modern “scientist”- an ‘independent observer’, 
inventive but critical: ‘His active brain continually utters hypotheses; his vehement temper 
continually urges him to recriminate’. ‘Casting away tradition with the courage of early 
humanism’, he rejects the canonical ‘philosophical method of a peripatetic’ and relies 
instead solely on his own ‘active brain’. Joyce follows McIntyre who emphasises Bruno’s 
modernity in giving a ‘rational basis’ to his ‘mystical’ beliefs inherited from the 
Neoplatonists; but whereas McIntyre examines Bruno’s influence on various modern 
philosophers, Joyce’s emphasis on Bruno’s absence from philosophical history in addition to 
promoting the significance of McIntyre’s book and Joyce’s review of it, is used to cast doubt 
on the form and very notion of history - specifically English history - and ‘what is called 
modern’ (110). Modernity, like Stephen’s definition of the classical, is here presented as ‘not 
the matter of any fixed age or of any fixed country’ but as ‘a constant state of the artistic 
mind’ (SH 83). 
The modernity of Bruno in McIntyre’s book is revealed in his impudence, 
rationalism, and egoism: ‘His perfect self-confidence and belief in the power of human 
reason (especially his own reason) to penetrate the mysteries of things, was accompanied by 
contempt for the argument from authority in philosophy, contempt for humility, submission, 
obedience in the speculative life. To believe with the many because they were many was the 
mark of a slave’ (101). It was this “heroic” ‘radical principle of artistic economy’ of an 
“enlightened” scientific philosopher, that Joyce had appealed to (rather anachronistically) in 
“The Day of Rabblement”, in order to expose ‘the sterility and falsehood’ of the Irish literary 
theatre in its cowardly retreat from treatment of “modern” themes and ideas (OCPW 50). 
Bruno’s defiance and rebellion- his rejection of authority and tradition, are symptoms of his 
modernity for McIntyre who casts him as a precursor of Enlightenment philosophy: ‘Bruno, 
before Bacon, before Descartes, insisted on the need of first of all clearing the mind from all 
prejudices, all traditional beliefs that rested on authority alone, before attempting the pursuit 
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of truth’ (101-2). In Joyce’s review, however, Bruno is modern as ‘an independent 
observer’- an indifferent theorist, and these rebellious elements of his philosophical method 
are largely subdued and pushed back historically, linked instead with ‘the courage of early 
humanism’ and with Bruno’s ‘heroic’ character:  the ‘honourable’, ‘sanctified’ and 
‘ingenuous’ ‘legend’ of ‘a great lover of wisdom’ (OCPW 93).  
Bruno’s revolt against prejudice, authority and tradition is intimated in Joyce’s 
description of ‘his attempt to reconcile the matter and form of the Scholastics’, a 
reconciliation that Bruno proposes as ‘an hypothesis’ in the face of the ‘formidable names’ 
of the Scholastics. Redirecting the focus of the philosopher’s inquiry from metaphysics to 
physics - ‘in his system as spirit and body [they] retain little of their metaphysical character’ 
- he resembles a modern natural philosopher and appears to be ‘a curious anticipation of 
Spinoza’ (93-4). Linking Bruno’s ‘hypothesis’ with Spinoza’s monism and questioning 
Bruno’s association with Romantic philosophy, Joyce finds it ‘strange’ that Coleridge saw 
him as a Romantic dualist. 11 McIntyre’s description of the relationship between Bruno and 
Spinoza, can explain why the dualist Bruno of Finnegans Wake was presented at this stage 
as ‘strange’. McIntyre points out that there are ‘two kinds’ of coincidences: ‘some 
“subjective” in the modern sense, e.g. the coincidences of directions in the globe; any one 
may be taken as depth according to the spectator's standpoint; others are “objective”, e.g. 
when in God the one and the many are said to coincide. According as the stress is laid on one 
or on the other, the theory may be regarded as either dualistic (as Cusanus’ really was) or as 
pantheistic’ (179). ‘There is no doubt, however’, McIntyre argues, ‘that it was in the latter 
sense that Bruno held the coincidence of contraries’. 
Joyce’s early writings and the character of Stephen Dedalus emphasise and 
dramatise (and later satirise) the need and significance of objective truth, of avoiding the 
scepticism of subjectivism, while also asserting the preeminence of the freedom of the 
subject. Unlike Yeats who was searching for a connection with the native ground of the 
homeland, Stephen seeks a philosophical “ground”, having rejected both the fatherland and 
the spiritual Father. For this ideal of certainty Bruno is indeed superior to Spinoza: ‘It is not 
Spinoza, it is Bruno, that is the god-intoxicated man’ (OCPW 94). Although the chain of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This declaration appears to be subverted in 1925 as he then describes Bruno’s philosophy to Harriet 
Shaw Weaver as ‘a kind of dualism’ (Letters I 224). This early ‘monist’ Bruno, has concerned 
deconstructive critics as monist indifference seems to deny “difference”. Jean-Michel Rabaté excuses 
‘Joyce’s perfectly logical repudiation of the Romantic view of Bruno, which made him appear as a 
precursor of Hegel’ and credits Molly’s ‘indifference’ for the fortunate fall from this One in the later 
Joyce: ‘monism can be seen as inverted dualism, as long as the pre-eminence of  “indifference” in the 
identity of the contraries is asserted’; ‘the sense of cosmological “indifference” is entirely necessary to 
create, by a strange twist, a new language in which one observes a multiplication of semantic 
“difference”’ (Rabaté, “Bruno No, Bruno Si” 32, 36).    
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relations in Bruno’s system is infinite, they find unity in God; but even though this ground is 
metaphysical, as ‘all in all’ his God is within all things rather than ‘beyond or above his 
handiwork’ (P 233). Joyce indeed views Bruno’s philosophy not only as a sceptic or fellow 
“heretic”, but also as an artist, and sees a novel paradigm for the creator.  
Having followed McIntyre’s extensive analysis of the parallels between Bruno’s 
philosophy and Spinoza’s, Joyce questions the “modernity” of Bruno’s monism; his system 
that enables the “inevitable” collapse of matter and form is compared to what Joyce in a later 
essay describes as ‘the immense (and in many ways admirable) system of philosophy that 
had its fundamental origins in Aristotelian thought, cold clear and imperturbable’, and his 
monism to the Scholastic ‘Materia Prima’ (OCPW 94). His questioning of Coleridge’s 
assertion of Bruno’s dualism is therefore a reminder of the theological and historical position 
of Bruno, who was not the Romantic that Coleridge wished him to be nor the rationalist that 
McIntyre’s emphasis of his relation to Spinoza implies.  
The radical proposition in Bruno’s philosophy is presented instead in terms of his 
denial of the fallen nature of man: ‘The death of the body is for him the cessation of a mode 
of being, and in virtue of this belief and of that robust character ‘prevaricating yet firm’, 
which is an evidence of that belief, he becomes of the number of those who loftily do not 
fear to die’ (94). 12 Certainty for this early humanist comes not only from ‘belief in the 
power of human reason’, but also from his insolent denial of death and replacement of an 
eternity of hell that awaited fallen man with an eternity of possibility. It is Bruno’s 
“heroism” in his fervent belief in man that distinguishes his philosophy from medieval 
theology: ‘Inwards from the material universe, which, however, did not seem to him, as to 
the Neoplatonists, the kingdom of the soul’s malady, or as to the Christians a place of 
probation, but rather an opportunity for spiritual activity, he passes, and from heroic 
enthusiasm to enthusiasm to unite himself with God’. 
Spirit and body are indeed united by him as he is driven not only by an intellectual 
desire, but also a religious “irrational” fervour. Reason is not enough, or at least not the only 
means for access to the truth; ‘enthusiasm’ or “will”- a term rendered dubious by German 
Romanticism and Nietzsche, is also paramount. This ‘mysticism’ that sustains and propels 
him on his mission - ‘strong, suddenly rapturous, and militant’ - for the ‘vindication of the 
freedom of intuition’ rather than reason, makes him a “heretic” like ‘Averroes’ and ‘Scotus 
Erigena’ more than a rationalist like Spinoza (94). 13 Intuition for the god-intoxicated Bruno, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 McIntyre highlights the significance of this theory as ‘one of the cardinal points of his philosophy, 
and one in which he differed most widely from Aristotle, as interpreted by him, and from the 
Aristotelians’ (153). 
13 Italics my own. 
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however, is not equivalent to the a priori imagination of the Romantic genius, or divine 
inspiration, but is above all divine contemplation, “intuitio”. 
The ‘ardent sympathy with nature as it is’ that Joyce describes as ‘the breath of the 
Renaissance’, dissolves the dualism between man and nature, thinking and being: ‘thought is 
a complex of elements, which are to it as the letters of the alphabet are to a printed book; but 
thought and reality or nature are not opposed to one another – they are essentially one. The 
elements of thought when discovered will accordingly give us the constitutive elements of 
nature and the connections in, and workings of, nature will be understood from the different 
complications of these simple elements of thought’ (McIntyre 54-5). The secret of nature lies 
within man; man reads in nature like Mallarmé’s Hamlet ‘the book of himself’ (U 239). The 
life of the mind gains both dignity and reality, but avoids the scepticism Kantian 
subjectivism through theology- through the alterity of God. 
Having replaced hypostasis with hypotheses, modern man must struggle to preserve 
and assert his identity and integrity: ‘The infinity of the cosmos threatens not only to limit 
the Ego, but even to annihilate it completely’ (Cassirer, Individual and the Cosmos 190). 
Renaissance theology explored exhaustively the paradoxes and perils of infinity as the 
testimony of Bruno’s cellmates illustrates: “He said that God needed the world as much as 
the world needed God, and that God could be nothing without the world, and for this reason 
God did nothing but create new worlds” (Rowland 60). This philosophy of “Being and 
Nothingness” is indeed very modern- post-modern even for deconstructionist critics who 
have emphasised Joyce’s link to this tradition to claim a shared heritage. 14 Joyce celebrates, 
in this early review, however, not a postmodern dissolution of the subject among an infinity 
of ‘modes and accidents’ of being (or language), but rather the pre-modern ‘chaosmos’ of 
Bruno: his ability to remain ‘a consistent spiritual unity’ despite the chaos of the modern 
cosmos (OCPW 93; FW 118).  
By the end of the review, Joyce reconciles what McIntyre had identified as the ‘two 
very distinct sides to Bruno’s philosophical character’: his rationalism and mysticism (109). 
It is indeed not only Bruno’s philosophical method that interests Joyce, but also his 
character, the ‘heroic fable’, paradoxically, of this proto-rationalist. Bruno is shown to 
embody his monist philosophy; through his ability to comprehend contradictions in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Colin MacCabe, James Joyce: New Perspectives; Margot Norris, The decentered universe of 
Finnegans Wake: a structuralist analysis; Susan Shaw Sailer, On the Void to Be: Incoherence and 
Trope in Finnegans Wake; Ronald J. Koch, “Giordano Bruno and “Finnegans Wake”: A New Look at 
Shaun's Objection to the “Nolanus Theory””; Jean-Michel Rabaté, “Bruno No, Bruno Si: Note on a 
Contradiction in Joyce”; Strother B. Purdy, “Is There a Multiverse in “Finnegans Wake”, and Does 
That Make It a Religious Book?”; Talia Schaffer, “Letters to Biddy: About That Original Hen”. 
Arielle Saiber in Giordano Bruno and the Geometry of Language also views Bruno as a proto-
deconstructionist.     
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complex and dissimulating identity he is truly a “coincidence of contraries”, “all in all”: ‘A 
Dominican monk, a gypsy professor, a commentator of old philosophies and a deviser of 
new ones, a playwright, a polemicist, a counsel for his own defence, and, finally, a martyr 
burned at the stake in the Campo dei Fiori – Bruno, through all these modes and accidents 
(as he would have called them) of being, remains a consistent spiritual unity’ (93). The 
“temperament” of this Renaissance polymathic artist is indeed compromised- Bruno is both 
‘savant and saint’. He is not only a philosopher but also philologist, theologian and 
dramatist. He maintains, however, his integrity like the God of the negative theology of Cusa 
and Eriugena who is both ‘the nothing of all things’ and ‘omnia simul, all things 
simultaneously’, being both a host of personas and the ‘No man’ of Joyce’s earlier 
revolutionary essay “The Day of Rabblement” (Hankins 184). 
He is a modern “author”; his pronouncements do not rely on the unity and structure 
of the Scholastic worldview and system of thought, but gain strength and validity through his 
own personality, his ‘enthusiasm’. His “heresy”, his detachment from the authority of 
tradition makes him modern. Bruno is modern, moreover, through his conspicuous and 
exuberant personality; as Umberto Eco notes, ‘The medieval thinker’, in contrast, ‘knows 
that art is the human way to reproduce, in an artefact, the universal rules of the cosmic order. 
In this sense art reflects the artist’s impersonality rather than his personality’ (7). The 
convivial atmosphere in which Bruno’s Socratic-like dialogues take place, the revelry that 
interrupts the structure of philosophical arguments in these boisterous symposia and the 
profusion of personas he employs to disseminate his argument, reveal the pre-eminence of 
the speakers amid the communication of abstract theories.  
For medieval thinkers, ‘Auctoritas’, according to Minnis, ‘entails unity: the 
singularity of the authorship of the Psalms, the unity of the diverse materials within the 
work, and the unity of the Psalter with the rest of the Bible’ (46). Lack of unity indeed 
threatens the modern author who is not supported by a body of tradition and community or 
tireless exegetes who piece together his fragments through analysis and search for the 
common truth. This modern author, however, revels in a profusion of roles and positions 
‘within or behind or beyond or above’, without fear of extinction (P 233). Unity in the face 
of the heterogeneity of roles and disguises- ‘modes and accidents’, is sustained by that 
mystical locus of widening horizons, his singular ‘spiritual unity’; his selfhood that is 
understood as a unity only in a mystical sense. 
The implications of Bruno’s (and Cusa’s) disruption of the teleological medieval 
cosmos for the nature of the artwork that “imitates” this cosmos are not fully explored until 
later in Joyce’s career, but in these early years Joyce sees the consequence of the novel 
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model of authorship Bruno submits, and problematises the idea of the “system” that for 
Joyce betrays Bruno’s debt to Scholasticism. Nevertheless, Bruno’s ‘mentality that is restless 
and somewhat amorphous’ and his ‘fascination of the unknown’ are shown to threaten the 
unity of Authorship and the culture it consolidates (OCPW 188, 187). This impulse, 
moreover, is not self-destructive for Renaissance man as it is for post-modernism: ‘The 
highest energy and deepest truth of the mind does not consist in going out into the infinite, 
but in the mind’s maintaining itself against the infinite and proving in its pure unity equal to 
the infinity of being’, Cassirer argues (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 37). ‘Giordano 
Bruno, in whom this new climate of opinion first appears, defines the relation between the 
ego and the world, between subject and object in this sense. For him the infinite process of 
becoming, the great spectacle of the world forever unrolling before our eyes, is the guaranty 
of that deepest meaning which the ego can find only in itself. The power of reason is our 
only access to the infinite’. The subject is not alienated from the world but is exalted by this 
new relation. As a “theorist”, Bruno is aware that this infinite journey is predominantly 
‘inwards’ (OCPW 93). The world, however, is becoming increasingly alien and 
incomprehensible; only ‘the power of reason’ confirms the subject’s link to the world. The 
philosophical weapon of infinity used against the “rabblement” will lead to martyrdom for 
the modern artist too, as infinity is not only heretical, but also “inhuman” without the 
reflection of an infinite god or the faith that will support the artist’s upward journey. 
 
 
vi. An insidious theory: Joyce, Wilde and the nation of art critics 
 
Joyce’s early writings are marked by repeated gestures of rejection and detachment. 
The need for the devastating expulsion of all “prejudices” and traditional structures of 
signification that characterises the driving force of the political and intellectual revolutions 
of the Enlightenment, necessitates the self-discipline of a ‘voluntary’ exile on the part of the 
artist (Letters II 83). Through his first (self)publication, “The Day of Rabblement”, Joyce 
makes a simultaneous dramatic entrance and exit from the Irish literary scene, by proffering 
his ideal of a ‘radical principle of artistic economy’: ‘No man, said the Nolan, can be a lover 
of the true or the good unless he abhors the multitude; and the artist, though he may employ 
the crowd, is very careful to isolate himself’ (OCPW 50). Through the words of warning of 
an excommunicated heretic and martyr of philosophy referenced in order to awaken his 
listeners from their stupor, Joyce presents his own ‘protest against the sterility and falsehood 
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of the modern stage’, through examples of the dull-witted intellectuals of ‘the most belated 
race in Europe’ that is ‘making terms with the rabblement’. 15  
Joyce is truly a “critic” in this essay, scathing and unforgiving of the idealising 
romanticism of Irish artists in particular, but censuring the entire scaffolding that supports 
and authorizes the work of these artists: the directors, the sponsors, the censor, the morality 
of the church and the nationalist ideologies of politicians. Both producers and consumers 
come under attack; the artist, in order to be ‘a lover of the true or the good’, must therefore 
paradoxically ‘abhor the multitude’ and step outside the field of culture in order to realize a 
Brunian coincidence of contraries. The guise of the philosopher is a polemical stance 
intended to expose ‘the hosts of prejudice and misinterpretation and ridicule’, as revealed in 
the pioneering Norway, through another disguised reference to Ibsen- the dramatic expositor. 
Even though the hidden reference is philosophical, the intent is artistic: the project of 
‘producing European masterpieces’ is ‘absolutely necessary’. 
 The enemies of art and the artist are many, but also indistinct, and so the essay 
wavers between a critique of culture and a catalogue of sufferings. The tyranny of authority 
is identified with a nameless and amorphous ‘vulgar’ crowd, while ‘the forces that dictate 
public judgement’ have ‘surrendered to popular will’ rather than shaping it. The censorship 
in Dublin is ‘powerless’, Joyce claims. His aim in this essay is above all to expose the 
cowardice of the Irish Literary Theatre, its ‘flattering influence of vanity and low ambition’, 
and this is highlighted by exposing the enemy as mythological rather than a real threat: as ‘la 
bestia Trioufaute [sic]’ of Bruno’s philosophical fable (51). 
Halfway through the invective, however, the criticism of a nameless crowd turns 
into a defamation of individual artists. The artist who is ‘making terms with the rabblement’ 
cannot conceal himself with anonymity. An enormous burden of culpability is placed upon 
the artist who is held accountable for allowing the tyrannical rule of the rabblement and 
weaving a treacherous web of influence by cultivating ‘the favour of the multitude’. Yeats, 
Martyn and Moore form Joyce’s unholy trinity of artists. He not only disputes Yeats’s 
‘genius’, brands him an ‘esthete’, berates his ‘treacherous instinct of adaptability’, accuses 
him of turning the stage into an oratorical ‘platform’ and challenges the ‘originality’ of 
Martyn and Moore, but by the end of the essay he deprives them of the title of artist: ‘Until 
he has freed himself from the mean influences about him – sodden enthusiasm and clever 
insinuation and every flattering influence of vanity and low ambition – no man is an artist at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 ‘He intended that the readers of his article should have at first a false impression that he was 
quoting some little-known Irish writer ... so that when they discovered their error, the name of 
Giordano Bruno might perhaps awaken some interest in his life and work. Laymen, he repeated, 
should be encouraged to think’ (S. Joyce 146).  
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all’ (51-2). Above any acquired skill or inborn genius, the artist is distinguished in terms of 
his autonomy and his allegiance to ‘Truth’. Fittingly, therefore, the warning is sounded in the 
words of a philosopher; philosopher and artist- the dramatist in particular, are both 
“theorists”, witnesses of truth. 
The reference to Bruno’s work The Expulsion Of The Triumphant Beast indeed links 
Joyce’s criticism with another such martyr who had challenged the art-life polarity; the most 
famous Irish “individualist” and proponent of criticism as an artistic ideal, Oscar Wilde. The 
critic in “The Critic as Artist” is “inspired” by this ‘placid and intensely moral’ ‘bestia 
Trioufaute’ (misspelled fittingly to include the word ‘fault’):  
 
[T]he true critic can, if it be his pleasure so to direct or waste his faculty of 
contemplation, produce work that will be flawless in beauty and instinct with 
intellectual subtlety. Why not? Dullness is always an irresistible temptation for 
brilliancy, and stupidity is the permanent Bestia Trionfans that calls wisdom from its 
cave. To an artist so creative as the critic, what does subject-matter signify? No more 
and no less than it does to the novelist and the painter. Like them, he can find his 
motives everywhere. Treatment is the test. (Intentions 138)  
 
The ‘hosts of prejudice and misinterpretation and ridicule’ in Joyce’s article have 
provoked the wrath of the disguised Thinker whose words are sounded by the artist. Joyce is 
indeed at this point an artist in potentia and reveals glimmers of his creativity through his 
criticism. But the art too is intended to be critical as his early pronouncements on his artistic 
ideals reveal: the antithesis between the creative and the critical faculties, as Gilbert argued, 
‘is entirely arbitrary’ (121). In contrast to Yeats who had deplored that the imagination in the 
modern world was ‘laid in a great tomb of criticism’, and prophesied that ‘this age of 
criticism is about to pass, and an age of imagination, of emotion, of moods, of revelation, is 
about to come in its place’, Stephen will foreground the construction of a critical “theory” 
that will both gesture towards the art not yet created - or the life of the ‘uncreated 
conscience’ - and serve as a weapon against these hosts by exposing their “faults” (Ideas 
308, 310; P 276). ‘Art is a revelation, and not a criticism’, Yeats argued; but the theory of an 
epiphany in Stephen Hero is appended to an esthetic theory, a theory that analyses and 
“demystifies” art, and later subsumes the epiphany in the Portrait (310). Criticism is both 
imperative and inescapable for the modern artist, and we see Stephen feeling increasingly 
constrained by this compulsion. The modern artist, an increasingly suspect marginal figure, 
must repeatedly vindicate not only the significance, but also the very legitimacy of both his 
role and his art in society.  
The critical skill, the ‘treatment’ of Joyce’s artist separates him from the 
“estheticism” of the Irish literary scene and its ideal of the Romantic genius that Joyce 
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dismisses as an ‘unsafe’ critical principle (OCPW 51). ‘It is Criticism that makes us 
cosmopolitan’, Gilbert argued, and like an Enlightenment philosopher saw the egalitarian 
and emancipatory potential of criticism: ‘It is only by the cultivation of the habit of 
intellectual criticism that we shall be able to rise superior to race-prejudices’ (212-3). It is 
through ‘the development of the critical spirit’, he argued, that ‘we shall be able to realise, 
not merely our own lives, but the collective life of the race, and so to make ourselves 
absolutely modern, in the true meaning of the word modernity. For he to whom the present is 
the only thing that is present, knows nothing of the age in which he lives. To realise the 
nineteenth century, one must realise every century that has preceded it and that has 
contributed to its making’ (172). It is not surprising that history becomes a nightmare for 
Stephen. Modernity compels the critic to ‘bear within himself the dreams, and ideas, and 
feelings of myriad generations’; the detachment from tradition comes at a great price (175). 
For Pater, it is language that is the ‘Product of a myriad various minds and contending 
tongues, compact of obscure and minute association’, and the critic as a scholar is an 
‘impersonal’ medium that must ‘purify its very elements’ through the sacrifices Yeats also 
extolled: ‘Self-restraint, a skilful economy of means, ascêsis’ (Style 108, 112-3; Ideas 149). 
For Wilde, however, the critic is a fecund medium of heterogeneity; his personality is 
splintered and multiplied rather than sacrificed. 
This diversity indicated for Yeats the regrettable rootlessness of modern man, the 
‘weariness’ of the modern artist that he admitted could not be overcome through art alone: 
‘now he must be philosophical above everything, even about the arts, for he can only return 
the way he came, and so escape from weariness, by philosophy’ (Ideas 303). ‘The arts’, he 
advised would need ‘to take upon their shoulders the burdens that have fallen from the 
shoulders of priests’, in order to resurrect the unity of tradition represented by the figure of 
the inspired bardic genius of Homer and be able to write another Odyssey: to ‘learn again 
how to describe at great length an old man wandering among enchanted islands, his return 
home at last, his slow-gathering vengeance, a flitting shape of a goddess, and a flight of 
arrows’ (304-5). 
The unity and completion that art both strives for and surpasses, exemplified for 
Yeats by art’s symbolic character and the unity of the community, and for Wilde by the 
formal characteristics of Platonic beauty and the unity of the individual, appears as an 
increasingly impossible but also dubious ideal for modern man. This suspicion, moreover, 
has an impact not only on aesthetics, but also on the creative artist: ‘To the aesthetic 
temperament the vague is always repellent. The Greeks were a nation of artists, because they 
were spared the sense of the infinite. Like Aristotle, like Goethe after he had read Kant, we 
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desire the concrete, and nothing but the concrete can satisfy us’ (Intentions 171-2). The 
insertion by philosophy and science of infinity into the cosmos threatens to annihilate the 
unity of art - of ‘an entire word, the signature or symbol’ of beauty and Form - and of man as 
an individual (Ideas 305). 
The dualism of artist and critic in Wilde’s dialogues and his attempt to find the 
coincidence between two, not least through the use of the dialogue form itself - a form both 
literary and philosophic that ‘creative critics’ like Bruno employed according to Wilde, 
allowing them to ‘both reveal and conceal’ themselves - betrays the threat to the critic that 
the public voice of journalism posed, but also to creativity: ‘creation is doomed’, Gilbert 
warned (208). Wilde admits, however, that the contemplative life, the theoretical ideal of 
‘disinterested curiosity’ doesn’t satisfy modern man: ‘we who are born at the close of this 
wonderful age are at once too cultured and too critical, too intellectually subtle and too 
curious of exquisite pleasures, to accept any speculations about life in exchange for life 
itself’ (175, 170). As for Yeats, moreover, it is Ireland that bears for him the promise of a 
rebirth of art: ‘though the mission of the aesthetic movement is to lure people to 
contemplate, not to lead them to create, yet, as the creative instinct is strong in the Celt, and 
it is the Celt who leads in art, there is no reason why in future years this strange Renaissance 
should not become almost as mighty in its way as was that new birth of Art that woke many 
centuries ago in the cities of Italy’ (197). 
There was indeed a more contemporary “age of criticism” for Joyce, of the great 
Victorian art critics more famous for their criticism than their artistic creations. ‘[T]he main 
effort, for now many years, has been a critical effort’, Matthew Arnold famously declared, 
‘the endeavour, in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to 
see the object as in itself it really is’ (3). It is the influence of this age and its scientific ideals 
that Yeats was attempting to overcome by inaugurating ‘an age of imagination, of emotion, 
of moods, of revelation’, and Wilde was responding to by reminding the disinterested 
scientific critic of that dubiously mysterious obfuscating medium, the individual; that art is 
‘a veil, rather than a mirror’ (Ideas 310; Intentions 29). Arnold ‘was rather a propagandist 
for criticism than a critic, a populariser rather than a creator of ideas’, Eliot would complain 
and gain success as a modern critic by casting doubt on the religious veneration of culture by 
Victorian critics (1). The critic’s aim, Wilde argued, ‘will not always be to explain the work 
of art. He may seek rather to deepen its mystery, to raise round it, and round its maker, that 
mist of wonder which is dear to both gods and worshippers alike’ (153-4). But the 
worshipper for Wilde, as for the modernists, was deviantly isolated. 
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The temperament of the modern “man of letters” is suspended between the ideals of 
creativity and criticism. But in contrast to Yeats’s retrogressive outlook, Gilbert argues that 
‘It is to criticism that the future belongs’ (207). To be a critic is to be modern; ‘creation is 
doomed’ because ‘It springs from too primitive, too natural an impulse’ (208). In contrast to 
Ernest’s (and Yeats’s) idealist impression of the Greek artist’s inspiration from his organic 
relation to nature and religious faith, Gilbert argues that ‘the Greeks were a nation of art-
critics’ (110). The critic usurps the laurel - and the mask - of the creative genius; although he 
surpasses the artist, he becomes his mirror image. This is achieved by Gilbert through his 
reinterpretation of Greek art. Gilbert exploits the confusion between nationality, geography 
and history of idealism (‘the details of history’, he says, ‘are always wearisome and usually 
inaccurate’), to identify ‘Greek’ not with ancient Greece and Athens, but with the Alexandria 
of the third century, through the link with ancient Greece that Aristotle provides as a proto-
literary critic and according to Wilde, first aesthetic philosopher:  
 
There is really not a single form that art now uses that does not come to us from the 
critical spirit of Alexandria, where these forms were either stereotyped or invented or 
made perfect. I say Alexandria, not merely because it was there that the Greek spirit 
became most self-conscious, and indeed ultimately expired in scepticism and 
theology, but because it was to that city, and not to Athens, that Rome turned for her 
models, and it was through the survival, such as it was, of the Latin language that 
culture lived at all. (125, 124) 
 
The historical and national upheaval is further intensified as Gilbert credits the Greeks 
not only with having ‘invented’ criticism, but also with being the first “moderns”; modernity 
is identified with Hellenism: ‘Whatever, in fact, is modern in our life, we owe to the Greeks. 
Whatever is an anachronism is due to medievalism’ (112, 119). The cosmopolitan 
Alexandrians were indeed the first “moderns” of Western history by instituting the first 
Renaissance of ancient Greek culture; Gilbert simultaneously provides a critical analysis of 
Western culture by tracing the various rebirths of Greek art. The Greece that modern man 
idealises is an amalgam of these culturally, historically and geographically diverse “rebirths” 
in the Hellenistic period, the reign of the Roman Empire, the Renaissance, Romanticism and 
‘in future years’, Wilde prophesies, the ‘strange Renaissance’ of the Celt will succeed these 
(197).  
The modernists indeed found, as Edwyn Bevan remarked in 1923 in his overview of 
the ‘popular philosophy’ of this age, ‘that the decadent Greco-Roman world shows strange 
analogies to the world to-day’, listing among these ‘the sophistication of life, the craving for 
sensation’ and ‘the credulous attraction to the occult’: ‘If a European of today were 
precipitated backward through time by a sorcerer's spell into some Hellenic town of the past 
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he would much sooner get used to his new surroundings, if they were in one of the great 
Greek cities founded by the Macedonians, Alexandria or Seleucia or Antioch, than if he were 
cast into the Athens or Syracuse of a hundred years further back’, J. B. Bury adds (100, 4-5). 
16 The centre of a vast empire, Alexandria was a multinational and multicultural city, and it 
was during this time that a Hellenised Semite (Jews along with Greeks and Egyptians were 
the three largest ethnicities) ‘introduced the idea of cosmopolitanism transcending 
patriotism; of the whole world, the oecumene, as a man's true fatherland; of a community 
embracing all rational beings, without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, or of 
freeman and slave’ (26). 
The Alexandrian scholars were the first systematic custodians of culture, having 
inherited and needing to preserve the ancient Greek culture that Alexander’s empire had 
disseminated and made renowned, but which was under threat of contamination in this 
society. It is to these scholars and their society that Wilde looks for a model of his ideal of 
the creative critic, as even ‘the inartistic temperaments of the day busied themselves also in 
matters of literature and art’ in Alexandria (118). This collective implication with art, 
however, had two grave consequences; firstly, as not everyone is naturally creative 
‘accusations of plagiarism were endless’, and secondly, as a result of the exhaustive 
reflection upon artistic matters, art ‘ultimately expired in scepticism and theology’ (118-9, 
124). It was in Alexandria that the artist first met his antagonist. The critic, while seemingly 
at his service, both purloined and corrupted his- and his nation’s, intellectual property: 
‘Hellenism – European appendicitis’, Joyce remarked in an early notebook (WD 91). 
The Alexandrian philologist establishes his authority over the “matter” of art- 
language, as the Victorian critics would try to: ‘That living authority which language needs 
lies, in truth, in its scholars, who recognising always that every language possesses a genius, 
a very fastidious genius, of its own, expand at once and purify its very elements, which must 
needs change along with the changing thoughts of living people’ (Pater, Style 108). Genius is 
not the attribute of an individual, but is made instead the property of language by Pater, the 
mastery of which authorises the critic. By taking control of language, the critic is also master 
of and privy to the secrets of history: ‘Prehistoric history belongs to the philological and 
archaeological critic’ (Intentions 211). This critic, moreover, fractures the unity of art not 
only by an unphilosophical historical analysis, bringing into play ‘the dreams, and ideas, and 
feelings of myriad generations’, but also by dividing artistic form into a multitude of genres: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ‘See what happens when your somatophage merman takes his fancy to our virgitarian swan?’, 
Shaun declares with dismay at Shem’s appetite for “birdgirls” (FW 171). ‘He even ran away with 
hunself and became a farsoonerite [a father, a son and atoned in Roland McHugh’s “Danish” 
translation], saying he would far sooner muddle through the hash of lentils in Europe than meddle 
with Irrland's split little pea’. 
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in addition to the trinity of lyric, epic and dramatic art, the Alexandrians subdivided and 
multiplied these genres, according to Wilde, into ‘burlesque, the idyll, the romantic novel, 
the novel of adventure, the essay, the dialogue, the oration, the lecture, for which perhaps we 
should not forgive them, and the epigram, in all the wide meaning of that word’ (175, 125). 
Humanism and its ideal of ‘self-culture’ that each “renaissance” of Greek culture 
endorsed, is a prerequisite for Wilde’s prospective Renaissance: “Individualism”, as Wilde 
renamed it (180). It was by becoming ‘self-conscious’ that the Alexandrians were able to 
perfect the various art forms (124). ‘The new Individualism’ was to become ‘the new 
Hellenism’ (Soul of Man Under Socialism 62). Both the creation and the appreciation of art 
is impossible without the individual, forgotten by science and nationalism, and fetishised by 
journalism’s ‘tyranny’ ‘over people’s private lives’ that cultivates the public’s ‘insatiable 
curiosity to know everything, except what is worth knowing’ (41). There is no contrast for 
Wilde between myth: ‘the primitive, anonymous collective poems’, and the art of the 
modern author; even these myths were ‘the invention of a single mind’- the one and many 
coincide: ‘The Critical Spirit and the World-Spirit are one’ (Intentions 122-3, 216). 
 
 
vii. The most impractical of theorists: the ‘ineradicable egoism’ of the artist and Wilde’s 
Individualism 
 
Joyce’s cosmopolitanism and indifference to tradition link him to Wildean 
aestheticism- a resemblance that he will ironically both accentuate and subvert through the 
character of Stephen Dedalus. The significance of tradition in “The Day of Rabblement” is 
implicit only through reference to another unnamed luminary whose tradition too is under 
threat of extinction and needs preservation by men ‘Elsewhere’ (OCPW 52). The Wildean 
critic, like the Nolan and Joyce, can survive on a ‘radical principle of artistic economy’: ‘the 
highest Criticism, being the purest form of personal impression, is in its way more creative 
than creation, as it has least reference to any standard external to itself, and is, in fact, its 
own reason for existing, and, as the Greeks would put it, in itself, and to itself, an end’ 
(Intentions 139). This type of ‘intellectual strike’ where the artist is permitted to masterfully 
‘employ the crowd’ but ‘is very careful to isolate himself’ does not seem consistent with the 
views of a ‘socialistic artist’ (Letters II 187, 89).  
Extolling Joyce’s “revolutionary” writing, Colin MacCabe regretfully concedes that 
his texts are ultimately ‘politically ineffective because they lack any definite notion of the 
audience to which they are addressed’ (Revolution of the Word 156). MacCabe’s criticism 
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sidelines, however, the debate on the “ideal audience” that Joyce responds to by questioning 
the links contemporary writers were attempting to forge with their audience through recourse 
to the bardic tradition. ‘The value of the bardic tradition for Synge’, Declan Kiberd argues, 
‘was that it reconciled this conflict – the awful disparity between the poem as imagined by 
the poet and the poem as recited by the performer’ (84). Through the restlessness, roles and 
rituals of his protagonists, Joyce criticises this ideal of an ‘enchanted audience’ that ‘having 
become, in Yeats’s words, “a single mind, a single energy”, are moved to “murmur” these 
shared rhythms after the poet or reciter’, ‘linking the mind of the people to the mind of the 
poet, which is itself linked to the mind of Nature’ (Schuchard 217). 
As Yeats found out in 1899, the artist idealises his audience at his own peril; Joyce’s 
“ideal” audience in 1906, ‘The Irish proletariat’, had ‘yet to be created’ (Letters II 186). The 
‘unsteady and ill-informed’ socialism of Joyce (by his own admission), the ideal community 
of which in “The Day of Rabblement” is made up of other individual(ist) artists shares, 
however, remarkable similarities with Wilde’s interpretation of socialism (Letters II 187). In 
the characteristically paradoxical version of socialism of Wilde, ‘Individualism … is what 
through Socialism we are to attain to’ (Soul of Man under Socialism 33). The exemplary 
model of this coincidence of contraries is the artist in Wilde’s comprehensive definition of 
this title: 
 
At present, in consequence of the existence of private property, a great many people 
are enabled to develop a certain very limited amount of Individualism. They are 
either under no necessity to work for their living, or are enabled to choose the sphere 
of activity that is really congenial to them, and gives them pleasure. These are the 
poets, the philosophers, the men of science, the men of culture—in a word, the real 
men, the men who have realised themselves, and in whom all Humanity gains a 
partial realisation. (6)  
 
The limited display of Individualism in society betrays for Wilde the oppressive exercise of 
authority that impedes the development of personality. Only artists ‘have been able to realise 
their personality more or less completely’ (12). But even their personalities have been 
‘wasted’, as most of them ‘have been obliged to be rebels’; ‘The note of the perfect 
personality is not rebellion’, however, ‘but peace’ (15, 16). 
Art and Individualism are defences against the ‘popular will’ and for Joyce, the 
‘floating will’ of Yeats (OCPW 51). In contrast to Yeats’s attempt to recuperate the idea of 
“popular” art, for Wilde ‘Art should never try to be popular’; instead, ‘The public should try 
to make itself artistic’ (30). When the artist yields to the claims of the public, ‘Art either 
entirely vanishes, or becomes stereotyped, or degenerates into a low and ignoble form of 
craft’ (29). This is what distinguishes journalism from art for Wilde as for Yeats: its 
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‘tradesman-like habits’ that urges the public to ‘desire the direct logic, the clear rhetoric, of 
‘popular poetry’’ (29; Ideas 14). Art is instead given birth to by the individual genius: ‘A 
work of art is the unique result of a unique temperament. Its beauty comes from the fact that 
the author is what he is’ (29). 
The answer therefore to the question “What is an author?” becomes inseparable from 
that of the meaning of art, and both Wilde and Joyce exploit in their fiction the paradoxes 
and hermeneutic complications that result from what appears to be a reductive principle of 
an artistic economy; but as the “myriadminded” Shakespeare of Stephen’s theory in Ulysses 
will demonstrate, ‘Personality is a very mysterious thing’ (20). The problematics of 
authorship become embroiled in the dilemmas and incertitudes of subjectivity that reveal the 
modernity of Joyce’s “subject” and make his work paradigmatic for postmodern philosophy. 
‘The true artist is a man who believes absolutely in himself, because he is absolutely 
himself’ for Wilde, and Stephen’s predicament as an artist will accordingly be presented as 
inextricable from a question of “belief”.  A parallel between the artist-hero’s crisis of faith 
and quest to become an artist is set up in the Portrait that will persist in Joyce’s later work; 
although in “Scylla and Charybdis” it will hinder rather Stephen’s career as a theorist (35).  
Individualism for Wilde, moreover, is not a mirror for narcissistic self-reflection, but 
a political weapon: ‘Art is Individualism, and Individualism is a disturbing and 
disintegrating force. Therein lies its immense value. For what it seeks to disturb is monotony 
of type, slavery of custom, tyranny of habit, and the reduction of man to the level of a 
machine’ (33). Wilde’s socialism is founded on an ideal of humanism that for Wilde as for 
Joyce is a modern concept, as it is born as a response to - and “heroically” in spite of - the 
dehumanising features of the modern metropolis. Joyce’s ambivalence towards the 
significance of the Renaissance in his essay on this period reflects the dual heritage of 
humanism and the dehumanising ‘tangle of machines’ this age imparts to modern man and 
society (OCPW 187). Like Joyce, Wilde reads modernity through the Renaissance, but also 
argues that this era bears a promise for modern man and the modern artist in particular, as it 
illustrates the interdependence of the rebirth of the arts and the flourishing of individualism: 
‘the Renaissance was great, because it sought to solve no social problem, and busied itself 
not about such things, but suffered the individual to develop freely, beautifully, and 
naturally, and so had great and individual artists, and great and individual men’ (Soul of Man 
53). 
From the ‘collective force’ of impersonal workers, according to Wilde, although 
‘Humanity gains much in material prosperity’, ‘it is only the material result that it gains, and 
the man who is poor is in himself absolutely of no importance. He is merely the infinitesimal 
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atom of a force that, so far from regarding him, crushes him: indeed, prefers him crushed, as 
in that case he is far more obedient’ (7). Bruno’s philosophy had illustrated both the threat to 
man in the boundless modern cosmos and the urgency of the endeavour to rescue him from 
nihilistic despair. Wilde, like Bruno and Joyce, understands the “redeeming” power of the 
‘ineradicable egoism’ that Stephen ‘conceived converging to him the deeds and thoughts of 
his microcosm’ (SH 39). Individualism is a ‘disturbing and disintegrating force’, but also 
forms a new whole by allowing man to develop ‘the full expression of a personality’, giving 
meaning and significance to man’s existence and reconciling him with the world that seems 
increasingly alien (26). 
The humanism of Wilde, however, is not an essentialist ideology; the new whole the 
‘complete and perfect man’ represents is dynamic and volatile: ‘The only thing that one 
really knows about human nature is that it changes. Change is the one quality we can 
predicate of it. The systems that fail are those that rely on the permanency of human nature, 
and not on its growth and development’ (15, 54). Like Wilde who searches for a model of 
‘the complete and perfect man’ in history, Joyce took pride in having discovered the fictional 
embodiment of the ‘complete man’ in the figure of Ulysses- or Bloom: ‘It will be a 
marvellous thing—the true personality of man—when we see it. It will grow naturally and 
simply, flowerlike, or as a tree grows’ (Budgen 16-17; Soul of Man 16). But the perfection of 
this complete man springs from the ‘mysterious’ nature of personality: ‘A man cannot 
always be estimated by what he does. He may keep the law, and yet be worthless. He may 
break the law, and yet be fine. He may be bad, without ever doing anything bad. He may 
commit a sin against society, and yet realise through that sin his true perfection’ (20). ‘There 
can be no reconciliation’, Stephen will repeat in “Scylla and Charybdis”, ‘if there has not 
been a sundering’ (U 249). 
With the rebellion against the concept of the original sin, the Enlightenment also 
eradicated this mysterious element of man’s being, thereby objectifying man, Cassirer 
argues: ‘The irreducible dualism of human nature is resolved only in the mystery of the fall. 
Human nature becomes comprehensible only by virtue of the incomprehensible mystery 
which underlies it. Thus all the standards of logical and rational knowledge are reversed’ 
(Philosophy of the Enlightenment 143). It is indeed through this mystery rather than a 
philosophical theory that Joyce tries to reconcile the warring twins of Finnegans Wake. 
Through a paradoxical coincidence of contraries, man could regain a prelapsarian integrity, 
Joyce remarked in an early notebook entry on Stephen: ‘He came to knowledge of innocence 
through sin’ (WD 95). Only crime for Wilde rivals art’s distinction as ‘the most intense mode 
of Individualism’, and from an early age the artist in the work of Joyce is distinguished more 
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by his “crimes” than by his artistic creations; the artist and the recidivist are related if not 
identical in Finnegans Wake (29).  
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Chapter 2: The Age of Enlightenment 
 
i. An inhuman theorist 
 
The characterisation of Joyce’s artist-hero through his interest in “theory” rather 
than art, both preserves the “mystery” of artistic creation and casts doubt on the very notion 
of authorship. Theory, moreover, does not give way to art, but assuming a modulating 
significance and defining the role of the artist, suggests that Joyce is either heralding with 
Hegel the end of art or is presenting a bitterly satirical portrait of the artist. 17 While Stephen 
is famous for his esthetic theory in the Portrait and his Hamlet theory in Ulysses, it is in 
Stephen Hero that his interest in theories is most conspicuous and diverse. The words 
“theory” and “criticism” are used repeatedly to describe his artistic endeavours, whereas in 
the Portrait his idealised poses of aloofness and indifference render him distinctly 
“uncritical”, while “theory” is only used three times: twice to refer specifically to his 
‘esthetic’ theory, and at the end of the fourth chapter to signal the impotence of theory in the 
face of Emma- of desire. 18 In Ulysses, “theory” is used solely with reference to Stephen’s 
“heretical” interpretation of Hamlet, while criticism is overshadowed by ‘moody brooding’ 
(9). 
For Rabaté, who has methodically analysed and categorised the different meanings 
of theory, Stephen’s absorption in the construction and presentation of theories betrays his 
problematic relation to authority that is also an impediment to his development into a rightful 
author: ‘Stephen’s heroism consists in the ardour and candor with which he strives to reach 
his goal of artistic self-generation through the egoistic production of a theory ... His “ordeal” 
consists in serial negotiations with figures of authority who can validate his “theories” and 
also recognize their marginal-or subversive-status’ (Politics of Egoism 78). 19 His theories 
are a passing stage in his career; “theory” is a privative term that needs to be corroborated by 
the practice of authority. Both theory and practice are negative terms for Rabaté; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Hugh Kenner has influentially argued that Stephen’s theory ‘is a fake’, suspecting that it was 
another ‘colossal leg pull’, as Gogarty was to describe Finnegans Wake (Dublin’s Joyce 98; JJ 722). 
Deconstruction has echoed Derrida’s qualified reference to Joyce as ‘the most Hegelian, perhaps, of 
modern novelists’, a perspective that Rabaté contrasts with the ‘radical otherness’ of Levinas 
(Authorized Reader 154-5). 
18 ‘His mind emptied of theory and courage, lapsed back into a listless peace’ (P 234). 
19 Vicky Mahaffey, who has also examined the idea of authorship in Joyce’s work in terms of the 
artist’s relation to and understanding of different types of authority, sees Stephen’s suppression of his 
desire for acknowledgement and validation as an impediment to his development as an artist: 
‘Stephen’s discoveries can never be more than recoveries as long as he overlooks his own desire for 
authority, refusing to see that the basis of authoritarian power is not the person wielding it, but the 
mental habits of those who respond to it…’ (56-7). 
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‘performance’ is related to desire for domination, ‘the hysterical contagion of the 
performative power of authority and orthodoxy’ (Authorized Reader 41). The theories reveal 
the “egoism”, immaturity and insecurities of Stephen that are related to his rejection of 
authority and his desire for freedom and independence - literary, philosophical, political and 
social - but also to his contradictory longing for validation and commendation: ‘The real 
“sublime” moment occurs when the author of the theory can renounce the paternity of the 
discourse, cutting as it were the umbilical cord linking the words to their enunciator, thus 
letting the theory follow its own course’ (Politics of Egoism 72). This sublime moment can 
only come after the theory- with art: ‘The theory will vanish only insofar as it teaches him 
how to “give birth” to art’ (71). But art for Rabaté is identified with ‘the performative power 
of language’; art is a drama in and of language (Authorized Reader 77). 
After the extinction of theory, the author as an emblem of the philosophical subject 
is next in line for execution in Rabaté’s serial progression; in Ulysses, ‘the death of the Artist 
… is in the name of the birth of language’ (Politics of Egoism 125). This sequence of 
disappearances is presented by Rabaté to highlight the significance of “silence” in Joyce’s 
work. Joyce is never tempted by the role of the bard, by the “metaphysics of presence” of 
speech; the theoretical philosopher gives way to the philologist, or ‘the reader-as-writer’ 
(152). Following Derrida, ‘The death of speech’ is presented as ‘the horizon and origin of 
language’ (Of Grammatology 315). The author relinquishes altruistically his theory, his self, 
his name, and his authority for the deliverance of the scholar. Art is as dubiously 
metaphysical as the Artist. But although Stephen certainly feels hampered and oppressed by 
the claims of various figures of authority and tyrannical ideologies, are the role of the author 
and the idea of authorship defined by their relation to and rebellion against authority? Does 
the theory of esthetics have a “didactic” function- does it teach the author how to make art? 




ii. The burgher notion of genius 
 
Stephen Hero differs from the Portrait not only in terms of the emphasis that 
Stephen places upon the need to construct a theory and the sense of gravity which 
accompanies his endeavours to construct and communicate his theories, but also in terms of 
Stephen’s certainty regarding his calling and confidence that characterises his pursuits as an 
artist. Whereas in the Portrait Stephen has a sudden and questionable conversion to the life 
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of the artist, in Stephen Hero his ordination as an artist is indubitable and all his attention is 
focused on the pursuit of this “career”. But he also scrutinises the conventional and contrived 
attributes and characteristics of the author; he has to destroy and reinterpret the 
preconceptions and prejudices of the public regarding the role of the artist, and discover 
through his own experiences and those of exemplary authors the fundamental components of 
this role. 
The most prevalent image that he has to try and challenge is that of the Romantic 
genius that had been contemporaneously revived and reinterpreted by nationalist movements 
across Europe. Genius, defined by Kant as ‘the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through 
which nature gives the rule to art’, had been attributed to the primeval and mythic bard: ‘the 
mouthpiece for a whole society, articulating its values, chronicling its history, and mourning 
the inconsolable tragedy of its collapse’, in an amalgamation of myth and philosophy that 
was indeed a heritage of the Romantic period (CAJ 168; Trumpener 6). Both the bard and 
the genius create “unconsciously”: ‘no Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas, so rich at 
once in fancy and in thought, enter and assemble themselves in his brain, for the good reason 
that he does not himself know, and so cannot teach others’ (CAJ 170). But even though the 
nationalist bard possessed boundless creativity, in contrast to the originality and 
independence of Kant’s genius, he was indistinguishable from his nation and owed his 
creations not so much to an inborn talent or inspiration from nature, but to a tradition that 
had been identified with nature; he calls upon the gods to help him recall the history of his 
people. His work glorifies his country and he is venerated in return. He is a mere 
“mouthpiece”, a medium. He sacrifices his identity in order to consolidate that of the nation. 
He is a historian rather than a poet; he is distinguished by his prodigious memory, not his 
originality. 
For Irish nationalism, David Lloyd argues, the recall of history played a pivotal role 
in the creation of a distinct identity: ‘Where the German nationalist’s identity is guaranteed 
by his language, revitalized by the philological tracing of the sensuous origins of his 
supersensuous ideas, the Irish nationalist revitalizes a relation to history that might have 
represented only death and division, finding in it both the lesson and the promise of unity’ 
(Nationalism and Minor Literature 68). The Irish artist must relinquish his claim to fame in 
order to aid the recall and recreation of a ‘Glorious, pious and immortal memory’: ‘Total 
immersion of the writer’s identity in that of the nation was seen as the first condition of a 
process that sought to fabricate a foreshortened literary history in which the development 
that had hitherto been thwarted might speedily be made up (U 38; Lloyd 76). 
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Stephen refuses to surrender his independence, talent, personal identity, and the 
contemporaneity that distinguishes him from his illustrious predecessors. But he has to 
dislodge the seductive image of the Romantic genius that haunts the popular imagination in 
order to be recognised as a legitimate artist:  
 
He was not convinced of the truth of the saying [Poeta nascitur, non fit] ‘The poet is 
born, not made’ but he was quite sure of c the truth of this at least: [Poema fit, non 
nascitur] ‘The poem is made not born’. The burgher notion of the poet Byron in 
undress pouring out verses [like] just as a city fountain pours out water seemed to 
him characteristic of most popular judgements on esthetic matters and he combated 
the notion at its root c by saying solemnly to Maurice – Isolation is the first principle 
of artistic economy c . (37) 
 
He is uncomfortable with the genetics of this ancient (and theologically suggestive) 
aphorism; the idea that the poet is ‘born’, however, is not exactly the ‘innate mental aptitude’ 
of Kant, even though it is simultaneously a translation of the ingenium of the genius. Kant 
speaks of a ‘talent’, a ‘natural endowment’, but through the reference to the genesis of the 
poet, Stephen seems to be resenting rather an ancestral bond and Trinitarian bond to the 
Father, not his bond to nature; to be upholding the originality that Kant bestowed to the 
genius by rejecting his origins. The artist is sui generis for Stephen; he creates his self, his 
identity, at the same time as he creates art. 
Moreover, although the metaphor of the fountain symbolises nature, its position at 
the centre of a city makes it a political (bourgeois) and cultural emblem. Although his author 
will later explain that for Stephen ‘the artistic process was a natural process’, Stephen will by 
no means take this likeness for granted and will persistently search for the differences as 
well as the similarities between art and nature (176). Giving birth to art is not a natural 
process for the male artist. So acute indeed is Stephen’s awareness of the artificiality of art – 
a vigilance that could be seen as both a consequence and a criticism of the Revival’s return 
to nature – that the genius of nature appears to curse him, depriving him of “inspiration”, 
hindering his development as an artist, and leaving him to wrestle with the construction of 
philosophical theories in a mental world. 
Stephen, however, is also rejecting the notion of creativity that is implied in 
thoughtless “spontaneous generation”. As well as betraying his anxieties regarding his 
creative abilities, the ideal of intuitive creation that he is rejecting would only further ‘the 
spiritual paralysis’ of Ireland; the poet would simply nurture bourgeois myths and become a 
symbol of bourgeois ideologies (151). Stephen, therefore, is compelled to seemingly do 
violence against nature by uprooting buried prejudices like a natural scientist, and like 
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Dante’s sodomites risk the punishment that will befall his successor Shem of walking 
eternally round in circles (‘Tossmania’, or exile in Tasmania) (FW 416). 
This ideal, moreover, is endorsed not only by the uncultivated populace, but also by 
his learned Jesuit masters. The surviving manuscript of Stephen Hero opens with an 
introduction to Father Butt, a ‘philosopher and scholar’ with literary expertise: ‘He read a 
series of papers at a total abstinence club to prove that Shakespeare was a Roman Catholic: 
he had also written against another Jesuit father who had very late in life been converted to 
the Baconian theory of the authorship of the plays’ (31). Seduced by the romantic idealism 
of the portrait of the inspired genius, he beguiles in turn his listeners, emulating the bard 
through his oratorical talent and turning the author into a religious symbol and a hero of his 
own art.  
It appears that Stephen is following (and later exploiting and satirising) the 
contemporary fashion for “theories” by assiduously constructing literary theories. But in 
contrast to these fanciful theories that nurtured popular preconceptions about authorship and 
promoted specific ideologies, the intention of Stephen’s theories in Stephen Hero is to 
expose such misconceptions by uncovering the mechanics of art and aesthetics. Following 
this introduction to Father Butt, we are told that Stephen had constructed a ‘theory on verse’; 
although the manuscript is unfortunately fragmentary and the details of the theory are 
missing, it is introduced with the assertion that ‘The beauty of verse consisted as much in the 
concealment as in the revelation of construction but it certainly could not proceed from only 
one of these’ (31). The artist, therefore, must not enchant his audience like a bard, but find 
instead a balance between concealment and revelation. Both processes, moreover, must be 
deliberate and calculated; siding with techne rather than physis in this ancient debate, 
Stephen’s model author is distinguished as a skilled craftsman. 
 
 
iii. The incessant labour of art 
 
As a scholar and scientist Stephen hopes to lead by example and recreate the image 
and role of the artist that had itself become fictional; the ‘extravagances’ of his theories are 
disregarded as ‘it was supposed probable that he represented really the artistic type’ (43). 
Stephen keeps his mystical and rapturous moments private, while his public appearances are 
distinguished by his ‘quiet deliberative manner’ (49). He becomes ‘a lover of the 
deformations wrought by dusk’, knowing that his peers ‘regarded his manifestations of 
spiritual activity as something more than unseemly’ and that his superiors were hoping ‘that 
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they would one day have the pleasure of receiving him officially into some hospital or 
asylum’ (184). As part of ‘that little known tribe’, the artist is both insignificant and 
irrelevant to modern society; and Kant is partly to blame in the antitheses he presents 
between the subject and the object, imagination and reason, theory and practice, ethics and 
aesthetics, art and life, genius and scientist: ‘It is quite plain that in order to say that the 
object is beautiful, and to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I 
can give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real 
existence of the object’ (CAJ 43). The subject is given complete creative freedom, but it is 
simultaneously alienated from reality. 
Art and aesthetics are distinguished by Kant from scientific knowledge; the 
judgment of taste is defined as ‘pure disinterested delight’: it ‘is not a cognitive judgement, 
and so not logical, but is aesthetic - which means that it is one whose determining ground 
cannot be other than subjective’ (43-4, 41-2). Rejecting tradition, regarded as the only true 
reality by the nationalists, and ranking the necessity of self-expression higher than the 
advancement of society, Stephen indeed alienates himself from reality, and comes to 
resemble, ironically, a ‘demagogue’ in his speculative declarations about art:  
 
It was not part of his life to undertake an extensive alteration of society but he felt 
the need to express himself such an urgent need, such a real need, that he was 
determined no conventions of a society, however plausibly mingling pity with its 
tyranny, should be allowed to stand in his way, and though a taste for elegance and 
detail unfitted him for the part of demagogue, [in] from his general attitude he might 
have been supposed not unjustly an ally of the collectivist politicians, who are often 
very seriously upbraided by [believers] opponents who believe in Jehovahs, and 
decalogues and judgments [for] with sacrificing the reality to an abstraction. (151-2) 
 
The “science” and “labour” involved in the creation and judgment of art are 
repeatedly highlighted by Stephen in an effort to convince his society that his work is 
valuable and plays a significant role in society, and more importantly, that he deserves to get 
paid for it. He tries in vain to reconcile convincingly the paradox that he presents to Lynch 
that his role requires his detachment from society, but society ought to pay him for his 
“service”: ‘I do not want to sell my poetical mind to the public. I expect reward from the 
public for my verses because I believe my verses are to be numbered among the spiritual 
assets of the State. That is not a simoniacal exchange’ (207). The invocation of simony 
reveals the perplexity of the artistic economy, and his author casts doubt on Stephen’s 
financial prowess: ‘The economic aspect of the affair did not present itself to him very 
vividly and, indeed, was only vivid enough to make him deplore the fact that the solution of 
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moral problems should be so hopelessly entangled with merely material considerations’ 
(208). 
To defend his paradoxical display of his art as both spirit and matter, Stephen 
presents a highly contentious example of the transaction between the state and a woman’s 
body: legitimate when sold ‘as a harlot or as a married woman or as a working celibate or as 
a mistress’, but a simoniacal exchange when the woman is considered as a free human being 
(207). It seems that Kant’s difficulty with ascribing objectivity to art, was not unjustifiable. 
But Stephen wants to advertise both the value and the rationality of his art, while 
simultaneously claiming that it is invaluable: ‘As an artist he had nothing but contempt for a 
work which had arisen out of any but the most stable mood of the mind. Was it possible that 
he would exercise less rigour on his life than he desired to exercise on his art?’ (209) For 
MacCann, art is “necessary”, but only because it is identified with the need of man for 
relaxation and entertainment: ‘he was of the opinion that amusement is necessary for the 
bodily welfare of mankind’ (49). 
Even though the idea of the genius is alluring, it belittles the ‘work’ and 
accomplishments of the artist, and exiles him from modern society where his effortless 
creations are seen as signs of indolence: ‘A man might think for seven years at intervals and 
all at once write a quatrain which would immortalise him seemingly without thought or care 
- seemingly. Then the groundling will say: “O, he could write poetry”: and if I ask “How 
was that?" the groundling will answer “Well, he just wrote it, that's all”’ (190). Stephen tries 
persistently to show the poet in action: he enacts philosophical dialogues, gives speeches, 
performs at the Donnybrook house- singing, playing the piano, acting, always with a 
‘composed’ and ‘quiet deliberative manner’ (49). Having no role in society, however, he 
risks becoming an actor of his own theories, simply a performer. ‘There should be an art of 
gesture’, he tells Cranly; ‘I would like to go out into Grafton St some day and make gestures 
in the middle of the street’ (188-9). He certainly succeeds in dispelling the stereotypical 
image of the artist in his attempt to construct ‘the enigma of a manner’; ‘A poet according to 
you, is a terribly mixed-up fellow’, Cranly responds to his unconventional portrayal of the 
role of the artist (32, 190). ‘I don't believe that beauty is fortuitous’, Stephen insists, and he 
invokes the trusted figure of Aquinas to help him make beauty “good”- necessary, 
“interested”, by arguing that both ‘the true and the beautiful were desirable’, in contrast to 
Kant’s aesthetic disinterestedness and differentiation between the agreeable, the beautiful 
and the good (189-90, 175). But he has to legitimate his desire: ‘He desired for himself the 
life of an artist’, but ‘feared that the Church would obstruct his desire’ (209). Both the state 
and the church are antagonistic to the suspect role and objectives of the artist.  
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Kant’s dissociation of aesthetics from ethics, moreover, and the more contemporary 
nineteenth century Aesthetic movement, had rendered the artist and art amoral and 
precarious:  
 
‘the c young men in the college c regarded art as a continental vice and they said in 
effect, ‘If we must have art are there not enough subjects in Holy-Writ?’ – for an 
artist with them was a man who painted pictures. It was a bad sign for a young man 
to show interest in anything but his examinations or his prospective ‘job’. It was all 
very well to be able to talk about it but really art was all ‘rot’: besides it was 
probably immoral; they knew (or, at least, they had heard) about studios. They didn’t 
want that kind of thing in their country. Talk about beauty, talk about rhythms, talk 
about esthetic – they knew what all the fine talk covered (38). 
 
Stephen’s criticism of ‘the antique principle that the end of art is to instruct, to elevate, and 
to amuse’ as one of the chief ‘profanities’, and his reinterpretation of the idea of ‘classical’ 
art in his essay causes an uproar in the ‘Literary and Historical Society’: ‘The essay was 
pronounced a jingle of meaningless words, a clever presentation of vicious principles in the 
guise of artistic theories, a reproduction of the decadent literary opinions of exhausted 
European capitals’ (107). Art for art’s sake, Pater’s love of words for their own sake and 
Wilde’s perverse veneration of beauty are detected behind’s Stephen’s rejection of tradition, 
nation and religion as the “end” of art. ‘[Y]ou must first have a nation before you have art’, 
his Irish class teacher retaliates to what he sees as an assault against the Irish nation by a 
‘renegade’: ‘the moral welfare of the Irish people was menaced by such theories. They 
wanted no foreign filth. Mr Daedalus might read what authors he liked, of course, but the 
Irish people had their own glorious literature where they could always find fresh ideals to 
spur them on to new patriotic endeavours’ (108). The authority of nationality, morality and 
tradition give the rule to art: ‘Ireland would be on her guard against the insidious theory that 
art can be separated from morality’. The examples of art are regulative and its authors 
representative of the laws that govern her. As a mouthpiece of these authorities the artist 
bears a great burden of responsibility. 
 
 
iv. The idea of the classical 
 
 The task that Stephen is faced with is not only critical, but also hermeneutical. He 
has to reinterpret and reformulate, destroy and rebuild the relation between symbol and sign, 
otherwise his theories risk being as unintelligible as the ‘thayology’ of the church- the words 
‘that you nor me can’t intarpit’ the congregation admires unconsciously because they have 
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been uttered by figures of authority (126). The exemplarity of the models that art provides 
has been confused with the dogmatism of authority. The gravity of the hermeneutical task is 
much more prominent in the Portrait and in Ulysses; Stephen’s character in Stephen Hero is 
distinguished by his disregard of the task of interpretation and preference for a religious 
veneration of Words. In Stephen Hero he allows himself only the humble role of the exegete; 
he does not yet exploit the creative possibilities that the hermeneutic task will afford him in 
his later literary appearances, focused as he is on the ‘science of esthetic’. ‘I have not 
changed the terms. I have explained them’, he defends himself to the President; although he 
discovers, particularly through his identification with heretical figures, the precariousness of 
this endeavour (102). The novelties of Stephen are threatening not because they are 
antagonistic to the old symbols, but because they subsume the old, they are the old, as Joyce 
will insist throughout his career with increasing faith in the multivalency of symbols- in the 
coincidence of the one and the many.  
The boldness of his enterprise is exhibited in his reinterpretation of the concept of 
the “classical”. ‘A great contempt devoured him for the critics who considered “Greek” and 
“classical” interchangeable terms’ and in his essay he argues that ‘Classicism is not the 
manner of any fixed age or of any fixed country: it is a constant state of the artistic mind. It 
is a temper of security and satisfaction and patience’ (38, 83). The classical is for Stephen a 
stylistic and methodical concept, a quality that aids the artist in the construction of the work 
of art. It is a term that is pertinent to the artist: ‘a constant state of the artistic mind’, rather 
than a critical standard. In contrast to the romantic ‘insecure, unsatisfied, impatient temper’, 
the classical temper is analytic, “scientific” and hermeneutic: ‘ever mindful of limitations, 
chooses rather to bend upon these present things and so to work upon them and fashion them 
that the quick intelligence may go beyond them to their meaning which is still unuttered’ 
(83). The romantic temper, like Schiller’s, is theoretic and idealistic: it ‘sees no fit abode 
here for its ideals and chooses therefore to behold them under insensible figures’, whereas 
the classical temper is practical and concrete: ‘ancient art was plastic and … modern art was 
pictorial’, Stephen argues (83, 38). But even though he rejects Lessing’s Kantian twofold 
forms of intuition- nacheinander and nebeneinander, his division resembles another 
Romantic differentiation- Hegel’s more “scholarly” distinction between classical and 
romantic art. 20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ‘The classical type of art … finds adequate realization in sculpture, while it treats architecture only 
as furnishing an enclosure in which it is to operate, and has not acquired the power of developing 
painting and music as absolute forms for its content. The romantic type of art … takes possession of 
painting and music, and in like manner of poetic representation, as substantive and unconditionally 
adequate modes of utterance’ (Aesthetics 97). The ideas of substance and adequacy that Hegel uses to 
describe romantic art that seem to contradict Joyce’s definition of romantic art, are contradictory also 
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‘In the Jena period’, Tilottama Rajan explains, ‘‘Classical’ and ‘modern’ … become 
critical approaches rather than historical categories, with the modern being at once the 
symptom, the cause and the corrective for Schlegel’s failure to work out a ‘classical’ 
approach to ancient poetry. The ‘classical poetical genres’, he writes, ‘have now become 
ridiculous in their rigid purity’ (in M. Brown ed. 234-5). Stephen denies the historical aspect 
of the classical, seeing it as a critical and stylistic model. The classical is an obstacle to 
Stephen’s Enlightenment project against ‘ancient superstitions and prejudices’, as its 
historicity links it to specific traditions (180). ‘The spell which the classics of the ancient 
world cast upon the spirit of later times was first dissolved with the ideals of the French 
Enlightenment’, Habermas argues (“Modernity versus Postmodernity” 4). The idea of 
modernity that had previously signified ‘a renewed relationship to the ancients - whenever, 
moreover, antiquity was considered a model to be recovered through some kind of 
imitation’, ‘changed with the belief, inspired by modern science, in the infinite progress of 
knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral betterment’ (3-4). The 
Enlightenment’s revolt against authority manifests itself in this emptying of the significance 
of the classical’s value in its inviolable preservation of tradition, and shift in emphasis on 
‘classical style’, a “method” that benefits the “advancement” of the modern writer.  
Stephen repeatedly distinguishes himself as “modern”, and finds a model of such 
aspiration towards infinite knowledge in the figure and philosophy of Bruno, who is the 
herald of the Enlightenment according to Cassirer (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 38). He 
insists repeatedly on the difference between ancient and modern; the distinction for him is 
not simply ‘a trick of words’ as it is for Cranly: ‘Stephen tried to sustain against him that 
though humanity may not change beyond recognition during the short eras known as the 
ages of man yet these ages are the preys of different ideas in accordance with which every 
activity, even the least, which they engender is conceived and directed’ (179). This 
insistence once again links him to the German Romantic theorists of the Jena period for who, 
Rajan notes quoting Schlegel, ‘there is an ‘absolute difference between ancient and modern’, 
which are structural and epistemic, not simply thematic, terms’ (234). It is precisely as 
‘structural and epistemic’ that Stephen sees the historical distinction between different eras, 
and he uses this antithesis as a weapon against the romanticising tendencies of the Revival to 
emphasise an unbridgeable gap with the past. 
“Romantic” is no longer equivalent to modern for Stephen, however, as it was for 
the German theorists, and for him “modern” seems to imply a separate third era. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
within Hegel’s Lectures. To these two types, however, Hegel adds a third that comes before them, the 
symbolic type of art. 
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Nevertheless, his essay does not refer to a third era, and in his evident partiality for 
classicism, he appears to conflate the classical with the modern. This implicit link between 
the classical temper and his own modern temper allows him to defend the validity of the 
‘modern method’ (190). Even though Stephen’s essay is presented ‘with a naïf air of 
discovering novelties’, the significance of art for him is not merely a matter of style; he 
understands the significance of the role of the artist as bringing to the world ‘spiritual 
renewal’ and preserving ‘the eternal images of beauty’ (81, 197, 218). ‘Art’, he explains to 
his mother, ‘is the very central expression of life. An artist is not a fellow who dangles a 
mechanical heaven before the public. The priest does that. The artist affirms out of the 
fullness of his own life, he creates’ (90-1). The artist has to beware of accepting the flattering 
divine ordination that the public seems eager to bestow on him- at a high cost, as we saw. 
The artist reveals something enduring that the classical represents. In contrast to the 
‘curiosity’ of the rabblement that journalism cultivates - ‘The London public will flock to see 
anything new or strange’, Stephen tells the President - the artist’s loyalty lies with “Truth” 
(102). The dissociation of the classical with history and tradition that the Enlightenment 
instigated gave rise to this fascination with the “novel”; but this novelty is not what 
distinguishes the “modern”, Habermas argues: ‘while that which is merely “stylish” will 
soon become outmoded, that which is modern preserves a secret tie to the classical. Of 
course, whatever can survive time has always been considered to be a classic. But the 
emphatically modern document no longer borrows this power of being a classic from the 
authority of a past epoch; instead, a modern work becomes a classic because it has once been 
authentically modern’ (“Modernity versus Postmodernity” 4). To be truly modern Stephen 
must avoid the temptation of seducing his audience by means of stylistic curiosities that 
suggested, moreover, aestheticism after the legacy of his Victorian predecessors.  
 
 
v. The ideal of scholarship 
 
Kant’s description of the role of aesthetics, ‘taste’, as ‘the discipline (or corrective) 
of genius’ that ‘severely clips its wings, and makes it orderly or polished’ and ‘gives it 
guidance directing and controlling its flight, so that it may preserve its character of finality’, 
suggests the necessity, but also the temptation of substituting- or at least amalgamating, the 
role of the artist with that of the critic (CAJ 184). When accused by his brother of drinking 
excessively and neglecting his writing, Joyce replied, ‘I may perhaps employ my sober 
moments in correcting the grammatical errors of the more illiterate among the rugged 
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geniuses’ (S. Joyce 248). Although this claim was voiced in a moment of frustration, the 
state of Irish art appears to demand such wing clipping (that Stephen suggests through his 
name) rather than the crowning of a young Irish bard with ‘that queer thing genius’ that 
dominates the discussion in the library in Ulysses (250). ‘Would you be surprised if I wrote a 
very good English grammar some day?’ Joyce asked his brother in 1905, in the period when 
his role as a reader and a critic of art was paramount in his “aesthetic education” (Letters II 
86). 
Stephen’s apprenticeship as an artist indeed begins with philological study: ‘People 
seemed to him strangely ignorant of the value of words they used so glibly’; and in his 
fascination with words and their meanings, ‘he read poetry as one would read a thesaurus 
and made a c garner c of words’ and ‘Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary by the hour’ (32). As 
part of ‘that little known tribe’ of artists, Stephen typically ‘educat[es] himself’ (43). His 
educational methods, however, are peculiar: ‘He sought in his verses to fix the most elusive 
of his moods and he put his lines together not word by word but letter by letter’ (37). Not 
only words, but even single letters are imbued with extraordinary value and meaning to 
which others are blind. But Stephen is not as isolated as he thinks; both this belief and his 
dedication link him to distinct Irish traditions. Vicky Mahaffey observes that ‘Ireland’s 
linguistic traditions feature the letter as worthy of being celebrated in its own right, whether 
that letter is conceived as part of a sacred tree, or whether it is an initial letter, elaborately 
illuminated by the monks at Kells’ (States of Desire 13). Flood, illustrating the dedication of 
the Irish scholars, quotes the remark of a German critic that ‘there is not a single letter of the 
entire alphabet which does not give evidence, both in its general form and its minute parts, of 
the sound judgement and taste of the penman’ (109). And in the Book of Revelation, Christ 
identifies himself through the first and last letter of the Greek alphabet.  
Stephen’s role as a scholar is simultaneously humble and presumptuous, as he 
imagines himself as a Holy Writer: ‘the saint who formerly was c chary of speech c in 
obedience to a commandment of silence could just be recognised in the artist who schooled 
himself to silence lest words should return him his discourtesy. Phrases came to him asking 
to have themselves explained. He said to himself: I must wait for the Eucharist to come to 
me: and then he set about translating the phrase into common sense’ (36). His role is 
hermeneutic rather than creative. He also combines the two roles, however, and appears to 
contradict his rejection of artistic inspiration, as ‘He spent days and nights hammering 
noisily as he built a house of silence for himself’ in order to ‘await his Eucharist’ (36). But in 
contrast to the ingenium of the Romantic genius, he receives his inspiration from God, 
manifesting the theological roots of this philosophical and literary notion that has become a 
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bourgeois myth. He finds roles for himself as a workman, humble scholar, celebrant and 
servant of God. And the reception of his inspiration dramatically casts him in the role of the 
Virgin Mary: ‘he would suddenly hear a command to begone, to be alone, a voice agitating 
the very tympanum of his ear, a flame leaping into divine cerebral life’ (36).  
Stephen transgresses the limits of the roles of both philosopher and the philologist; 
‘the intellect had great trouble keeping him within bounds’ and he becomes “inspired” by 
language: ‘his mind, which had from the first been only too submissive to the infant sense of 
wonder, was often hypnotised by the most commonplace conversation’ (35, 32). This does 
not seem to be the wonder that according to Aristotle compelled men to philosophise, but the 
trance-like states of artistic inspiration and initiation that Yeats had described. His habit of 
repeating words to himself ‘till they lost all instantaneous meaning for him and became 
wonderful vocables’, seems rather a parody of the role of the philologist in Stephen’s 
extraordinary love of the logos even when hollow, but also of Yeats’s fascination with 
incantation, chanting, ‘rites, rituals and esoteric practices’, and his design for the Abbey 
theatre to become ‘a theatre of musical speech and chanted verse’ (36; Schuchard 135, xxii). 
Stephen finds words ‘for his treasure-house’ from Skeat’s dictionary and ‘haphazard in the 
shops, on advertisements, in the mouths of the plodding public’, in contrast to Yeats’s search 
for them in the idyllic countryside and pure and original language of the people (36). 
Stephen’s words, moreover, are hoarded for his ‘treasure-house’ rather than 
employed for the creation of a common culture and consolidation of tradition. Whereas 
Yeats sought a revival of oral poetry and the bardic vocation, Stephen’s chanting leads to 
meaninglessness- or at least an esoteric meaning, and he ‘schooled himself to silence’ (36). 
Words for him ‘are simply receptacles for human thought’; divorced from discourse and 
communal tradition they are indeed “silent” (33). Rather than manifesting his proficiency as 
a scholar or rejection of the idealism of Yeats, his collection of recycled words is driven by 
his desire to distil their essence. His ideal word is the ‘inner word’ of Scholasticism: ‘the 
mirror and the image of the divine Word’, that ‘says what the thing is, is nothing by itself 
and does not seek to be anything’ (Gadamer 420). The ‘inner word’ that Scholasticism 
appealed to in order to explain the mystery of the Trinity, is ‘not related to a particular 
language, nor does it have the character of vaguely imagined words that proceed from the 
memory; rather, it is the subject matter thought through to the end (forma excogitata)’ (421). 
It has a processual and mystical character like the Trinity: ‘It is not utterance but thought; 
however, what is achieved in this speaking to oneself is the perfection of thought’, Gadamer 
explains (421-2).   
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Unlike the divine word, however, ‘the human word is essentially incomplete. No 
human word can express our mind completely’; ‘because our intellect is imperfect—i.e., is 
not completely present to itself in what it knows—it needs the multiplicity of words. It does 
not really know what it knows’ (424). ‘Whereas God completely expresses his nature and 
substance in the Word in pure immediacy, every thought that we think (and therefore every 
word in which the thought expresses itself) is a mere accident of the mind. The word of 
human thought is directed toward the thing, but it cannot contain it as a whole within itself’ 
(424-5). The ‘receptacle’ of the word allows the “actualisation” of thought only in the mind 
of the Maker- the artist for Stephen; ‘the mouths of the plodding public’ adulterate this 
relation between potency and act (SH 36). 
Reflecting his scepticism of the ability of language to communicate the truth 
following this contamination, Stephen’s ideal language requires the construction of ‘an entire 
science of esthetic’; a science that like that of Scholasticism discloses its debt to Greek 
philosophy, employed to disentangle the “algebra” of the Trinitarian economy that involves 
both letters and numbers in its calculations. According to Heidegger, 
 
In the Greek sense what is “true” […] is aisthēsis, the straightforward sensuous 
apprehending of something. To the extent that an aisthēsis aims at its idia [what is its 
own] – the beings genuinely accessible only through it and for it, for example, 
looking at colors – apprehending is always true. What is in the purest and most 
original sense “true” – that is, what only discovers in such a way that it can never 
cover up anything – is pure noein, straightforwardly observant apprehension of the 
simplest determinations of the Being of beings as such. (80) 
 
Such silent monologue of thought, a science of ‘aisthēsis’ is the model of Stephen’s ideal 
language, as his analogies of the poetic word and beauty with the Triniarian Word that 
proceeds ‘eternally uncreate’ betray (Noon 119). He responds to the movement of the 
Revival of the Irish language by casting doubt on the very idea of language; robed in ‘the 
vestment of its appearance’ language cannot communicate the truth (SH 218). Unless the 
artist is allowed ‘to pierce to the significant heart of everything’, language functions as a sign 
system, as ‘an instrument of subjectivity’ which ‘ultimately leads to the rational construction 
of an artificial language’, Gadamer warns (417). As Finnegans Wake will dramatise through 
the perpetual creation of “new” languages, ‘Postreintroducing’ the same in an impossible 
exhaustion of the meaning of language, the rupture between language and thought (both 
individual and collective), does not only lead to miscommunication but also to a ‘reiterative 
regress’ of “metalanguages” in a hermeneutical nightmare (246; Gadamer 414-5). While for 
deconstuctionist critics ‘Joyce’s texts refuse the very category of meta-language’, the 
language of Finnegans Wake reflects not only the mythical simultaneity between word and 
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thing, but also presents a dramatisation of such regress that language as a sign system 
precipitates (MacCabe, Revolution 14). 
In Stephen Hero, however, Stephen does ground the meaning of words in a tradition; 
‘they receive more valuable thoughts’, he argues, in the ‘literary tradition’- in the mind of 
literary authors (34). His fascination with words and hermeneutics, but also scepticism about 
the ability of language to reflect the truth, indeed reveals his “enamourment” with a 
Renaissance ‘idealising’ and ‘more veritably human tradition’ (SH 32). ‘In view of the 
Humanist’s philological task and of the experience of the ambiguity of every word in 
varying contexts’, according to Ernesto Grassi, ‘the significance of words is no longer a 
rational definition of being, but a response to historical claims in view of which being – 
subject and object – is discovered in its meaning’ (32). While the movement of the Irish 
language revival appears to claim a mythical unity between word and thing in its devaluation 
of the historicity of language and search its ‘original hen’, Stephen’s view of language is 
closer to the nominalism of the Renaissance that revealed the creative possibilities in man’s 
freedom to name things- the poetic character of language (FW 110).  
The emphasis on the historicity and creativity of language of Renaissance 
philosophy, however, makes Stephen’s scientific method appear dubious; his fall into the 
heterogeneity and indeterminacy of language threatens his quest for ‘certitude’:  
 
c He doubled backwards into the past of humanity and caught glimpses of emergent 
art as one might have a vision of the plesiosauros emerging from his ocean of slime. 
He seemed almost to hear the simple cries of fear and joy and wonder which are 
antecedent to all song, the savage rhythms of men pulling at the oar, c to see the rude 
scrawls and portable gods of men whose legacy Leonardo and Michelangelo inherit. 
And over all this chaos of history and legend, of fact and supposition, he strove to 
draw out a line of order, to reduce the abysses of the past to order by a diagram. (36-
7)  
 
Stephen is shown to seek the experience of art like Pater, rather than a detached scientific 
determination of the “truth” of art. He is a participant as well as an observer of this spectacle; 
he appears to have fallen into a Renaissance painting. The history of art is conceived 
mythically and artistically- through the productions of his predecessors. But he is compelled 
to become a “scientist” because this tradition imaginatively conceived surpasses logic and 
understanding; he tries to ‘reduce’ the abysses in order to ‘ascertain scientifically what art is’ 
(38; Hegel, Aesthetics 13). Stephen feels the need to grasp the ontological foundation of the 
world and art before he can bring to life his own creations. His essay is conceived on the 
premise ‘that no-one served the generation into which he had been born so well as he who 
offered it, whether in his art or in his life, the gift of certitude’, and his art like nature must 
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vi. The passion for a supremely satisfying order 
 
To treat ‘the philosophy of artistic beauty’ ‘scientifically’, Hegel argues, ‘we must 
begin with its Conception’; although this does not imply, as it does for Stephen, a mythical 
journey into the past, but determining the ground of this concept (Aesthetics 27). ‘The object 
of every science presents prima facie two aspects: in the first place, that such an object is; in 
the second place, what it is’ (27). The difficulty with the scientific investigation of art is not 
only that we can’t determine what art is, as ‘what we have at command are merely the 
elements and aspects of it, as they are or have at former periods been presented, in the 
diverse ideas of the beautiful and of art in the mere common consciousness’, but also more 
worryingly, if it is at all: ‘If…the objects are of subjective kind, i.e. are given only in the 
mind, and not as external sensuous objects, we are confronted by our conviction that there is 
nothing in the mind but what its own activity has produced’ (29, 28). 
In order to try to capture and control this fleeting world of the innumerable 
manifestations of art in the ‘chaos of history and legend’ and try to interpret the 
incomprehensible ‘rude scrawls’ that art affords, Stephen appeals for the aid of philosophy. 
‘The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of 
the intuition)’, feels to Stephen as to Kant, ‘like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself’, and 
requires reason and mathematics, in a vain effort to measure the abyss, as ‘for the rational 
idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing 
out such an effort on the part of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of 
attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility’ (CAJ 107). This “excess” of the imagination 
characterises the experience of the sublime for Kant: ‘The mind feels itself set in motion in 
the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is 
beautiful therein it is in restful contemplation’ (107). Although the idea of the sublime 
disappears from Stephen’s aesthetic discourse after Stephen Hero, Stephen’s aesthetic 
education and experiences are still suspended in both the Portrait and Ulysses between the 
ideal of ‘restful’ theoretical contemplation and the experience of sublime moments of 
enthusiasm. 
‘To talk about the perfection of one’s art’, Stephen’s author explains following 
Stephen’s discussion with Father Artifoni on the relation between the good and the beautiful, 
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‘was not for him to talk about something agreed upon as sublime but in reality no more than 
a sublime convention but rather to talk about a veritably sublime process of one's nature 
which had a right to examination and open discussion’ (SH 176). As for Kant, ‘true 
sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject, and not in the object of 
nature that occasions this attitude by the estimate formed of it’, a mind that ‘feels itself 
elevated in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still unequal to 
its ideas’ (104-5). This sublime experience of art, moreover, is a cause of Stephen’s 
isolation: ‘It was exactly this vivid interest which kept him away from such places of 
uncomely dalliance as the debating society and the warmly cushioned sodality’ (176). Once 
again Stephen seems to follow Kant, who both lures the young artist to a godlike view of 
artistic life as disinterested contemplation, and exposes his pretensions through his claim that 
‘isolation from all society is looked upon as something sublime’ (130). 
Whereas taste is for Kant ‘sensus communis’, ‘public sense’: ‘a critical faculty which 
in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else’, 
in order to avoid subjectivism, ‘an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its 
judgement’, the sublime is distinguished by isolation as ‘a faculty of mind transcending 
every standard of sense’ (151, 98). This private sublimity indeed characterises the artist’s 
individual experience of art in Joyce’s work as Stephen’s secret experiences of rapture 
reveal, but also the poems of Chamber Music, where the artist/performer is completely 
engrossed in an aesthetic experience that is consonant with a lover’s devotion and 
enthusiasm. In the absence of a Yeatsian traditional ‘community’, aesthetics prevent art from 
becoming hedonistic. 
 The ‘science of esthetic’ seems to be needed, therefore, as ‘the discipline (or 
corrective) of genius’, so that the ‘fantastic idealist’ can avoid becoming a Byronic 
spontaneous fountain instead of a hardworking founder (39). Stephen’s theories have a 
demystifying objective; in the long walks of Stephen and his brother that were ‘beguiled’ 
‘with philosophic discourse’ and which allowed Stephen to construct ‘an entire science of 
esthetic’, the two brothers ‘both felt that it was possible to arrive at a sane understanding of 
so-called mysteries if one only had patience enough’ (41). In the midst of idealistic and 
heroic traditions that lure the outwardly composed Stephen to sensuous ‘breathless flights of 
zeal’, such a science grounds his imagination by fixing it to definitive rules and laws (35). 
 The contents of this science, however, are vague and scattered among various 
sections and fragmentary dialogues. This scientist is not very methodical; for all his defence 
of the reality of the “thing” of art, the object of his investigation is unclear. Hegel confesses 
that the methodology of the aesthetic science is confronted with a mutually exclusive 
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paradox; that following the law of non-contradiction seems to ‘hinder us from arriving at any 
true result’: ‘On one side we see the science of art merely, so to speak, busying itself with 
the actual productions of art from the outside’, while ‘On the other side we see science 
abandoning itself independently to reflection upon the beautiful, and producing mere 
generalities which do not touch the work of art in its peculiarity, creating, in short, an 
abstract philosophy of the beautiful’ (Aesthetics 17). 
Although in the Portrait Stephen’s theory is better organised than Stephen Hero into 
a tripartite structure, 21 Stephen undertakes the dual investigation that Hegel suggests in both 
books: ‘general points of view that are to govern both criticism and artistic production’ and 
‘an abstract philosophy of the beautiful’. But even though the Portrait theory is 
distinguished by its clearer structure, it lacks the investigation of ‘actual productions’, that 
Stephen engages with on various occasions in Stephen Hero. The structure of the Portrait, 
moreover, suggests that Stephen’s theory has enabled him to give birth to art, as it is 
followed by his composition of the villanelle; in Stephen Hero, the villanelle is composed 
after an “epiphany” that gives birth to both a “theory” and art. The “end” of theory in the two 
books therefore seems to differ. Whereas in Stephen Hero the theory of ‘applied Aquinas’ 
that Stephen presents to the Literary and Historical Society is ‘intended to define his own 
position for himself’ and is presented in order ‘to satisfy his own taste for enigmatic rôles’, 
his theories in the Portrait have only interlocutors for an audience and Stephen becomes 
increasingly resentful of the rôles he is forced into in his deliveries (81). 
The essay “Art and Life” appears to correspond to Hegel’s first manner of the 
scientific investigation of art: giving a division of the genres of art, defining the role of the 
artist and the qualities of his temper, describing the role of the critic and the ‘modern 
spectator’ and concluding with a Shelleyan eulogy to the poet - ‘the intense centre of the life 
of his age to which he stands in a relation than which none can be more vital’ - Stephen 
provides ‘general points of view that are to govern both criticism and artistic production’ 
(85; Aesthetics 17). These general formulas of the first manner of investigation have had two 
differing functions in the history of art, according to Hegel. For writers like Aristotle and 
Horace, they were ‘meant to stand especially as precepts and rules, according to which, 
particularly in times of degeneration of poetry and art, works of art were meant to be 
produced’; although clearly, Hegel argues, they failed in this aim (18). In modern times, their 
aim has been to form taste, but they have failed on this account too: ‘formation of taste only 
touched what was meagre and external, and moreover drew its precepts only from a narrow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Stephen divides his theory quite clearly into three separate sections in the Portrait: examining the 
role of the spectator and critic first, then the nature of beauty and the object of art, and finally the 
role(s) of the artist. 
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range of works of art and from a borné culture of intellect and feelings’ (19). This has failed 
to satisfy modern man as ‘we assume something further’ behind the external element of art, 
‘something inward, a significance, by which the external semblance has a soul breathed into 
it’ (23). To avoid abstract speculation, Hegel insists that we need to examine the content of 
the work of art: ‘Only the scholarship of the history of art has retained its permanent value’: 
‘the aesthetic appreciation of individual work of art’ and ‘the historical circumstances that 
externally condition such works’.   
 Abstract speculation is avoided in Stephen’s theory through the ‘method’ of the 
‘classical temper’, that in contrast to the romantic temper’s ‘figures blown to wild 
adventures’, ‘chooses rather to bend upon these present things’ (83). It is this ‘classical style’ 
that prevented, we are told, Stephen’s theory descending into ‘spiritual anarchy’. However, 
referring to no individual works and no historical circumstances - in fact, as we saw, turning 
the historicity of the classical into an element of style, abstracting art from history and 
tradition through the ‘revolutionary’ claim that ‘the tradition of art is with the artists’ and 
warning critics that they must ‘verify their calculations’ like ancient astronomers or seers 
‘When the poetic phenomenon is signalled in the heavens’ - Stephen’s theory is more 
romantic than classical (84-5). 
 
 
vii. Beauty and the splendour of truth 
 
If Hegel considers the results of the aims of his first method to have been a failure, 
he is equally cautious about the second: ‘the study of the beautiful in its separate nature and 
in its own idea may itself turn into an abstract Metaphysic’, and once again he emphasises 
the significance of content: of ‘combining metaphysical universality with the 
determinateness of real particularity’ (Aesthetics 25-6). As we have seen, Joyce’s 
compatriots felt that he was guilty of this error, and it is certainly puzzling why his aspiring 
artist-hero needs to define “beauty”, through a theory so abstract that he simply earns for 
himself a reputation as an eccentric. Abstract theoretical pronouncements, however, allow 
Stephen to rid art of the interests of nationalism and religion that ‘corrupt the springs of 
speculation at their very source’ (81). 
Philosophy allows the author to perform a dramatic catharsis, as Joyce will defiantly 
declare in his poetic manifesto “The Holy Office”. Naming himself ‘Katharsis-Purgative’ 
and armed with ‘the poets’ grammar-book’, he undertakes the project of enlightening the 
dreary taverns and brothels with the aid of ‘The mind of witty Aristotle’ (PE 103). 
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‘Peripatetic scholarship’ does not “teach” the Irish writers how to make art, but allows the 
‘unprejudiced’ writer who is ‘Steeled in the school of old Aquinas’ to ‘carry off their filthy 
streams’, leaving them to ‘dream their dreamy dreams’ (103-5). Enticing them with 
philosophy, he assumes substance by becoming ‘the sewer of their clique’; significantly, he 
does not purify himself (104). His catharsis is rather a kenosis that explains the mystery of 
the Incarnation: ‘the Word of God is emptied, i.e., lowered Himself, not by putting away His 
own greatness, but by putting on human lowliness’ (Summa Contra Gentiles 142). Guarding 
himself against prejudice does not imply “purity”, but fullness of being; he reaches the 
Absolute by being everything: ‘To enter heaven, travel hell, / Be piteous or terrible / One 
positively needs the ease / Of plenary indulgences’ (103). 
This is not an abstract conception of being, moreover, but as Joyce emphasised in a 
letter to his brother, it is particular and individual. The soul is not ‘Formless spiritual’, but is 
brought to completion as the Aristotelian “form of forms” through embodiment- through 
performance: 
 
my opinion is that if I put down a bucket into my own soul’s well, sexual 
department, I draw up Griffith’s and Ibsen’s and Skeffington’s and Bernard 
Vaughan’s and St. Aloysius’ and Shelley’s and Renan’s water along with my own. 
And I am going to do that in my novel (inter alia) and plank the bucket down before 
the shades and substances above mentioned to see how they like it: and if they don’t 
like it I can’t help them. I am nauseated by their lying drivel about pure men and 
pure women and spiritual love and love for ever: blatant lying in the face of truth. I 
don’t know much about the ‘sāince’ of the subject but I presume there are very few 
mortals in Europe who are not in danger of waking some morning and finding 
themselves syphilitic. (U 237; Letters II 190-1)   
  
In his polemic against the “profanity” of ‘the antique principle that the end of art is 
to instruct, to elevate, and to amuse’, Stephen turns to Aquinas’s definition of beauty made 
in terms of ‘the most abstract relations afforded by an object’ (SH 84). Complicating the 
relation between theory and praxis, Stephen describes his “theory” as ‘in the main applied 
Aquinas’ (81). His implementation of Aquinas’s theoretical ideas on beauty to “give the rule 
to art”, however, is too ‘practical’ for Father Butt (109). As ‘a passionate admirer of the 
artistic’, Stephen is not skilled for such application, as ‘such people are not always the most 
practical people in the [side] world’, Father Butt warns. The “end” of Stephen’s ‘Esthetic 
philosophy’ is indeed very vague, as it does not seem to be either the production of works of 
art or the formation of taste. Although he defines art in terms of ‘a human disposition’, his 
theory describes a drama with a limited cast: the artist is the protagonist if not the sole actor, 
while the critics are given at best the role of the chorus that simply “acknowledges” that 
‘beauty, the splendour of truth, has been born’ (81, 85). But what distinguishes this drama is 
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its lack of an audience: to its ‘spectators’ this drama seems unintelligible- ‘a dispute about 
names’ (83).    
Stephen’s perspective, moreover, is not theoretic either, as he carefully avoids the 
definition of beauty in the delivery of his essay; apart from mentioning that Aquinas’ 
definition of beauty is very abstract, he does not elaborate his trinitarian theory of beauty in 
his essay. His ‘esthetic’ refers to art in general which for the Scholastics ‘signified a 
technique for constructing objects’ rather than ‘the psychological and ontological conditions 
of aesthetic pleasure’ (Eco 3). As Eco notes, these were treated separately: it was ‘Romantic 
and Idealist aesthetics’ that ‘identified the aesthetic with the artistic’ (173). Stephen’s 
“amendment” and “clarification” of scholastic terminology is indeed presented in private 
discussions with the President, Father Artifoni, and in more detail with Cranly. It is in these 
discussions and in his discussion with Cranly in particular that Stephen presents himself as a 
“scientist”; in the modern sense of science primarily, however. Distinguishing his method in 
terms of its repudiation of the ‘lantern of tradition’, the modern philosopher is not searching 
for “an honest man” (190).  
Like an Enlightenment philosopher, Stephen discriminates between reason and 
tradition, and attempts to rescue art from falsehood by detaching it from tradition and 
describing both its construction and its judgment in terms of a “scientific” methodology:  
 
What we symbolise in black the Chinaman may symbolise in yellow: each has his 
own tradition. Greek beauty laughs at Coptic beauty and the American Indian 
derides them both. It is almost impossible to reconcile all tradition whereas it is by 
no means impossible to find the justification of every form of beauty which has ever 
been adored on the earth by an examination into the mechanism of esthetic 
apprehension whether it be dressed in red, white, yellow or black. (217) 
 
Tradition cannot be regulated by unequivocal rules and laws and so Stephen turns to 
physiology; in order to avoid the dangers of scepticism and relativism, he locates 
universality in ‘the mechanism of esthetic apprehension’. This mechanism is as defining and 
definitive as reason: ‘We have no reason for thinking that the Chinaman has a different 
system of digestion from that which we have though our diets are quite dissimilar. The 
apprehensive faculty must be scrutinised in action’. 
 This ‘action’, however, is not the same as that which the lantern-holding Cynic 
Diogenes opposed to theory; Stephen’s action takes place within the mind of the beholder: 
‘Consider the performance of your own mind when confronted with any object, 
hypothetically beautiful’, he tells Cranly (217). The mind, like the modern spirit is 
‘vivisective’ for Stephen: ‘Your mind to apprehend that object divides the entire universe 
into two parts, the object, and the void which is not the object. To apprehend it you must lift 
	   76	  
	  
it away from everything else: and then you perceive that it is one integral thing, that is a 
thing. You recognize its integrity’ (217). In the tripartite definition and apprehension of the 
beautiful that Stephen maps, this division is followed by ‘Analysis’ that is needed for 
‘wholeness’: ‘The mind considers the object in whole and in part, in relation to itself and to 
other objects, examines the balance of its parts, contemplates the form of the object, 
traverses every cranny of the structure. So the mind receives the impression of the symmetry 
of the object. The mind recognises that the object is in the strict sense of the word, a thing, a 
definitely constituted entity’ (217-8). Stephen therefore meets both of Hegel’s requirements 
for the scientific definition of an object: ‘that such an object is’ and ‘in the second place, 
what it is’ (Aesthetics 27). He refutes, moreover, the suspicion ‘that there is nothing in the 
mind but what its own activity has produced’, as the object is apprehended and analysed in 
the mind, not created. 
 The final component of beauty, Stephen confesses, puzzled him for a long time. 
Aquinas’s use of ‘a figurative word (a very unusual thing for him)’ confused him as an 
objective scientist. But seeing through the metaphor, he explains that ‘Claritas’- divine 
splendour, ‘is quidditas’- the essence of the thing (218). This recognition of the essence he 
renames - following Aquinas’s poetic licence - ‘epiphany’: ‘we recognise that it is that thing 
which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance’ (218). The 
freedom of the object that Kant wanted to secure is preserved also in Stephen’s definition: 
the soul ‘leaps’ towards the passive subject. There is no ‘free play of the cognitive faculties 
attending a representation by which an object is given’, however; Stephen’s aesthetic 
experience is defined by the ‘organized composite structure’ of the thing (CAJ 58; SH 218). 
Stephen “clarifies” scholastic terminology and simultaneously affords the art 
spectator with the quintessential spectacle- a visio Dei. His tripartite apprehension of beauty 
is a religious experience; claritas is not simply divine splendour but an epiphany of the 
Godhead. Theory is a vision of the theion: ‘θεὸς, which is the Greek for God’, Aquinas 
explains, ‘is derived from θεᾶσθαι, which means to consider or to see’ (Summa Contra 
Gentiles 101). The dualism of analysis and synthesis in Stephen’s scientific method is 
dissolved through reference to the ideal and metaphysical model of unity in multiplicity of 
the Trinity. The object perceived aesthetically assumes the characteristics of the Trinity, and 
the mind follows its processual character: ‘First we recognise that the object is one integral 
thing, then we recognise that it is an organized composite structure, a thing in fact: finally, 
when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, 
we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the 
vestment of its appearance’ (SH 218).  
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 Despite the emphasis on epistemology, Stephen attempts an ontological definition of 
beauty. His description of an ‘organized composite structure’ follows Aristotle’s in his 
refutation of ‘those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or 
the good’ (Metaphysics XIII.3). For Aristotle too beauty is an object of science: since 
‘Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes’, beauty is an element of 
Wisdom; or as Stephen points out in his theory, it is the manifestation of Wisdom (I.1). It is 
both the truth and what allows us to apprehend the truth: a “nicely polished looking-glass”. 
His identification of claritas with quidditas is indeed closer to the phenomenological 
emphasis of Hegel’s description of the Trinity rather than Aquinas’s, who as Noon notes, 
‘would have said that quidditas is a condition for claritas, rather than claritas itself’ (72). For 
Hegel, ‘God in Christianity is conceived in his truth, and therefore, as in Himself thoroughly 
concrete, as a person, as a subject, and more closely determined, as mind and spirit. What He 
is as spirit unfolds itself to the religious apprehension as the Trinity of Persons, which at the 
same time in relation with itself is One. Here is essentiality, universality, and particularity, 
together with their reconciled unity; and it is only such unity that constitutes the concrete’ 
(Aesthetics 77). 
The aesthetic object has “real existence” for Stephen; in his trinitarian definition of 
beauty, there is a coincidence not only between truth and beauty, but also beauty and “the 
good”, as he emphasises in his conversation with Father Artifoni. Even though Aristotle in 
fact distinguishes the good from the beautiful - ‘for the former always implies conduct as its 
subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things’ - in order to prove the real 
existence of the aesthetic object, Stephen has to ascribe to it the ‘absolutely necessitating 
law’ through which Kant distinguishes the ‘absolutely good’ from the beautiful (Metaphysics 
XIII.3; CAJ 118). 
‘When the poetic phenomenon is signalled in the heavens’, Stephen as a ‘heaven-
ascending essayist’ reaches the climax of his argument in his speech to the Literary and 
Historical Society, ‘it is time for the critics to verify their calculations in accordance with it. 
It is time for them to acknowledge that here the imagination has contemplated intensely the 
truth of the being of the visible world and that beauty, the splendour of truth, has been born’ 
(85). Scholes and Kain trace this description of beauty to a letter by Flaubert, in which he 
exhorts Art to ‘raise itself above personal feelings and nervous susceptibilities!’, and like 
Stephen’s vivisective method, advocates that ‘It is time to endow it, through a methodical 
indifference, with the precision of the physical sciences!’ (248). For the artist, as his 
contemporary Pater also insisted, this means the perfection of his medium: ‘The great 
problem, for me, remains style, for, the indefinable Beauty resulting from the conception 
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itself, which is the splendor of truth, according to Plato’. As style, however, the ‘splendor of 
truth’ in Flaubert’s modern formulation, highlights the discrepancy between appearance and 
reality, form and content, rather than the manifestation of the truth. It is a reflection rather 
than a revelation. 
This splendour that defines beauty for Plato, is truly formative in the Christian 
tradition; it is the agent of creation in the book of Genesis, and allows God as the first 
“theorist” to admire his creations. But it is also of particular significance for the literary 
artist; as Gadamer points out, ‘The Christian doctrine of the word, the verbum creans ... 
follows the Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphysics of light’, and he notes that for Aquinas it 
is in the word that ‘knowledge is consummated’: ‘Thomas points out that in this respect the 
word resembles light, which is what makes color visible’ (425). It is conspicuous indeed that 
Stephen as a literary artist ignores the question of language in his theories. The word that he 
wishes to beget seems to be this metaphysical self-manifesting and self-interpreting divine 
Word. ‘It is through the word and not alone through self-introspection that the poet gives 
form to his own experience and negotiates an insight into the experience of others’, Noon 
protests against Stephen’s curious creative practices, and Cranly is similarly bewildered: 
‘Such concentration upon oneself was unknown to him and he wondered at first with the joy 
of solitary possession at Stephen's ingenuous arrogance’ (67-8; SH 130). 
The Trinity, the model of Stephen’s tripartite aesthetic apprehension, for Aquinas is 
an emblem of the archetypal creative act: it ‘originates in the primal birth by which the 
divine wisdom is eternally begotten by the Father’; ‘All other births are imperfect’ (De 
Trinitate 4). The ‘poetic phenomenon’ that ‘is signalled in the heavens’ is the creative act 
itself; in the contemplation of ‘the truth of the being of the visible world’, the critics - like 
the Magi who the celebration of the Epiphany commemorates - follow the sign in the 
heavens and attend to the birth of beauty. This “theory” is not abstract; the critic witnesses 
the miracle of the Incarnation, the word becoming flesh: the ‘whatness’ of the object ‘leaps’ 
out of its schema. All the structural and analytical scaffolding disappears in Stephen’s 
transubstantiation. 
Aquinas’s description of integritas, consonatia, and claritas as the ‘three conditions’ 
of beauty - an ‘essential attribute’ that he assigns to the Son as both verbum and imago Dei - 
suggests that the beautiful object for Stephen is modelled on the Word (Summa Theologica I. 
q. 39, a. 8). Whereas the Father is defined by ‘“eternity”’, beauty ‘has a likeness to the 
property of the Son’. As the Father is ‘a “being” without a principle’, ‘“a principle without a 
principle”’, through the incarnation of the Son we are able to “see” God. But if the model of 
the beautiful “thing” is the Word, the critic, according to Stephen, attends to the conception 
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and birth of art. These two processes according to Aquinas are simultaneous only for God. 
There is no division as there is in human birth nor is there a lapse in time: ‘God’s Word, 
abiding in God the Speaker, subsists perfectly in Himself, and distinct from God the 
Speaker... Accordingly in the generation of the Word of God conception is the same as birth’ 
(Summa Contra Gentiles 57). Moreover, it is not only conception and birth that are 
simultaneous processes for God, but the interpretation of the Word is also simultaneously 
performed: ‘for the very reason that He understands Himself His Word must be in Him... 
Therefore God’s Word must have been in Him always: and consequently His Word is co-
eternal with Him and does not come to Him in course of time, as the word that we conceive 
within ourselves’ (50).  
As conception, birth and interpretation are simultaneous processes in the beatific 
vision that Stephen describes, the critical and the creative act coincide. The human artist 
does not create ex nihilo, but needs to be ‘confronted’ with an object, at least ‘hypothetically 
beautiful’ (SH 217). In contrast to the ‘esthetic stasis’ that according to Stephen in the 
Portrait beauty ‘awakens, or ought to awaken, or induces, or ought to induce’, the mind here 
is compelled to take part in a ‘performance’ (P 223; SH 217). Even though this is only a 
noetic experience, the moment of contemplation is presented as a creative event, as 
Stephen’s comparison of the moment of epiphany with Shelley’s fading coal in the Portrait 
will highlight. But for Aquinas, Eco explains, ‘the perception of beauty is something 
cognitive, because it has to do with formal causes’, it is not creative as it is for Stephen; 
creation is exclusive to God: ‘no body can create a thing, for it is to make something out of 
nothing’ (57, Summa Contra Gentiles 30).  
Despite the ontological weight that Stephen bestows on art and beauty, Stephen as a 
modern artist cannot completely avoid subjectivism or accept the role of a humble scholar. 
As his role as a modern scientist betrays, Stephen’s reading of Aquinas is made through the 
Enlightenment; ‘through Descartes’ spectacles’, as Noon remarks (10). Stephen, Noon 
argues, confuses ‘the subjective psychological responses to the beautiful with the 
constitutive ontological principles which might be called the “objective correlative” of this 
response’ (45). In his description of the critics’ contemplation of the ‘poetic phenomenon 
[that] is signalled in the heavens’, it is not clear whether it is because ‘the imagination has 
contemplated intensely the truth of the being of the visible world’ that beauty has been born; 
whether it is the act of contemplation that gives birth to beauty, or whether the critic is 
simply a witness of this performance (SH 85). The ‘performance’ of the mind in Stephen’s 
theory is much more “sublime”, than Aquinas would allow. 
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The ‘apprehension’ that Aquinas describes in the passage that Stephen refers to is 
not in fact that of the beautiful object, but of God, whose essence “agrees” with these three 
properties, but Who we must try to understand in the way that we observe creatures. This is a 
fourfold process, Aquinas says, following Aristotle’s four causes:  
 
Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider 
God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four 
points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely 
is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic 
power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration 
embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our 
mind in reference to God. (Summa Theologica I. q. 39, a. 8) 
 
Stephen neglects the final cause in his conflation of three properties that Aquinas assigns to 
beauty with the four points in the apprehension of an object. 22 The ‘relation to its effects’ is 
ignored in Stephen’s theoretical approach, as Father Butt notes following his presentation of 
his essay: ‘just as an act which may be good in itself may become bad by reason of 
circumstances so an object intrinsically beautiful may be vitiated by other considerations’ 
(SH 109). This apparent omission reflects Stephen’s aim of separating art from morality, an 
aim his esthetic shares with that of Hegel: the ‘perverseness of the question ‘What is the 
use?’, Hegel argues, ‘lies in the point that the work of art would then be regarded as aspiring 
to something else which is set before consciousness as the essential and as what ought to be; 
so that then the work of art would only have value as a useful instrument in the realization of 
an end having substantive importance outside the sphere of art’ (Aesthetics 61). 
 Against this view, like Joyce in “The Day of Rabblement”, Hegel maintains that ‘art 
has the vocation of revealing the truth’ and ‘has its purpose in itself’, in representation and 
revelation (61). Representation and revelation are contemporaneous in a divine simultaneity 
that Stephen lays claim to in his experience of the ‘sudden spiritual manifestation’ that 
characterises the epiphany (SH 216). The distinction between creator and observer is 
immaterial in the dissolution of temporality that distinguishes divine creation: ‘not only is 
the concept of the divine intellect called the Word, which is the Son, but also the revelation 
for the divine concept is called the Word’s word’, Aquinas explains (Summa Contra Gentiles 
62). By ignoring the “effects” of art, however, Stephen also disregards the question of the 
audience, as it is pointed out to him by Hughes following his presentation of his essay. The 
question of who is having and is able to have an “epiphany” is ignored. Stephen’s argument 
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that even though his art ‘has its purpose in itself’ he still expects payment for it, accentuates 
the suspicion that Shaun voices in Finnegans Wake that the sole purpose of Shem’s art is to 
enable him ‘to utter an epical forged cheque on the public for his own private profit’ (181). 
 
 
viii. Epiphany and the mechanism of esthetic apprehension    
 
Stephen’s definition of an epiphany that precedes his tripartite analysis of the 
beautiful object to Cranly is distinguished by such an instantaneous recognition and 
confusion between creation and perception, understanding and interpretation. Explaining to 
Cranly how the clock of the Ballast Office can be ‘epiphanised’, Stephen says, ‘I will pass it 
time after time, allude to it, refer to it, catch a glimpse of it. It is only an item in the 
catalogue of Dublin's street furniture. Then all at once I see it and I know at once what it is: 
epiphany’ (SH 216). The moment of the epiphany dissolves the gap between perception and 
understanding; these two processes are performed ‘at once’- “in one intuition”, as in the 
mind of God. The experience of the ‘sudden spiritual manifestation’ that Stephen has, 
moreover, is creative, insofar as following this moment of epiphany that “arrests” his mind 
that has been ‘dancing the dance of unrest’, Stephen composes the “Vilanelle of the 
Temptress” (216). It seems indeed that in the Portrait the epiphany is renamed ‘arrest’: in 
the moment of an esthetic apprehension, ‘The mind is arrested and raised above desire and 
loathing’ (P 222). A temporal suspension takes place as in the moment of epiphany. As 
perception and understanding are identical, moreover, the man of letters is deprived of his 
critical and hermeneutic role and he can merely ‘record these epiphanies with extreme care’, 
in a moment of stasis comparable to the “verification” of the critics’ ‘calculations’ when 
beauty is born (SH 216; 85). 23 
As we saw, for Scholes and Kain these epiphanies are ‘not a matter of artistic 
creation but only of apprehension and recording – to be done not by an artist, necessarily, but 
by “the man of letters”’ (WD 3). But how can the man of letters ‘record’ an epiphany if he 
has not himself had one? He must have at least been present at the moment when the object 
was ‘epiphanised’. It is not clear in Stephen’s description if this is a subjective experience or 
if he expects Cranly to have one too. The passage is preceded, moreover, by the narrator’s 
revelation that Stephen ‘had come to the conclusion that nature had designed him for a man 
of letters’; so unless he has also had a sudden conversion, artist and man of letters do not 
appear to be incompatible vocations for Stephen at this point in his literary career. Indeed, 
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the only role available to the human artist seems to be that of the man of letters. As the birth 
of the word is not simultaneous with its conception for the human artist, the lapse in time 
between the epiphany and the composition of the verses does not mean that the epiphany is 
not part of a creative process. 
Whether the contemplative of Stephen’s epiphanies is a creator or simply a witness, 
s/he is a participant; not so much in an aesthetic experience, as a momentous event. The 
critic in Stephen’s essay is present at the moment of the birth of the Word, like John the 
Apostle; and the man of letters is a witness of His Revelation as Alpha and Omega, like John 
of Patmos. The one stands in the beginning of time and the other at its end, but both are 
witnesses of a theophany. This not a Paterian moment of ecstasy or ‘a single sharp 
impression’; for Stephen ‘the spirit of man makes a continual affirmation’ and the spectator 
is truly present in this event (Renaissance 210, 85). He witnesses and rationally analyses the 
spectacle before his eyes, he does not simply “experience”.  
Emblematic of the paradox of this “presence” of the spectator of Stephen’s 
theophanies is the gospel of John the Evangelist who records that another John- the Baptist, 
was called ‘to bear witness of the Light’, symbolic of both the Genesis and the Incarnation: 
‘John bare witness of him, and cried, saying, This was he of whom I spake, He that cometh 
after me is preferred before me: for he was before me’ (John 1.15). Time is dissolved and in 
a reversal of the linear narrative of history, even though a precursor he becomes the 
successor. By being a witness, moreover, John the Baptist is confused with the Word: ‘I am 
not the Christ’, he has to clarify (1.20). Baptising the Holy as Joyce in the Holy Office 
baptises the unholy, John ‘saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God’ (1.34). His role 
of witness to this spectacle, moreover, allows him to become an “author”, a Holy Writer. 
The Feast of the Epiphany indeed celebrates also the baptism of Christ and manifestation of 
the Holy Spirit; catharsis and epiphany are linked. 
It is this role of John as Holy Writer that Stephen repeatedly assumes. The 
presumptuousness of what seems to be a humble scholarly role is revealed in the gravity and 
prestige he assigns to his endeavours; he presents himself as the Liberator of not only his 
country but also his ‘generation’, and as the sole witness of the manifestation of the Truth 
(SH 81). The recording of epiphanies, his annotation of the ‘incident’ of his meeting with the 
President, his hermeneutical mission to explain the word of God (better than his Scholastic 
masters), his ordination by nature as a ‘man of letters’ and the reputation he builds as a ‘a 
competent Danish scholar’ - a savant with knowledge of a recondite language (in the eyes of 
his compatriots), perhaps Pentecostally acquired - suggest this divine calling (104, 213, 46). 
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By being both a participant and an observer, however, the theorist transforms the 
very meaning of theory. Stephen may assume the posture of the detached scientific observer 
and analyse “methodically” the object, but the epiphany is impossible without him; his 
presence at the scene of the epiphany is essential for the revelation. He contributes to the 
creation of beauty even without “recording” the epiphanies. The objectivity he wants to lay 
claim to is contaminated; ‘the gropings of a spiritual eye’ can never produce scientific 
results, whatever way it may try to ‘adjust its vision to an exact focus’ (216). 
The modernity of Stephen’s theories is seen in his eagerness to “test” them 
experimentally and willingness to sacrifice both the semantic and the symbolic power of 
language to the altar of his theory with the ostensible claim of “rescuing” words from the 
sweeping tide of language in this way: ‘Soon Stephen began to explore the language for 
himself and to choose, and thereby rescue once for all, the words and phrases most amenable 
to his theory’ (32). He seizes, moreover, the words of other authors too, quoting their phrases 
‘to illustrate his theory’ (34). Even the excellency of ‘the literary form of art’ was examined 
‘in favour of his theory’ (82). When he senses the ‘vulgarity’ of Emma and her lack of 
sympathy, he deplores ‘that it was not for such an image that he had constructed a theory of 
art and life and a garland of verse’ (164). Reality is disappointing because it does not 
correspond to his theory.  
This “modern” interpretation of theory implies that the truth of art requires the tools 
of a theory or philosophy for its revelation. Stephen, however, emphasises that the end of art 
does not lie beyond it: ‘He proclaimed at the outset that art was the human disposition of 
intelligible or sensible matter for an esthetic end’ (81). His theory merely sets out the 
principles of his ‘artistic economy’ (37). We are told, moreover, that the original title of his 
essay was “Drama and Life”, but ‘he had occupied himself so much with securing the 
foundations that he had not left himself space enough to raise the complete structure’ (85). 
The dramatic basis of his theory is much more obvious in the Portrait where Aquinas is 
joined by the author of the Poetics to aid Stephen in the construction of his theory that is 
more specifically a theory of drama. The position of the spectator in a dramatic performance 
differs considerably from that of the other literary art forms in Stephen’s tripartite division. 
In Stephen Hero, however, Aristotle, the “classical” theorist of the Poetics is 
considered as the progenitor of the theologian Aquinas, and as a ‘biologist’ whose ‘spirit 
would hardly do itself justice in treating of the “inexact” sciences’ (191). In another reversal 
of origins, Stephen challenges Aristotle’s role as custodian of theology: ‘Let him examine 
me if he is able’, and as patron of the arts: ‘Can you imagine a handsome lady saying “O, 
excuse me, my dear Mr Aristotle, for being so beautiful”?’ The domain of art is impervious 
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to the criticism of philosophy and theology. Although a scientific façade distinguishes the 
critic of art and the recorder of epiphanies, their objectivity is severely compromised. The 
role of the observer in both cases is creative; he does not determine the meaning of art, but 
participates in its construction and shares as a “celebrant” in ‘the sane and joyful spirit that 
issues forth’ (83).  
 
 
ix. The gift of certitude 
 
The roles that Stephen assigns to both artist and critic as merely witnesses and 
scribes compromise, however, the scope of both their creativity and critique. Although we 
have seen him profess his wish ‘to amend or to clarify scholastic terminology’ and uphold 
the use of reason as opposed to repetition of ‘the stale maxims of the Jesuits’, the implication 
of “factualness” in his emphasis on truth is both constrictive and inartistic, and deprives him 
of the ability to interpret the world in the rule-bound laws he imposes upon art (SH 176, 42). 
The manifestation of the “thing” in Stephen’s theory is simultaneous with its interpretation, 
just as the Word of God stands for both the divine intellect and His revelation: ‘all at once I 
see it and I know at once what it is’ (216). Noon has argued that Stephen’s claritas is not 
Aquinas’ quidditas, but rather ‘the haecceitas of Duns Scotus’: ‘The specific or universal 
form rather than the individual form is the inner heart of the object as Thomists view the 
individual thing’ (72). 24 This ambivalence appears to be a result of Stephen’s belief in the 
simultaneity of what the thing is and what it means, its significance: ‘we recognise that it is 
that thing which it is’, Stephen explains, but it is not clear whether we recognise the 
universal or the particular thing. The task of interpretation and criticism has already been 
performed, and therefore the critic can only be a spectator. 
The beautiful, a manifestation of the truth, dissolves the gap between appearance and 
reality for the ancients. Stephen, however, uses it as a scientific tool to verify his 
calculations; to test the credibility of his thoughts, and to make the critic ‘superfluous’ 
(OCPW 48).  Similarly, the doctrine of the Trinity reconciles the one and the many, the 
universal and the particular: the ‘hard conflict’ which modern man must witness but also 
embody (Hegel, Aesthetics 59). ‘[T]he source of plurality is otherness’ in the Trinity, not 
difference, Aquinas argued in his exegesis of Boethius’s De Trinitate; the Trinity is a model 
for relations, not contrasts (60). However, even though the Trinity presents a metaphysical 
solution to this problem of universals, rationally and analytically conceived it is a perilous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 As have Goldberg, Arkins and Beebe (52; 28; “Joyce and Aquinas” 29). 
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paradox, as the long prehistory of heretics who tried to interpret it reveals. It is a ‘mystery’, 
as Stephen will concede in Ulysses, not a principle for the scientific ‘vivisective’ method 
(266). Even though the ‘science of esthetic’ was constructed by the two brothers with the 
premise that ‘it was possible to arrive at a sane understanding of so-called mysteries if one 
only had patience enough’, this patience - as the reader of Finnegans Wake understands - is 
itself ‘inhuman’ (SH 40-1, 131). 
The mystery of the Trinity is interpreted by Aquinas through its ‘likeness’ with the 
human mind (Summa Contra Gentiles 115). The relations and unity between mind, intellect 
and will in the human mind reflect those of the Trinity. These ‘psychological analogies’ that 
were introduced by Augustine, ‘opened the way to the anthropological turn of theology’, 
according to Luigi Goia: ‘talk about the Trinity becomes a pretext for the exploration of the 
self’ (16). Stephen, however, goes beyond psychology; the relation his Trinitarian analogies 
investigate is not between speech and thought, but between thought and object. The question 
of language, how the thought is transformed into a word, how it becomes speech, is ignored. 
The word, ‘the Greek λόγος’ that as Aquinas explains stands ‘for word or reason’, appears to 
only signify reason for Stephen, who conflates- or perhaps confuses, the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment with that of the Scholastics in his construction of his ‘insidious theory’ (169; 
SH 108).  
If for Kant ‘Taste may be designated a sensus communis aestheticus, common 
human understanding a sensus communis logicus’, Stephen exposes this as a silent 
communion with the external world (CAJ 153). Alienating himself from tradition in his 
investigation of ‘the most abstract relations afforded by an object’, Stephen ignores the 
question of language and interpretation (SH 84). Even though his beautiful object is 
modelled on the Word, this only exposes his fetishisation of the word as an object; a pure 
form, as his repetition of words ‘till they lost all instantaneous meaning for him and became 
wonderful vocables’ betrays (36). He performs as in “The Holy Office” a kenosis of the 
word, but the word remains empty. Aesthetics, following his complete purgation of aisthesis, 
reveal the fraudulence of the artist.  
Faced with the ‘ugly artificiality’ of the lives of those around him and the ‘spectacle 
of the world in thrall’, art assumes greater substance than the spectrality of external reality 
(164, 199). He undertakes again a ritual catharsis by ‘repeating to himself a line from Dante 
for no other reason except that it contained the angry disyllable “frode”” (164). ‘Even the 
value of his own life came into doubt with him’, and he can only conceive his connection 
with external reality through visionary trances ‘in the similitude of a distorted ritual’ (167-8). 
His wanders around the ‘ugliness’ of the city reveal his resemblance to Dorian Gray rather 
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than emphasise his search for truth. He is caught between two ‘spectacles’: ‘The spectacle of 
the world which his intelligence presented to him with every sordid and deceptive detail set 
side by side with the spectacle of the world which the monster in him, now grown to a 
reasonably heroic stage, presented’, and he can only overcome the paralysis of despair 
through the comfort of ‘melancholy versing’ (45). 
Literature, dealing only with the ‘portrayal of externals’, ‘a spacious realm’, ‘seemed 
to him a term of contempt’ (82). Only in a world of ‘unalterable laws’, that he argues is ‘the 
realm of the poet’, he feels secure; marking a contrast not so much between genres, but 
between the gifted individual and a popular profession, producer and production (82-3). 
Language, moreover, is no longer a vehicle of understanding; the ‘One’ Stephen searches for 
is ‘incommunicable’ (84). It is only when again in a trace-like state he approaches the One 
that he obtains ‘the gift of certitude’: “It is so! It is so! Life is such as I conceive it”, he cries 
(42). In this ironic conception, the certitude he acquires is distinctly modern and 
philosophical; it seems to be a translation of cogito ergo sum, and succinctly collapses 
Stephen’s ambivalence between the logical analysis of philosophy and the creative scope of 
the imagination. 
Problematically, this delimiting form even includes language. Although Stephen 
trains as a philologist and scholar as part of his schooling as an artist, philosophy and 
philology are increasingly antagonistic in the quest for an “epiphany”- an apophatic vision. 
Language becomes an obstacle rather than a tool for both the critic and the artist. The critic 
is warned against semblances and appearances in Stephen’s essay:  
 
The critic is he who is able, by means of the signs which the artist affords, to 
approach the temper which has made the work and to see what is well done therein 
and what it signifies. For him a song by Shakespeare which seems so free and living, 
as remote from any conscious purpose as rain that falls in a garden or as the lights of 
evening, discovers itself as the rhythmic speech of an emotion otherwise 
incommunicable, or at least not so fitly. But to approach the temper which has made 
art is an act of reverence before the performance of which many conventions must be 
first put off for certainly that inmost region will never yield its secret to one who is 
enmeshed with profanities. (83-4)  
 
The critic must be able to follow the signs, but what he is searching for is ‘incommunicable’. 
He must approach the ‘temper’ of the work through a catharsis of everything that is not 
sacred. Like Stephen’s ‘preparative abstinences’ for the composition of his essay, art 
involves sacred practices and rituals available only to the initiated (74). Like the man of 
letters in the theory of the epiphany, the critic is depicted as a spectator. He attends to a 
‘performance’, “approaching” in ‘rhythmic speech’ - in tempus praesens - the ‘temper’ as a 
templum in an etymological procession of derivatives of time [tempus]. As the “experiment” 
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of the epiphany revealed, aesthetic apprehension, although described as an individual 
experience, has the character of event- transcendental rather than public. Having transformed 
the world into a ‘spectacle’, Stephen can only relate to it through a dramatic theory. Only 
‘naked drama’ overcomes the barriers to truth that phenomenology presents (OCPW 45). 
The reason why ‘An aesthetic idea cannot become a cognition’ according to Kant, is because 
‘it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found’ 
(210). By ignoring the medium of language, Stephen resurrects the Romantic genius in all 
his divine majesty.  
 
 
x. Intuition: the moment of radiant simultaneity 
 
Despite the scientific scaffolding that Stephen erects for his analysis of an epiphany, 
its resemblance to the moment of intuition suggests that the novelty of his theory is 
terminological: ‘all at once I see it and I know at once what it is: epiphany’ (SH 218). 
‘What?’, Cranly replies; all that Stephen can say is that ‘the object is epiphanised’, he cannot 
say “what it is”. When the object is ‘epiphanised’, it looses its ‘vestment’; as in Kant’s 
definition of an intuition, a concept is not adequate to the aesthetic idea, and ‘language, 
consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible’ (175-
6). Although described as a moment of understanding, the epiphany signals an overflowing 
of the intelligible concept in a paradoxical coincidence of excess and privation, a messianic 
sublation of strength that is ‘made perfect in weakness’- a ‘spiritual manifestation’ that is 
made possible through ‘vulgarity’ (2 Cor. 12:9; 216). 
With no “appearance”, the object is no longer a mere “phenomenon” and the ‘two 
worlds’ that Stephen perceives ‘as aliens one to another’ - the ‘monster in him’ and ‘the 
spectacle of the world’ - are reconciled (45). The reconciliation of these two worlds is indeed 
accomplished through an “epiphany” at the beginning of the manuscript of Stephen Hero: 
‘He had all but decided to consider the two worlds as aliens one to another - however 
disguised or expressed the most utter of pessimisms - when he encountered through the 
medium of hardly procured translations the spirit of Henrik Ibsen. He understood the spirit c 
instantaneously c’. Once again, Stephen ignores the medium of language; even though his 
encounter is made through translation, the “incessant labour” involved is forgotten and 
understanding appears to be instantaneous: ‘Ibsen had no need of apologist or critic: the 
minds of the old Norse poet and of the perturbed young Celt met in moment of radiant 
simultaneity’. Understanding and interpretation are collapsed in the instant of this 
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momentous simultaneity; the radiance appears to be hermeneutic: the ‘whatness’ that leaps 
out is the “meaning” itself, and therefore the critic is unnecessary. 
This view of a simultaneity between author and reader in the process of 
understanding followed the propositions of the Kantian genius, according to Gadamer. The 
identification of the interpreter with the author is legitimised, ‘insofar as it is not the author's 
reflective self-interpretation but the unconscious meaning of the author that is to be 
understood’ (192). Stephen’s focus is on the unique ‘spirit of Ibsen’, disguised ‘behind the 
impersonal manner of the artist’; Ibsen is the ultimate and unsurpassable example of not only 
the artist, but also Man, epitomising ‘the dignity of the human attitude’ that ‘one could 
scarcely advance’ (189, 44-5). Stephen’s prostration before this Christlike paragon of 
perfection, moreover, contrasts the playful rivalry that is staged between Joyce’s artist heroes 
(including Joyce himself) and his precursors. The focus in Stephen Hero is on a mystical 
“recognition” that is founded on psychological and biographical grounds- a compatibility 
between “tempers”. Therefore, although the choice of Ibsen as a model is controversial, his 
relation to his predecessor is pious and conservative. 
The recognition that the moment of intuition allows is not an abstract, but personal 
and individual: ‘[Ibsen with his profound self-approval, Ibsen with his haughty, disillusioned 
courage, Ibsen with his minute and wilful energy.] a mind of sincere and boylike bravery, of 
disillusioned pride, of minute and wilful energy’ (46). Impersonality is a ‘vestment’ that 
safeguards the personality, but also allows its manifestation. It is a ‘manner’ that intuitive 
understanding sees through. Personality and impersonality are therefore not incompatible as 
is revealed in the evolution of Stephen’s theories. Although in this early work Stephen’s 
youthful impressionability and his conceited eclectism are highlighted, this mystical 
correspondence of “temperaments” will resurface in his Hamlet theory in Ulysses and will 
mark Joyce’s idiosyncratic selection and engagement with a host of artists in Finnegans 
Wake. Such “coincidence of contraries” in the later work, however, will problematise and 
complicate the principles of an ‘artistic economy’. 
The ‘dignity of the human attitude’, the individual and unique ‘human personality’ 
in Stephen Hero rivals the ‘economy of heaven’, revealing the Maker as a notional and 
immaterial idea: ‘Let the world solve itself in whatsoever fashion it pleased, let its putative 
Maker justify Himself by whatsoever processes seemed good to Him, one could scarcely 
advance the dignity of the human attitude a step beyond this answer’ (45-6). In this 
indifference towards the Maker and multiplication of makers, however, the mind-spirit of the 
individual artist, like the Geist of German philosophy, is caught in an infinite dialectic 
between the universal and the particular. Joyce seems undecided whether for Stephen ‘the 
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very spirit of Ibsen himself’ refers to ‘a mind’ or ‘Ibsen’, as the parentheses reveal. There is, 
as in the moment of epiphany, a hesitation between quidditas and haecceitas. Moreover, the 
characteristics that he ascribes to Ibsen are remarkably similar to his own- both real and 
desired.  
The influence of history and nationality as an enabling force for this intuitive 
understanding, moreover, is admitted: ‘Here, and not in Shakespeare or Goethe was the 
successor to the first poet of the Europeans, here, as only to such purpose in Dante, a human 
personality had been found united with an artistic manner which was itself almost a natural 
phenomenon: and the spirit of the time united more readily with the Norwegian than with the 
Florentine’ (46). Matter and form are united in a hylomorphic manner; the particular and the 
universal, the potential and actual complement each other so well that the talent of this gifted 
individual appears to be an ingenium: ‘bestowed directly from the hand of nature’ (CAJ 
171). His ‘artistic manner’ is not a façade, but ‘a natural phenomenon’ (SH 46). ‘[A]lmost’, 
however, as the unanimity of individuals but also of the particular ‘human personality’ and 
the universal ‘artistic manner’ is shown to be “momentous”- possible only through particular 
historical circumstances. History plays a significant role as it rescues the artist from 
becoming a “type”; assuming merely a role or alternately sacrificing all his individual 
characteristics in order to represent the natural and godlike genius. 
The “name” of great authors, however, like the idea of the classical and the beautiful 
object, is distinguished by its fusion of timelessness and contemporaneity. The name of the 
author has an extraordinary allure. It is the name of Ibsen that disturbs the nationalists and 
Stephen’s Jesuit masters rather than his work that they admit they are not familiar with. His 
name has become a symbol of immorality: ‘you cannot name him even in mixed society’, the 
President tells Stephen, and fears that his publication of an essay that disregards the authority 
of venerable names will expose the college (98). The capacity that the author has ‘of 
absorbing in himself the life that surrounds him and of flinging it abroad again amid 
planetary music’, celebrated by Stephen in his essay, entails the less desirable consequence 
that he must embody not only the “truths” of his generation, but also its prejudices, the 
‘filthy streams’ he must carry as its ‘sewer’ (85; PE 104). 
Ibsen’s name is distorted to denote an entire ideology: ‘To support Ibsenism on 
Aquinas seems to me somewhat paradoxical. Young men often substitute brilliant paradox 
for conviction’ (101). Great authors must remain inviolable for the President. Stephen’s 
declaration in his essay that ‘the tradition of art is with the artists’ implies their ‘freedom 
from all guidance of rules’, but also from the contamination of the great authors’ truth with 
the falsehoods of the less reputable who render the standard of excellence of this tradition 
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problematic (84; CAJ 181). Stephen’s Ibsenist prejudice distorts the credible truth of 
Aquinas and the notoriety of Wilde’s legacy haunts the “truth” of his own theory. This 
violation deforms and confounds the symbolic status of the name. 
The exemplarity of the author becomes problematical in the multiplication of 
models, as Stephen uses the creative licence of the genius as a critical standard: ‘You cannot 
compare Dante and Ibsen’, the President cautions, appealing to the need for reference to ‘a 
specific code of moral conventions’ (96). The advice that the President gives to Stephen is 
valid, however: ‘I am sure too that when your studies have brought you further afield you 
will be able to amend it so as to - fit in more with recognised facts; I am sure you will be 
able to apply it better then - when your mind has undergone a course of . . . regular . . . 
training and you have a larger, wider sense of . . . comparison’ (103). If the rule is to be set 
by a ‘fellowship of artists’, an ever-widening nexus of artists must be proffered to support 
the theory (Artwork of the Future 205). Although if this fellowship like Wagner’s is ‘new 
and never-hitherto-existing, and thus … never-to-be-repeated’, the very idea of comparison 
and indeed relation becomes problematic (204). 
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Chapter 3: The Age of Reason 
 
i. A Synopsis Philosophiae Scholasticae 
 
The prominence of the idea of “theory” for the poetics and representation of the 
artist in Stephen Hero, is in the Portrait markedly subdued. The trinitarian economy in the 
use of the word theory here - carefully ascribed to Stephen’s “discovery” of knowledge 
through dialectical reasoning, descriptive of his esthetic, and finally expropriated by his 
author to criticise Stephen’s futile use of theory as a cure for nihilism - reveals the profound 
mystery that surrounds this term in the Portrait and its theological foundation. Even though 
Stephen’s interest in theories in the Portrait is not manifested until the last chapter, and is 
accompanied by the suspicion voiced by his jovial companion ‘Are you laughing in your 
sleeve?’, a theoretical question underlies the central paradox of the novel: how does the work 
of art, a product of mimesis- a “portrait”, disclose the truth of its being? (227). As a paradox, 
truth here does not elucidate the meaning of art, but threatens the career of the artist and the 
legitimacy of his work. The artist is put in the position of the spectator rather than allowed to 
claim exclusive insight into truth, and the spotlight on the “performance of his mind” in his 
ardent quest for truth makes him a tragicomic character in the drama of his eternal 
contemplator- his author. 
Endless “theory” continues to characterise the protagonist whose quest for self-
knowledge is guided through inexhaustible reflection. The structure of the novel, however, is 
presented as an obstacle, as the ‘silent watchful manner’ of Stephen is challenged in each 
chapter with new “performances” that he is called upon to take part in (71). The ‘agile 
bullets’ with which he challenged his many opponents in Stephen Hero are turned against 
him (56). The reader, moreover, finds himself placed before this new literary “genre” of 
portraiture, and has to learn how to “look at” an ever-changing portrait that desires to be an 
icon; to disclose ‘the full ontological power of the picture’, a capacity only available to the 
religious picture, as Gadamer argues (137). 25 As ‘the divine becomes picturable only 
through the word and image’, in an icon ‘Word and image are not mere imitative 
illustrations, but allow what they present to be for the first time fully what it is’. Believing in 
the ability of art to reflect ‘perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose’ his ‘inner world of 
individual emotions’, however, Stephen’s spectral idea of portraiture exposes his narcissism, 
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but also allows Joyce to revise the idea of mimesis and present a drama that relies heavily on 
autobiography to maintain its link to “truth” that becomes increasingly questionable (P 181). 
Stephen is therefore no longer the sole theorist, as the reader too becomes a vehicle and a 
victim of his insidious theorist, in yet another trinity of refractions. 
The ‘entire science of esthetic’ that labouring incessantly Stephen had been 
constructing in Stephen Hero disappears in the Portrait; as does Stephen’s impersonation of 
the scientist through the links he had been forging between science and art. The 
demystifying drive of the two brothers who ‘felt that it was possible to arrive at a sane 
understanding of so-called mysteries if one only had patience enough’ and the ‘light of day’ 
that aids the ‘vivisective’ ‘modern method’ of Stephen who feels in possession of ‘the gift of 
certitude’, find a pale parallel only in the last chapter of the Portrait, where Stephen, with a 
surprising newfound and short-lived confidence in the role of the dialectician declares to 
Lynch the characteristics of his “scrupulous” method: ‘We are right, he said, and the others 
are wrong. To speak of these things and to try to understand their nature and, having 
understood it, to try slowly and humbly and constantly to express, to press out again, from 
the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison 
gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand—that is art’ (SH 41, 
190, 81; P 224). The ‘gross earth’ that the artist here must “labour over” like a humble 
farmer and the description of ‘sound and shape and colour’ as ‘the prison gates of our soul’, 
reveal the scientific outlook to be a disguise or simply a paradigm that Stephen lays claim to 
in order to describe the “work” of the artist and authorise his theory. 
His scientific scrutiny of the “object” in Stephen Hero in his analysis of an epiphany 
becomes in the Portrait an “image”; as does the basket that Stephen tries to describe to 
Lynch in terms of ‘the necessary phases of artistic apprehension’ (229). The emphasis on 
‘the performance of your own mind’ in Stephen’s description of an epiphany, is replaced in 
the Portrait with ‘the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure’: ‘a spiritual state very like 
to that cardiac condition which the Italian physiologist Luigi Galvani, using a phrase almost 
as beautiful as Shelley's, called the enchantment of the heart’ (217, 231). The “method” is 
ironically vivisective in Stephen’s romanticised reference to the Enlightenment physician’s 
“poetry”; a phrase used by Galvani to describe ‘what happens to a frog’s heart when a needle 
is inserted in its spine’, as Gifford explains (Joyce Annotated 11). The ‘gropings’ of the 
physician’s punctilious eye become a ‘cardiac condition’ that ardently tries not to appear 
sentimental (SH 216). The ‘significant heart of everything’ that Stephen had tried to ‘pierce’ 
rejecting ‘dilettantism’ in Stephen Hero, is that of a fairy-tale frog (37). 
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ii. On the (sin-loving) Soul  
 
The divergence from the science of Stephen Hero in the Portrait is marked by the 
formal and thematic consequence of Aristotle’s interpretation of the soul, that as Joyce 
remarked during his early scholarship on Aristotle, ‘is in a manner all that is’ (Joyce Papers 
I.ii, Image: 02-004). Whereas in Joyce’s early writings and in Stephen Hero the ideals of 
isolation, egotism, individualism, the regulation of praxis by theory and scrupulous analysis 
in the search for Truth and Necessity implied that an act of will by the Wagnerian “Artist of 
the Future” held the promise of the repair of the fissure between the individual and the 
community, Mind and Nature, thought and being, the source of union is in the Portrait 
located in that most difficult “object” of knowledge and ‘first principle of living things’ that 
Aristotle examines “scientifically” in De Anima, the soul (126). 26 The soul, ‘as the form of a 
natural body which potentially has life’, and the ‘intellectual soul’ in particular, as ‘the form 
of forms’, provides the overall structure to the novel; a malleable structure that 
accommodates and is “affected” by the movements of the body, and revolts against the rigid 
order that the scholastic system of education attempts to impose (157, 210). As according to 
Aristotle in art the form of things ‘is in the soul of the artist’, Stephen’s anticipated 
‘encounter’ with ‘the unsubstantial image which his soul so constantly beheld’, would here 
constitute the moment of epiphany (Metaphysics VII.7; P 67). 
Aristotle’s functional division of the soul into five faculties ‘nutritive, perceptive, 
desiderative, locomotive and intellective’, is reflected in Joyce’s five chapters, that do not 
examine each faculty in isolation, but traverse the spectrum of relations and their variations 
(DA 162). Unlike Bruno and Plato, Aristotle distinguishes the ‘world soul’ from that of man 
and criticises Plato’s intellectual bias: ‘For Plato is clearly wanting his ‘world soul’ to be of 
the same kind as that which is ordinarily called the intellect. (At least, he cannot be wanting 
it to be like the perceptive or desiderative faculties, as their movement is certainly not 
circular.) But the intellect is a single and continuous thinking as is thinking, and thinking just 
consists of thoughts’ (141). Seemingly universal, the world-soul is in fact a symbol of the 
human mind, that in the face of such greatness, ‘becomes lost, denies itself and grows 
weaker’, as Joyce would remark in his essay on the Renaissance (OCPW 187). Aristotle’s 
hylomorphic soul, neither dualist nor materialist, allows Joyce to examine, criticise, parody 
and exploit the consequences of the definition of the soul by cognition that had resurfaced in 
the Enlightenment and had been imparted to Joyce through his scholastic masters. Through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 ‘In general, and in all ways, it is one of the hardest things to gain any conviction about the soul’ 
(126). 
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the multivalency of the Aristotelian soul, moreover, Joyce reconsiders and transforms the 
representation of literary “character”, and participates in the philosophical debate of 
modernity on the problematics of the finitude and infinitude of Man and the renewed and 
devastating antagonism between reason and imagination, freedom and necessity, 
“thrownness” and “spontaneity”.  
Rejecting Plato’s mind-body dualism, Aristotle in De Anima asserts the essential 
unity and correspondence between the soul and the body: ‘[T]he affections of the soul’, he 
argues, are ‘inseparable from the natural matter of living things’ (130). Knowledge is 
attained through the senses rather than disembodied Ideas. Sense perception is not deceptive 
as it is for Descartes, but as Joyce wrote in his notes on De Anima, ‘The sensation of 
particular things is always true’ (qtd. in Peterson 214). Theoretical knowledge is one among 
five ‘states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial’: ‘art, 
scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason’ (NE VI.3). 
Moreover, the intellect for Aristotle is pliant and impressionable: it is ‘in a way potentially in 
the objects of thought, but nothing in actuality before it thinks, and the potentiality is like 
that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written’ (DA 203). Thinking is 
transformed by the object it thinks; perception, says Aristotle, is ‘a kind of alteration’ (169). 
The mind is a mirror continuously modified by its reflections: ‘Only when it is separate from 
all things is the intellect really itself and this intellect separate from all things is immortal 
and divine’, Joyce remarked in his notes on Aristotle (Joyce Papers I.ii, Image: 02-003). 
Even though only the divine mind is capable of perfect mimesis, unencumbered by the 
modern dilemmas of subjectivity, thinking does not alienate man from the phenomenal 
world for Aristotle: ‘thinking is the thinking of Being’, in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Aristotelian “theory” (220). Even though sensory perception is not scientific knowledge, the 
path to truth begins with sensation. 
In Stephen’s first artistic performance there is no agony over perfect expression, as 
he assumes that sounds and words reflect his movements: ‘He danced: Tralala lala’ (3). The 
mimesis of words - their ability to reflect the world - is interpreted dramatically: they truly 
“imitate” his performance, allowing the reader to “see” his dance. The expressive capacity of 
rhythm had indeed been defended by Aristotle in the Poetics: ‘even dancing imitates 
character, emotion, and action, by rhythmical movement’; but Stephen here equates the 
rhythm of language with the rhythmical movements of the actors’ bodies on stage. Rhythm, 
an ‘instinct of our nature’ from which poetry has sprung according to Aristotle, manifests 
itself in words (Poetics). In his embodiment and interpretation of the word through his 
performance, moreover, Stephen becomes an object of theory- a work of art: his father 
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‘looked at him through a glass’; but performance also makes him an artist: ‘He sang that 
song. That was his song’ (3). His art - ‘O, the green wothe botheth’ - is both an interpretation 
and an imitation of a song memorised, following Aristotle’s “poetic” principle that nothing 
comes from nothing.  
 The ‘enigma’ of the artist that Stephen ‘was busy constructing’ in Stephen Hero, is 
in the opening pages of the Portrait presented as the cyclical logic through which Heidegger 
brings to light the origin of the work of art: ‘The artist is the origin of the work. The work is 
the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other. In themselves and in their interrelations 
artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, namely, that 
which also gives artist and work of art their names – art’ (143). The relation between the 
artwork and the artist that becomes in modernity a bitter conflict, appears to require “a third 
man” to reconcile these adversaries and explain their meaning. The opening of the Portrait 
performs this dialectic through the problematic position of the actor in the “whole” that art 
represents: is he an artist or a work of art? Reflecting and highlighting this indeterminacy, 
the artist is positioned both within and before the work of art in the title of the novel. The 
inability of Stephen to determine the meaning of art will indeed suggest that he can neither 
be an artist nor produce a work of art; a quandary that makes Stephen an archetypal 
modern(ist) artist, but also forms a prophetic commentary on the dilemmas of modern art. 
Originality or “genius” is unthinkable in this circle of reasoning. For Aristotle, the 
preeminent theorist of poetry, it is indeed ‘the imitation that makes the poet’ (Poetics). 
Imitation, he argues, is an ‘instinct’ ‘implanted in man from childhood’ that is instructive; it 
is ‘through imitation’ that he ‘learns his earliest lessons’. Man in the Poetics is distinguished 
from other animals by being ‘the most imitative of living creatures’. Whereas the scientific 
method of the Metaphysics had been founded on man’s universal desire to know, Aristotle in 
the Poetics adds that ‘no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated’. The path to 
knowledge through imitation, however, appears to be perverse; whereas scientific knowledge 
begins from the senses, the pleasure derived from imitation goes against the senses: ‘Objects 
which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with 
minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies’. 
The isomorphism between mind and object for the modern sceptical artist, however, 
reveals what Nietzsche had denounced as an anthropomorphic error, and denies the artist’s 
freedom and the originality of his creations, as the mind simply reflects the forms that it 
perceives. The epiphanised object of Stephen Hero, under the influence of Aristotle’s 
pictographic imagination becomes in A Portrait an ‘image’. In Aristotelian science, the 
imagination is a subordinate faculty: it ‘cannot occur without perception, nor supposition 
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without imagination’, and requires the aid of the senses to produce a mental image (DA 198). 
‘[I]t is from light, without which seeing is impossible, that imagination takes its name’, 
Aristotle argues, explaining the etymology of phantasia. The art spectator differs from the 
scientist, Stephen will argue in his Aristotelian esthetic theory in chapter five; he does not 
seek to grasp or “grope” the object: ‘Beauty expressed by the artist’, ‘awakens, or ought to 
awaken, or induces, or ought to induce, an esthetic stasis’ (223). Aristotle introduces a series 
of mirrors that although aim to aid knowledge distance the modern spectator from the object 
of perception. Even though imagination springs from sense perception, the object is held 
captive by the mind: whereas with belief ‘we at once experience the corresponding emotion’, 
‘in the case of imagination, we are in just the same state as if we were looking at the terrible 
or comforting things in a painting’ (DA 198). 27 
In contrast to Aristotle’s light of the imagination, Stephen’s mind is ‘a dusk of doubt 
and self-mistrust’ mirroring ‘A dusk like that of the outer world’ (191, 67). The scientific 
method that he had called upon to aid him in this darkness in Stephen Hero, exposes his 
alienation from the world in the Portrait in his futile attempt to use a ‘lamp’ borrowed from 
Aristotle and Aquinas in order to see, that possibly ‘smokes or smells’ (202). Stephen’s 
expectation and desire for correspondence between the individual mind and outward reality 
that is accompanied by a romantic idealisation of the individual imagination, precipitates his 
tragic rise and fall (and rise again), and more comically exposes the narcissistic inclination 
of his ‘theory’ that depends on (self)reflection for understanding and interpretation, modelled 
on the Father’s eternal contemplation ‘as in a mirror His Divine Perfections’ (161). Isolation 
in A Portrait is largely resented by Stephen and is exposed as a vain consolation based on 
the Romantic ideal of the genius. 
Mimesis, following Stephen’s scholastic training, is revelatory of the hapless 
inexactness of human knowledge. Although ‘speculatio’, as François Dastur explains, 
‘comes, of course, from specto, to look at, to scrutinise, and was used by Boethius to 
translate the Greek theoria into Latin’, ‘in Christian theology this meaning was forgotten, 
especially by Thomas Aquinas, who derives speculatio from speculum, mirror, and relates 
the word to what Paul says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13.12) concerning the 
vision of God who we see now confusedly as ‘in a mirror’ but whom later, that is to say, 
after death, we will see ‘face to face’’ (in Sparks ed. 78-9). Stephen’s description of the 
‘tragic emotion’ as a ‘face looking two ways’, betrays its link to this divine model of theory, 
but also Stephen’s translation of its impossibility through the imagery of Greek theatre 
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masks he evokes (222). But whereas abstract and obscure “theory” in the Christian narrative 
is supplanted by an ethical relation between man and God, Stephen’s model is an individual 
face that reflects the self-division and alienation of modern man. Whereas pity and fear are 
for Aristotle the vehicles of catharsis, in Stephen’s theory, through the ‘tragic emotion’ - 
renamed subtly ‘the esthetic emotion’ - ‘The mind is arrested and raised above desire and 
loathing’; aesthetics institute distance rather than purgation, reconciliation and recognition.  
 
 
iii. Scholasticism: a break-water of order and elegance 
 
The attention that had been devoted in Stephen Hero to Stephen’s extra-curricular 
study of the Irish language, undertaken in order to get closer to Emma, is in the Portrait 
replaced by an examination of Stephen’s education at the hands of his Jesuit masters, and the 
details of his home life by a delineation of his school life and education. “Home” is from the 
beginning a place of longing and desire, and the very first familial relation that the novel 
registers is pictured ‘through a glass’ (3). The scientific looking-glass becomes a symbol of 
detachment and isolation; a symbol of an ethical problem in its obstruction of the face to 
face relation, reflected also in Stephen’s narcissistic gazing in mirrors to ‘know even as also 
I am known’ (1 Corinthians 13). Epistemology is confounded with ethics after Stephen’s 
glasses are broken by being pushed into the square ditch by Wells for not trading his snuff 
box. Unlike his author, however, Stephen, like many of Joyce’s readers, does not find his 
efforts to comprehend, define, and ultimately replace the realm of ethics with epistemology 
and aesthetics entertaining; nor is he willing to admit the culpability of his egotism. 
The contrast of Stephen Hero between Stephen’s endeavour ‘to pierce to the 
significant heart of everything’ and his ‘countrified’ bourgeois classmates for who art is ‘a 
continental vice’ and the artist ‘a man who painted pictures’, disappears in the Portrait (39, 
37). The interactions with his peers disclose instead the many similarities that he shares with 
them despite Stephen’s isolation. His ideas are no less idealistic, Cranly warns him when 
Stephen refuses to take his Easter duty despite his mother’s entreaties: ‘that bloody bleating 
goat Temple has ideas. MacCann has ideas too. Every jackass going the roads thinks he has 
ideas’ (263). The guise of science no longer distinguishes Stephen; science figures rather as 
a school subject- a subject that Stephen does not excel in. 
Stephen’s ineptness as a scientist is highlighted from the beginning. In his first 
classroom appearance during ‘the hour for sums’, even though he takes part in the “War of 
the Roses” that Father Arnall stages as a ‘stimulus to friendly rivalry’ - a ‘characteristic 
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feature of Jesuit pedagogy’ according to Sullivan - and tries ‘his best so that York might not 
lose’ despite being ‘no good at sums’, he is completely indifferent to the result of either the 
sum or the competition (78; P 9). Aesthetics distract Stephen from the answer and alleviate 
his loss: ‘He could not get out the answer for the sum but it did not matter. White roses and 
red roses: those were beautiful colours to think of. And the cards for first place and second 
place and third place were beautiful colours too: pink and cream and lavender. Lavender and 
cream and pink roses were beautiful to think of’. The possible rather than the actual 
captivates Stephen’s imagination, and memory prevails over history: ‘Perhaps a wild rose 
might be like those colours and he remembered the song about the wild rose blossoms on the 
little green place. But you could not have a green rose. But perhaps somewhere in the world 
you could’. 
Sullivan notes that a ‘new educational machinery’ was introduced in the Jesuit 
system of education after 1890, that marked a shift from the humanities to applied science: ‘a 
new emphasis was placed on the study of mathematics and the natural sciences, and such 
subjects as drawing, bookkeeping, and shorthand were introduced into a curriculum which 
until then, in Irish Catholic educational practice, had been exclusively humanistic’ (71). 
Although Joyce emphasises that Stephen’s education does not prepare him for the “practical” 
aspects of everyday life, science and mathematics are indeed much more prominent than the 
human sciences, and the stage for key scenes in the novel is provided by the theatre of 
anatomy and of physics. 
The lancet and the ‘nicely polished looking-glass’ are in the hands of Stephen’s 
Jesuit masters in the Portrait; “science”- knowledge, is the mark of a divinely sanctioned 
authority (Letters I 64). Although this definition of science circumvents its modern sense, a 
legacy of the Enlightenment’s methodological ideal of the objectivity of the natural sciences, 
it shares for the Scholastics the same emphasis on “method”. The natural impulse of the 
‘desire to know’ is supervised for the Scholastics by a distinguished discipline- 
“philosophy”, second only to theology. 28  As dialectical reasoning, philosophy is an 
indispensable tool for the understanding of spiritual truths and reconcilement of human 
reason with divine revelation. The emphasis on reason rather than inspiration or spiritual 
intuition distinguished the scholastics from their Patristic forefathers, as did the choice of a 
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Joyce’s attendance’, criticising the curriculum at University College as ‘more suited to the mentality 
of a schoolboy than to that of a university man’, Sullivan nevertheless calls attention to the emphasis 
on method and reason- on ‘formal and systematic training’ that had distinguished Joyce’s education in 
all its grades (Sullivan 165). 
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different philosophical precursor- Aristotle rather than Plato. Their Aristotelian theory of 
knowledge is described by Turner as ‘a system of Moderate Realism and Moderate 
Intellectualism’, conditioned by a ‘scientific method’ that ‘begins with the observation of 
fact’, in the endeavour to reconcile human and divine knowledge and truth 
(“Scholasticism”). ‘As well as on the side of art in general as on the side of beauty’, 
Maritain explains, ‘it is understanding (as the schoolmen teach in thousands of ways) which 
holds the primacy in art work’ (Introduction to Philosophy 51).  
When theology and philosophy no longer shared the same truths- the same Author, 
however, scholasticism came to an end. This end is marked by the prevalence of “science” 
defined as method rather than knowledge, an end that the figure of Descartes and his 
philosophy have come to symbolize. Even though the emphasis on method eventually 
brought the downfall of scholasticism, however, it had also aided the scholastics in 
dismissing the two prevalent charges brought against them: ‘First, that they confounded 
philosophy with theology; and second, that they made reason subservient to authority’ 
(Turner). The Summa Theologica of Aquinas opens by addressing these charges, and his 
presentation of the relation between philosophy and theology is founded upon the role of the 
Author and the hermeneutics of Scripture. Scripture reveals the limits of philosophy and 
separates its wisdom from that of theology: ‘Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of 
philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that 
besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God’ (ST I 
q.1 a. 1). The Word is a stumbling block for the philosopher and “belongs” for Aquinas to 
the theologian. 
The question of authorship and authority undermines the significance of philosophy. 
The objection Aquinas proffers poses a mutually exclusive dialectic between reason and 
authority: either the proof is from authority or it is from reason (ST I, q.1, a. 8). Authority is 
anti-hermeneutic, rendering philosophy superfluous. Aquinas’s response is defiant: ‘the 
argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest’. This has indeed been seen 
as proto-anti-authoritarianism; although of course, ‘the argument from authority based on 
divine revelation is the strongest’. ‘One need not go so far as to say, with Barthélemy Saint 
Hilaire, that “Scholasticism, in its general result, is the first revolt of the modern spirit 
against authority”, Turner admonishes; in the case of Joyce, however, despite Kevin 
Sullivan’s admonition that ‘Nothing in the scholastic background of a Clongownian prepared 
him for the role of social or political rebel’, the possibility may be upheld (23).  
Scholasticism was shaken by a crisis of faith and authority incurred by the very 
philosophical method that had set it apart. The scholastically trained Descartes pushed the 
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emphasis on reason to an ontological extreme; the very being of man is not just distinguished 
by thinking as it was for Aristotle, but determined by it. Thought is free but both tyrannises 
and terrorises the existence of the subject: ‘I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? 
For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I 
should totally cease to exist’ (18). The death of the author, a distinctly philosophical tragedy, 
comes both before and after the death of the subject, resurrected as a spook to deal the final 
blow. Aristotle, as the ‘maestro di color che sanno’, becomes a martyr in modernity’s 
rebellion against the Author. As Descartes and Bruno had argued and Heidegger would later 
confirm, this maestro is the man that the modern author must call upon to help him ‘carry off 
[the] filthy streams’ of the authorised version of history and tradition (PE 105). 
In the melancholic tragedy that is staged in the Portrait, it is similarly a crisis of 
authority and reason that precipitates Stephen’s endless suffering. Lacking like Mangan ‘the 
faith, which in middle age, sent the spires singing up to heaven’, or Bruno’s ‘courage of 
early humanism’, his tragedy is distinctly modern (OCPW 58, 93). Stephen’s proclivity for 
sensory knowledge in the first chapter is replaced by methodic doubt that dominates the 
movements of his thoughts for the rest of the novel, and lacking the Enlightenment optimism 
of his predecessor in Stephen Hero, his recourse to art and aesthetics highlights his 
Romanticism. Both his despair and his desire for transcendence, moreover, reveal their 
historical, sociopolitical and psychological foundations. 
The desire for knowledge may be universal, but Stephen soon finds out that its 
satisfaction is the privilege of an elect few who have been ‘rendered immune mysteriously’ 
from the perils of this indulgence by their ‘ordination’ (P 172). Knowledge is synonymous 
with power in the school environment, mysterious and incomprehensible in its repeated 
“unreasonable” manifestations either through divine or human agents. The admixture of 
pleasure and pain that divine knowledge arouses distinguishes it as “sublime” in Stephen’s 
Romantic imagination, and its ‘awful power’ will indeed be used in the retreat sermon to 
purge through pity and fear the listeners’ body and soul, and to seduce Stephen to join the 
order through the promise that by ‘following up to the end the rigid lines of the doctrines of 
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iv. Sublimity of mind 
 
In the ‘beautiful appearance of the dream-worlds’ over which Apollo reigned 
according to Nietzsche, ‘every man is a perfect artist’, and Stephen indeed has no trouble 
creating “art” in the first chapter, as all experiences and memories are aestheticised (BT 2). 
The ‘soothsaying faculty’ of Apollo allows him to transform even the scene of his 
martyrdom with which the chapter ends into an aesthetic experience (3). Through the “ek-
stasis” that distinguishes his theoretical posture he is “disembodied”- he stands outside 
himself; the ‘trembling hand’ of this human artist - an image used by Aquinas to symbolize 
his imperfection in contrast to the divine creator - is presented ‘like a leaf in the fire’, and it 
is by “thinking” of his hands ‘beaten and swollen with pain all in a moment’ that he feels ‘so 
sorry for them as if they were not his own but someone else’s that he felt sorry for’ (P 51). 
The paradoxical amalgamation of pain and suffering with aesthetic imagery and 
voluptuous vocabulary, highlights Stephen’s growing estrangement from his body- from 
aesthesis. Bodily pain becomes inseparable from spiritual turmoil during this 
incomprehensible in its injustice experience. Just like he is punished for something that he 
has not done, so his hand is made to atone for his sins, and through the transformation of this 
‘crumpled burning livid hand’ into ‘a livid quivering mass’, Stephen is “transubstantiated”. 
Through the martyrdom of his hand that according to Aristotle the soul is analogous to, and 
therefore according to Joyce’s notes on Aristotle, is ‘not (absolutely) part of the body’, body 
and soul are united in Eucharistic sacrifice (Joyce Papers I.ii, Image: 02-008).  
His martyrdom is hermeneutic like that of Christ: “Christ is not only the hero of 
Scripture, but also, at once, its interpreter; he is, both in the active and passive sense, its 
logos” (Martella in Balsamo, Tradition of Christian Epics 121). Stephen’s composure, his 
cry that becomes a prayer, the focus on the palms of his hands that shrink into ‘a livid 
quivering mass’, his “altruism” during his suffering that makes him feel sorry for his hands 
‘as if they were not his own but someone else’s’, make his account Christological (51). In 
this violation of the “truth” and violence that attends Stephen’s defence of it, interpretation is 
inseparable from performance; his testimony makes use of an assortment of religious 
symbols to communicate this apophatic experience. The ‘scalding water’ that ‘burst forth 
from his eyes’ reveals that Stephen is not only the actor and narrator of this scene, but also 
the spectator who is “purified” at the end of a tragic performance in Aristotle’s account. 
The religious iconography of this portrait distances him further from his own 
experience, as he stands in dreadful awe before this spectacle. With the aid of third person 
narrative, Stephen retains his position as an aesthetic spectator; he indeed manages saintly-
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like to protect his soul by viewing his body as an alien object following the division between 
body and soul that pain generates. The imagery of fire and water that had also accompanied 
his narration of Parnell’s death, allows him to conceive this event as both a death and a birth. 
No longer simply a portrait, the aesthetic object is here an icon, conceived through ‘The 
attitude of rapture in sacred art, the raised and parted hands, the parted lips and eyes as of 
one about to swoon’ that would become for Stephen ‘an image of the soul in prayer, 
humiliated and faint before her Creator’ (162). The “ek-stasis” of the theorist gives way to 
ecstatic rapture; his “sacrifice” as a tragic hero transforms him into a Dionysian artist. 
Aesthetic contemplation of beauty gives way to a sublime experience. Under the 
sway of such ecstasis, he is ‘no longer the artist’, but has ‘himself become a work of art: in 
these paroxysms of intoxication the artistic power of all nature reveals itself to the highest 
gratification of the Primordial Unity’; or in Stephen’s case of the prefect (BT 4). But rather 
than self-forgetfulness, freedom, universal harmony, and ‘release of all the symbolic 
powers’, that characterise the Dionysian artist for Nietzsche, Stephen’s self and art are 
vanquished by the theological symbolism that shapes this scene (7). Moreover, his desire is 
not to sink back into this ‘Primal Unity’, but to identify with one of ‘the great men whose 
names were in Richmal Magnall’s Questions’, or with their Author Peter Parley, a hero too 
by being ‘on the first page in a picture’ (55).  
Stephen’s idealisation of a sublimity that as Kant stressed is only ‘discoverable in 
the mind’, imprisons him ‘in a mental world’ (CAJ 92; P 223). Aristotelian images become 
Kantian examples that aid the aesthetic theorist’s judgments in the absence of scientific 
concepts. The ‘motion’ that ‘in the representation of the sublime’ ‘The mind feels itself set 
in’, is not only elevating, however, but also treacherous, leading the mind to ‘The point of 
excess for the imagination’, that feels to the mind ‘like an abyss in which it fears to lose 
itself’ (CAJ 107). Without ‘the development of moral ideas’ and ‘culture’, Kant argues, the 
sublime ‘merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying’ (115-6). Sublimity of mind as the 
example of the Jesuits and of Shakespeare in Ulysses indicate, leads to “sundering”.   
The “sublime” idea that captures Stephen’s imagination is that ‘truth inherent in the 
spirit of Catholicism: that man cannot reach the divine heart except across that sense of 
separation and loss that is called sin’ (OCPW 151). Thinking about his sinful classmates who 
drank from the altar wine, he feels ‘A faint sickness of awe’ that ‘made him feel weak’, in 
his inability to understand what prompted them against the background of the mysteriously 
‘dark silent sacristy’ (P 40). Re-living the ‘terrible and strange sin’ in his imagination, his 
‘deep awe’ of the sin merges with his awe of the sacraments and mysterious and luxurious 
setting of the altar, and ‘it thrilled him to think of it in the silence’ (47). Through poetic 
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licence he alters the account of the event and prefers to think of the sin of stealing ‘the 
flashing gold thing into which God was put on the altar in the middle of flowers and candles 
at benediction’, making himself the protagonist, but like his author refusing to receive 
communion.  
Perversity, understood here as a paradox of thinking about the ‘terrible and strange’ 
sin and the punishment of the fellows ‘smugging in the square’ in the hands of Mr Gleeson 
and feeling a ‘queer quiet pleasure’ that that leads to ‘deep awe’, seduces Stephen both to the 
‘obscure silences’ of the Catholic Church and to the ‘dark orgiastic riot’ that is ironically 
narrated liturgically (42, 46, 113, 105). In Stephen Hero, where Stephen openly wages war 
against the ‘farce’ and ‘plague’ of the Catholic Church, Catholicism is distinguished by this 
paradox: ‘Exultation of the mind before joyful beauty, exultation of the body in free 
confederate labours, every natural impulse towards health and wisdom and happiness had 
been corroded by the pest of these vermin’, coincides with ‘Contempt of [the body] human 
nature, weakness, nervous tremblings, fear of day and joy, distrust of man and life, 
hemiplegia of the will, beset the body burdened and disaffected in its members by its black 
tyrannous lice’ (151, 198). An “ecstatic reality” which ‘does not heed the single unit, but 
even seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystical feeling of Oneness’ 
distinguishes both the Dionysian and the Christian rites (BT 5).  
Sublimity, that according to Kant ‘provokes a representation of limitlessness, yet 
with a superadded thought of its totality’ distinguishes also the oratory and imagery of the 
retreat sermon, staged in the timeless present of the Apocalypse that will signal the collapse 
of the antithesis between the ‘eternity of bliss’ and ‘eternity of hell’ (CAJ 90; P 122,142). 
The sermon calls for future memory, to ‘Remember only thy last things’, and employs the 
fleeting notion of time to inspire insecurity and vulnerability (116). Personal memory has to 
contend with the eternal ritual cycles of the church year. Through a profusion of oxymoronic 
phrases and interfusion of the imagery of fire and water that Stephen had already made use 
of in the scene of his own martyrdom, both Stephen’s reasoning and his sensory perception 
become bewildered and capitulate to the impassioned voice telling him ‘to confess, to speak 
out in words what he had done and thought’, to make the inner outer (136). 
The word of God in the unequivocal obedience that it demands abolishes 
hermeneutic ambiguity, leaving simply ‘Forms’ that ‘passed this way and that through the 
dull light. And that was life’ (119).  As ‘earthly beauty’ is ‘dangerous to look upon’, it is 
only through symbols and emblems that divine beauty can be conceived (125). Images, 
necessary for cognitive processes according to Aristotle, and for fallen man who can only 
see “through a glass”, are deceptive for the sinner, as for the modern philosopher. ‘The soot-
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coated packet of pictures’, ‘his monstrous dreams’ and ‘the foul long letters’ are symptoms 
of Stephen’s theoretical malady (124). Catharsis must consummate his tragedy; by giving 
shape to his sins in confession through spoken words, ‘His sins trickled from his lips’, 
allowing him to fill the void with the body of Christ (156). 
Stephen’s confession does not bring an end to his sufferings, however. ‘[A]wful 
agony’ must precede ‘awful power’ in an interplay of power and submission that Stephen 
becomes engrossed in while hallowing himself daily ‘in the presence of some holy image or 
mystery’ (143, 171). The “instant” that allows man to shatter his bond with God gives 
Stephen ‘an intense sense of power to know that he could, by a single act of consent, in a 
moment of thought, undo all that he had done’ (165). But even though Stephen refuses the 
offer of ‘secret knowledge and secret power’ of the Jesuit Order, the bond that he breaks is 
not with god, but with his family and friends, falling in love again with Words and their 
Authors (172). As an artist, he believes that he must preserve the ‘smithy’ of his soul - ‘the 
workshops of the brain’ through which Mind (“Geist”) for Wagner, thinking itself to be ‘the 
ground and cause of Nature’ ‘hurls herself; a raging stream of madness, upon the world of 
actuality’ - inviolate (P 276; 83).  
 
 
v. Beware of martyrdom 
 
The theme of martyrdom, an emblem of the intersection of Irish history and myth, 
myth and religion, along with the negation of meaning which is the aim of art for Pater and 
the Aesthetic movement, leads to Stephen’s association of art with death. Tragedy is indeed 
the pinnacle in Stephen’s theory and is the model for his aesthetic theory and theorist. 
Stephen views himself not only as a martyr of “truth”, but also as a martyr for truth in his 
fantasy of his dead mass. In order to be vindicated, for Wells to be punished and repent, he 
must die; he has to sacrifice himself for the “truth”. The revelation of the truth, however, a 
personal reward as everyone else would have ‘sad faces’, is meaningless if he is not there to 
see it (22). Wanting to become the Author, Stephen must also become his own theorist in 
order to give meaning to his Word following his total severance from the community. Time 
is again an obstacle that can be overcome only through godlike transcendence. His 
declaration of his “indifference” to his plight in the perverse pleasure he derives from the 
song that accompanies his procession, ironically highlights his egoistic conception of the 
truth, but also questions the transcendence from suffering that aesthetic distance is thought to 
afford. 
	   105	  
	  
Stephen’s detachment from the scene of his death dramatises the split between the 
spectators and the artist, the artist and his work of art. Stephen is not the sole theorist in this 
scene, but has to contend with those present at his funeral, with his author who refers to him 
in the third person and with the reader. “Truth” is filtered through a series of mirrors. 
Disinterested contemplation is exposed as a mask of Stephen’s alienation from history. 
Through aesthetics, he attempts to consolidate personal and communal memory; he confuses 
his fantastical death with the historical event of Parnell’s death: ‘he had not died then. 
Parnell had died’, he later realises (99). But the comprehension of alterity through art - either 
through “experience” or distance - is problematic; instead of empathy for the plight of 
Parnell, through the artistic depiction of his death Stephen perversely derives aesthetic 
pleasure. His heroic “fearlessness” in the face of death ironically highlights his alienation 
from reality and aestheticism. Alterity is shifted to words that “move him” because they are 
mysteriously ‘beautiful and sad’, and do not demand comprehension (22). In order to 
understand the significance of the death of Parnell through art, Stephen has to make himself 
the protagonist, to enact the event of Parnell’s death in a literal translation of “mimesis” that 
is narcissistic. 
Ignoring the consequence of history, Stephen’s thoughts once again become 
“metaphysical”. He does not try to understand the significance of the particular event and 
empathise with the particular individual, but rather the mystery of death itself, charging the 
individual- himself, with the burden of unveiling this mystery, that as tragedy and the fate of 
national and nationalist artists show, necessitates the sacrifice of the individual. In order to 
be archetypal, he must sacrifice his ego. Art is more philosophical than history by 
suppressing the consequence of history that is “unaesthetic” in its privileging of the 
particular. The criticism of nationalist art in Stephen Hero is replaced in the Portrait with a 
critique of aesthetics to reveal the problematic role of art in the creation of modern national 
consciousness. Stephen’s aestheticism in his view of art as a mirror perfectly reflecting his 
emotions exposes the danger of narcissism in Yeats’s claim ‘that one’s verses should hold, 
as in a mirror, the colours of one’s own climate and scenery in their right proportion’ (Ideas 
5). The quest to revive the consciousness and identity of the nation through art understood as 
an ideal repository of historical memory, ignores how art privileges the “best self” and 
collapses the transformations of history in an apocalyptic hermeneutic moment that 
privileges the ‘now’, but as if it was ‘not part of time at all’ (Physics 374-5). 
Art, ironically, has a “therapeutic” effect for Stephen who fantasises about his dead 
mass while laid up in the infirmary, as he is distracted from his own suffering through the 
beauty of words, combining both the modern and the ancient function of art: ‘Art is to drive 
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away hours and moments of discomfort, boredom, half-bad conscience, and if possible, 
transform the faults of the lives and characters into faults of world-destiny’, Nietzsche 
complained; ‘Very different were the Greeks, who realised in their art the outflow and 
overflow of their own sense of well-being and health, and loved to see their perfection once 
more from a standpoint outside themselves’ (Human, All-Too-Human 319). Like Joyce, 
Nietzsche was sceptical of the modern interpretation of catharsis - ‘The pathological 
discharge … which philologists are at a loss whether to include under medicinal or moral 
phenomena’ - that was in fact ‘merely esthetic play’ for the ancients (BT 83). Both the 
ancient and the modern function of art are equally self-indulgent in Stephen’s aestheticised 
“tragedy” that interprets Aristotle’s ‘παθηµάτων κάθαρσιν’ as a purgation of feelings rather 
than happenings and sufferings (παθήµατα); emotions that Joyce in his review of Arnold 
Graves’ Clytemnestra describes as ‘that indifferent sympathy with certain pathological states 
which is so often anathematized by theologians of the street’ (OCPW 88). 
The entanglement of art with history, however, renders aesthetic play dubious. 
Although Stephen tries persistently to depict himself as a tragic protagonist, the historical, 
mythical and theological models that he is copying are exposed and deny him the exemplary 
status he is seeking. Individualism, relativism and the estrangement of modern man from 
nature and tradition mark the end of ‘tragic culture’ for Nietzsche (BT 64). The sacrifice of 
the modern philosopher for truth can only be comic, he argues, as long as truth is understood 
as “theory”, as long as ‘cool paradoxical thoughts’ replace ‘Dionysian ecstasies’ (43). The 
intersection of the mythical culture of nationalism with the philosophical tradition of 
Scholasticism will indeed repeatedly deny Joyce’s aspiring artist tragic status and hinder the 
production of works of art. Behind the trope of martyrdom shared by both traditions, 
Nietzsche’s warning to ‘These pariahs of society, these long-pursued, badly-persecuted ones 
- also the compulsory recluses, the Spinozas or Giordano Brunos’, ‘refined vengeance-
seekers and poison-Brewers’, will be sounded to ‘beware of martyrdom’: 
 
The martyrdom of the philosopher, his “sacrifice for the sake of truth,” forces into 
the light whatever of the agitator and actor lurks in him; and if one has hitherto 
contemplated him only with artistic curiosity, with regard to many a philosopher it is 
easy to understand the dangerous desire to see him also in his deterioration 
(deteriorated into a “martyr”, into a stage-and-tribune-bawler). Only, that it is 
necessary with such a desire to be clear what spectacle one will see in any case - 
merely a satyric play, merely an epilogue farce, merely the continued proof that the 
long, real tragedy is at an end, supposing that every philosophy has been a long 
tragedy in its origin. (Beyond Good and Evil 536-7) 
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vi. The tragic emotion  
 
Stephen’s “ignorance” - his unfulfilled desire to know - causes him to “suffer”, and 
from a young age he begins to conceive himself as a tragic hero: ‘It pained him that he did 
not know well what politics meant and that he did not know where the universe ended. He 
felt small and weak’ (14). As he does not know ‘what politics meant’ and ‘where the 
universe ended’, he is estranged from his family and ‘the fellows in poetry and rhetoric’. 
Communication and social participation are for him contingent on hermeneutics. His plight 
is indeed not only epistemological, but as the last chapter will highlight, it is also 
hermeneutical. His alienation from the sphere of ethics and his demotion of kinesis are 
indeed here foreshadowed, as politics and “science” are regarded as counterparts: 
‘[P]hilosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same’, however, as Aristotle 
argues; in politics it is practical wisdom ‘which is concerned with a man himself- with the 
individual’ that is required (NE VI.7). Stephen, however, will understand this to mean his 
individual self, a self that will become increasingly self-divided. 
Philosophic wisdom ‘will contemplate none of the things that will make a man 
happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being)’, and Stephen indeed becomes 
increasingly despondent (VI.12). Stephen’s mind very quickly becomes old and dejected, not 
only due to a change in fortune, but also through his acquaintance with the ‘love of sorrow 
for the sake of sorrow and despair and fearful menaces’ that distinguished ‘the high 
traditions of Mangan’s race’ (OCPW 59). Even though this ‘delightful sadness’ may have 
been a divinely or imperially ordained lot that the Irish could not escape, it was also 
cultivated and idealised by both the Irish and their oppressors and distinguished for Joyce the 
Romantic “mood” of the Literary Revival (Yeats, Ideas 271). ‘In his head’, Nolan argues, 
‘the colonized subject has confounded an historical ill with an eternal and transcendent 
principle of evil. History is lent the force of myth, and the individual appears powerless, 
controlled by unseen forces forever beyond his or her agency’ (70). Myth, promising escape 
from history, reason and isolation, as it had for the Romantics, ‘would establish upon the 
future a far more cruel tyranny’, Joyce warned (OCPW 59). 
It is indeed through his fictional adventures that Stephen’s mind grows ‘older and 
sadder’,  “historicised” not only through reference to historical actors, but also through his 
assumption of the role of the protagonist (P 65). The ‘scattered and dead revellers who had 
been the companions of his father’s youth’ are for Stephen simply ‘names’- disembodied 
phantoms (96). While his father drinks with his friends ‘to the memory of their past’, that 
past assumes such force and reality for Stephen that his memory of his own past and his very 
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existence seem to him to be ‘fading out in the sun or … being lost and forgotten somewhere 
in the universe’ (101, 99). Following Stephen’s apocalyptic sense of history, the last come 
first: ‘His mind seemed older than theirs: it shone coldly on their strifes and happiness and 
regrets like a moon upon a younger earth’ (102). Disconnected from the tradition and 
community that his father shares with his friends, history for Stephen has meaning only 
through “names”. Like Little Chandler who regrets that ‘his name was not more Irish-
looking’, which would allow his identification with ‘the Celtic school’, the remains of 
tradition are similarly fossilised in names for Stephen that only communicate “The Celtic 
note” (D 80). But while Stephen will later criticise Davin’s “worship” of ‘the sorrowful 
legend of Ireland’ - ‘the broken lights of Irish myth’ - he simply fills the void that his 
rejection of tradition leaves through his incantation of ‘violent or luxurious language’ of an 
equally “decadent” tradition (195-6). 
In response to this “tragic necessity” that the intersection of myth and history 
establishes, the hermeneutics of tragedy repeatedly take centre stage in Joyce’s work. 
Stephen rehearses his own definition of tragedy in the Portrait through his Aristotelian 
theory on the significance of pity and terror for the spectator of tragedy in response to the 
martyrological character of Irish culture, but also modern culture in its sensationalisation of 
daily life. As an Irish artist Stephen has to battle with the ghost of melancholy that haunts his 
art and stands in his way of creating real “drama”, but also as a modern artist contend with 
the daily spectacle that the newspapers provide. Joyce’s assessment of Synge’s Riders to the 
Sea in 1903, had indeed similarly focused on his incorrect use of ‘tragic’: ‘It is tragic about 
all the men that are drowned in the islands: but thanks be to God Synge isn’t an Aristotelian’, 
and also on Yeats’s ill-judged comment that the play ‘was quite Greek’ (Letters II 35). His 
response to Synge, like that of his character, was a presentation of his own ‘esthetic’; a 
presentation that Synge either correctly or prophetically interpreted as theatrical as well as 
philosophical (‘Synge says I have a mind like Spinoza!’) (38).  
Stephen’s approach to drama through Aristotle’s theory is not very promising, 
however. The “ideal” spectator of his dramatic theory suddenly finds himself contemplating 
‘an image of the beauty we have come to understand’ rather than dramatic action; defined, 
moreover, not by Aristotle, but by Aquinas. ‘What do you mean’, Lynch reminds Stephen of 
the impertinence of his theological diversion, ‘by prating about beauty and the imagination 
in this miserable Godforsaken island? No wonder the artist retired within or behind his 
handiwork after having perpetrated this country’ (233). The retired artist, as the archetypal 
theorist, is not “arrested” by an ideal ‘static’ ‘esthetic emotion’, but is rather completely 
indifferent; having ‘perpetrated’ his work of art, he decides to hide. 
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The conceit of Joyce’s response to Synge over a decade earlier, moreover, is 
reflected in the complex relation of Stephen with Davin, who comes to Stephen’s mind prior 
to his presentations of his esthetic theories, as he looks at the statue of Thomas Moore as ‘a 
Firbolg in the borrowed cloak of a Milesian’ (194-5). The comparison of Stephen’s mind, 
‘eager of speculation’, with the ‘reluctance of speech and deed’ of Davin is not only parodic 
in its disingenuousness, but also parallels the traditions that have shaped and constrained 
both the intellectual and moral progress of the two characters- religion and nationalism 
(196). Stephen’s “classical” temper and style, his ‘speculation’ that he believes separates him 
from the ‘grossness of intelligence’, ‘bluntness of feeling’ and ‘dull stare of terror in the 
eyes’ of Davin, do not absolve him of romanticism as Donovan points out to him: ‘Goethe 
and Lessing, said Donovan, have written a lot on that subject, the classical school and the 
romantic school and all that’; the dualism is itself Romantic (195-6, 229). Classical style 
manifests itself in Stephen’s theory as exegesis and catechesis that Stephen employs in his 
endeavour to formulate an abstract theory on the meaning of art- a task set by the dean of 
studies. 29  
Joyce’s ironic stance towards his character, has therefore political as well as artistic 
resonance, accepting and exploiting his debts to tradition but also refusing to accept it ‘with 
all its griefs and failures’ or ‘failures and regrets’ and censuring the romantic oxymoron of 
‘delightful sadness’ that was used to characterise and create ‘national melodies’ (OCPW 58, 
136; Ideas 272). Irony and parody, moreover, allow Joyce to subvert Yeats’s definition of 
tragedy: ‘All happy art seems to me that hollow image, but when its lineaments express also 
the poverty or the exasperation that set its maker to the work, we call it tragic art’ (Ideas 
329). Joyce was aware, as Wilde had been, that tragedy cannot be a private affair, and how 
easily sentimentalism could pass as tragedy in Irish theatre. Stephen’s conceited Romantic 
solitariness questions the quest for the revival of an idyllic concept of community that 
ignores its debts to Romanticism and the creative input of those it views as mere 
“spectators”. The representation of the ‘real face’ of Ireland, was indeed not only an ethical 
issue, but also a political and dramatic concern; Declan Kiberd argues that the foundation of 
the Abbey theatre was ‘part of a crusade against the Stage Irishman’ that staged the 
‘contemporary debate about what constituted the real face of Ireland now that the mask had 
been tossed aside’ (The Irish Writer and the World 28). This tremendous responsibility that 
the artist is faced with in terms of mimesis that since Aristotle had defined art, paralyses 
Stephen and sends him gazing into mirrors to discern his true face. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ‘When may we expect to have something from you on the esthetic question?’ (202). 
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Davin’s tale of his encounter with a peasant woman in response to Stephen’s 
‘violent or luxurious language’ that he used to absolve himself from responding to the Irish 
language question, allows Stephen some insight into “womanhood” that is so alien to him as 
an ‘unsubstantial image’ (67). But it also aids Stephen’s philosophical quest for truth, as the 
‘batlike soul’ that Davin evokes is also a reminder of Aristotle’s warning to the theorist of 
the limits of human understanding: ‘as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the 
reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all’ (198; Metaphysics 
II.1). The paradox that the investigation of the truth presents us with, Aristotle argues, is that 
it is ‘in one way hard, in another easy’: while ‘no one is able to attain the truth adequately’, 
‘we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and 
while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a 
considerable amount is amassed’. Therefore, he adds, ‘we should be grateful, not only to 
those with whose views we may agree, but also to those who have expressed more 
superficial views’. Knowledge and understanding cannot be attained through individual self-
reflection; even the theorist must be sensitive to the communality of truth. Hermeneutics 
must take the form of an interminable dialogue, the portrayal of which in writing can only be 
a limited and artificial construction, and in the silence of writing resemble delusively a 
monologue. 
The impression of the figure of this woman to Stephen as ‘a batlike soul waking to 
the consciousness of itself in darkness and secrecy and loneliness’ highlights his ethical 
predicament, but also the problem of representation; the artist’s embodiment of this soul 
through ‘the eyes and voice and gesture of a woman without guile’, is a “transmutation” and 
a partial manifestation (P 198). Joyce’s concern that he had not ‘reproduced’ in Dubliners 
the ‘beauty’ and the ‘ingenuous insularity and its hospitality’ unique to Ireland - ‘The latter 
‘virtue’ so far as I can see does not exist elsewhere in Europe - a paradoxical combination 
that the lonely woman ‘calling the stranger to her bed’ reveals, is reflected in Stephen’s 
anxious and confused feelings towards Emma and inability to make her conform to the 
archetypes he is familiar with (Letters II 166). Gabriel in “The Dead” similarly struggles to 
praise Ireland’s hospitality in his speech, which in his derision of the living examples that 
surround him degenerates into a conceited oratorical display.  
Whereas Stephen’s earlier poetic composition had been a dedication to Emma 
through vacuous imagery ‘of the night and the balmy breeze and the maiden lustre of the 
moon’, the memory of her interrupts his ‘tremulous’ ‘morning inspiration’ of the villanelle 
(74, 235). In an ironic “substantiation” of the ‘luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure’ in 
Stephen’s ‘mystery of esthetic’, the typological relation between the Virgin Mary and Eve 
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allows him to “transubstantiate” his carnal desire ‘In the virgin womb of the imagination’ 
(231). “Weary” like Shelley’s moon, his muse betrays his Romanticism. The scholar who 
has just delivered his philosophical disquisition to an indifferent interlocutor, gives way to an 
inspired Romantic who authenticates his inspiration by usurping the role of the Virgin in 
order to consummate his desired encounter with the ‘unsubstantial image which his soul so 
constantly beheld’ ‘without any overt act of his’ (67). 
Once his verses are written down, however, the memory of Emma as ‘a figure of the 
womanhood of her country, a batlike soul’, dissipates his ideal coincidence of these eternal 
feminines, and exposes his blindness in her seeming refusal to ‘unveil her soul's shy 
nakedness’ to him (198, 240). ‘[R]ather than guiding him to privileged spiritual truths’, Lisa 
Rado argues, ‘Stephen’s dream maidens reflect his repressed sexual fantasies; realizing this 
fact leads him almost immediately to doubt his authenticity and ability as an artist’ (30). 
Reminding him of the physical and spiritual turmoil she had caused him, the memory of 
Emma lays bare the instincts that have really “inspired” him which he had tried to clothe 
with liturgical vestments. The ‘distorted reflections of her image’ call up in his memory 
other Dublin females that he had regarded with fear and awe and excluded from his art. 
Suspicious of their ‘vanities’ and pitying ‘the dark shame of womanhood’, femininity for 
him is purely ethereal (239, 72, 242). 
His disguise as ‘a monk’ is exposed by Emma who tells him he is ‘a heretic’, 
although he still makes a vain effort to hold on to the sacramental nature of his vocation as a 
‘priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant 
body of everliving life’ (238, 240). He attempts to distinguish this role from ‘one who was 
but schooled in the discharging of a formal rite’, despite having just made an offering at ‘the 
altar of the world’ and turned the earth into ‘a swinging swaying censer, a ball of incense, an 
ellipsoidal fall’ (240, 236). Through the amalgamation of scriptural and liturgical imagery, 
and by usurping for himself the fecundity of femininity, he had transcended the difficulty of 
the artist in making the word flesh, but also allowing the flesh to signify through the word. 
But as the distorted images the memory of Emma call up reveal, the flesh is not a mirror. His 
alchemical productions indeed evade all relations and actions that ritual establishes and 
accomplishes “formally”. 
Conceiving his productions as ‘a form of homage’, however, he cannot maintain the 
indifference of the dramatist (239). Autobiography as well as history war against Stephen’s 
idealism. As the sole performer, ‘sitting at the old piano, striking chords softly from its 
speckled keys and singing’ while she ‘leaned beside the mantelpiece’ he can maintain the 
ideal stasis, but as soon as it is transformed into kinesis through her dancing that urges 
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participation, the visionary trance is broken (238). He refuses the communion that art would 
allow between them by sending his verses to her, fearful of the response he might get. His 
understanding of this homage and his relation to his body is formed rather through ‘The 
radiant image of the eucharist’ that he invokes in order to overcome his anger (240). 
Refusing the “sacrifice” that he believes his homage compels him to make, he turns to the 
Eucharist as an ‘image’ that is poetically expedient, simulating the artist’s union of art and 
life, while pitying Emma’s “fallen” body, ‘humbled and saddened by the dark shame of 
womanhood’ (242). The Eucharist, ‘as a symbolic transubstantiation of male body and 
blood’, as Christine Froula notes, is placed ‘in parallel with the biological menarche that 
Eliade projects as “the mystery of blood”, sign of a naturally sacralized femininity’ (65). 
While Eucharistic images abound in his art as in his author’s, Stephen refuses to 
receive communion. Uninitiated to ‘the great mystery of love’, a mystery that urges sacrifice 
and self-division, his communion can only be with himself (162). Willing to ‘unveil her 
soul’s shy nakedness’ only within the confines ‘of a formal rite’, this veiled female figure - 
like ‘the veiled face of God’ before which the dramatist ‘stands a mediator in awful truth’ 
and for the sake of whom he ‘forgoes his very self’ in Joyce’s early essay “Drama and Life” 
- is an adversary to the artist’s desire to create epiphanic art, as his meditations on the 
allegiance of women to religion and to the Irish language foreground (240; OCPW 26). His 
solitary communion is forged through ‘radiant’ imagery and the ‘liquid letters of speech, 
symbols of the element of mystery’ (242). ‘Passing by ‘the voice of a servant’ singing 
“Rosie O’Grady”, Stephen’s ‘esthetic apprehension’ is realised only through ‘The soft 
beauty of the Latin word’ that Cranly quotes to “translate” this experience to Stephen (265). 
Her voice is a seductive call to ‘formal rite’ once again, as she is imagined as ‘The figure of 
a woman as she appears in the liturgy of the church’, revealing ironically Stephen’s own 
translation of desire and action into ritual; a ritual, however, that he observes with ‘quiet 
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vii. The broken lights of Irish myth 
 
The mythical and historical traditions imparted to Stephen during his brief 
interruption of studies by the paternal figures that step in to fill the pedagogic role of the 
Jesuits - the political and legendary ‘subjects nearer their hearts’ that they discussed 
‘Trudging along the road or standing in some grimy wayside public house’ - and the “return” 
to nature that his adventures with the milkmen afforded him, ironically awaken in Stephen 
“vulgar” animal instincts and urges that he suppresses by reading about the ‘marvellous’ 
adventures of The Count of Monte Christo and practicing in his imagination the Count’s 
‘proud gesture of refusal’ (P 64-5). His “inborn” mythical tradition manifests itself as a 
‘savage desire’ ‘before which everything else was idle and alien’, as a ‘dark presence 
moving irresistibly upon him from the darkness, a presence subtle and murmurous as a flood 
filling him wholly with itself’ (105). The mythical world for Stephen is masculine, primitive 
and Dionysian. It is an unconscious and universal realm that he must rebel against through 
“theory”; a feminised reaction both through the undertones of homosexuality in theory’s 
links to Aestheticism and to Catholicism and the series of female images of beauty that 
Stephen ‘exulted to defile with patience’. The mother-tongue is truly “silenced”, reflecting 
the spectral role of female figures in the novel that are represented as a mirror and vessel of 
male desires.  
Stephen is unprepared for the ecstatic reality of Dionysus; a reality that questions the 
very essence and consequence of aesthetics. The ‘measured restraint, that freedom from the 
wilder emotions, that philosophical calm of the sculptor-god’ Apollo, ‘the deity of light’ that 
Stephen was able to mirror in the first chapter through godlike and aesthetic detachment - 
even when he was compelled to suffer a ‘mystical self-abnegation’ - is an increasingly 
fragile theatrical mask that must be worn in order to avoid submersion into ‘Oneness as the 
soul of the race, and of nature itself’ that would obliterate his ‘symbolic powers’ as an artist 
(BT 3, 5, 7). He is a reluctant and resentful player, enjoying artistic performance only in 
solitude, and like the man of letters in the definition of an epiphany in Stephen Hero, he 
‘chronicle[s]’ epiphany-like scenes ‘with patience’- with the capacity to endure and suffer, 
rather than scholarly ‘extreme care’ (P 70; SH 216). 
He is only ‘seemingly a tranquil watcher of the scene before him’ while ‘sitting in 
the midst of a children’s party’; ‘His silent watchful manner’ masks ‘the feverish agitation of 
his blood’ that Emma’s glance excites ‘through the circling of the dancers and amid the 
music and laughter’ (73, 71-2). The ‘mirth’ kindled by art and play is merely ‘a soothing 
air’, ‘false and trivial’ that allows him to conceal his intemperate exhilaration (71). In 
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contrast to the fleeting merriment of the games, Emma’s eyes conjure a ‘tale’ ‘from some 
dim past’ heard many times before; his ‘feverish agitation’ is ascribed mythical dimensions; 
a myth “authored” by Emma’s ‘vanities’: ‘her fine dress and sash and long black stockings’, 
that seduce him into a Dionysian ecstatic reality antagonistic to the world of art and the 
individual (72). The ‘pink-dressed figure’ discovered ‘In a dark corner of the chapel’ while 
Stephen waits to go on stage, is similarly a “temptress” arousing ‘A low murmur of 
curiosity’ and eliciting ‘A movement of impatience’ that is conciliated aesthetically by 
Stephen’s contemplation of the theatre from a distance as ‘a festive ark’ and by ‘the faint 
rhythm of the music’ that precipitates his “catharsis”: ‘His unrest issued from him like a 
wave of sound: and on the tide of flowing music the ark was journeying, trailing her cables 
of lanterns in her wake’ (77-9).   
This mythical tradition is incompatible with Stephen’s ideal of beauty, demanding as 
in tragedy the absorption of the theorist into the drama through ‘pity and fear’, and union 
with nature. Stephen’s essay presentation before the audience of the Literary and Historical 
Society in Stephen Hero is replaced with his performance in the Whitsuntide play as a 
‘farcical pedagogue’, the account of which is interrupted by memories of Stephen’s 
“martyrdom” at the hands of his classmates in his defence of Byron as the greatest writer 
which follows the “heresy” of his school essay (77). While he is able to share ‘the common 
mirth’ as he stands ‘in the wings’ of the stage, when he is transposed to the stage ‘amid the 
garish gas and the dim scenery’, he again feels detached: ‘the play which he had known at 
rehearsals for a disjointed lifeless thing had suddenly assumed a life of its own. It seemed 
now to play itself, he and his fellow actors aiding it with their parts’ (90). As an actor rather 
than theorist, he finds himself ‘acting before the innumerable faces of the void’: a ‘simple 
body’ that is ‘magically deformed’ at the end of the performance, as ‘the void of faces’ is 
seen ‘breaking at all points and falling asunder into busy groups’. His ability to see, know 
and judge is impaired in his immersion in the action of the play. Whereas previously he had 
countered the impersonality of art by placing himself in the position of both subject and 
object of theory, his distance from his audience registers an ethical void that Emma’s 
‘serious alluring eyes watching him from among the audience’ had momentarily dissipated.  
His participation in the school play and perception of the theatrical performance as a 
ritual celebration in his imaginary transfiguration of the theatre into a ‘festive ark’ is 
followed by a mystical initiation into ‘a fantastic world of sombre masses’ (98). In contrast 
to ‘the company of subversive writers whose jibes and violence of speech set up a ferment in 
his brain before they passed out of it into his crude writings’, and the “greatest writers” that 
Stephen defends even at the cost of his own suffering, the living father figures whose 
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company he keeps during this period, fail to draw him into their society (83). Indifferent to 
‘his father’s ‘evocation of Cork and of scenes of his youth’, the ‘legend’ that the word 
‘foetus’ carved on the desk at his father’s school evokes, is a mirror reflection of the 
‘individual malady of his own mind’ (92, 95). The epiphany of his unborn soul - that must 
experience ‘a slow and dark birth’, as Stephen will later explain to Davin - through the word 
engraved upon ‘the dark stained wood’ of the desk, conjures a ‘den of monstrous images’ 
(220, 95). 
The lamps of theory cannot illuminate the depths of the soul that Stephen senses as 
an alien being; the potency of this “inner word” that he reads in the anatomy theatre arouses 
a timeless unconscious - mythical rather than historical - that obliterates the symbolic 
function of words: ‘The memory of his childhood suddenly grew dim. He tried to call forth 
some of its vivid moments but could not. He recalled only names. Dante, Parnell, Clane, 
Clongowes’ (98). Words become meaningless signs, inscrutable ‘letters’ and he turns to the 
healing powers of art; to the melancholy of ‘Shelley’s fragment’ that addresses a nameless 
‘you’ in order to forget his ‘weariness’ through the aesthetic distance that art affords (95, 
102). Mourning the death of his childhood and his soul ‘capable of simple joys’, Shelley’s 
fragment allows aesthetic transcendence: ‘Its alternation of sad human ineffectiveness with 
vast inhuman cycles of activity chilled him and he forgot his own human and ineffectual 
grieving’. 
While subject to his carnal desires, he is initiated into and becomes a participant of a 
ritual procession, wandering through ‘a maze of narrow and dirty streets’ and ‘up and down 
the dark slimy streets’, whose ‘yellow gas-flames’ appeared to be ‘burning as if before an 
altar’ (106-7). He is initiated by succumbing to ‘a presence subtle and murmurous as a flood’ 
that sounds ‘like the murmur of some multitude in sleep’, and he walks among a 
congregation ‘gathered arrayed as for some rite’. He becomes a tragic actor in the immense 
suffering that the ‘wasting fires of lust’ and ‘the inarticulate cries and the unspoken brutal 
words’ subject him to in ‘the hell of sufferers’ he finds himself among (106). Replicating his 
martyric posture at the hands of the prefect, when the ‘subtle streams’ of the ‘murmurous’ 
‘flood’ ‘penetrated his being’, ‘His hands clenched convulsively and his teeth set together as 
he suffered the agony of its penetration’. His final surrender, ‘body and soul’ under ‘the dark 
pressure’ of ‘softly parting lips’, consummates his “tragedy”, as ‘the vehicle of a vague 
speech’ breaks his ‘silent vows’ (108). 
This ritual takes cosmic dimensions in the following chapter, as the mathematical 
signs through which he attempts to visualise his soul become symbols of a ‘vast cycle of 
starry life’ that ‘bore his weary mind outward to its verge and inward to its centre’ (110). 
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The symbolism of Catholicism ironically fills the hollow forms that Stephen’s denial of his 
body leaves: while ‘His soul was fattening and congealing’, ‘the body that was his stood, 
listless and dishonoured, gazing out of darkened eyes, helpless, perturbed, and human for a 
bovine god to stare upon’ (119-20). His drama becomes apocalyptic, as he traverses and 
assumes the form of a series of types and archetypes through the enchanting eloquence of the 
“mythical” tales of the retreat sermon that transforms the historical actors of his English 
lesson into ‘mute phantoms behind their veil of names’ (135). The drama that the sermon 
stages is nevertheless “cathartic”; following his initiation into the Biblical and liturgical 
mysteries of the retreat, his private encounter with his soul takes place in ‘the dark shell of 
the cave’, populated with ‘Goatish creatures with human faces, hornybrowed, lightly bearded 
and grey as india-rubber’ that Stephen will try to escape from like Plato through philosophy 
(148). His encounter with ‘the unsubstantial image which his soul so constantly beheld’ that 
the previous chapter had presented as a woman, becomes once again a self-reflection- a ‘face 
to face’ meeting with his sins (67). Catharsis though the ‘vague speech’ of the prostitute is 
substituted with redemption through the Word that Stephen struggles to ‘utter’ (108, 151). 
During the sacramental purification of his soul in the next chapter, he continues to 
relate to his body through ritual: ‘he drove his soul daily through an increasing circle of 
works of supererogation’, by means of which ‘his soul was enriched with spiritual 
knowledge’ and the world once again acquired meaning as ‘one vast symmetrical expression 
of God’s power and love’ (159-60). His relation both to the world and to ‘eternity’ is forged 
through ‘vague sacrificial or sacramental acts’ whose purpose is not ‘To merge his life in the 
common tide of other lives’ but to produce an effect in the face of the ‘sad human 
ineffectiveness’ and ‘ineffectual grieving’ that had previously been his response (172, 164, 
102). The imagery of ‘a great cash register’ by means of which he solemnly tries to 
‘purchase’ his entry into heaven through a simoniacal exchange, parodies his 
misinterpretation of praxis in its complete detachment from the sphere of ethics (160). 
Stephen’s attraction to ‘the vague acts of the priesthood which pleased him by 
reason of their semblance of reality and of their distance from it’ ironically highlights his 
alienation from public life and desperate search for a “role” that the artist in modernity had 
been deprived of in the degeneration of art that served simply ‘to drive away hours and 
moments of discomfort, boredom, half-bad conscience, and if possible, transform the faults 
of the lives and characters into faults of world-destiny’ (171; Human-all-too-human 319). 
His “religion of art” that he will not renounce following his rejection of priesthood but will 
proudly display as a distinguishing mark of his art, will expose, however, the constrictions 
that these roles impose upon his art, and the temptation they present the artist with of not 
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only ‘playing parts’, but more treacherously ‘of living the part of the artist’ (Dublin’s Joyce 
354, 44). 
Although ‘it displeased him to imagine that all the vague pomp should end in his 
own person or that the ritual should assign to him so clear and final an office’, Stephen still 
longs for ‘the minor sacred offices’, where ‘forgotten by the people’ but dressed the part, he 
can be the sole actor of his drama (171-2). His fantasy of picturing himself as a celebrant ‘as 
in the pictures of the mass in his child’s massbook, in a church without worshippers’, 
parodies his models and his ideal of detachment, but also highlights the ethical and political 
void that Stephen tries to fill through ritual and appropriation of a “holy office”. Requiring 
‘an appointed rite’ in order to overcome the paralysis that in Dubliners is an epidemic that 
has both religious and political origins, Joyce, like Heidegger, criticises the definition of 
action in terms of utility and power. 
For Heidegger, this misunderstanding of praxis is a symptom of the ‘Homelessness’ 
of modern man in his ‘oblivion of Being’ (242). This exile is traced back to the ‘translation 
of Greek experience into a different way of thinking’ by the Romans, ultimately “uprooted” 
by becoming ‘a fixed body of doctrine’ in the Middle Ages (149, 65). Highlighting that 
Being ‘has the inclination to be ensnared in the world in which it is and to interpret itself in 
terms of that world by its reflected light’ and ‘in a tradition which it more or less explicitly 
grasps’, Heidegger warns against ‘the thorough neglect of the question of Being’ that results 
from this uprooting, which leads to a distracting ‘interest in the manifold forms of possible 
types, directions, and standpoints of philosophizing in the most remote and strangest 
cultures, and with interest tries to veil its own lack of foundation’ (65).  
The endless metamorphoses of Stephen, however, are a cathartic process, by means 
of which he tries to cut loose his ties not only with his ‘average everydayness’ but also ‘the 
constant voices of his father and of his masters’ (59, P 88). He simultaneously acquaints and 
acquits himself from history and tradition, but ultimately remains ‘ensnared’ by the 
hermeneutics that these ‘types, directions, and standpoints’ dictate, and continues in the final 
chapter his endeavour to interpret Being by the ‘reflected light’ of the lamp of Scholasticism, 
despite seemingly dissociating himself from ‘the broken lights of Irish myth’ (195). These 
types, understood by Stephen and his author typologically, introduce a complex network of 
relations that are both historical and transhistorical: past, present and future are collapsed 
into the contemporaneity of the hermeneutic moment, that is modelled on the moment of 
Apocalypse that will finally eliminate all doubts. Whereas in the hands of Joyce, as Frances 
Restuccia has argued, typology ‘function[s] as sabotage’, Stephen’s ‘company of phantasmal 
comrades’ exposes his alienation from both society and history (34, 88). 
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Stephen’s hermeneutics are formulaic and he risks becoming like Wilde himself 
‘troped (and trapped) by caricatures’, by understanding these types as roles that he simply 
enacts rather than interprets (Mahaffey, States of Desire 37). ‘The tragedy of Wilde’s 
career’, Mahaffey argues, ‘is that he who so determinedly set out to shatter the stasis and 
unreality of stereotyped images in his writings, himself became a shattered image. He gained 
notoriety early by marketing himself as a human work of art, a living “character”, which in 
turn set him up to be caricatured’ (42). In his endeavour to understand his self-image through 
types and stereotypes but lacking any historical sense, Stephen similarly risks assuming ‘a 
shape that can’t be changed’, as he did for Joyce after the Portrait (Budgen 107). 30 
But even though Stephen struggles to accommodate history into his aesthetics, his 
consciousness of their dissonance transforms his understanding of truth. Endless self-
reflection is not relinquished, although the “optimism” of the first chapter in Stephen’s quest 
for truth ‘By thinking of things’, gives way to a premonition of an epiphanic encounter- ‘a 
happening of truth’; although neither Stephen nor the reader can be sure when and if in fact 
it- or rather they, have happened (43; Heidegger 162). This encounter, however, is presented 
as revelatory only for Stephen; he has lost his capacity for representativeness in the 
instability of both the narrative and the narrator. The burden of the author’s exemplarity falls 
wholly upon autobiography given the fraught relation of Stephen to his models, although the 
“epiphany” of the Portrait is rather the mystery and mutivalency of both the experience and 
the human subject. 
Whereas ‘The happiness of the historian’, according to Nietzsche, is ‘to harbour in 
himself not an ‘immortal soul’ but many mortal souls’, Stephen’s mortal souls, as his 
esthetic theory manifests, are still founded on an immortal ideal (Human, All-Too-Human 
275). His parodic anthropomorphic portrait of the deity paring his fingernails, however, as 
well as the history of aesthetics from Plato to his contemporaries that Stephen traverses in 
his theory, reveals his growing consciousness of the significance of history, but also his 
understanding of the significance of parody as a critical and hermeneutical principle. His 
final mythical self-portrait will be preceded by his record of a ‘sudden gesture of a 
revolutionary nature’ made while engaged in another self-centred monologue in his 
conversation with Emma, that ‘must have looked like a fellow throwing a handful of peas 
into the air’ (275). The dates in the series of epiphanies that are collected at the end of the 
book also suggest an attempt at historicisation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “I have just got a letter asking me why I don’t give Bloom a rest. The writer of it wants more 
Stephen. But Stephen no longer interests me to the same extent. He has a shape that can’t be changed” 
(Budgen 107). 
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Chapter 4: The Age of Liturgy31 
 
I. Critic 
i. Thinking without chops: the economy of authorship in modernity 
 
‘I know these Bohemian chaps, these poets, who don't consider it waste of time to 
think. But at the same time they’re damn glad to borrow an odd shilling now and then to buy 
chops with’, Simon Dedalus responds to his son’s defiant declaration at the end of Stephen 
Hero that all he has been doing for the past twelve months is think (222). ‘How will you like 
thinking when you have no chops?’, he warns Stephen, predicting his future in ‘secondhand 
breeks’ (U 5). ‘Can't you go for something definite, some good appointment in a government 
office and then, by Christ, you can think as much as you like. Study for some first-class 
appointment, there are plenty of them, and you can write at your leisure. Unless, perhaps, 
you would prefer to be a loafer eating orange-peels and sleeping in the Park’ (SH 222). Even 
though Stephen’s choice of this occupation will be vindicated in Finnegans Wake when a 
‘child of a strandlooper’, discovers ‘a motive for future saintity’ among ‘a few spontaneous 
fragments of orangepeel’ in a ‘limon’ (meadow), both the Portrait and Ulysses highlight the 
economic sources of Stephen’s plight and melancholy (110). Resuming his efforts of 
Stephen Hero to legitimate the role of the artist in modern society, but with his own theories 
having been affected by his ‘new religion of unbelief’, the question Stephen had posed to 
Madden is still implicit in his public performances in Ulysses: ‘I am an artist, don't you see? 
Do you believe that I am?’ (SH 145, 60). Confirming rather than dispelling stereotypes, the 
question nevertheless aids Stephen’s quest for payment; until he admits that he himself does 
not believe or know what he “is”. 
Although the struggle of the artist to discover and repudiate the prejudices and 
stereotypes surrounding his role is overshadowed by Stephen’s psychodrama in the Portrait, 
the narrative nevertheless highlights that ‘Not all Stephen’s trouble of mind but all his 
problem is economic. His poverty has conditioned his relations to women and is in fact at the 
root of all his distress’, as Frank Budgen remarks (43). The ‘mood of embittered silence’ that 
characterises Stephen after the second chapter of the Portrait, is accompanied by a ‘change 
of fortune which was reshaping the world about him into a vision of squalor and insincerity’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In a speech entitled “Liturgia and the Modern State” delivered by Giorgio Agamben in 2009 in The 
European Graduate School that discussed the consequence of the idea of liturgy on Western culture 
and politics, Agamben argues that ‘we cannot understand what is a performance in contemporary art if 
we do not understand that it is a liturgical practice’ and concludes that ‘perhaps the first half the 
twentieth century is not only the age of movements, but also the age of liturgy’. The significance of 
liturgy in Joyce’s work will be examined in the latter half of this chapter. 
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(69). Although he receives no similar warning from his father, his “ambition” to become an 
artist appears viable only in nocturnal imaginary adventures. The male role models that step 
in to educate Stephen during his absence from Clongowes fail to introduce him to modern 
society, as Stephen struggles to comprehend their legendary tradition and political history 
which seem irreconcilable with his own experiences and ideals. While ‘his elders spoke 
constantly of the subjects nearer their hearts, of Irish politics, of Munster and of the legends 
of their own family’, Stephen is left anticipating his consignment of a role in society: ‘The 
hour when he too would take part in the life of that world’ (64). His ‘unrest’ is wakened not 
only in his encounters with females, but also upon the sight of ‘the bales of merchandise 
stocked along the walls or swung aloft out of the holds of steamers’ during his wanderings 
around Dublin that present him with ‘a new and complex sensation’ (69). 
The ‘swift season of merrymaking’ that interrupts Stephen’s ‘moody brooding’, lasts 
only as long as he has money (104; U 9). He suddenly becomes both a “man of action” and a 
great socialite, if not exactly sociable: ‘Every day he drew up a bill of fare for the family and 
every night led a party of three or four to the theatre to see Ingomar or The Lady of Lyons’ (P 
104). His economic affluence allows him to effortlessly forge relationships and ‘take part in 
the life of that world’ actively (64). The “marketplace” adulterates the value of the currency 
to suit the interests of the traders, but it also allows the formation of a community based on 
this currency. It is an unstable community, forged ‘by rules of conduct and active interest’, 
as Stephen will deplore, but art is similarly open to such charges, despite Stephen’s 
distinction between the use of words in the marketplace and in the literary tradition (104). He 
tries to make art “unmarketable” by arguing that the value of words cannot be “exchanged” 
in the literary tradition, although the greater security that he ascribes to artistic value would 
attract rather than deter investors. But while he argues that art is “invaluable”, he is 
nevertheless willing to sell the ‘lamp’ that allows him to fabricate his theory. As the 
confusion over a tundish in his meeting with the dean of studies highlights, the literary 
tradition is not inviolate, as it is prey to the volatility of language that is a common currency. 
‘Stephen wanders through the noisy streets of Dublin expounding his theory because 
he cannot afford to go shopping’, Garry Leonard diagnoses (205). For Leonard, Stephen’s 
aspiration is to become a bourgeois consumer rather than merchant: his ‘theorizing about 
aesthetics is not so much a work of scholarship in progress as it is a way of life, a means of 
coping, and a fantasy of immunity from the experience of modernity’ (204). His theorising is 
certainly presented not so much as a necessary stage in his progress towards becoming an 
author, or even as an exposition of his misunderstanding of the role of the author, but as a 
disguise in the scepticism that surrounds this role and (apparent) lack of living examples. He 
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feels, as the Romantics did, that he must legitimate his role as an artist by emphasising the 
philosophical and theological foundation of art, and by displaying his dexterity in dealing 
with these subjects. He has to ‘to dress the character’, as will become more prominent in 
Ulysses (19). When ‘“value” is no longer part of an agreed upon tradition, constructing and 
experiencing one’s own subjectivity involves a complex theatrics of self-presentation, or 
“lifestyle”’, Leonard argues (11). Having deplored the devaluation or miscalculation of the 
true worth of art but rejecting recourse to the traditions that had preserved its eminence, 
Stephen attempts to raise its “interest” by presenting himself - begrudgingly and with the aid 
of drink - as the peripatetic advertisement of his “paradoxical” or at least eccentric 
interpretation of art. His affinity to Wilde indeed becomes more than simply intellectual in 
his attempt to create and market his art through such a character. 
Stephen’s growing consciousness of his socioeconomic predicament is reflected in 
the change that the transition from the Portrait to Ulysses registers in terms of his self-
understanding. While the narrative in the Portrait traces the various models of authorship 
that Stephen aspires to, as a consequence of the diversity of Stephen’s sources of 
“inspiration” and of the parodic gap that is left between the model and its imitator, the very 
quest for a stable sense of identity and the ultimate goal of artistic development characteristic 
of the Bildungsroman novel is undermined. Authorship like selfhood is revealed as ‘a 
fluctuating plenitude of possibilities-in-anguish, constantly beset by external pressures – 
national, religious, familial – which seek to repress it into integrated definition’ (D. Brown 
36). But whereas Stephen in the Portrait contributes to this repression in his (self)imposed 
discipline, search for and scrupulous selection of specific models, and desire as in Stephen 
Hero ‘for a supremely satisfying order’ that continues to be reflected in the diary form which 
brings the novel to its conclusion, his identity in Ulysses is understood as both formed and 
dispersed, through a series of debts that account in part for the self-divisions that led to 
shame and isolation in the Portrait (210). His representation as a ‘spendthrift saint’ is indeed 
reflected in the unruliness of the narrative and structural volatility (WD 60). Through the 
widening contexts that both form and content are composed of before which Stephen’s own 
“models” pale in comparison, ‘the writing becomes an obvious performance, an exhibition of 
excess’, as Karen Lawrence remarks, of an even more profligate Author rather than narrator, 
as his creations allow hermeneutic indeterminacy- a form of tyranny in itself in the 
compulsion it creates to interpret (188).  
Stephen’s awareness of the problematic ‘economy of heaven’ that he had idealised 
in order to validate his egotism and as compensation for his isolation, results, moreover, not 
in an increase of artistic productions, but in a growing sense of the theatricality of his 
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character and an inflation of “performances” of art and of the role(s) of the artist that become 
compulsive - ‘Are you condemned to do this? - in an endeavour to solve the problem of 
making money (U 274, 266). A ‘cabaret of disjunctive self-roles’ reflects, as Brown argues, 
‘the brokenness of the self’s experience through time’, but also characterises the author 
following his rejection of the unity tradition (141-2). Unlike the dramatic artist of Stephen’s 
theory, Joyce does not detach himself as a theorist of this performance, but ironically both 
accepting and denying Plato’s criticism of the rhapsode for admitting he lacks technical skill 
by claiming he is divinely inspired, he becomes ‘just like Proteus’ “inspired” by language, 
twisting and turning into ‘everyone at once’, and communicating ‘all these beautiful words 
about Homer’ ‘knowing nothing’ (µηδὲν εἰδὼς), seemingly relinquishing his philosophical 
credentials (Ion). For Hugh Kenner, who has argued that ‘the theatre of roles and surfaces’ is 
‘congenial’ to Joyce’s ‘vision of things’, it is indeed through the “excess” of ‘technical 
rigour’ that Joyce avoids ‘the almost inevitable error of living the part of the artist’ (Hart and 
Hayman 341, Dublin’s Joyce 44). 
The strategies that Stephen devises as a response to the devaluation but also revision 
of the role of the artist in modern society as a result of the proliferation of authors and the 
economic model of capitalism that views art as ‘an empty and dissipating dilettanteism’ and 
the artist as the eternally unemployed - ‘His jymes is out of job, would sit and write’ - link 
him to the idealists of Dubliners Little Chandler and James Duffy, as he shares with them 
many of the dilemmas of the modern writer (BT 71; FW 181). While Little Chandler in “A 
Little Cloud” envies Gallaher’s success and affluence, his aspiration is to ‘appeal to a little 
circle of kindred minds’ like the societies and the ‘group who rented a room in a mean street 
to discuss philosophy’ that Yeats refers to in his writing (D 80; Ideas 90). The antagonism of 
the modern writer towards the journalist is exposed here as jealousy of his success and 
“popularity”- his prominent cultural position and appeal to an audience that is so wide and 
diverse that he usurps from the poet the consolation that though destitute and marginalised, 
he is the voice of the nation. 
Conscious of the limited appeal his poetry would have, Little Chandler forges a 
market plan, intending to advertise his poetry by assuming his mother’s more ‘Irish-looking’ 
name that would act as a password for entry into such circles, and entice ‘The English 
critics’ who would categorise him as ‘one of the Celtic school by reason of the melancholy 
tone of his poems’ (80). The fact that ‘He would never be popular’, would certainly be 
viewed as an asset by Yeats. Like Stephen, he understands that he must create a character in 
order to promote his art, and plans to use his isolation to his advantage, understanding the 
niche market he would appeal to more than Stephen, who rather than readers and publishers, 
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appears to seek an audience to perform before, conceivable only as ‘the innumerable faces of 
the void’ in his resentment towards almost everyone alive (P 90). Stephen’s relation to his 
audience is indeed so strained and artificial that he becomes stereotyped as a “character” in 
the difficulty he has understanding his audience and appealing to it, and in his self-defeating 
“unbelief” not in God, but in himself and his “talent” - or lack thereof in the biblical meaning 
of talent as sum of money - that he repeatedly squanders like the “wicked” servant of the 
lord in Matthew’s parable. 
While Stephen is unable to shop, Little Chandler is unwilling and out of touch with 
fashion. Going to buy a blouse for his wife costs him ‘an agony of nervousness’ rather that 
‘ten and elevenpence’, and he begrudges her ‘prim and pretty’ sense of fashion (91). His 
outmoded ideal of poetry betrays itself in his inability to understand both the nature of 
women and fashion, and in his denial of the reality of his home life. James Duffy in “A 
Painful Case” is similarly resentful of the ‘mean, modern and pretentious’ suburbs of Dublin, 
and although he shows a keen sense of fashion in the arrangement of his “lifestyle”, in his 
“abhorrence” of ‘anything which betokened physical or mental disorder’ and understanding 
of his social life as adhering to a set of ‘conventions which regulate the civic life’, he 
conceives himself as not only the ideal author, theorist and human being - as the moulding of 
his self on Nietzsche’s Übermensch reveals - but also, like Stephen, as his own “ideal 
reader”: ‘He had an odd autobiographical habit which led him to compose in his mind from 
time to time a short sentence about himself containing a subject in the third person and a 
predicate in the past tense’ (119, 120, 121). The detailed listing of his collection of books 
highlights the pride he takes as a reader of the great Authors of Western culture: 
Wordsworth, Hauptmann, Nietzsche and God. 
This conflation of the roles of reader and author that James Duffy’s “empirical” 
interpretation of the philosophy of Nietzsche reflects and deconstruction celebrates, is here 
presented as a consequence of an ethical limitation and inability of James Duffy like Stephen 
to at least envisage imaginatively an audience or a diverse group of readers. In the company 
of Mrs. Sinico, he similarly becomes his own audience, ‘listening to the sound of his own 
voice’, ‘the strange impersonal voice which he recognised as his own, insisting on the soul's 
incurable loneliness’ (124). Disillusioned by Mrs. Sinico’s ‘interpretation’ of ‘his theories’, 
he leaves her in order to hear his own voice sounded through his copied sentences from 
Nietzsche. As with Little Chandler, his identity crisis is precipitated not only as a result of 
his relation to a female who reminds him of the significance of love, but also through 
journalism. The anonymous voice of the press communicates to him in the impassive manner 
that has ironically characterised him, the ‘DEATH OF A LADY’ (126). Like Stephen who 
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had tried to warm himself by touching ‘The pages of his time-worn Horace’ but feels like ‘a 
shy guest at the feast of the world’s culture’, Mr. Duffy comes to the realisation that ‘he was 
outcast from life’s feast’ (P 194; D 131).  
Lacking ‘material access to the international realm’, ‘modernity is mythological’ for 
the characters of Dubliners, Emer Nolan argues (31). Living in a purgatorial world where 
myth and modernity have formed a tentative allegiance but are equally alien from reality, the 
Dubliners are portrayed in a state of ‘paralysis’- a word that is “sublime” for the young 
narrator of “The Sisters” in its combination of incomprehensibility and perversion (7). Even 
the cosmopolitan Gabriel cannot resist this coincidence of contraries. While he watches his 
soul ‘fading out into a grey impalpable world’ after his acquaintance with the ghost of 
Michael Furey from the west of Ireland, the anonymous voice of the newspapers announcing 
that ‘snow was general all over Ireland’ becomes a symbol of the anonymity of death, as he 
realises the potency of the tropes and symbols of tradition (255). The nameless universality 
of modernity is translated as an inescapable destiny through the ‘romance’ tale of a pair of 
star-crossed lovers; a tale that Gabriel himself allows to take mythical dimensions, imagining 
‘some impalpable and vindictive being’ ‘coming against him, gathering forces against him in 
its vague world’ (254, 252). Linking the lovers to the homeland that he resolves to flee but 
remains haunted by its ghost, he resents ‘how poor a part’ he has ‘played in [Gretta’s] life’, 
theatricalising it; fearing ‘she had not told him all the story’, he foreshadows the drama of 
jealousy of Richard in Exiles (254). Rather than a consequence of a ‘resurgence of tradition’, 
as Nolan argues, Gabriel’s ‘experience of ‘decenteredness’’ results from his mythopoeic 
impulse that is woken by an ‘incommunicable emotion’ as it is for Stephen, betraying his 
self-alienation and denial of emotions (34-5; P 78). The relation between myth and the 
unconscious that Finnegans Wake will dramatise, manifests itself in Joyce’s early works in 
the psychodrama of his artist heroes. In the absence of a language, or at least a conceptual 
vocabulary for the unconscious, they turn to the phantasmagorical world of myth. 
As the last “epiphany” of Dubliners becomes an Apocalypse of ‘all the living and 
the dead’ and the artist reaches the limit of representation and communication in an 
experience that Joyce like Dante will repeatedly present as apophatic, unable or refusing to 
reconcile the contradictoriness of human experience or simplify its complexity, ‘that agency 
of collective authorship, the press’ continues to “interpret” (256; Lawrence 63). This 
characterless ‘continuarration’ announcing the ‘dissolving and dwindling’ of the author, will 
be painstakingly fabricated in Finnegans Wake, allowing him to participate in both the 
creation and criticism of the mythologies of modernity and its cycles of repetition of “the 
new in the repeatedly same, and the repeatedly same in the new”, that enable simultaneously 
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the resurrection of the now transient name(s) of the Author(s) (FW 205; D 255; Benjamin in 
Habermas, “Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism” 39). Preceding, however, the 
author’s initiation, the dramatisation in Ulysses of ‘the mythical compulsion to repeat that 
infiltrates capitalism, despite the modernization of the patterns of existence’- of the 
theatricality that characterises both the citizens of Dublin and the rhythms and patterns of 
modernity, allows Joyce to present Dublin ‘to the world’ as a modern capital, and himself as 
its “first” modern author (39; Letters II 122).  
Modernity ‘is mythological’ in Ulysses too; through the dramatisation of the rituals 
and performances that distinguish the everyday life of the Dubliners, however, Joyce here 
presents his compatriots as uniquely prepared - even if simply “subconsciously” - not only to 
take part in the experience of modernity that as Nolan argues, threatens to subsume the 
individuality of their experience ‘into a larger system’, but also to transform the rhythms and 
patterns modernity imposes (32). Highlighting that myth was not a thing of the past that 
needed to be revived, but was also a pervasive feature of modernity, Joyce criticises both the 
mythologising impulse of modernity and the search for mythical origins of antiquarian 
scholars and dealers, poets and politicians, while employing their “findings” to display the 
modernity of his nation and its Author. “Restricting” his own performance to the ‘self-
conscious pantomime of indifference’ of the dramatist, he allows its actors - who for cultural 
theorists should have been the novel’s “ideal readers” - to speak for themselves (Morse 135). 
Denied the role of the consumer they are presented as its producers through the display of 
‘the paradoxical snobbery of a novel that would be almost unreadable by its own 
protagonist’; ‘His producers are … not his consumers’ (Latham 787; FW 497).32  The 
‘creative instinct’ that distinguishes the Celt for Joyce as for Wilde in the cosmopolitan 
‘nation of art-critics’ - the ‘weird creativeness’ that Hugh Kenner discerns in the life of the 
Dubliners in Ulysses - allows Joyce to celebrate the parodic results that such subsumption 
‘into a larger system’ would generate (Intentions 125; Dublin’s Joyce 11). The eponymous 
voices of these Dubliners are pitted against the anonymous voices of the modern world, but 
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ii. Author-journalist. A literary occupation? 
 
The journalist, the antagonist of the modern writer, a ‘tradesman’ rather than an 
artist, who caters for the public’s ‘insatiable curiosity to know everything, except what is 
worth knowing’ and creates the demand for ‘the direct logic, the clear rhetoric, of ‘popular 
poetry’’, encroaches upon the artist’s territory, but also steps in when his singular voice loses 
meaning in his alienation from his audience (Soul of Man 29, 41; Ideas of Good and Evil 
15). The press, Nolan argues, is presented in “The Dead” as a form of ‘collectivity in 
anonymity’ in the absence of community in modernity (35). The bond that it proffers, 
however, is as transient and insipid as the snow that undergoes a symbolic metamorphosis 
through the personal experience of the artist. Whereas during Gabriel’s oratorical 
performance before an “ignorant” audience through clichés that would secure his applause 
he had hailed ‘the memory of those dead and gone’, while glancing outside at the snow as a 
symbol of escape and detachment from his audience, his discovery of his intimate 
connection with those memories that he had referred to as a rhetorical commonplace but 
were “alive” for his wife, transforms the snow into a symbol of a universal destiny.  
Collectivity in the anonymity of death exposes rather the absence of community, and 
the loss of memory as the cycles of history and nature destructure the order and rhythm of 
the liturgical calendar and festivities of tradition. The commemorative strain in Gabriel’s 
speech - an oratorical display performed under the compulsion of custom, pandering rather 
than appealing to his audience - reveals the transformation of the artist in modernity into a 
‘public entertainer’ rather than a bard- the voice of the nation or cultural symbol (Friedman 
53). He presents himself as an actor, scholar and “exile” rather than rhapsode in his punning 
assumption of the role of Paris as depicted in “The Judgement of Paris”, a myth popular 
among Renaissance painters, rather than as the hero of the Homeric tale. 
Having taken over the role of the storyteller who is distinguished for Benjamin by 
his ability to give ‘counsel’ to his readers - or ‘gloomy moralising’ as Gabriel refers to it - 
‘the newspapers were right’ in their dissemination of facts (Illuminations 86; D 233, 255). 
Not only does ‘the communicability of experience’ decrease in modernity, as Benjamin says 
explaining the loss of this figure, but also experience itself ‘has fallen in value’: the ‘new 
form of communication is information’ (86, 84, 88). Refusing to ‘linger on the past’ in his 
speech, Gabriel falls back on mythical imagery as rhetorical conventions that expose his 
ambivalence between the old world and the new, and his difficulty to carry out the task of 
the interpretation of the modern world that the newspapers perform with such ease, 
‘elucidating all these intricate questions’, as the young narrator of “The Sisters” admires 
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(233, 11-12). Ironically, the informational fact that the newspapers had publicized was orally 
communicated to Gabriel by Mary Jane, another vapid performer in the story. Whereas 
Benjamin warns that it is ‘fatuous’ to grieve for the loss of ‘the epic side of truth, wisdom’, 
‘to see in it merely a “symptom of decay”, let alone a “modern” symptom’, Gabriel is caught 
between despondency and optimism; his melancholy before the snow that has become for 
him a symbol of silence, anonymity and death is juxtaposed with his confident resolution ‘to 
set out on his journey westward’ (86, 255). 
Linking the genre of the short story with the oral tradition, Kiberd argues that 
Dubliners ‘bears positively no trace of the oral tradition’: ‘Where the oral tradition took the 
spectacular as its subject, Joyce finds poetry in the commonplace. Where the oral tales 
climaxed in blood-baths and supernatural reversals, Joyce’s epiphanies describe nothing 
more momentous than the passing of a coin’ (48). The banality of newspaper stories links 
them with Joyce’s: ‘Every morning brings us the news of the globe, and yet we are poor in 
noteworthy stories’, Benjamin remarks, holding accountable the conflation of event and 
explanation that newspapers provide; the “expenditure” of interpretation that results from 
such ‘prompt verifiability’ (89). In the suspension of disbelief, however, with which Joyce’s 
stories end as a result of the psychological turmoil and exposition of ‘the profound perplexity 
of the living’ that distinguishes the modern novel for Benjamin, Joyce reconciles the 
storyteller with the journalist, raising, as he will continue to, the question of the significance 
of genre (87). The “epiphany” that ends each story promising revelation, brings partial 
resolution and highlights this ‘profound perplexity’. 
The ‘average comprehensibility’ of the everyday, only ‘demonstrates [its] 
incomprehensibility’, for Joyce as for Heidegger: ‘It shows that an enigma lies a priori in 
every relation and being toward beings as beings’ (44). 33 This ‘average understanding of 
Being’, however, is not something superfluous to its meaning, but ‘ultimately belongs to the 
essential constitution of Dasein itself’ (46). The coincidence of comprehensibility with 
incomprehensibility, moreover, does not lead to nihilism, but creates a new “science”: ‘The 
undefinability of Being does not dispense with the question of its meaning but compels that 
question’; although in Joyce’s work the need to raise this question recurrently becomes - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The similarities of Heidegger with Joyce can be traced back to their exegesis of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, ardently undertaken by both of these philosophers. Aristotle there begins his 
‘investigation of the truth’ with the warning that it is ‘in one way hard, in another easy’: ‘every one 
says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing 
to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed’ (II.1). 
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problematically and parodically - a compulsion. Heidegger indeed emphasised that this 
question has yet to be ‘formulated’ (44-5). 34 
The ‘real ‘“movement” of the sciences’ for Heidegger is hermeneutic: ‘the revision 
of these basic concepts’ (50). Modern literature, in distinction from the folk tale that is ‘an 
echo of old mythologies’, as Kiberd argues, participates in this revision, as ‘a deliberate 
criticism of actual life’ (46). Joyce distinguishes himself as a modern and modernist writer 
through his relentless dramatisation of the ambivalence that these conflicting artistic and 
historical ideals create that will ultimately lead to a declaration of war against language 
itself. 35 The critical and philosophical impulse that characterises Stephen as an artist, denies 
him the ability to ‘tell a story’. While this allows him to avoid the philosophical fallacy of 
resolving theoretical questions by resorting to storytelling - ‘as if Being had the character of 
a possible being’ - it also condemns him to silence (Heidegger 46). Although the modernist 
writer distinguishes himself by ‘laying bare and exhibiting the ground’, his philosophical 
credentials render him a “fraud” as an artist (49). Even though he creates an air of ‘mystery’ 
through his philosophical theory, he perplexes rather than captivates his audience, luring 
them ‘to the threshold of sleep’ through boredom rather than enchantment (Ideas of Good 
and Evil 250). While bawdiness and alcohol help to keep Stephen’s audiences interested in 
Ulysses, the narrator of Finnegans Wake has to beg for patience: ‘Now, patience; and 
remember patience is the great thing, and above all things else we must avoid anything like 
being or becoming out of patience’ (108). 
The “moral of the story” that the teller of the Wake attempts to provide, is replaced 
with the “meaning of life” in the novel according to Benjamin, the incomprehensibility of 
which exposes the narrator’s limitations and grand aspirations before an increasingly 
“impatient” reader, who armed with a stack of facts, sees himself as ‘an expert—even if not 
a professional’ (Illuminations 99; “Author as Producer” 4). The loneliness of the reader 
transforms him into a critic and “scholar”: ‘In this solitude of his, the reader of a novel seizes 
upon his material more jealously than anyone else. He is ready to make it completely his 
own, to devour it, as it were. Indeed, he destroys, he swallows up the material as the fire 
devours logs in the fireplace. The suspense which permeates the novel is very much like the 
draft which stimulates the flame in the fireplace and enlivens its play’ (Illuminations 100). 
The modern writer may try to disguise his scepticism in order to present himself as a source 
of authority and credibility, but he is confronted with ‘an audience of lonely sceptics who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Heidegger was similarly aware of this paradox, prophesying that this ‘crisis’ of ‘basic concepts’ 
would ultimately lead to the “death” of philosophy (50). 
35 ‘What the language will look like when I have finished I don’t know. But having declared war I 
shall go on “jusqu’au bout”’, he told Harriet Shaw Weaver (JJ 580). 
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insist on a literature which reflects their everyday lives’ (Kiberd 47). A battle of “Wills” 
ensues, as Stephen’s Hamlet theory presentation will reveal.  
The storyteller, however, is for Benjamin ‘the man who could let the wick of his life 
be consumed completely by the gentle flame of his story’ (108). Although deconstruction 
celebrates this consummation- as a modern phenomenon, the Wicker of the Wake refuses 
such “martyrdom” and flees rather that disappears. His multiple manifestations expose his 
many disguises through his manipulation of language. Having been the voice of the nation, 
he cannot be “distinguished” - or can be as Here Comes Everybody - exposing the paradox 
of the nationalist project whereby an illustrious bard like Shakespeare rather than Amergin, 
is sought to revive the nation’s literature and morale.  
Like all the schemas of Ulysses, this modern antagonism between journalist and 
artist is both implicitly suggested and explicitly subverted in the ‘parallel courses’ of these 
two figures that are traced throughout the novel; “parallax” in the disorientation of the 
narration that even manages to “lose” both characters as a result of visual impairment and 
distracted by grander processions and imposturous sounds (U 776). Stephen is too 
preoccupied with ghosts to view Bloom as a rival, while Bloom’s bourgeois fantasy of 
authorship while ‘Asquat on the cuckstool’ is based on the financial success of Philip 
Beaufoy following the publication of his ‘prize titbit’ in a weekly magazine; a piece of “art” 
that although it ‘did not move or touch him’ emotionally, ‘was something quick and neat’ 
that aided his bowel movements (83-4). Stephen is by contrast pitied, consoled and 
counselled rather than ‘envied kindly’. 
The dualism characterises the narrative rather than the protagonists, reflecting the 
‘profound changes in apperception’ in modernity that have confounded its theorist(s) 
(Illuminations 235). The great mass of cultural debris that litters both content and form 
appears to announce the ‘birth of the reader-as-writer’, allowing the reader to usurp the 
authority of the artist in his proficiency as critic and hermeneut: ‘to become the “hero” of a 
drama involving the editing and deciphering of texts’ (Rabaté, Authorized Reader 152; 
Politics of Egoism 194). The ‘increased mass of participants’, however, who attend 
‘Uninvited’ ‘the feast of the world's culture’, populating the text as both guests and enemies 
- “Hostis non hostis” - proffer an alternative ‘mode of participation’ to the impatient reader 
and expose the author’s composition as ‘an epical forged cheque … for his own private 
profit’ (Benjamin, Illuminations 239; U 686; P 194; FW 181). Revelling in his own 
distraction and destruction, the author assumes many disguises to elude accountability for 
the anarchy of his text. Like a bard who freely interrupts his narrative plot with vignettes that 
showcase his creative talent and sustain the attention of his audience, or an ancient historian 
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who borrows the bardic method of circular composition and supplements his accounts with 
diversions in order to authenticate his claims, or perhaps adopting the modern ‘literary 
occupation’ of ‘author-journalist’ who understands the advertising value of quotations as 
‘Wisdom while you wait’, distraction is a key element of his craft (U 584, 361).  
Distraction rather than intellectual engagement allows the empowerment of the 
modern audience for Benjamin. ‘Reception in a state of distraction’ is a radical response to 
the aestheticisation of political life as a way of seducing the masses to take part in its ritual 
and cultic practices (Illuminations 240). Film, for Benjamin, ‘makes the cult value recede 
into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the 
fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an 
absent-minded one’ (240-1). In a similar manner, although Ulysses elevates the reader to the 
pedestal of scholarship, the spectacle of ‘The absentminded beggar’ that it stages is not only 
a parody of Stephen as a failed artist, but also exposes the ‘hierophantic’ pretensions of the 
narrative, and makes intellectual engagement seem preposterous; the reader turned scholar 
begins to wonder like Stephen whether s/he is ‘condemned to do this’ (239, 280, 266). 
In contrast to the epiphanic ‘gropings’ of Stephen’s ‘spiritual eye’ while “glimpsing” 
at ‘the inscrutable dial of the Ballast Office’, the ‘troubled eyes’ of the new theorist of 
Ulysses Bloom, are raised towards the ‘ballastoffice’ as a diversion from anxious thoughts 
(SH 216; U 194). Far from an epiphany, his gropings of the “object”- the ‘Timeball’, lead to 
further perplexity; he is reminded of his inability to understand the meaning of the word 
‘parallax’, highlighting the significance of hermeneutics that Stephen had ignored in his 
theory of the instantaneous revelation of the ‘whatness’ of the object that the man of letters 
must ‘record’ (SH 216, 218). 36 Bloom’s bewilderment, however, does not last long, as this 
memory is supplemented by that of Molly’s creative hermeneutics based on punning that 
turns bemusement into amusement. The multivalency of language allows the elusion of 
physical or metaphysical questions, but as well as highlighting this relentless wo/anderer’s 
“indifference”, it manifests an ever-widening horizon of interpretations, through which the 
actors of Finnegans Wake will wander. 
Having announced the commencement of a ritual performance on the part of the 
artist-fulfilled most conspicuously in Stephen’s theory presentation in “Scylla and 
Charybdis” that ends with a benediction in the name of ‘the druid priests of Cymbeline’, and 
a ritual procession across Dublin on the part of the journalist, it appears that ‘exhibition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  As “change”, parallax is the antithesis of the stasis that characterises Stephen’s epiphany. It is also 
the cornerstone of Aristotle’s natural science, a concept that even Bloom, a ‘distinguished 
phenomenologist’, struggles with in the monotony and routine that distinguishes time in modernity (U 
445). 
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value begins to displace cult value all along the line’, as stylistic experimentation 
overshadows any other “activity” (280; Illuminations 225). The regretful alienation of the 
modern artist from his audience exposes art’s professed ‘dependence on ritual’ as 
‘parasitical’ (224). The one time illustrious bard, named ‘parasites- a Greek word meaning 
“dining companion”’ of ‘the wealthiest of Celtic chiefs’, is now ‘but a shy guest’ (Freeman 
141; P 194). Whereas in Yeats’s ideal vision ‘The enchanted audience, having become … “a 
single mind, a single energy”, are moved to “murmur” these shared rhythms after the poet or 
reciter’, the audiences in Joyce’s fiction - with the exception of “The Dead” - repeatedly 




i. A dreadful bard  
 
Ulysses opens with a parody of a sacrament performed by Mulligan that will pale in 
comparison to the exuberance of the festivities that the novel will celebrate, but which 
sounds the call to its ‘displeased and sleepy’ reader to attend ‘Solemnly’ to its ritual 
performance (1). Dressed in liturgically symbolic vestments, Mulligan usurps Stephen’s role 
as ‘priest of the eternal imagination’ and exposes the ambitions of the young idealist in his 
crass interpretation of that role (P 240). Rather than having imaginatively transformed this 
paradigm of the role of the author and his relation to his (national in particular) audience like 
Shelley and the Symbolists, Stephen is shown to have remained trapped by the language, 
doctrines and symbols of his Scholastic schooling and the archetypes that his masters 
imparted to him. The invocation of the muse in this epic is replaced with the priest’s 
invocation of the Holy Ghost, which ‘answering Pope Gregory’s prayer – descends upon him 
and enables him to sing the liturgical chant for the Introit’ (Petersen in Havsteen 104). 
Calling on Stephen to ascend rather than descend, Mulligan ascribes to him the role of the 
ghost, mimicking his designation of the role of the ghost to the Bard in his theory. Stephen’s 
gestural poetics are interpreted by making ‘rapid crosses in the air, gurgling in his throat and 
shaking his head’, while his Eucharistic transubstantiation of his shaving water - a materialist 
rendition of Stephen’s “epiphany” - is a further parody of the artist’s spiritual contraptions 
(1). 
Stephen has retained his pose as a “theorist”, although here as a reluctant ‘watcher’ 
of Mulligan’s showmanship. Envious of his magniloquence, the orator before him is seen as 
‘Chrysostomos’- ironically a crusader against the abuse of authority. Imagined also as ‘a 
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prelate, patron of arts in the middle ages’, Mulligan circumscribes antagonistically ‘the 
freedom and power of his soul’ through which Stephen had prophesied in the Portrait ‘He 
would create proudly’, following in the footsteps of ‘the great artificer whose name he bore’ 
(2; P 184). That name, which for Stephen as for Joyce in his youth was invested with 
mythical powers in the quidditas it had the capacity to epiphanise, is degraded by Mulligan 
to a ‘mockery’- a theatrical derisory imitation (2). Whereas his name had sounded to Athy in 
the beginning of the Portrait ‘like Latin’ - fittingly as the novel relates Stephen’s tale to the 
Ovidian myth - Mulligan, going back to ‘the original’, and displaying his philological 
credentials, exposes the ‘mockery’ of the higher power that has cast Stephen as ‘an ancient 
Greek’ (23). 
Disentangling the pagan roots of the Christian ritual, Mulligan dissolves the mystery 
that keeps the congregation like the audience of his magical tricks enthralled. His 
scholarship, however, is similarly an idealised pose that Stephen had assumed, but which 
here belongs to the ‘dreadful’ ‘ponderous Saxon’ who is occupying the tower (2). Intent on 
finding a fitting ‘name’ for Stephen to distinguish his role among all these adepts, Mulligan 
turns to another “original” title- bard. As originality in modernity for the Nietzschean 
Mulligan is only possible as an archaeological search for mythical origins, he proffers to 
Stephen the role of the antiquarian’s Celtic bard. The “aura” that is seen ‘shrivelling’ ‘with 
an artificial build-up of the “personality”’ of Mulligan with ritual turning into exhibitionism, 
traverses a retrogressive course through time; but with his emphasis on the “new” and the 
“original” Mulligan evokes rather the Romantic genius (Illuminations 231). In a literal 
rendition of the Fichtean spontaneity of the self-positing I, Mulligan suggests Stephen 
colours his art through his self-production of snot, turning his ‘noserag’ into a marketable 
relic (3). While his author had been able to merge the two bardic traditions in “Gas From a 
Burner” - a bardic invective written by Joyce in 1912 that anticipated the ‘obscene’ 
production of the ‘alshemist’ of Finnegans Wake ‘from his unheavenly body’ - Stephen is 
absorbed by ‘moody brooding’ in “Telemachus”, and as in the Portrait, ‘the mystery of his 
own body’ is still a source of ‘dread’ for him (FW 185; U 9; P 182). 
The feminised “bat-like” soul of Ireland, eroticised in its shrouded mystery and 
expressive of a metaphysical as well as a carnal desire that had lured Stephen in the Portrait 
to probe its mysteries, a symbol of Stephen’s artistic inspiration but also of his haughty 
detachment as a philosopher-poet from the dark mythical past of his nation, disintegrates 
after his mother’s death into a series of material objects: ‘Her secrets’ are ‘toys’ rather than 
implements he had planned to use to ‘forge’ with in the ‘smithy’ of his soul (10; P 276). As 
in the Divine Comedy, the veil drops in “Telemachus” to reveal a siren; the soul is 
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metamorphosed into a ‘Ghoul’, while the dualism of the physical and the metaphysical is 
transformed into a contrast between the material and the void (11). The symbolic language 
of Swinburne’s ‘great sweet mother’ is dissolved for Stephen in the face of life- and 
theology, as the sea turns into ‘a dull green mass of liquid’ like the bowl of bile by his 
mother’s bed (3, 4). As ‘a bowl of bitter waters’, theological symbolism once again 
overshadows Stephen’s thoughts, as he presents a Hebrew translation of the name of the 
mother of the church offered by St. Jerome as ‘pikra thalassa, bitter sea’- ‘mar (bitter) and 
yam (sea)’ (9; Maas, “The Name of Mary”). 
While Mulligan’s mocking chanting initially evokes in Stephen a romantic vision of 
a harp being played by an indistinct ‘hand’, this stereotypical symbol of Irish nationalism 
fails to placate the unrest that Stephen’s mythical mothers awaken (9). The cultural 
memories that the bard preserves are overshadowed by personal memories and the 
‘Phantasmal mirth’ of fashionable performances. But the very act of remembrance is also 
painful for Stephen; the memory of human mortality nullifies the symbolism of the relics of 
his mother. Rather than Phemius or even Telemachus, Stephen rather resembles Penelope, 
whose ‘unforgettable sorrow’ prevents her from enjoying the ‘excellent’ singing of the bard 
and requests a change of subject, as Stephen will when Bloom queries his relation to his 
motherland (Lattimore 36). 37 
In this vision Stephen finds himself again in the position of an actor rather than a 
creator; coalescing in his memory the pantomime his mother had enjoyed with his own 
solitary performance, he creates a nightmare production of a Hamlet-like scene that he 
cannot wholly lay claim to as its producer, as it is partly an “epiphany” of his unconscious. 
He assumes the role of the protagonist, although he refuses the sacrifice that his role in this 
tragic performance commands: ‘No, mother! Let me be and let me live’, recalling the 
reassertion of authority of Hamlet and Telemachus in defiance of their mother’s wishes; in 
the case of Telemachus a defense also of artistic freedom in his admonition to his mother to 
not ‘begrudge this excellent singer his pleasing himself as the thought drives him’, as ‘It is 
not the singers who are to blame’ but Zeus (U 11; Lattimore 36). In his insurrection against 
the ghost of his mother, moreover, Stephen recreates the uprising of the audience of the 
inaugural performance of The Countess Cathleen, reinterpreted here as both an act of 
resistance against mythical absorption and as a condemnation of the ‘playwright who wrote 
the folio of this world’ (U 273). 
Commanding, however, Penelope to return to her loom, distaff and handmaids, 
Telemachus declares that ‘the men must see to discussion’, making a distinction which 
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undermines Stephen’s challenge, as he is effeminised in his choice of silence as a weapon 
and alienated from the male community (36). While Telemachus is prompted by the gods, 
Stephen mourns the loss of his “inspiration” (that he will recover later with the help of 
alcoholic spirits) and has to become his own muse, replacing inspiration with philosophical 
musing. Struggling to maintain his idealised critical distance in the face of a real life tragedy, 
moreover, his artistic credentials are put in doubt, and he assumes once again the modest role 
of the exegete of the Bard and playwright, in an increasingly futile denial of performance. 
While Yeats had distinguished the performative role of the bard from that of the 
actor, ‘because in his art he must possess and retain a strong and unique “personality”’ and 
‘Unlike the actor, he dramatizes only himself in striving to re-live the story, not to act it’, as 
Schuchard notes, the location of both performances in the theatre had compromised this 
distinction: ‘When the Abbey Theatre finally became a reality in 1904, it was from the outset 
envisioned as a theatre of musical speech and chanted verse, a theatre in which actors on the 
stage would also serve as reciters in the streets’ (214, xxii). The distinction, moreover, was 
tenuous; the bard for Plato as for nationalism is above all a mouthpiece - of the gods and of 
national tradition - rather than an author, or even an “individual”. He is a ‘third-removed 
interpreter’: ‘the interpreter as a paradigm of the poet, himself only an interpreter of divinely 
inspired knowledge’, and as both the gods and tradition become more difficult to interpret in 
modernity, he becomes above all an emblem of a lost tradition (Judovitz in Cascardi ed. 31, 
30). It is his role in society and relation to his audience that modern writers covet, disdaining 
the new forms of communication and demands of the modern public. The printed word was 
associated with the dissemination of information through ‘newspapers, prayer books, popular 
novels’ for Yeats, that the Irish ‘general public’ read to the exclusion of Irish literature that 
was celebrated only in England (Autobiographies 296). The artist had to distinguish his 
mode of communication, appealing to his audience though the spoken word: ‘if Ireland 
would not read literature it might listen to it, for politics and the Church had created 
listeners’ (296). 
Yeats’s early project ‘to establish a new “Library of Ireland”, comprised of books by 
the best contemporary writers and scholars for the distribution to small Irish towns’ was 
sidelined in favour of the creation of a live audience, in his growing conviction that the 
literary reader was conspicuously absent in Ireland: ‘The people of Ireland respect letters and 
read nothing. They hold the words ‘poet’ and ‘thinker’ honourable, yet buy no books’, he 
regretfully remarked in 1892 (McDiarmid in Litz et al. 156). Stephen similarly reflects upon 
his misinterpretation of the role of the artist and the stagnation of culture in terms of 
institutional libraries. The ‘studious silence of the library of Saint Genevieve where he had 
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read, sheltered from the sin of Paris, night by night’ is a reflection of his detachment from 
life, art, readers and a live audience (U 30). In the company of ‘Fed and feeding brains’ 
‘under glowlamps, impaled, with faintly beating feelers’, he is instead caught in the circle of 
reason- ‘Thought is the thought of thought’; ‘the soul is the form of forms’, as the futility of 
his youthful quest for the “enlightenment” of his ‘mind’s darkness’ through the lamps of 
men of letters is exposed (30-1). ‘Come out of them, Stephen’, the creative mind of 
“Proteus” will urge: ‘Beauty is not there. Nor in the stagnant bay of Marsh's library where 
you read the fading prophecies of Joachim Abbas. For whom? The hundredheaded rabble of 
the cathedral close’ (49). His failure to imaginatively reconstruct an “ideal audience”, as the 
Revival had in order to fill the void of the repudiated rabblement, renders his art 
meaningless; silent in the absence of an audience, as the ideal recipient of his epiphanies- 
‘the great libraries of the world, including Alexandria’, exposes (50).  
While the role of the artist for the Revivalists had been constricted by the ideal of the 
bard and his audience circumscribed by a sublimated ideal of the peasant, Stephen’s own 
devotion to Ireland as an ‘Isle of saints’ had created a ‘saint’ rather than a poet whose work 
appealed to a mythically devout reader (49). As Stephen’s interpretation of the role of the 
artist in the National Library will suggest, the Irish artist has to ‘dress the character’ for his 
public performance in order to gain success and popularity. He lays claim to the creation of a 
communal spirit through enchantment and active engagement with his audience rather than 
through the presupposition of a Kantian aesthetic universality- a subjective universality 
relying on the universal communicability of the aesthetic experience that modernity had lost 
faith in. The very idea of universality becomes suspect as the re-emerging spectre of a 
“rabblement” in Stephen’s thoughts reveals. The narrow group of boisterous intellectuals he 
revels with instead, however, similarly forces Stephen to market his art in a way that would 
appeal to his audience rather than allowing him expressive freedom; the narrative indeed 
traces their transformation into a “rabblement” that Stephen is an indistinguishable part of. 
As John Nash has argued, while ‘Joyce’s work might seem designed to render any 
communality impossible’, he also ‘shows that communities are inevitable, if also 
problematically constituted’ (160). 
Universality, moreover, is compromised not only philosophically and politically, but 
as Allison Pease highlights, through its association with mass culture (179). The bardic pose 
similarly had an underlying commercial value that was masked through emphasis on the 
ideological consequence of this role. As a bard, the alienated modern artist hoped to enlarge 
his audience; presenting this quandary to Georges Borach, Joyce justified his dual allegiance 
by explaining that although ‘As an artist I am against every state’, ‘I must recognize it, since 
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indeed in all my dealings I come into contact with its institutions’ (JJ 446). This commercial 
interest and dependency on the forces of production that becomes apparent in Stephen’s 
interpretation of the role of the bard, nevertheless brought the modern artist closer to the 
ancient Irish bard than to his Romantic reincarnation; in contrast to the Romantic bard, ‘an 
inspired, isolated, and peripatetic figure’ ‘standing apart and transcending [his] particular 
time and place’, the Irish fili was ‘in the service of an oppressive feudal order’ (Trumpener 6, 
212). As Mangan’s poem “O’Hussey’s Ode to the MacGuire” illustrates - a bard’s 
lamentation in honour of his dead king that Joyce liked to recite according to Budgen - the 
bards ‘worked for the status quo, for the maintenance of their own status and that of the king. 
They protected the king against sorcery and they were tightly bound to him in a form of 
mutual obligation and support’ (182, MacMathúna in Welch ed. 6). 
The Revival’s idealisation of the role of the bard as the voice of the people had 
shrouded this partisan and conservative feature. In “Bardic Ireland” Yeats had presented the 
bards as isolated figures who ‘kept by rules of their order apart from war and the common 
affairs of men, rode hither and tither gathering up the dim feelings of the time, and making 
them conscious’, but were also figures of authority: ‘The bards were the most powerful 
influence in the land, and all manner of superstitious reverence environed them around’ 
(Collected Works IX 110). Stephen’s unabashed question ‘Would I make any money by it?’ 
posed to Haines who politely expresses his desire to ‘make a collection of your sayings if 
you will let me’, brings him therefore closer to the ancient bard employed in the service of 
his well-spoken king (18). Stephen, acutely conscious and resentful of his servitude, at first 
resists this role that Mulligan has chosen for him: ‘I get paid this morning’, he replies 
following Mulligan’s suggestion to ‘Touch him for a quid’- ‘A guinea’, rephrased by 
Mulligan to make the transaction sound nobler (11). Despite Stephen’s unassuming 
occupation as a teacher, however, Mulligan insists on his role as a performer: ‘We’ll have a 
glorious drunk to astonish the druidy druids’, he declares, conceding at least that Stephen’s 
role as bard is more “pragmatic”.  
 By the end of the first chapter Stephen successfully dresses his character, as he 
departs from the tower by casting a spell: ‘Horn of a bull, hoof of a horse, smile of a Saxon’, 
while Mulligan is disrobed: ‘The priest's grey nimbus in a niche where he dressed discreetly’ 
(27-8). His appearance in the next chapter suggests he has accepted the role that Mulligan 
ascribed to him, as he views himself as a ‘bullockbefriending bard’ in his encounter with Mr. 
Deasy (44). He will recall this epithet three more times, and only under the influence of 
drink he will find it empowering. His evocation of this theatrical role will nevertheless 
reflect his increasing self-consciousness: in his advertisement parable in “Aeolus” it will 
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reveal his understanding that his role is a ‘trade’ rather than (or as well as) a divine calling, 
while in his theory presentation to the Irish literati he will display his onerous awareness of 
the influence of history, as he will there rehearse the role of the bard’s Romantic 
reincarnation as the lonely Hamlet who walks ‘reading the book of himself’ (239). It will be 
left to the citizen in “Cyclops”, however, to exhibit - more forcefully than Stephen’s silent 
oath - those mythical powers of the bard to bless and curse, and to exhort the narrative to 
develop mimetically his ‘gigantesque element’ ‘into a greatness and solemnity’ and his 
‘vagueness and indeterminateness into that misty immensity and weird obscurity’, as 
MacPherson did according to Standish O’Grady (46). 
Even in “Telemachus”, however, Stephen finds himself sharing the role of the bard 
with a growing number of contenders. The milkwoman who enters the scene ‘from a 
morning world, maybe a messenger’, has similarly been given ‘names’ from ‘old times’, and 
is like the peripatetic but servile bard ‘A wandering crone, lowly form of an immortal 
serving her conqueror and her gay betrayer’; although now she too expects payment (15). 
Like the bard, moreover, she has the power to bless and curse- ‘To serve or to upbraid’, but 
is also in modernity simply a national emblem as ‘Silk of the kine and poor old woman’ and 
a “mythical” figure: ‘a witch on her toadstool’. As a server of ‘rich white milk, not hers’, she 
also symbolises the figure of the nurse, another disappearing figure that once ‘embodied oral 
abundance’ but in the modern world ‘begins to represent a repressed collective unconscious’: 
‘She is at once a figure for the persistence of memory (her own memory shores up the past; 
the memory of her is a triumph over the forces of amnesia) and like the bard before her, an 
emblem of how much is irrevocably forgotten’ (Trumpener 197, 198). 38 
The role of the nurse in shaping the ‘collective unconscious’ had been acknowledged 
by Joyce in “Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages”, where crediting the nurse with the 
preservation of the collective memory of his nation, he emphasised the political consequence 
of her guardianship, even on someone ‘in whose veins not a single drop of Celtic blood ran’: 
‘If Parnell was a thorn in the side of the English, it was because, in his boyhood in Wicklow, 
he heard the tale of English ferocity from his nurse’ (OCPW 115, 119). In the Portrait, it is 
similarly through Dante that Stephen is introduced to the political stage and its religious and 
ideological divisions with the ‘brushes in her press’- one for Parnell and one for Michael 
Davitt (3). She even introduces Stephen to bribery, giving him ‘a cachou every time he 
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uncomprehending Irish audience and Haines for a readily available metropolitan readership’ (62). She 
is, however, equally misunderstood by the three intellectuals who read her as a clichéd symbol of a 
mythical motherland. Her incomprehension indeed allows her to elude the roles she ascribed. Like 
Haines who is both a writer in his editorial role as “collector” and a potential reader of Stephen’s 
compositions, the milkwoman is similarly both a symbol of oral culture and of silence. 
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brought her a piece of tissue paper’, and vengeance and subjugation through her ominous 
poem of eagles that would pull out his eyes if he failed to apologise (4). 
With a heavy dose of irony, Dante’s knowledge of national divisions and 
‘heartburn’, make Stephen consider her to be ‘a clever woman and a well-read woman’  (7). 
But she is also herself a divisive figure as a result of the deep-rooted traditions and beliefs 
that distinguish her character, disrupting the idyllic Christmas scene with her antagonistic 
hieratic ‘language of the Holy Ghost’ and prophetic vision that Stephen will ‘remember all 
this when he grows up’ (31). As the foreboding tales of Dante about the future are 
counterposed with the tale of Mr Casey’s inane and impertinent act of resistance against a 
hysterical woman, an unbridgeable rift between men and women is registered for Stephen, 
while the exchange of violent and abusive language alienates him from his elders and their 
traditions. The door-slamming of Nora in The Doll’s House is re-enacted as the antithesis of 
Ibsenite “heroism” and “feminism” to highlight the ‘paralysis’ of both men and women that 
similarly, however, reduces a male protagonist to tears, in a “terror”-generating drama for its 
theorist, Stephen, not mature enough to critically unravel the subtexts of symbols and idols. 
Like the bard, the nurse is an ambivalent figure, Katie Trumpener argues: ‘If the 
nurse evokes the bards’ traditional strengths – their prodigious memory, their narrative 
powers, and their loyalty to their masters – she also recapitulates their legendary weakness: 
their credulity, their partisanship, their uncritical allegiance to the ruling house, and their 
willingness to fabricate mythic histories in the service of an oppressive feudal order’, which 
might explain Stephen’s resentment towards the milkwoman- his fear of her magical powers 
and derision of her servility (212). The tale of Parnell’s nurse is similarly shown to have 
perpetuated both resistance and ferocity that Joyce identified with the English but also with 
the ‘internecine strife’ in ‘the three centuries that preceded the arrival of the English’ 
(OCPW 113). It is a tale, moreover, that Joyce suggests should not be immortalised: ‘Just as 
ancient Egypt is dead, so is ancient Ireland. Its dirge has been sung and the seal set upon its 
gravestone’. The “moral” of the tale, Joyce argues, has become a reminder of ‘failures’, 
betrayals, servitude, violence and a feudal order.  
As a ‘messenger’ from ‘a morning world’, the milkwoman is not only an Athena 
figure - a counterpart to ‘Mercurial Malachi’, the prophetic messenger of the god - but also 
Yeats’s ‘ideal reciter’ with ‘a magical vision of life that informs his being’, who Yeats 
describes as the “messenger” of the poet (15, 19; Schuchard 216). ‘As the creative process is 
analogous, in Yeats’s mind to the magical process, the reciter’s knowledge of ancient secrets 
significantly increases his interpretive power’, Schuchard explains. However, even though 
the milkwoman is ascribed all these bardic characteristics, she is like the ‘dreadful bard’ a 
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“mute” figure: ‘I'm ashamed I don't speak the language myself’ (16). She even lacks 
‘interpretive power’, and unable to understand, she has to trust the experts: ‘I'm told it's a 
grand language by them that knows’’. Language is not only in the hands of the occupiers, but 
also of the professionals- the scholar and the ‘medicineman’. 
“Silence”, as the figure of the milkwoman highlights, is not only a consequence of 
the loss of or alienation from tradition; while the relinquishment of language to ‘them that 
knows’ designates the link between knowledge and power, it also highlights the 
specialisation of modern culture that Adorno and Horkheimer argue is paradoxically also a 
homogenisation: ‘The sociological view that the loss of support from objective religion and 
the disintegration of the last precapitalist residues, in conjunction with technical and social 
differentiation and specialization, have given rise to cultural chaos is refuted by daily 
experience. Culture today is infecting everything with sameness’ (94). While specialisation 
has lead to severance and estrangement, Habermas argues, it has also resulted in a ‘reified 
everyday praxis’: ‘The differentiation of science, morality, and art has come to mean the 
autonomy of the segments treated by the specialist and at the same time letting them split off 
from the hermeneutics of everyday communication’ (9, 11). For Habermas, as for Benjamin 
before him, he argues, ‘Far from being a guarantor of liberation, the development away from 
ritual ominously forebodes a specific loss in experience’ (“Consciousness-Raising or 
Redemptive Criticism” 44). 
As a ‘cultured allroundman’ with ‘a touch of the artist’, Bloom reveals the 
paradoxical position that the art-loving layman finds himself in modern bourgeois society: 
‘On the one hand, the layman who enjoyed art should educate himself to become an expert. 
On the other hand, he should also behave as a competent consumer who uses art and relates 
aesthetic experiences to his own life problems. This second, and seemingly harmless, 
manner of experiencing art has lost its radical implications, exactly because it had a confused 
relation to the attitude of being expert and professional’ (Habermas, “Modernity versus 
Postmodernity” 11-12). While Joyce’s acclaimed elevation of the reader to the pedestal of 
authorship as an “Authorized Reader” is presented as revolutionary, the dualism of 
“disinterested” expert and involved consumer is a paradox characteristic of Joyce’s art that 
cannot be overcome through an ideal expert reader who seizes the functions of the author but 
also ‘accedes to the play of this incompletion’ (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 32). The 
celebration of Joyce’s ‘creation of a new reader’, overcomes this dualism through the 
notional creation of a not quite human functional reader who fails to register the irony in the 
oxymoron of ‘an ideal insomnia’ (FW 120). While Bloom is able to bridge the gap between 
the two roles through his role as producer- as ‘THE CANVASSER AT WORK’, and Joyce 
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seems to echo Benjamin’s future vision of ‘the author as producer’ which ‘must be derived 
from the press’, he also accedes like Benjamin that as the newspapers ‘still belong to 
capital’, this role is problematic (152; “Author as Producer” 3). 
 
 
ii. Musemathematics: The decay of the aura(l)? 
  
Although the bardic ideal appears to be undermined in Joyce’s modernist epic, the 
figure of the bard, the characteristics of his language and method of composition keep 
reappearing throughout the novel in various forms and disguises, challenging his modern 
antagonists, as well as being challenged by them. As in Finnegans Wake, a dialogue is set up 
between eye and ear, between the visual art of the canvasser and the aural of the poet. Joyce 
saw like Benjamin that the confusion of the nacheinander and the nebeneinander was a 
consequence of technical reproduction and the ‘frenetic sensationalism’ that distinguishes 
modern culture, a “crisis” of art that Joyce had located historically in the Renaissance, and 
portrayed negatively in 1912: ‘The Renaissance, to put is briefly, has placed the journalist in 
the monk’s chair: in other words, it has deposed a sharp, limited and formal mind in order to 
hand the sceptre over to a mentality that is facile and wide-ranging (as the saying goes in 
theatre journals), a mentality that is restless and somewhat amorphous’ (OCPW 188). 39 
While Joyce celebrated the emancipatory capacity of modern art, he also highlighted that 
modernity had inherited ‘the restless search for what is new and strange, the accumulation of 
details that have been observed or read, the parading of common culture’ from a previous 
Renaissance of culture (189). 
Ritual, ‘the parading of common culture’, showed no signs of “decline” for Joyce, 
and he sought to expose the continuities and “renaissance” of these rituals in modernity. The 
profusion of staged ritual performances in Joyce’s work highlights the variety of ways that 
the aural and the oral were still intertwined with the oracular, particularly in Ireland which 
possessed a ‘powerful tradition of public oratory, ecclesiastical, political, and forensic’ that 
was still alive in Dublin, as Hugh Kenner has noted, but had been ‘degraded’ to a ‘spectral 
colloquial reality’ (Dublin’s Joyce 15-6, 21). The spectacle and the ‘spectral colloquial 
reality’ are shown by Joyce to converge in their shared theatricality: ‘The Irish public man 
was regarded, like Agamemnon, Parnell’s analogue in Ulysses, as both doctus orator and a 
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beauty, developed during the Renaissance and prevailing for three centuries, clearly showed that 
ritualistic basis in its decline and the first deep crisis which befell it’ (Illuminations 224). 
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tragic hero’, Kenner argues (16). Reduced by Joyce to a ‘rehearsal of received speculations’, 
these revered performative roles are repeatedly conflated, parodied and interrogated (20).  
 In “Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages”, Joyce had presented the Irish oral tradition 
as a cause of deprivation, deception and delusion, and he had criticised even the traces of this 
tradition in modern Ireland. Quoting a dialogue between two Irish artists shown to be 
celebrating that ‘We Irish … have nothing, but we’re the greatest talkers since the days of 
the ancient Greeks’, he links orality with political failure and emphasises the limitations of 
the spoken word in the public sphere: ‘though the Irish are eloquent, a revolution is not made 
from human breath, and Ireland has already had enough of compromises, misunderstandings 
and misapprehensions’ (OCPW 126). 40 Presenting the nineteenth century as ‘the most 
insistently parliamentary age in Britain’s history’, Matthew Bevis highlights the significance 
of oratory in the relation between politics and art: ‘a commitment to literary eloquence 
involved consideration of how far it might, or should, be both a ‘weapon’ and ‘an art’’ (16, 
3). While ‘Prolixity became a weapon in the fight for political freedom’ in the campaign for 
Home Rule after the Act of Union, however, Bevis shows that Joyce’s scepticism about the 
consequence of Irish oratorical prowess was shared by many of his compatriots after Parnell: 
‘For some, the fall of Parnell and the subsequent split of the party demonstrated the 
inefficacy of a parliamentary solution to the Irish question; for others, Irish garrulity 
indicated an eloquence that was self-defeating on account of its self-promotion’ (205, 206). 
However, despite this hesitancy with regard to the spoken word in its association with 
oratory, both eloquence and garrulity, song and gesture, particularly in their dialogue with 
the silence of the written word and isolation of the writer, distinguish Joyce’s idiomatic 
language. As Kenner highlights, it is Joyce’s esteem for and experimentation with the 
spoken word that distinguishes his poetics and “dramatic theory”: ‘he scrutinized talk as the 
old rhetoricians did, intent on systematizing its gestures into miniature dramatic situations’ 
(Dublin’s Joyce 13). Even the stream of consciousness of Joyce’s characters bears the marks 
of this oral culture: ‘‘Bloom is the Ciceronian doctus orator in final decay. He goes through 
the day uttering an immensely intricate monologue that no one hears’ (214-5). 
The newspaper office, the modern fortress of the written word that safeguards the 
publication and dissemination of the ‘GREAT DAILY ORGAN’ of the nation, is in 
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even though Joyce here appears to implicitly associate Yeats and Wilde as writers who idealised the 
role of the bard, Joyce’s own criticism greatly resembles Yeats’s own that ‘The antagonist of 
imaginative writing in Ireland is not a habit of scientific observation but our interest in matters of 
opinion’ (1; Collected Works VIII 91). 
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“Aeolus” invaded by aspiring rhetoricians. 41 Their ‘windy Nous’ causes havoc with the 
order and consensus of opinion that the newspaper titles seek to establish (FW 56). The 
dramatisation of the dialogue and antagonism between the written and the spoken word 
marks ‘the most significant change in the style of narration’ in Ulysses (Lawrence 8). The 
‘shift of attention from the dramatic action of the plot to the drama of writing’ that this 
chapter indicates for Lawrence, is indeed presented as a drama- the headings that interrupt 
the narrative resemble a dramatic script as well as newspaper titles (12). It appears that the 
‘narrative voice advertises its own incompetence’, as the narrator has assumed the role of the 
dramatist, and it is the Word itself that is the primary actor: ‘style’ is ‘replaced by a series of 
rhetorical masks’ (46, 8). ‘These masks in the second half of Ulysses both reveal and 
disguise the author’, as the ‘drama of writing’ that he stages advertises the multivalency of 
the role of the artist. The ‘series of aesthetic experiments’ in the second half of the book may 
lead to the “death of the author”, but through exhaustion, as he takes part in his play like 
Shakespeare as both actor and author, having been “atoned” with his Word- even if his 
presence is slightly “ghostly” (10). 
The ‘process of estrangement from consciousness as ultimate authority’ is consistent 
with this dramatic shift (63). Distracted by the sounds of the office while trying to compose 
an advert that ‘Catches the eye’, Bloom finds that as in “Circe”, ‘Everything speaks in its 
own way’ (106, 154). Like a deus ex machina, the printing machines display their dominion 
over the human actors: ‘Smash a man to atoms if they got him caught. Rule the world today’; 
‘Working away, tearing away’ they threaten man with paralysis and annihilation (150). As in 
drama, visual and aural stimuli compete: ‘All very fine to jeer at it now in cold print but it 
goes down like hot cake that stuff’, Bloom defends the material of his art (160). He does not, 
however, idealise the permanence of the written word. Aware of the materiality of paper, he 
recurrently thinks how it too can be destroyed. Like Stephen, he indeed associates the written 
word with death, as a letter is for him a reminder of his father’s suicide, just like Stephen’s 
memories of the death of his mother are associated with a telegram. More optimistically, 
however, thinking of the ‘huge webs of paper’ that are cinematographically ‘unreeled’ from 
the mechanical looms in “Aeolus”, he imagines the potential afterlife of all that paper in 
‘various uses, thousand and one things’ (152). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 ‘These men’, for Emer Nolan, ‘as their precarious situation among the clanking printing-presses 
suggests, are stranded in print culture. They are out of their natural linguistic medium, their very high-
sounding words perpetually interrupted by the comic parodies which take the form of newspaper 
headlines’ (91). Karen Lawrence similarly argues that it is the ‘discontinuity created by the headings’ 
that is significant in this chapter, which ‘destroys the illusion of a stable narrative voice’ (60). These 
headings, however, also harbour such an illusion insofar as, as Cheryl Herr argues, domination begins 
with labelling’ in Joyce’s fiction, and ‘Throughout Ulysses ... the press is an agent of stereotyping and 
distortion’ (Joyce’s Anatomy of Culture 76, 17).  
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‘The hearer of oratory may be a mere seeker of aesthetic enjoyment, a θεωρός, or 
one who forms a judgment on what is to come, or on what is past’, Gilbert remarks, and 
Stephen indeed appears in this chapter once again as a “theorist” of drama (167). He is 
“inspired” by eloquence to compose a rhyming fragment and is ‘wooed by grace of language 
and gesture’ listening to Molloy’s delivery of Bushe’s speech (177). He also considers the 
role of the orator for himself: ‘Could you try your hand at it yourself?’ (180). His delivery of 
‘a vision’ at the end of the chapter, the rhetoric of which has shifted from politics to law, 
philosophy, art, theology and prophecy to end with an advert - ‘A Pisgah Sight of Palestine 
or the Parable of The Plums’ - to rival Plumtree's Potted Meat, will challenge the ‘Dead 
noise’ of oratory with the more complex hermeneutics of art- a portrait of ‘Two old Dublin 
women on the top of Nelson's pillar’, and expose rhetoric as sophistry (183, 189, 182, 187). 
While Stephen’s “parable” is not a very good example of either oratory or advertising, as a 
“plagiarist” - ‘Moses and the promised land. We gave him that idea’ - he shows his grasp of 
the “currency” he must use to appeal to his audience (189). 42 His “scandalous” tale exposes 
his view that both journalism and rhetoric employ swindling tactics to “woo” their audience. 
The criticism of Joyce in his early essay “The Study of Languages” of ‘The notion 
of Aristotle and his school, that in a bad cause there can be true oratory’ - dismissed as being 
‘utterly false’ - appears to be echoed in Stephen’s association of oratory with 
meaninglessness: ‘Dead noise’ and the ‘Akasic records’ of theosophy (182). While 
Stephen’s philosophy in Ulysses is distinctly “negative”, he still retains his belief in the 
epiphanic capacity of language. His Romanticism is exposed, however, in his desire for the 
poet to be its “hierophant”. The poetic word is set against the rhetorical, while Stephen’s 
silent thoughts increasingly interrupt the contest of eye and ear. The verse he composes, 
however, is repeated until it is emptied of all meaning, and the alluring effect of his rhyming 
echoes is revealed. As he tries to become his own interpreter, to mix ‘RHYMES AND 
REASONS’, he begins to fracture the architectonics of his art, revealing ‘Dead noise’: 
‘Mouth, south. Is the mouth south someway? Or the south a mouth? Must be some. South, 
pout, out, shout, drouth’ (175). 
Following his composition of “Sirens”, Joyce described this disenchantment as 
‘scorching’: ‘The word scorching has a peculiar significance for my superstitious mind not 
so much because of any quality or merit in the writing itself as for the fact that the progress 
of the book is in fact like the progress of some sandblast. As soon as I mention or include 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For Herr, McHugh’s interpretation of Stephen’s parable ‘demonstrates the efforts of culture to 
incorporate works of art and other productions into already existing paradigms, this stopping the 
circulation of meaning and confining the counterinstitutional potentiality of such works’; although 
Stephen is also guilty of this charge by consigning his “art” to the “genre” of the parable (Joyce’s 
Anatomy of Culture 89).  
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any person in it I hear of his death or departure or misfortune: and each successive episode, 
dealing with some province of artistic culture (rhetoric or music or dialectic), leaves behind 
it a burnt up field. Since I wrote the Sirens I find it impossible to listen to music of any kind’, 
Joyce wrote to Harriet Shaw Weaver in July 1919 (Letters I 129). The soundless musical 
performance that is conducted in Sirens is a technical exercise as tedious as Mary Jane’s 
‘Academy piece, full of runs and difficult passages’ that Gabriel could not bear to listen to 
(D 211). The very concept of art is questioned in this technical display. No longer a creator, 
the role of the artist is that of ‘an engineer at work with compass and slide-rule’ (Budgen 
123). Ironically, he simultaneously appears to have reached such heights of inspiration that 
language, meaning and grammar are subsumed in the flow of rhythm and memory in a 
rhythmically rather than historically “timed” episode. “Creating” ceaselessly and almost 
compulsively, blending images with sounds, his art is sheer mimesis of rhythm and 
movement. 
Bloom’s thoughts are similarly inspired, and struggle to be “heard” among the noise 
that this focus on aurality creates. ‘Means something, language of flow’, Bloom thinks trying 
to “make sense” of music, although his hermeneutics are just a repetition of cultural clichés- 
‘Was it a daisy? Innocence that is’ (339). The emphasis on sound and random patterns of 
association that it creates, reveal ‘The matrix of this pseudo-community’ to be ‘not ethos but 
pathos’ (Dublin’s Joyce, Kenner 24). Revenge is taken by the orators who had been 
‘stranded in print culture’ in “Aeolus”, as the emphasis on sound renders Bloom- and the 
reader, “blind” (Nolan 91). As both Bloom and the reader are unable to see the performers, 
the ‘song sang from within’ appears to be ‘voiceless’ (U 340). Once again, the performance 
in this chapter is theatrically staged: ‘Down stage he strode some paces, grave, tall in 
affliction, his long arms outheld’, but the reader is allowed to “see” only a dramatic script: 
‘Upholding the lid he (who?) gazed in the coffin (coffin?) at the oblique triple (piano!) wires. 
He pressed (the same who pressed indulgently her hand), soft pedalling, a triple of keys to 
see the thicknesses of felt advancing, to hear the muffled hammerfall in action’ (349, 339).  
‘[T]he whole issue of expression and self-expression’ comes into question, Brad 
Bucknell argues, ‘by highlighting a technical linguistic practice which links the 
representation of inside and outside so closely together, and in so intimate an association 
with music as a social phenomenon, that the possibility of mystical depth becomes 
somewhat flattened against a wall of social interpretive practice’ (7-8). All references in this 
chapter indeed seem pre-interpreted in the ability of song to awaken cultural and national 
memories. While song touches the listeners’ ‘still ears with words, still hearts of their each 
his remembered lives’ and the narrative seems to drift into Bloom’s private recollection, the 
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dialogue between the transcribed words of the songs and the flow of Bloom’s thoughts 
obscures the ‘border between interiority and outward expression’; ‘to such a point’, for 
Bucknell, ‘that the very notion of a self existing outside or separate from communal codes of 
expression and understanding of that self is cast into doubt through Joyce’s representation of 
music’ (353, 7). The transcription of interiority, however, casts doubt also on the idea of a 
communal memory that can be awakened through art, specifically through its live 
performance. In the neglect of the ‘spoken word which knits us to normal man’, Yeats 
protested, ‘we have lost in personality, in our delight in the whole man - blood, imagination, 
intellect, running together - but have found a new delight, in essences, in states of mind, in 
pure imagination, in all that comes to us most easily’ (Collected Works of W.B. Yeats Volume 
IV 195). For Bloom, ‘The human voice’ amounts to ‘two tiny silky chords’ that are 
‘wonderful, more than all others’, but are not the vehicle of expression and understanding: 




i. Perverted transcendentalism and the hubbub of Phenomenon 
 
Although the contradictions - or at least diversity - of the roles that Mulligan 
presents to Stephen and urges him to “perform”: bard, philosopher, celebrant and scholar, is 
the main source of parody in “Telemachus”, it is again Stephen’s “theory” that distinguishes 
him as a character in Ulysses, and exposes his eccentric interpretation of the role of the artist. 
His Hamlet theory is another example of ‘applied Aquinas’, Mulligan tells Haines, 
constructed ‘by the light of one or two ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas’: “propped up” by 
‘fiftyfive reasons’ to correspond with Aristotle’s fifty-five ‘unmovable substances and 
principles’, and proven scientifically by means of algebra (P 227, 202; U 20; Metaphysics 
XII.8). Prior to his theatrical theory presentation among the Dublin men of letters in “Scylla 
and Charybdis”, however, the reader is made privy to Stephen’s silent rehearsal in “Proteus”. 
His author allows him to present to the reader the raw matter of his theoretical constructions 
by transcribing the uninterrupted flow of his thought, as he will do for Molly at the end of 
the book. 
“Proteus” problematises and reinterprets theory as an act that takes place within the 
mind, as not only perception, but also sounds, sensations, experiences, experiments, 
memories, desires, imagination, reasoning and language all contribute to Stephen’s 
meditations. This theorist even goes “blind” in order to probe deeper the mysteries of being 
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in his radical questioning of the foundations of epistemology and ontology. While his 
“scientific” method is seemingly modeled on Aristotelian empiricism and Enlightenment 
epistemology, his “apophatic” premises are revealed in his quest ‘in the dark’ for ‘eternity’- 
for a reality beyond space and time (45). Stephen’s emphasis on theory and scant poetic 
compositions that are counterposed with a torrent of “ineffable” words, link his 
interpretation of the role of the artist with ‘The nondiscursive logic of negative mysticism’ 
(Jaurretche 7). His alienation from his body is presented as a deliberate ‘darkness or 
purgation’ of the sensual in order to allow his spirit ‘to be enkindled and to burn with the 
love which this dark and secret contemplation brings with it and sets firmly in the soul’ 
(Saint John of the Cross 29, 35). Failing his spiritual exercise, however, as his metaphysical 
desire for the ‘word known to all men’ rouses rather than quenches physical desire, he finds 
himself ‘caught in this burning scene’ of the Dionysian ‘Pan's hour, the faunal noon’ (682, 
61). Following Aquinas who had stressed that our knowledge of abstract concepts is limited 
to “phantasms”, Stephen’s next theoretical endeavour will explore this ghostly generation of 
“theories”. 43 
Stephen (and Joyce) revisit in “Proteus” the Enlightenment ideas, ideals and 
manifestos of their youth, as the references to philosophers and philosophy of this era and 
Stephen’s “empirical” method reveal. In a chapter which takes place wholly in Stephen’s 
mind, Joyce presents ‘the potentiality of thought itself’ that Cassirer identifies as the driving 
force of Enlightenment philosophers; ‘the autonomy of the intellect’ of a ‘mind like Spinoza’ 
(Philosophy of the Enlightenment 4, 45; Letters II 37). The modernity of Stephen’s 
philosophy is read through Enlightenment ideas: the emphasis on ‘immediate experience’, 
‘sensory flux’ and ‘Becoming over Being’ -characteristics of modern philosophy for 
Schwartz, but also of Enlightenment thought - obfuscate the valences of the two modern eras 
(34, 21, 37). Stephen’s modern skepticism is ironically communicated through Berkleyan 
subjectivism that offers Stephen the consolation of theoretical creativity in the ‘void of 
incertitude’: ‘at least that if no more, thought through my eyes’ (U 866, 45). 44 
The “reality” of “Proteus” is Brunian insofar as for Bruno ‘thought and reality or 
nature are not opposed to one another – they are essentially one’ (McIntyre 50). Stephen’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 ‘Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers 
the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since 
it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the 
phantasms’ (ST I q. 85 a. 1). 
44 As for Berkeley ‘perception is never a cause of ideas- only an occasion’, and it is ‘the proper 
objects of vision [that] constitute a universal language of the Author of Nature’, the human mind 
contributes to ‘an act of continued “actualization”: the world is eternally present in the mind of God, 
but it begins to exist in time as it becomes gradually perceptible to finite created minds’, rather than 
being itself creative (Dupré 303; Berkeley 81; Vitoux 168). It is not clear in Joyce’s text, however, 
whether Stephen’s thought is the creative source or simply a medium. 
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thoughts, ‘a complex of elements’, are presented to the reader ‘as the letters of the alphabet 
are to a printed book’. Psychology and epistemology were inseparable for Bruno as McIntyre 
explains: ‘The elements of thought when discovered will accordingly give us the constitutive 
elements of nature and the connections in, and workings of, nature will be understood from 
the different complications of these simple elements of thought’. The references to Berkeley 
in this chapter both entertain and undermine the possibility that the secret of nature (or at 
least of the book) lies in Stephen’s thought, allowing Berkeley’s ‘esse is percepi’ to be read 
as relativism, but also reminding the reader that ‘the proper objects of vision [which] 
constitute a universal language of the Author of Nature’ are ‘made by the mallet of Los 
Demiurgos’- or Joyce in this case (Berkeley 114, 81; U 45). 
The figure of Bruno is significant in this chapter, moreover, as just like Bruno had 
been presented by Joyce as both a Renaissance and an Enlightenment philosopher, so this 
chapter weaves these two eras and Bruno’s ‘two very distinct sides’: empiricism and 
mysticism (McIntyre 109). 45 In his endeavour to read the ‘Signatures of all things’ rather 
than words, Stephen assumes as Enlightenment philosophers did that the truth of nature ‘is 
revealed not in God’s word but in his work; it is not based on the testimony of Scripture or 
tradition but is visible to us at all times’ (Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment 43). His 
search for ‘the laws of nature’ is made through ‘observation and experiment’, and he puts 
Berkeley’s philosophy to test: ‘Shut your eyes and see’ (44-5; U 45). His idealistic rather 
than scientific endeavour to ‘read’ the ‘Signatures of all things’ - the Book of Nature and 
language of God, ‘the sole auctor of things’ who ‘can use things to signify’, as the reference 
to Boehme implies - puts him, however, ‘in the position of a blind man’ both literally and 
metaphorically: ‘man, if he presumes to see into the life of things and know them as they 
really are in themselves, immediately becomes aware of the limits of his faculties; he finds 
himself in the position of a blind man who must judge the nature of colour. But analysis is 
the staff which a benevolent nature has placed in the blind man’s hands’, Voltaire had 
warned (Minnis 73; Cassirer 12). 46 Incorrectly claiming that Aristotle ‘was aware of them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The unflattering portrait of Aristotle as ‘Bald’ and ‘a millionaire’ could also be seen as a Brunian 
influence (U 45). 
46 As Cheryl Herr explains, for Boehme ‘spirit informs sound with essence or being, a process that 
makes possible communication through spoken words. The word is the signature or form which is the 
“receptacle” for spirit; thus language becomes an analogue for the way God's spirit informs all signs, 
including mineral, vegetable, and animal life’ (“Theosophy, Guilt, and ‘That Word Known to All 
Men’ in Joyce's Ulysses” 46). 
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bodies before of them coloured’, as James Cappio notes, Stephen, however, shifts this 
blindness to the ‘maestro di color che sanno’; his is a brief experience of darkness (U 45). 47 
Beginning with ‘Creation from nothing’, Stephen attempts in “Proteus” a mythical 
reconstruction of history as progress towards an epiphany of an ideal beauty: ‘Belly without 
blemish, bulging big, a buckler of taut vellum’ (46). While Bruno had more humbly 
maintained that ‘our knowledge is not concerned with the infinite object in its entirety, but 
only with the visible back (“dorso”) of the object, with a speck of the infinitely extended 
universe’, Stephen desires a vision of the ‘immortal’ and ‘everlasting’ (Gatti 282-3). Being 
able to ‘see truth in its entirety, face to face’, Bruno had argued, ‘would mean penetrating 
into the depth of the womb (“grembo”), the infinite ocean that remains the dark and 
mysterious source of eternal life’; Stephen’s quest for truth leads him indeed to the ‘Womb 
of sin’, as his Enlightenment optimism is halted by the mystery of the fall (283; U 46). 
It is indeed the prominence of history in Stephen’s thoughts and “philology” that 
highlights the difference of his “poetics” from his earlier aesthetic theories. While his return 
to origins is seemingly consistent with Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge as the 
knowledge of causes, the theological “Creation from nothing” contradicts Aristotelian 
metaphysics. Lacking faith, Stephen’s metaphysics are ‘constructed upon the incertitude of 
the void’ (818). But although his skepticism suggests that he has surrendered the truth of art 
‘to unlikelihood’, the influence of another Renaissance philosopher whose philosophical 
architectonics will aid the construction of the “system” underpinning Finnegans Wake, 
presents Stephen with an alternative pattern of history and a positive relation between history 
and art, without undermining art’s philosophical credentials. 
Philology, the “art” of “Proteus”, is for Vico ‘the science of everything that depends 
on human volition’, ‘a philosophy of human ‘authority’’ whose aim is to discover ‘the 
outlines of an ideal eternal history’ (5). The “origins” that Vico searches for are those of 
language, in the belief that ‘the etymologies of native words contain the history of the things 
they signify following a natural order of ideas’, a belief that Joyce had echoed in his early 
essay “The Study of Languages” (15). But the ultimate goal of his philosophical quest is to 
discover the ‘conceptual language common to all nations’ and to ‘compile a Conceptual 
Dictionary embracing all the different articulate languages both living and dead’, in an 
example of the allure of ‘a universal language’ in the seventeenth-century (84; Yates, The 
Art of Memory 364). 48 In Vico’s metaphysics, the bard is not the ideal progenitor of poetry; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 ‘In fact, Aristotle argues in precisely the opposite way - from an awareness of change of color to the 
existence of something unchanging, itself uncolored, which remains the same despite the change’ 
(Cappio 29). 
48 Italics my own. 
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in his tripartite division of history, in the first era- ‘the age of gods’, language was ‘mute or 
wordless’, ‘which used gestures or physical objects bearing a natural relationship to the ideas 
they wanted to signify’ (22). Linking the etymology of “mute” with “mythos”, he argues that 
‘speech was born in the mute age as a mental language’, and ‘this is why in Greek logos 
means both word and idea’ (157). 
While “Proteus”, a chapter whose “meaning” according to the Linati schema is 
“Primal matter”, can be seen to reflect the ‘mental language’ of ‘age of gods’, all three of 
Vico’s “ages” contribute to the structure of the chapter. The ‘age of heroes’ that follows ‘the 
age of gods’, ‘used heroic emblems- such as similes, comparisons, images, metaphors, and 
descriptions of nature- as the principal lexicon of its heroic language’, while the ‘age of men’ 
‘used vocabulary agreed by popular convention, and of which the people are the absolute 
lords’ (22). The procession of religious symbols in Stephen’s thoughts is followed by 
symbols of Irish myth, until the memory of Deasy’s ‘letter for the press’ leads to an 
autobiographical narrative full of memories from his time in the cosmopolitan city of Paris 
(47). But wary of the endeavour of Renaissance systems to ‘simplify the complex’, Joyce 
violates even Vico’s cyclical order, as he will do in Finnegans Wake, allowing the 
“progress” of Stephen’s thoughts to mirror the protean flux of a Berkeleyan and Brunian 
reality, and history and autobiography, as well as reality and language, to coalesce (OCPW 
94).  
Vico, however, is careful to distinguish his Science from the ‘rational and abstract 
metaphysics of today’s scholars’ (144). The figure of Proteus had been invoked by Vico in 
order to illustrate what he calls the ‘conceit of scholars’ who ‘assert that what they know is 
as old as the world’ (77). ‘Scholars’, he says, 
 
believed that the poets had signified prime matter by their myth of Proteus. In this 
myth set in Egypt, Ulysses on the shore wrestles with Proteus in the water but cannot 
hold on to the monster, which keeps changing shape. What the scholars mistook for 
sublime learning was in fact the extreme coarseness and ignorance of early people. 
For just as children try to grasp their own reflection when they look in the mirror, so 
primitive people thought they saw an ever-changing person in the water when they 
beheld how it altered their own features and movements’. (310-11) 
 
Vico’s interpretation of this myth parodies Stephen’s ‘self-defeating desire for rational 
knowledge of intuited truths’ (Herr, “Theosophy” 52). But the ‘two metaphysical ideas’ that 
Vico’s ‘theological poets beheld in humankind’ ‘With their crude physics’, are the very 
object of Stephen’s inquiry and desire: ‘being and substance’. ‘Being was clearly 
apprehended by the Latin heroes in a very coarse manner. Thus, the Latin verb esse, ‘to be’, 
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originally meant ‘to eat’ (312). Stephen’s repeated refusal to eat, therefore, betrays not only 
his alienation from his body, but also being. 
It is ‘impossible for anyone to be both a sublime poet and a sublime metaphysician’, 
Vico had warned, as ‘metaphysics draws the mind away from the senses, while the poetic 
faculty sinks the whole mind into them’ (375). Stephen appears to become aware in Ulysses 
of this distinction, as his paraphrase of Dryden’s “prophecy”- ‘Cousin Stephen, you will 
never be a saint’, his mocking references to the philosophic aspirations of his youth and 
‘taste for enigmatic rôles’, imply (49; SH 81). Dominated by recollections, moreover, his 
thoughts exemplify Vico’s description of the poetic mind, which has a trinitarian structure. 
While the metaphysician thinks by means of reflection, the mental faculty that is most 
important for the poet is memory, Vico argues, which ‘has three distinct aspects’: ‘memory 
when it recalls things; imagination when it alters or recreates them; and ingenuity or 
invention when it orders them in a suitable arrangement or context’ (369).  
Vico’s distinction between the poet and the philosopher, moreover, introduces a new 
notion of subjectivity: while ‘rational metaphysics teaches us that man becomes all things 
through understanding, homo intelligendo fit omnia’, Vico argues, his own ‘imaginative 
metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding homo non intelligendo 
fit omnia. For when man understands he extends his mind to comprehend things; but when 
he does not understand, he makes them out of himself and, by transforming himself, 
becomes them’ (160). Stephen’s thoughts become increasingly theatrical, as he tries to arrive 
at self-knowledge through a series of “selves” he has traversed in time and through his 
familiarity with history and myth and their famous actors. Instead of becoming ‘All in all’, 
however, his encyclopedic quest, ends with the dualism of ‘All or not at all’; rather than a 
“form of forms”, he finds that his soul is a phantom that has been walking beside him, as the 
selves he met in his journey were simply ‘Disguises’ (272, 62, 54). 
Although the focus of Joyce’s “Proteus” is epistemological, its ever-changing primal 
matter that Joyce tries to capture through rhythm and language highlights also an ontological 
transformation. Once again, the philosophy of Bruno can be seen underpinning this 
reworking of the material of the Author, in the growing speed and number of metamorphoses 
that are recorded. For Bruno matter is ‘absolute possibility’ and ‘co-eternal with God’: ‘act 
and potency, absolute possibility and infinite actuality coincide’ (Cause, Principle, Unity 
xvi). Whereas for the Scholastics God is ‘pure esse- actuality’, for Bruno as for Cusa, ‘God 
is “wholly in act” (penitus in actu)’: He is ‘the infinite actualization of all possibilities’ 
(Moran in Hankins ed. 180). To illustrate this, Bruno recounts another version of the myth of 
Proteus- a feminine version. Bruno presents the goddess Thetis as a symbol of ‘the material 
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substance that underlies all the specific formations that make up the natural world’ (Gatti 
260). ‘[A]ssociated with the ocean in its infinite Protean capacity for metamorphosis’, she 
symbolises like Vico’s Proteus ‘both the possibility and inevitable limits of an inquiry into 
natural causes’, as she ‘is by no means easy to “catch” or to define in definite and certain 
terms’. She is presented as ‘the wife of many husbands, none of whom can truly be said to 
possess her’: ‘Although her forms can be pursued by reason (“subiectum ratione 
formabile”), she resists all attempts at such dominion, and renders the hunt for her secrets 
difficult and problematic’. ‘The natural philosopher would be unwise to think that it is 
possible to penetrate her essence’ Bruno warns, as Gatti explains; ‘All that can be hoped for 
is to understand something “around and about” her ways and habits’. 
While these are characteristics of Molly who remains covered all day until her 
‘visible back (“dorso”)’ is revealed to the reader, Stephen’s composition of poetic fragments 
reflect his desire for a ‘myriadislanded’ female (60). 49 As for Bruno, women for Stephen are 
‘a poetic expression of man's furor for reunion with the One’ (Koch 241). His vision of his 
courtship of a female and urgent desire to be touched is consummated with a ‘scribbled note’ 
and recollection of God’s vision of his Creation in Genesis (61). His desire for human 
contact that is interposed with his desire for ‘that word known to all men’, suggests not only 
Stephen’s desire for communication and “recital” of his art to a live audience - ‘Somewhere 
to someone in your flutiest voice’ - but also for the corporeality of his words; for language 
itself to perform - Eucharistically - the communion with the body that Stephen desires (60). 
 
 
ii. That queer thing genius 
 
The irony of Vico’s “disclaimer” and corroboration of his New Science through his 
assertion of its resemblance to geometry, ‘which, by constructing and contemplating its basic 
elements creates its own world of measurable quantities’, ‘but with greater reality, just as the 
orders of human affairs are more real than points, lines, surfaces and figures’, did not go 
unnoticed, and is reflected in Stephen’s construction and presentation of a theory which 
according to Mulligan can be substantiated by means of algebra (129). Like Vico, moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Rabaté in “Bruno No, Bruno Si: Note on a Contradiction in Joyce” and Voelker in ““Nature it is”: 
The Influence of Giordano Bruno on James Joyce’s Molly Bloom” have explored Bruno’s association 
of femininity with Nature and Joyce’s appropriation of Bruno’s paradigm. A further parallel may be 
drawn between Bruno’s portrayal of Thetis as a dolphin ‘whose back only at times appears as well 
defined above the moving waters of becoming’, and Bloom’s memories of ‘The first night after the 
charades’ at ‘Dolphin’s Barn’, following Molly’s request for an explanation of ‘Metempsychosis’ 
(Gatti 260; U 77). 
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Stephen in “Scylla and Charybdis” searches for “the true Bard” - Shakespeare rather than 
Homer - examining whether he ‘was in fact a philosopher’, and reanimating the antagonism 
between the bard and the philosopher/scholar (355). 
The chapter opens with an invocation of the genre of Bildungsroman to which 
Stephen’s own “biography” in the Portrait belonged to and which his Hamlet theory 
interprets metaphysically, while purportedly investigating the historical reality of the life of 
the Bard. Having himself contributed to this genre and desiring to go beyond the stereotype 
of the artist that it had created, Stephen attempts to do so with a novel interpretation of the 
archetypal artist and modern Bard, Shakespeare. Goethe, the first national “genius” that is 
referred to in the debate that this chapter stages, ‘pioneering the use of artists as central 
characters’, presented in Wilhelm Meister and Werther an ‘uncompromisingly exalted notion 
of what the true artist ought to be’; closer to Vico’s bard, however, Stephen presents the 
artist as ‘simply a commoner’ (Beebe, Ivory Towers 86-7; Vico 363). But while he attempts 
to desacralise the cult of the genius, as a result of his ‘bodily shame’ the relation between the 
artist and his art remains metaphysical. 
In the company of the Dublin men of letters, Stephen is referred to once again 
mockingly as an aspiring bard: ‘Have you found those six brave medicals, John Eglinton 
asked with elder’s gall, to write Paradise Lost at your dictation?’ (235). He is, however, 
presented as a Romantic bard, as the reference to Goethe and his intention according to 
Eglinton to compose ‘The Sorrows of Satan’ highlight. “Trying his hand at” rhetoric, as he 
had challenged himself in “Aeolus”, Stephen interprets the oral tradition of the bard through 
his oratorical display of his theory, but also invokes the dramatic tradition of Shakespeare, 
presenting his theory as a dramatic performance. Providing himself with dramatic notes, he 
tries to disengage himself from his immediate environment in order to inspire “belief” by 
enacting his theory. As the subject of the discussion is the creation of ‘a figure which the 
world will set beside Saxon Shakespeare's Hamlet’, taking the lead from the Romantics 
Stephen presents his own interpretation of a Bildungsroman artist-hero (236).  
‘[A]n underlying assumption in the artist-novel is that creative man is a divided 
being’, man and artist, a historical personage who merely serves as the medium through 
which the creative spirit manifests itself’, Beebe explains in his survey of the genre (Ivory 
Towers 6). ‘The man must spend himself, but the artist-spirit saves itself by becoming one 
with its works and thus escaping the bonds of time’ (7). Understanding as Wilde had in his 
Portrait of Mr. W. H the theological background of this division and its origins in the 
hermeneutics of Scripture, where the unity of the Author was maintained at the expense of 
its human scriptors who were vehicles of a divine inspiration and assumed the blame for any 
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errors in trascription, Stephen presents a theological “solution” to this paradox of artistic 
creation. 50  
Proposing to disentangle the ghostwriter from the Holy Ghost, he begins his delivery 
by asking his audience to deliberate on the nature of a ghost that links in his theory life and 
art. Probing the nature of the character of the Creator - a solipsist and sentimentalist 
modelled on the character of Hamlet, but also on the diversity of interpretations of his 
Creation - Stephen appeals to the theological mystery of the Trinitarian economy to 
reconcile this paradox of the one and the many. In his influential interpretation of Hamlet, 
Coleridge had indeed distinguished this play in terms of its theological overdetermination: 
‘Shakespeare’s refusal to locate his motive in the plot of the play, rather than in the “doubts 
and hesitations” of Hamlet’s mind, turns the explicable revenge tragedy into a mystery’ 
(Quillian 2-3). This “mystery” was located in Hamlet’s mind; he is presented as an 
“intellectual dreamer” - an ‘ineffectual dreamer’ for the librarian - who is an embodiment of 
the philosophical outlook of his author (235). A ruse for philosophy, however, the mystery 
of the creation - of the wildness and irregularity of our Shakespeare, an “absentminded” 
genius - throws into confusion the principles of literary criticism:  
 
when once the end which our myriad-minded Bard had in view, and the local 
accidents that favoured or obstructed or in any way modified its manifestations are 
once thoroughly comprehended, the doubt will arise whether the judgment or the 
genius of the man has the stronger claim to our wonder, or rather it will be felt that 
the judgment was the birth and living offspring of his genius even as the symmetry 
of a body results from the sanity and vigour of the life as an organizing power. 
(Coleridge in Read 606) 
 
Shakespeare’s creative power was located in his unconscious, in an ‘innate mental aptitude 
(ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’: he “shaped his characters out of the 
nature within; but we cannot so safely say, out of his own nature, as an individual person” 
(CAJ 168; Read 613). 
But while for the Romantics understanding the genius required ‘a divinatory act of 
con-geniality’ in the face of the inscrutable mystery of the unconscious, Stephen presents 
Shakespeare through a web of relations that complicates the ‘nature within’ from without 
(Gadamer 188). While for the Romantics ‘Composition becomes valorized as an act of 
supreme philosophical significance’ as ‘the writer’s struggle to overcome his or her own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Jarlath Killeen reads Wilde’s Mr. W.H. as ‘a contribution to a major issue for Victorian England: 
the question of the authority of the Bible and the best way to interpret it’ (45). For Killeen, ‘The 
Portrait of Mr W.H. makes clear [the] link between sexual/textual ambiguity and authority: the greater 
the interpretive insight of the characters, the more central the passionate relationship between 
Shakespeare and Willie Hughes becomes’ (52). 
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limits and finitude’, both ‘the act of poiesis and critical acts of self-reading and revision’ are 
absent in Stephen’s portrait of the artist (Clark 118). Delivering an account of Shakespeare’s 
life which rolls concurrently with his reconstruction of a performance of Hamlet, Stephen, 
like Spinoza rather than a Romantic, highlights the need to ‘understand the mind of the 
author “historically”’, undermining the idea of genius- ‘an innate productive faculty of the 
artist’ (Gadamer 182; CAJ 169). What Spinoza’s emphasis on history implies, Gadamer 
explains, is the need to ‘overcome our prejudices and think of nothing but what the author 
could have had in mind’ (182). But while for the Romantics this implied the need for a 
mystical communion in order to gain access to the writer’s mind, Spinoza uses history to 
highlight the impossibility of this task, and ultimately to undermine both history and the 
authorship and authority of Scripture: ‘Spinoza’s method thus ultimately proves, and was 
intended to prove, that Scripture is unintelligible. The more one “understands” Scripture, the 
more one understands that it cannot be understood’ (Morrison 68). Stephen’s theory traces 
the same path towards unintelligibility; towards a mystery that is theologically constructed 
but located in history. 
While Stephen’s esthetic theory had traversed - implicitly - the philosophical history 
of the terms he sought to explain, his account in “Scylla” of ‘the phenomena of artistic 
conception, artistic gestation, and artistic reproduction’, traces the history of Shakespeare’s 
critical reception (P 227). Although biographical criticism was popular at the end of the 
nineteenth century, Stephen’s “biography” is metacritical- and mythical. His bardic 
“memory” is a gathering, a telling (legein) of fragments of tradition. 51 “Forgetting” is indeed 
a creative tool that promises renewal: ‘Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I 
now. Other I got pound’ (242). The preserved historical annals of the library are ‘Coffined 
thoughts … in mummycases, embalmed in spice of words’ (248). What distinguishes the 
artist is his ability to ‘weave and unweave his image’, to triumph over time ‘In the intense 
instant of imagination’, described by Stephen as an actualisation of potency: ‘that which I 
was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be’ (249). It is an instant 
of mystic simultaneity not between the artist and his work as it was for the Romantics, but 
between the artist and the totality of the narrative of history. As according to Aquinas, as 
Noon explains, it is ‘the Father’s infinite understanding of Himself’ that ‘begets a perfect 
Image, the Person Who thus proceeds by way of intellection (the Son)’, ‘a perfect Word or 
Image generated or begotten in the perfect likeness of His progenitor or Conceiver (the 
Father)’, so Stephen’s creative ‘instant’ is characterised by perfect ‘reflection’: ‘So in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The philology of Vico and Heidegger highlights the connection between saying and gathering in 
their common lex- root. 
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future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that 
which then I shall be’ (112, 249). Once again, however, there is no mention of “begetting” or 
generation of the Word, only silent self-reflection. 
Noon indeed wonders why Stephen uses the paradigm of the Trinity to describe the 
process of artistic creation, as ‘No poet may dare hope to give himself so perfectly to his 
poems as the divine Father gives Himself to His consubstantial Son’; the ‘theological 
argument for the procession of the second Person of the Trinity as the Son (since He 
proceeds as the Logos) is invariably founded on the Augustinian analogy of the conception 
of the inner word, the soul’s knowledge of itself, and not upon the outward utterance of a 
word spoken or written’ (118-9). ‘This literary experience, it may be, could more easily 
explored on the analogy of a “Creation” or an “Incarnation”’, Noon suggests (119). Stephen, 
however, is not interested in describing the relation between the artist and his audience, but 
between speech and thought that Aquinas used to explain the mystery of the Trinity. The 
librarian’s counsel that Stephen should ‘work out his theory for the enlightenment of the 
public’, ironically highlights that Stephen is describing a silent self-communion, examining 
the mystery of the phenomenon of language (251). 
Far from a redemptive event, Shakespeare’s “incarnation” of his word - ‘There is, I 
feel in the words, some goad of the flesh’ - is shown to be ‘driving him into a new passion, a 
darker shadow of the first, darkening even his own understanding of himself’ (252). His 
apparent consubstantiality with his work is a cleverly contrived mask ‘to hide him from 
himself’; his theatrical ‘personality’ ‘passes on towards eternity’ ‘undiminished’. Unable to 
decipher or utter his word, he remains ‘untaught by the wisdom he has written or by the laws 
he has revealed’, and undecipherable, ‘He is a ghost, a shadow now, the wind by Elsinore's 
rocks or what you will, the sea’s voice’. The dissolution of plurality in Stephen’s Trinity, 
makes it heretical despite his assertion of “consubstantiality”, as his parody of Apostle’s 
creed highlights. His Aristotelian and Berkeleyan theorising in “Proteus” ironically coincide: 
Shakespeare’s creation is his world and his world is his creation. 
Unable to give birth to the ‘perfect Word or Image’, Stephen presents language as an 
impediment for the human artist. Whereas the discussion turns repeatedly to the composition 
of ‘Our national epic’ by an Irish genius, an artist-hero who ‘must speak the grand old 
tongue’, Stephen stresses the freedom and artistic licence that distinguished the genius for 
the Romantics: ‘A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the 
portals of discovery’ (246). The ‘product of a genius’, Kant had stressed, ‘is an example, not 
for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of 
the work), but to be followed by another genius - one whom it arouses to a sense of his own 
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originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art that for art 
itself a new rule is won - which is what shows a talent to be exemplary’ (CAJ 181). ‘[T]hat 
queer thing genius’, that for Kant ‘cannot be communicated, but requires to be bestowed 
directly from the hand of nature upon each individual’, becomes ‘the standard of all 
experience, material and moral’, Stephen complains (246). This is an ‘aping when the pupil 
copies everything down to the deformities which the genius only of necessity suffered to 
remain, because they could hardly be removed without loss of force to the idea’, Kant had 
warned (181). Insofar as the rule of art must instead be ‘gathered from the performance, i.e., 
from the product’, Stephen presents himself as the genius the men of letters are looking for 
(171). 
Suggesting that Stephen’s ‘brilliances of theorising’ are outdated, John Eglinton 
calls for Stephen to produce a more popular performance that might appeal to ‘The bard's 
fellowcountrymen’ (254). Conglomerating “biographical” facts - ‘a mixture of   
theolologicophilolological’ - Stephen turns to Brandes’ and Dowden’s interpretation of 
Shakespeare as a ‘“man of practical affairs”’, a member of a bourgeois ‘William 
Shakespeare and company, limited’, and a product of a market economy ‘made in Germany’ 
(Quillian 18; U 263, 262). As rumours of Shakespeare’s profligacy and promiscuity 
proliferate in the discussion, Stephen’s theory is in danger of collapsing. As the Romantic 
and Symbolist Shakespeare ‘reading the book of himself’ is left behind, the theatricality of 
Stephen’s delivery increases (239). 
Unable to reconcile art and life, the “man of practical affairs” with the intellectual 
dreamer, ‘battling against hopelessness’, Stephen turns again to the Trinitarian mystery 
(265). But while in the first version of his theory consubstantiality had allowed Shakespeare 
to preserve his personality ‘undiminished’ in ‘eternity’, the multivalency of history threatens 
this unity (252). The legacy that follows the “death of the Author” here is a ‘mystical estate’ 
that is ‘a legal fiction’ created by an alderman (266). 52 The practical and the metaphysical 
converge in the Law. More forcefully than in his earlier version, Stephen presents tragedy as 
the site where the life and art of Shakespeare converge. The mystery is located in an act of 
hubris, that ‘repeats itself, protasis, epitasis, catastasis, catastrophe’, providing the structure 
of Shakespeare’s plays (272). Mimesis, as for Hölderlin, ‘is no longer the (re)presentation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 While Joyce acknowledged Allen Upward’s The Divine Mystery as a source of inspiration for 
“Circe”, Stephen is not so gracious (Letters I 156). In his description of the characteristics of the 
religion of primitive man, Upward argues that ‘The knowledge of the common law of parentage has 
never driven out the belief in the soul or spirit as something independently implanted in the offspring, 
at least in human offspring. Neither has fatherhood been accepted as a necessary law’ (63). As 
Upward’s book was published in 1913, Stephen can present himself as an original thinker- to his 
listeners if not his readers. 
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pragmata, but that of the tragic itself in its essence; that is to say, of the experience or the 
ordeal of the divine as hubris’ (Lacoue-Labarthe in Sparks 132). The mystery of the genius 
of the Bard is interpreted by Stephen through the Romantics’ interpretation of tragedy as ‘the 
conflict between immutable orders co-existing in man: the order of nature or of necessity, on 
the one hand, and the order of freedom on the other, the order of sensible finitude, and the 
order of practical infinity’; through the ‘paradox’ of this dialectic that both the structure- the 
“plot” of tragedy and its resolution presents to Romantic philosophy (Sparks 6; Hölderlin 
89).  
The absence of an assertion of freedom through transgression of the Law in 
Stephen’s portrait of a tragic hero is conspicuous given his virtual identification of art with 
freedom in the Portrait and Stephen Hero. More significantly, if the Law is a ‘fiction’, 
tragedy becomes impossible: ‘the poetical form of tragedy, which is the most rigorous form 
of poetry, cannot resist when it tries to expose das Schicksallose, ‘the lack of destiny’ of 
modern beings, of which Oedipus’ living death is only the presentiment. Only lyric poetry 
can be fitted for the exposition of the dysmoron, the lack of Moira or share … of modern 
beings, as Hölderlin’s great poetry from the turn of the century shows’ (Dastur in Sparks 86).  
The artist in Stephen’s theory becomes ‘All in all’, but his sacrifice does not lead to 
a revelation: he remains ‘untaught by the wisdom he has written or by the laws he has 
revealed’ (U 252). The sin that ‘sundered’ father and son, the unspeakable ‘breach’ caused 
by ‘bodily shame’, remains ‘in infinite variety everywhere in the world he has created’ (266, 
272). ‘Lover of an ideal or a perversion’, his desire for truth is a sign of his perversion, as 
knowledge must come through suffering: ‘His unremitting intellect is the hornmad Iago 
ceaselessly willing that the moor in him shall suffer’ (272-3). Stephen’s interpretation of 
tragedy is a dramatisation of the nightmare of history: ‘If tragedy discloses the universal 
impact of history on finite being’, Weinsheimer argues, ‘then pathei mathos means there is 
no knower of history that is not also a participant in history, no theory of history that is not 
also involved in historical practice, and hence no pure theory of history at all’ (Weinsheimer 
36-7). ‘In the light of tragedy, to understand is not to do but to suffer, to be overwhelmed by 
the course of events’ (35). 
The autobiographical focus of Stephen’s theory in “Scylla” questions the very 
possibility of theory in the face of history. Not only are “facts” distorted through the passing 
of time, but the attempt to subsume the particular under a universal rule or formula becomes 
itself a distortion of these “facts”. ‘Historical consciousness’, Gadamer argues, ‘knows about 
the otherness of the other, about the past in its otherness, just as the understanding of the 
Thou knows the Thou as a person. In the otherness of the past it seeks not the instantiation of 
	   158	  
	  
a general law but something historically unique. By claiming to transcend its own 
conditionedness completely in knowing the other, it is involved in a false dialectical 
appearance, since it is actually seeking to master the past, as it were’ (354). The freedom and 
originality of the genius is in conflict with ‘the poet of “universal human nature”’ in 
Stephen’s theory- with the Bard as the voice of the nation (Quillian 2). 
The culmination of Stephen’s “dialectic” into the formation of an ‘All in all’ 
Nietzschean superman who ‘sitteth on the right hand of His Own Self’, reflects this attempt 
to master plurality (253). As his Trinitarian analogy dramatises, ‘the interpreter of history 
always runs the risk of hypostasizing the connectedness of events when he regards their 
significance as that intended by the actual actors and planners’ (Gadamer 364). ‘Historical 
tradition can be understood only as something always in the process of being defined by the 
course of event’, Gadamer argues, and ‘Similarly, the philologist dealing with poetic or 
philosophical texts knows that they are inexhaustible’ (366). Only through metaphysics 
Stephen can impose a limit- an interpretation, and employ history and literature to create his 
portrait of the artist. His theory indeed collapses as soon as it is presented. ‘The one flaw’ in 
his theory, as in that of Cyril Graham's in The Portrait of Mr. W. H, ‘is that it presupposes 
the existence of the person whose existence is the subject of dispute’ (125).  
The ‘vaulted cell’ of the library in which Stephen’s play takes place, reflects and 
ironically inverts the contrast between the philosopher and the historian; the philosophers in 
“Scylla” are lead out of the cave ‘into a shattering daylight of no thought’ (276). Stephen’s 
inability to theorise without becoming a ‘lubber jester’, however, is not only an ontological 
condition. Mulligan’s reference to the Abbey Theatre - ‘Our players are creating a new art 
for Europe like the Greeks or M. Maeterlinck. Abbey Theatre! I smell the pubic sweat of 
monks’ - highlights that it is the dominance of a particular narrative of history that results in 
the performance of a single play, and withholds Stephen’s presentation of his drama ‘to the 
world’ (276-7; Letters II 111). 
 
 
iii. A distinguished phenomenologist 
 
Stephen is not alone in his quest for truth in Ulysses. Although a dualism of stasis 
and kinesis is established that separates him from Bloom, Bloom is also one of the ‘seekers 
of the pure truth’ in Joyce’s epic (805). His compulsive rationalisation, demystification, 
constant recourse to scientific facts, laws and methods, and desire for exposition and 
justification may not come with the despair of Stephen’s internal conflict, but his search for 
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truth is similarly tragicomic. His grand plans for social as well as scientific progress and 
improvement and his desire for knowledge for its own sake, link him to Flaubert’s Bouvard 
and Pécuchet. While Stephen is disillusioned and pessimistic in Ulysses, the Enlightenment 
ideals of his youth manifest themselves in the “phenomenology” of Bloom. Described by 
Kenner as ‘a parody of the Enlightenment’, Bloom is indeed mocked and upbraided for his 
scientific perspective, as Stephen had been for his ‘science of esthetic’, by both the Dublin 
citizens and the various narrators (Dublin’s Joyce 217). Moreover, although the introduction 
of the “kindly” Bloom appears to imply that ‘Joyce holds forth no hope’ for Stephen, 
Marguerite Harkness suggests that the contrast is not necessarily in Stephen’s disfavour: 
‘Stephen’s artistry and his sense of mission as an artist begin, through Bloom’s exaggeration 
of bourgeois attitudes, to look more positive than they do in isolation’ (Schutte, Joyce and 
Shakespeare 120; 188).  
The catechistic method of “Ithaca” is a parody of Bloom’s rationalising more than 
Stephen’s predilection for dialectic as a ‘jejune jesuit’, or even his ‘classroom techniques 
vis-à-vis his pupils’ that are marked by his indifference to the facts and knowledge he is 
obliged to impart (U 2; Dublin’s Joyce 241). As the focus of the narrative in the last chapters 
of Ulysses shifts to Bloom, the “scrupulous” regress that characterises his thoughts is 
dramatised and satirised in “Eumeaus” and “Ithaca” in ‘an exhibition of excess’, before 
giving way to the flow of Molly’s language (Lawrence 180). Lawrence detects ‘a parody of 
the basic activity of symbol making and deciphering’ in “Ithaca”, ‘the kind of activities 
engaged in by everyone, but by writers and readers especially’; but the complete 
transparency of the language is also a reflection of Bloom’s scepticism of the symbolic 
capacity of language (200). 
His views of language which contrast with Stephen’s anxious quest for ‘that word 
known to all men’ reflect his modern scepticism, but also the Enlightenment foundation of 
this discrediting of ‘Useless words’, materially conceived as ‘Inked characters fast fading on 
the frayed breaking paper’ (682, 208, 113). ‘The exclusion of what a language “is” beyond 
its efficient functioning as sign material - i.e., the self-conquest of language by a system of 
artificial, unambiguously defined symbols’, is an ‘ideal of the eighteenth-and twentieth-
century Enlightenments’, Gadamer argues, that ‘represents the ideal language, because to it 
would correspond to the totality of the knowable: Being as absolutely available objectivity’ 
(414). Stephen is therefore not the only idealist in his search for an epiphanic word; Bloom’s 
skepticism is founded on an ideal of ‘absolutely available objectivity’. 
In a coincidence of contraries of science and metaphysics, this ideal sign language 
corresponds to negative theology’s “learned ignorance”: ‘That the true being of things is to 
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be investigated “without names” means that there is no access to truth in the proper being of 
words as such - even though, of course, no questioning, answering, instructing, and 
differentiating can take place without the help of language’ (414). But whereas in 
Renaissance philosophy and theology language as a sign system reflected the creative 
capacity of man and infinity of the human mind, the quest for infinity in modernity has 
nihilistic implications, reflected in Bloom’s difficulty to understand and interpret what words 
“mean”; “nihil” is no longer the “name” of God. 53 A ‘parody of metaphysical intuition, or of 
allied aesthetic modes of knowledge’ as well as science, the chapter highlights the neglect of 
the significance of language in both science and metaphysics (Dublin’s Joyce 176). Whereas 
in “The Study of Languages” Joyce had defended the ‘rigidity’ and ‘neatness and regularity’ 
that literature shared with mathematics, the ‘uncompromising theorems’ of science had 
become increasingly questionable by the time he came to write “Ithaca” as McCarthy 
highlights: ‘in 1921, the year when Joyce was busily writing “Ithaca”, Albert Einstein was 
forced to admit that “Insofar as the propositions of mathematics give an account of reality 
they are not certain; and insofar as they are certain they do not describe reality”’ (611). 
Instead of mathematics being the model for language, mathematics was exposed as just 
another “language”. 
 ‘By this gesture toward the primacy of style the “Ithaca” technic suggests a notion 
of language as pure gesture, free both of literal and of figurative signification’, Harold Baker 
argues- Stephen’s ideal ‘universal language’ in “Circe”: the Pentecostal ‘gift of tongues 
rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm’ (280; U 
564). This apophatic ‘proud gesture of refusal’ links Stephen and Bloom through their shared 
skepticism towards history that it manifests (P 65). The shared idealisation of these 
“inhuman theorists” of a ‘mute or wordless language’ that Vico ascribes to ‘the age of gods’, 
highlights the ‘arrogant neglect of the human for the benefit of humanity’ in the dream of 
‘the history of the world as idea’ (22; Nietzsche; Human, All-Too-Human 391, 21). Haines’ 
duplicitous “blaming” of history while idealising its monuments, reveals the paradox that 
these Dubliners are faced with in having to both remember and forget the nightmare of 
history in order to preserve their identity but also move forward. 
Although Bloom exercises his ‘mnemotechnic’ predominantly through reminiscence 
of his personal history and through his endeavour to retain information, he also feels 
oppressed by the pattern of history that seems to him as an eternal recurrence of the same 
(834). As William Schutte remarks, although Bloom’s vision of history is ‘not a nightmare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 ‘For Nicholas of Cusa, reason and its expression in language do not exhaust the reality of the mind’, 
Duclow explains; ‘The mind is constitutively related to transcendence and totality’ (260).  
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full of shattered glass and toppling masonry’, he also ‘sees history as inimical to man’: ‘For 
him the past and the future combine to form an essentially meaningless continuum. Things 
do not change day after day; they go on the same’ (“Leopold Bloom” 128-9). But whereas 
Stephen, ‘Heavy of the past’ filters his experiences through its monuments, conscious that 
thinking about the past ‘Give[s] you the creeps after a bit’, Bloom concentrates instead on 
the present and the future, reassuring himself- ‘I am here now’, and looking forward to 
Molly’s ‘ample bedwarmed flesh. Yes, yes’ (146, 73-4).  
As an ad-canvasser, he is very aware of the significance of memory, both for 
understanding and composing the narrative of history, and he highlights the consequence of 
meaningful “examples”; examples that ‘instead of forcing “categories”’ allow meaning to 
‘show itself to itself on its own terms’, ‘in its average everydayness’ (Heidegger 59). 
Distanced from religion, the Bible is full of ‘dead names’ for him, while his interpretation of 
‘metempsychosis’ is drawn from ‘Naked nymphs’ (73, 78). While Stephen deliberates on the 
oppression of the grand narratives of history, through Bloom Joyce draws attention to the 
‘ephemeral moments’ of history, as Garry Leonard argues: ‘“Official” versions of 
“historical” events are actually the distortion, whereas the never to be historicized events of 
the everyday are beneath notice, and therefore, for Joyce, most notable’ (Palgrave Advances 
47). Conscious of the materiality of his “art”, Bloom is conscious of its ephemerality that is 
threatened more than Stephen’s by being unbound and daily recycled. 
The examples that adverts provide, moreover, are not “exemplary”, as Stephen’s 
strange parable in “Aeolus” demonstrates, but involve momentary recognition: ‘Something 
to catch the eye’ (106). As ‘constellations of desire’, their meaning is variable; like puns or 
jokes, they ‘have something in [them] capable of momentarily deceiving us’, and ‘when the 
semblance vanishes into nothing, the mind looks back in order to try it over again, and thus 
by a rapidly succeeding tension and relaxation it is jerked to and fro and put in oscillation’ 
(Wicke, “Modernity Must Advertise” 610; CAJ 202). Adverts are indeed a great source for 
jokes for Bloom as for Joyce. Far from regulative, the interpretation of the “mystery” of 
adverts repeatedly leads to an endless regress of random associations. 
Puzzled why the reduction to nothing of the joke is ‘a source of very lively 
enjoyment for a moment’, as ‘certainly understanding cannot rejoice’ at this, Kant concludes 
that ‘Its cause must consequently lie in the influence of the representation upon the body and 
the reciprocal effect of this upon the mind’ (201). Attentive to the reciprocity between body 
and mind in both his life and his art, Bloom is indeed a ‘kinetic’ artist, allowing the 
composition of an “epic of the human body” and the incarnation of the word through puns 
(Budgen 21). History is a nightmare for Bloom because being in touch with his corporeality, 
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he is also aware of his mortality. The preservation of the memory of the dead, he thinks, 
should be made by means of a gramophone, conserving not only the written word or an 
image, but also the vocal sound. Such preservation would not allow perfect communication - 
‘Kraahraark! Hellohellohello amawfullyglad kraark awfullygladaseeagain hellohello amawf 
krpthsth’ - but would give a fuller picture of the departed person (144). Similarly, Stephen’s 
“gesture” in Circe, as Lynch’s interpretation of it as ‘Pornosophical philotheology’ suggests, 
as well as a manifestation of his ideal of absolute representation, reflects his desire for an 
ideal correspondence between body and soul- a ‘meeting point of man’s inner and outer 
worlds’ (563; Aubert 93). 
Telling a joke as an experiment, Kant analyses the laughter of his imaginary 
audience by concluding that ‘the bubble of our expectation was extended to the full and 
suddenly went off into nothing’ (200). Bloom allows Joyce to practice the ‘art of deflation’ 
intellectually, somatically and linguistically (Gibson 113). The inability of the narrator of 
“Eumaeus” to signify, mirrored in various clumsy acts performed by Bloom, leads to a series 
of comic scenes based on ‘Missed Understandings’ (FW 175). This ‘abnihilisation of the 
etym’ is not “inhuman” but ‘consist[s] in a feeling of the furtherance of the entire life of the 
man, and hence, also of his bodily well-being’ insofar as it leads to ‘gratification’ (353; CAJ 
198). The ‘wit or originality of humour’ required for exciting laughter, Kant argues, is ‘as 
rare as the talent is common for inventing stuff that splits the head, as mystic speculators do, 
or that breaks your neck, as the genius does, or that harrows the heart as sentimental 
novelists do (aye, and moralists of the same type)’ (204). ‘Humour, in a good sense, means 
the talent for being able to put oneself at will into a certain frame of mind in which 
everything is estimated on lines that go quite off the beaten track (a topsy-turvy view of 
things), and yet on lines that follow certain principles, rational in the case of such a mental 
temperament’ (203). Although this talent is not what is required for ‘fine art’, Kant says, ‘It 
belongs to [its] originality of mind (des Geistes)’. While ‘no geste reveals the unconnouth’, 
the position of ‘the gest’ ‘In the beginning’ of Finnegans Wake, allows Joyce to lay claim to 
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IV. Theologian 
i. Ritual: a rest for the poet  
 
Dramatised on a more “gigantic” scale, the ‘dreadful bard’s theological 
interpretation of history through ritual processions characterises the bardic narrative of 
“Cyclops”. The bardic diversions that continuously and antagonistically interrupt the 
narrative account of the nameless narrator who appears to be delivering his tale full of “I”s, 
“Ay”s and eyes like Stephen to himself, are either inventories, processions or spectacles, full 
of anachronisms, clichés, myths and miracles in an inflation of “impossibles” that are 
presented as ‘a movement’, and therefore ‘an actuality of the possible as possible’ (30). 
History in this episode is indeed a nightmare as the Revival of culture that is staged leads to 
a dizzying spectacle: ‘everything is reduced to terms of “events” like those of modern 
physics and philosophy – events which make up a “continuum”, but which may be taken as 
infinitely small’ (Wilson 177-8). In a dramatisation of modern philosophy’s understanding of 
being as an event ‘which occurs when it historicizes itself and when we historicize 
ourselves’, the narrative of “Cyclops” ceaselessly “historicises” itself (Vattimo 3). 
Everything is ‘flatten[ed] out at the level of contemporaneity and simultaneity’, and the 
Revival of history ironically produces ‘a de-historicization of experience’ (10). The 
coincidence of bard and historian that the Revival had idealised, representing ‘the bard as 
historian, and indeed, as teacher of history’, as Andrew Gibson argues, leads to the collapse 
of both history and art, into ritual (111). 
The rituals staged in “Cyclops” are not only emblematic of a lost tradition, but also 
of their disguised continuities, highlighting in particular the affiliation of religion and 
politics in their “medieval” convergence that the Revival was resurrecting in the 
collaboration of church and state for the nationalist project, symbolised in the parallel 
courses of the processions of priest and king in “Wandering Rocks”. The ‘supernatural pomp 
to the already gruesome spectacle’ that the parade of religious relics lends to these 
processions, blends the miraculous and legendary of mythology with that of theology, but 
also exposes the ideological interests behind modern displays of wealth and power that 
seemingly bring religious and political communities together (396). 54 The masses that attend 
these processions, are participants as a ‘monster audience’ that is brought together through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For Andrew Gibson, Joyce’s ‘medievalism’ is an ‘assault on revivalist historiographies’ ‘and the 
politics and aesthetics implicit in them’: ‘O’Grady disparages what he takes to be the medieval ‘thirst 
for minuteness, chronology and succession, co-ordination and relation’. Joyce’s Dantean aesthetic – 
his Dantean architectonics – promotes these values’ (108, 113). The similarities that Joyce highlights 
between the two traditions, however, are also significant in terms of the Catholic Church’s 
involvement with the politics of nationalism. 
	   164	  
	  
‘kinetic’ sentiments: ‘heartrending sobs’ and ‘general merriment’ (400). The chapter 
transforms communal rituals into ‘an immense accumulation of spectacles’, recorded by 
newspaper reportages (Debord 2). 55  ‘[C]ult value’ and ‘exhibition value’ are 
indistinguishable (Illuminations 224). ‘All that once was directly lived has become mere 
representation’, Debord diagnoses, and the spectacle, ‘the material reconstruction of the 
religious illusion’ as ‘a social relationship between people that is mediated by images’, 
enables the creation of pseudo-communities (2, 5, 2).  
When ‘the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the 
total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on 
another practice-politics’, the sinister consequence of which Benjamin identified with 
Fascism (Illuminations 224, 242). Ritual and politics are indistinguishable in “Cyclops”, in 
an alliance that the contemporaneity of past, present and future through diversions, narrative 
frames, anachronisms, myths and legends in the narrative time of this chapter, highlights. 
The “rabblement” that attends these ritual celebrations, as in Joyce’s early essay, ‘placid and 
intensely moral’, mournfully or joyfully takes part in ritual celebrations as a spectator, 
indifferent to the injustice that Bloom as a Marxist spokesman in “Circe” will indict: ‘The 
poor man starves while they are grassing their royal mountain stags or shooting peasants and 
phartridges in their purblind pomp of pelf and power’ (OCPW 51; U 602). When the rich and 
the poor are united in their attendance to a public execution - ‘The children of the Male and 
Female Foundling Hospital’ having been afforded ‘a genuinely instructive treat’ by ‘the 
Little Sisters of the Poor’ and the ‘viceregal houseparty’ ‘the most favourable positions on 
the grandstand’ - it is only the delegates who ‘without exception expressed themselves in the 
strongest possible heterogeneous terms concerning the nameless barbarity which they had 
been called upon to witness’ and stage ‘An animated altercation’ ‘as to whether the eighth or 
the ninth of March was the correct date of the birth of Ireland's patron saint’ (397-8).  
‘History is a great ritualist’, Allen Upward had remarked following his search for the 
Genius, the ‘Divine Man’ in myth, ritual and the scholarship of ‘Professor Skeat’: ‘Her eye 
is ever fixed on outward forms and ceremonies, on state processions and sounding 
proclamations’ (222). The only way that the “genius” of the narrative of “Cyclops” can 
“remember” appears to be through such ‘outward forms and ceremonies’; rituals which are 
enigmatically related, however, to the debate that is held between Bloom and the citizen on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 In Gerty’s sentimental vision of the evening service, the men ‘were there gathered together without 
distinction of social class (and a most edifying spectacle it was to see) in that simple fane beside the 
waves, after the storms of this weary world, kneeling before the feet of the immaculate, reciting the 
litany of Our Lady of Loreto, beseeching her to intercede for them, the old familiar words, holy Mary, 
holy virgin of virgins’ (U 460). 
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history, nationalism and identity. Feigning the seduction of the reader through the rituals and 
spectacles of this “epic” chapter, the narrative instead elicits distraction, boredom and 
frustration, manifesting the enthusiasm (as well as skepticism) that Joyce shared with 
Benjamin for the potentially emancipatory capacity of ‘the distracting element’ that 
distinguished modern art (Illuminations 238). While Benjamin refers to Dadaism as an 
example, Joyce asked Budgen if this episode came across as being ‘futuristic’ (156). 56 As 
the voices of past and present blend and clash in the narrative’s constant movements through 
time, and a distinct parallelism between bardic and medieval diversions is drawn, they 
become a distorting mirror of each other. Although the ‘Swindling’ of modern culture 
enrages the citizen who hounds Bloom out of the pub like a scapegoat for disclosing that the 
‘secret’ of advertisements is ‘repetition’, the reenactment of the past that distinguishes his 
own narrative is characterised by repetition, necessary for the preservation of ‘The memory 
of the dead’ (419, 396).  
The contrast between the voice of the storyteller and the silence of the written word 
of the newspapers is dissolved through the multitude of narrative frames and general 
commotion that confuses the “script” with the voices of the audience, as rituals and theatrical 
performances are reconciled - or “silenced” - only in the enthralling “epiphany” that ends the 
chapter. By the end of the chapter, moreover, the “prophetic” nature of such cultic practices 
is revealed in the near-crucifixion of Bloom. The theatricality that was exposed at the end of 
Stephen’s imaginary procession in “Telemachus”, similarly distinguishes Bloom’s exit, 
described by the nameless narrator as ‘as good as any bloody play in the Queen's royal 
theatre’ and followed by a list of its producers’ initials- of “impersonal” modern culture 
(446). 57  
“The Day Rabblement” finally dawns in “Cyclops”, as the narrator’s voice can no 
longer be isolated from the crowd’s. The “end” of representation is followed by endless 
performance that distinguishes both the narrator and his narrative. Although a highly 
political chapter, the multivocality of modern culture disperses any “message” the artist as 
the mouthpiece of his nation claims to communicate. As in the end of “The Dead”, the 
storyteller’s voice and role are challenged, but also salvaged, through the anonymous voice 
of the newspapers that keep disrupting the nameless narrator’s account with lists, reportages 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Budgen replied that it seemed to him ‘Rather cubist than futurist’ as ‘Every event is a many-sided 
object’ (156). While Budgen’s reference to a ‘many-sided object’ evokes the “wholeness” in 
Stephen’s description of aesthetic apprehension, what Joyce appears to view as futuristic is the 
“speed” with which he sweeps over the past and his version of “divisionism”. 
57 Bloom himself links religious ritual with the theatre in “Lotus Eaters”: ‘There’s a big idea behind it, 
kind of kingdom of God is within you feel. First communicants. Hokypoky penny a lump. Then feel 
all like one family party, same in the theatre, all in the same swim’ (U 99). 
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and adverts, but simultaneously disseminating the Word and mirroring his attempts to give 
an account- antagonistically to a larger audience, as they now embody the voice of the 
nation. Even a direct satirical attack against the bard is made in a reportage prompted by the 
sound of the citizen’s dog and the citizen’s own speech on the Irish language, of a ‘really 
marvelous exhibition of cynanthropy’ that engrossed ‘Our greatest living phonetic expert’ 
who traced, leaving ‘no stone unturned in his efforts to elucidate and compare the verse 
recited’ by ‘the famous old Irish red setter wolfdog’, ‘to the ranns of ancient Celtic bards’ 
(403-4). In this parody of journalistic reportage, Joyce stages a fictional conflict between the 
journalist and the bard while exposing the similarities between the two. Presenting ‘a 
specimen which has been rendered into English by an eminent scholar whose name for the 
moment we are not at liberty to disclose though we believe that our readers will find the 
topical allusion rather more than an indication’, the reportage is an exhibition of the way that 
modern culture seduces its audiences by proffering to them the distinguished role of the 
scholar (404). The scholarly gloss is not only presented as a testimony to the authenticity of 




ii. In duty bound: A server of a servant 
 
Stephen’s egoistic economy and quest for freedom are transformed in Ulysses into 
an awareness of interminable servitude and infinite debt. Although the historical, political, 
socio-economic and religious background of Stephen’s condition is emphasised - by Stephen 
himself, as well as by his author - the despair that characterises Stephen’s thoughts and the 
philosophical nature of his discourse present his plight as an almost existential condition. His 
servitude is described in terms of distinct roles he has himself assumed and has been called 
upon to perform that circumscribe his possibilities as an individual and as an artist. Both a 
curse and a title of distinction, his role as a ‘server of a servant’ indicates the paradoxical 
position he finds himself in as an artist (12). 58 A mockery of his ideal role during his 
composition of the villanelle in the Portrait as ‘a priest of the eternal imagination’, he 
appears defeated in his quest to reinterpret the divine office that he had rejected (P 240). 
This role simply highlights his divisions as a subject of the British empire, the Roman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 A curse delivered by Noah upon being exposed by his son Ham: ‘Cursed be Canaan; a servant of 
servants shall he be unto his brethren’ (Gen. 9.25). Gifford notes that ‘The Latin phrase Servus 
Servorum Dei (A Server of the Servants of God) is a title once used by bishops and rulers, but since 
the twelfth century it has now been used exclusively by the pope and is now part of the superscription 
of papal bulls’ (Ulysses Annotated 20).  
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Catholic church, and a ghostly ‘third’ ‘who wants [him] for odd jobs’, completing the 
Trinitarian economy that administers Stephen daily life (U 24).  
The constraint he feels in this ministry is conceived as a state of indebtness - both 
moral and material - reflecting his enduring attraction to ‘vague sacrificial or sacramental 
acts’ (P 172). Having ‘shr[u]nk from the dignity of celebrant because it displeased him to 
imagine that all the vague pomp should end in his own person or that the ritual should assign 
to him so clear and final an office’, ‘the absence of an appointed rite’ has nevertheless 
‘constrained him to inaction’. What distinguishes ‘the mystery and power of the priestly 
office’ for Agamben, is that it ‘institutes a circular relation between being and praxis, by 
which the priest’s being defines his praxis and his praxis, in turn, defines his being’ (Opus 
Dei 79). Since the priest ‘has to be what he does and does what he is, the subject of a 
liturgical act is not truly a subject (on the theological level this is expressed in the thesis 
according to which his action, as opus operatum, is done by another, namely Christ)’ (83). 
Like Barthes’ ‘modern scriptor’ who is ‘born simultaneously with the text, is in no way 
equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing’ and ‘is not the subject with the 
book as predicate’, as ‘there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is 
eternally written here and now’, ‘priesthood, of which the character is the cipher, is not a 
real predicate but a pure signature, which manifests only the constitutive excess of 
effectiveness over being’ (Image-Music-Text 145; Opus Dei 83).  
In this ‘proximity between the ontology of command and the ontology of office’, 
being for Agamben ‘is totally dissolved into a debt, into a having-to-be’: ‘law and religion 
necessarily coincide’ (81-2, 99). But ‘In contrast with other human duties, the debt that is in 
question in religio cannot be satisfied once and for all, because it is in its essence 
inexhaustible’ (100). In response to Mr Deasy’s motto ‘I paid my way’, Stephen’s list of his 
debts is presented as similarly endless: ‘Mulligan, nine pounds, three pairs of socks, one pair 
brogues, ties. Curran, ten guineas. McCann, one guinea. Fred Ryan, two shillings. Temple, 
two lunches. Russell, one guinea, Cousins, ten shillings, Bob Reynolds, half a guinea, 
Koehler, three guineas, Mrs MacKernan, five weeks’ board. The lump I have is useless’ (U 
37). In “Scylla and Charybdis”, this sense of indebtness is shown to be behind Stephen’s 
desire for a protean identity: ‘Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. 
Other I got pound’ (242). Memory - which preserves identity: ‘But I, entelechy, form of 
forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms’ - is memory of sin and religious 
duty: ‘I that sinned and prayed and fasted’. Both Stephen’s identity and the language through 
which he understands it are ‘totally dissolved into a debt, into a having-to-be’:  
I, I and I. I. 
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A.E.I.O.U. (242-3) 
‘The transformation of being into having-to-be’ that the paradigm of the priest’s 
office illustrates for Agamben, ‘defines the ethics as much as the ontology and politics of 
modernity’ (81-2). ‘If being is something that must be realized, if it necessarily implies a 
putting-to-work, it will be necessary to presuppose a will that renders it possible’ (118). 
Agamben traces this demand to Aristotle, ‘in whom the concept of will appears for the first 
time in an ontological context precisely to explain the passage from potential to act: that 
which has the hexis of a potential can pass to the act “when it wills [hoti boulētheis]” (On the 
Soul 417a26–27)’. Stephen’s thoughts on possibility and actuality in “Nestor”, however, 
refer rather to Aristotle’s definition of motion in Physics as the fulfillment of what exists 
potentially. Preceding here Aristotle’s definition of infinity which ‘exists as potentiality’, 
Stephen’s thoughts on time and movement - which Aristotle says ‘are indeed unlimited, but 
only as processes’ - appear as an attempt to erase the Author of history, and like Bruno 
identify him with Infinity (Physics 247, 257). ‘If one starts from the assumption that the 
universe is infinite, it no longer makes sense to conceive the coincidence between act and 
potency as the exclusive property of a fixed point in the hierarchy of being, a privileged 
point in a finite and physical cosmos conceived as distinct from the intelligible world’, 
Ingengo explains Bruno’s thought (Cause, Principle, Unity xiv). Bruno’s ‘forms of forms’ is 
described as an ‘absolute act, which is identical with absolute potency’, but ‘cannot be 
comprehended by the intellect, except by way of negatives’ (68). The ‘sloth of the 
underworld’ in Stephen’s ‘mind’s darkness’, however, ‘shy of brightness’, is not capable of 
such coincidence of contraries; his metaphysics are still trinitarian: ‘Thought is the thought 
of thought’ (30-1). 
Searching for a metaphysical solution that will allow him to free himself from ‘the 
stoneheaps of dead builders’- from a historically amassed debt, Stephen’s efforts seem 
doomed (55). Through Stephen’s metaphysics, however, and his consternation before 
kinesis, Joyce is able to question and examine the idea of the “act” as a concept linking 
ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics: the citizen, the actor/performer and the author. Stephen’s 
invocation of ‘gesture’, his theatrical understanding of the idea of character, emphasis on 
“theory” and penchant for the role of the liturgical server, reveal his struggle to revise and 
reinterpret this concept as both a verb and a noun. Moreover, while Bloom appears to 
embody the paradigm of the praxis that Stephen is looking for, he too, wandering around 
Dublin for work and pleasure, constantly tries to interpret his actions, giving them through 
this process excess meaning, but simultaneously trying to come to terms with the fact that 
the search for a truly meaningful act may be “Useless”. 
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Stephen’s gesture in “Circe” which signals the incarnation of all matter in the drama 
of this chapter is interpreted by Rabaté in terms of the dualism of potency and act: ‘Act 
would … perhaps be a better term than gesture here, if by act we understand the 
performative power of language and its capacity to reveal the hidden motives of the 
unconscious’ (Authorized Reader 77). “Circe” for Rabaté ‘presents the textual unconscious 
in its “acting out” of all the potential fantasies contained in the book – this is the sense of 
“actualization” developed by “entelechy”’. He warns, however, that ‘the fact that most 
theoretical pronouncements made by Stephen in this episode derive from the Trieste 
notebook (dated 1907-9) should inspire some prudence and perhaps imply that these 
statements reveal Stephen’s immaturity rather than a key to the episode’. His ritual gesture in 
“Circe” indeed appears to present a satiric portrait not only of his own youthful ambitions, 
but also those of Yeats, who had influenced Stephen’s conception of the artistic vocation in 
terms of a priestly office. Yeats, as Schuchard describes, ‘In chanting a poem’, ‘withdrew to 
an approximation of the magical process in which he created the poem, into the visionary 
trance in which its images and rhythms arose – recreating the rhythmic breathing and pauses, 
recovering the cadences achieved through many subtle repetitions of line, conducting the 
living voice with the hieratic movement of arm and hand, affording the listener some sensual 
access to the achieved poetic ecstasy of his imaginative world’ (135). What Yeats’s hieratic 
gestures were divulging, Schuchard explains, was that ‘the psaltery experiments were related 
to his earlier prophecy that “certainly belief in a supersensual world is at hand again”, and to 
all the rites, rituals and esoteric practices that he had pursued to that end in the past decade’. 
Professing to Djuna Barnes that he had included in Ulysses all ‘the great talkers’ but 
also ‘the things they forgot’, Joyce claims to have ‘recorded, simultaneously, what a man 
says, sees, thinks, and what such seeing, thinking, saying does, to what you Freudians call 
the subconscious’ (JJ 524). “Circe” enables this contemporaneity through its dramatic form. 
The memory that is awakened in this chapter takes the form of the illicit collective 
subconscious, the variability and unreliability of which is reflected through theatricality. 
This unnarratable discourse is “incarnated” through its actors in a “black” reproduction of 
the drama of the Mass. Initiated through Stephen’s chanting of ‘the introit for paschal time’ 
and a premature “catharsis”: ‘Vidi aquam egredientem de templo a latere dextro’, ‘gesture’- 
performance, is announced as the ‘universal language’ (564).59 
Stephen’s thoughts on potentiality and actuality in “Nestor” revealed his struggle to 
free himself from Scholastic philosophy; in “Circe”, his epiphanic gesture is similarly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Willis E. McNelly corrects the narrative’s “deviation” by explaining that ‘it is not the Introit for 
Paschal time that Stephen is chanting: it is the Asperges for Paschal time’ (293). 
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theologically inscribed, performed as a liturgical act- cathartic in particular. Preceded 
‘triumphaliter’ by ‘Salvi facti sunt’ - “And they are made whole” - his act of ‘shivering the 
lamp image, shattering light over the world’ symbolises the efficacy of his word (564). The 
substantial reality of his word is secured through an actualisation of potency through this 
sacramental act. ‘Crucial to the whole Catholic concept of strict sacramentality’, as Noon 
explains, ‘is the notion that the Sacraments are not merely signs but practical and efficacious 
instruments which effect what they signify, the conferring of grace. The theological formula 
insists upon the causality ex opera operato rather than as ex opera operantis … As Aquinas 
conceives of the sacramental rite, the word (verbum vitae) is the formal cause, the 
determining and perfecting principle, which gives meaning and instrumental efficacy to the 
sacramental actions’ (153). Reversing this trope, Stephen turns to the sacramental rite in 
order to “perfect his words”- to give them ‘meaning and instrumental efficacy’. 
While Joyce gives his word substance and efficacy through the incarnation of all 
material beings that appear in this chapter, Stephen’s sacramental gesture is a kenosis in 
reverse. Chanting ‘with joy’ what the dramatic notes describe as ‘the introit for paschal 
time’, he appears to celebrate the Passion, although by in fact chanting the asperges, he also 
celebrates the baptism of Christ. Commemorating the baptism, Stephen celebrates the 
commencement of the public ministry of Christ, but also the Epiphany as his act of 
‘shattering light over the world’ demonstrates (564). By invoking ‘gesture’, a formal act 
emptied of its substance - ‘not music, not odour’, ‘rendering visible not the lay sense but the 
first entelechy’ - Stephen empties the Word of its corporeality. While Christ according to 
Paul ‘humbled himself’: ‘made himself of no reputation [ἐκένωσεν], and took upon him the 
form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men’, in Stephen’s fantasy of 
empowerment ‘the form of a servant’ is shattered (Philippians 2:7-9).  
Similarly, Stephen as ‘the vicar of Christ’ in “Oxen” had celebrated the Eucharist 
with his ‘soul’s bodiment’ but not his body; in “Circe”, however, chanting the antiphon, 
Stephen refuses the role of the celebrant- the Eucharist is performed by Father Malachi 
O'Flynn and The Reverend Mr Haines Love (510). In his celebration of a ‘feast of pure 
reason’, Stephen refuses any kind of sacrifice (696). ‘[A]s the high priest of a sacrifice in 
which the officiator sacrifices himself (heauton prosēnenken, 9:14)’, Agamben explains, 
‘Christ accomplishes a liturgical action that is, so to speak, absolute and perfect and that for 
this reason can be carried out only once (hapax prosenechtheis, 9:28; mian . . . prosenenkas 
thysian, 10:12). In this sense Christ coincides without remainder with his liturgy - he is 
essentially liturgy - and precisely this coincidence confers on his liturgy its incomparable 
efficacy’ (Opus Dei 17). While Shem as ‘Primum opifex’ and ‘altus prosator’ achieves this 
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coincidence through ‘corrosive sublimation’ by writing on his body until ‘one continuous 
present tense integument slowly unfolded all marryvoisin moodmoulded cyclewheeling 
history’, refusing sacrifice - refusing to allow his ‘squidself’ to wane ‘chargreenoldand 
doriangrayer in its dudhud’ - Stephen’s sacrament is a symbolic gesture of his desire for such 
unrepeatable and ‘incomparable efficacy’ of his Word (FW 185-6). His metaphysical desire 
in the Portrait to possess the ‘power of the priestly office’ in order to reconcile himself with 
the world which ‘for all its solid substance and complexity no longer existed for his soul 
save as a theorem of divine power and love and universality’ in the face of ‘the powerful 
recurrence of the tides within him’, is awakened following his entry into Mecklenburgh 
street (175, 162, 104). 
In the dreamlike fantasy world of Circe, a Bacchic-inspired nightmare of history 
where all movement manifests itself as desire and the Prime Mover is replaced by ‘the 
causality of the will as the only causality’ while ‘all active force’ is sublimated 
‘unequivocally as will to power’, Stephen’s role as an artist is once again interpreted and 
authorised through the ‘awful power’ of the priest of God with which the director had 
tempted him to join the Jesuit order (Beyond Good and Evil 546; P 171). As ‘negation of 
will’ is not possible, neither is the saint, Nietzsche argues, as Stephen reminds himself in 
“Proteus”; but remembering ‘the proud claims of the church’, he takes part in this ‘dreadful 
performance’ (175; SL 271). Fittingly- and ironically, “Circe” is modeled on Flaubert’s The 
Temptation of St Anthony: ‘a philosophic closet-drama … a play about an anchorite, an 
expressionistic monodrama in which temptation and flagellation were performed by the 
same actor upon himself’, as Levin explains (qtd. by Baron 135). The surrender of all action 
in “Circe” to desire, is set against St Anthony’s struggle to avoid temptation, to curb his will. 
60 Unlike Nietzsche’s identification of will with power, however, the will in “Circe” is 
associated with perversion- masochistic in particular; subjugation is presented as another 
form of desire. 
Realising Stephen’s suppressed desire for ‘vague sacrificial or sacramental acts’ and 
Bloom’s for personal and social advancement, but also dramatising the public image they 
project, the priest and the king traverse again parallel courses in this episode. Prior to the 
complete dissolution of Stephen’s being into praxis- as a marionette, the narrative traces the 
multitude of “offices” that Bloom as a ‘kinetic artist’ assumes. Bloom’s ascendancy from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 ‘I should have served my brethren more effectually by being a simple priest. I might succour the 
poor, administer the sacraments, and guard the purity of domestic life’, St Anthony thinks meditating 
on his solitary life (Flaubert 7). ‘Besides, all the laity are not lost, and there was nothing to prevent me 
from being, for example, a grammarian or a philosopher. I should have had in my room a sphere made 
of reeds, tablets always in my hand, young people around me, and a crown of laurel suspended as an 
emblem over my door’. ‘But there is too much pride in such triumphs!’, he reconsiders. 
	   172	  
	  
impotence to power is described through another torrent of spectacles and processions, as his 
role as mayor is inconspicuously transformed into that of ‘His Most Catholic Majesty’ (609). 
During his residency in office, his being like that of the priest ‘dissolves into its practical 
effects’ (Opus Dei 9). Bloom falls silent and the dramatic notes record his actions which are 
distinguished by their “effectiveness”: the coincidence of potency and act in the miracles he 
performs.  
What defines the sacraments, Agamben like Noon explains, is that ‘their being [is] at 
once a sign and the cause of that of which they are a sign’: ‘in the formula that Aquinas cites 
as canonical, the sacraments efficiunt quod figurant, effectuate what they signify’ (50-1). 
Bloom hardly has need for words, as his actions have become effective signs; language 
becomes superfluous: ‘(shaking hands with a blind stripling) My more than Brother! 
(placing his arms round the shoulders of an old couple) Dear old friends! (he plays pussy 
fourcorners with ragged boys and girls) Peep! Bopeep! (he wheels twins in a perambulator) 
Ticktacktwo wouldyousetashoe?’ (608). The potency of his word is revealed in his reading 
of a random collection of Hebrew words, the meaning of which lies entirely in their 
utterance. His ‘universal language’ that will accompany ‘universal brotherhood’, is another 
ideal “sign language” that will allow unequivocal communication (610). Bloom ‘solemnly’ 
corrects Crofton’s admiration of his performance: ‘You call it a festivity. I call it a 
sacrament’.  
In a dramatisation of “The Dialectic of the Enlightenment”, Bloom’s schemes for 
improvement, modernisation and regeneration turn into an ideology or cult; apparently 
stepping outside conventions and the law, he creates a mirror image of a totalising scheme 
that consumes all culture, science, morality and industry as its props. The absolute freedom 
that Bloom announces to his citizens coincides with his absolute power. But rather than 
highlighting the relative impotence of the word before such ‘absolute and perfect’ act, the 
narrative’s dramatisation of the gap between description and action succeeds in ridiculing 
Bloom’s movements, as the identification of his being with performance leads to his 
transformation into a jester (Opus Dei 17). ‘[P]riestly praxis’, Agamben argues, ‘is always 
constitutively an “alteration” (vece); it is something “done” or “acted out” and never a 
substance. The one in whose “stead” (vece) the function is carried out in his turn takes the 
place of another and precisely this constitutive vicariousness defines the “function”’; like the 
priest, Bloom is determined entirely by ‘the function he exercises’ (55-6). His being is 
‘factical and functional—it refers each time to a praxis that defines and actualizes it’, as his 
transformations, pantomimic contractions of his face ‘so as to resemble many historical 
personages’ and repeated calls to prove himself as an expert reveal (56; U 615). Through 
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typology Bloom is indeed identified with the whole of history when Brini, the Papal Nuncio 
appears to read out his genealogy- ‘Leopoldi autem generatio’, until A DEADHAND 
appears and ‘(writes on the wall) Bloom is a cod’ (615-6). Having been completely defined 
through his actions, he is exposed by the signature of the irreversible hand of divine 
authority. With a final sacrament- Bloom’s execution, the end of the drama is announced 
with the arrival of ‘THE END OF THE WORLD’ that usurps Bloom’s role as performer, 
calling for a danse macabre (624). 
Pictured repeating inanely a ‘series of empty fifths’, Stephen emerges as an 
indifferent theorist of this spectacle: ‘The rite is the poet’s rest’ (621-2). Dismissing the 
search for the origins of art in ritual as a scholarly matter ‘of no importance’ to the artist, his 
thoughts turn to the “dissolution” of stasis by ‘the rhythm of beauty’: ‘It is susceptible of 
nodes or modes as far apart as hyperphrygian and mixolydian and of texts so divergent as 
priests haihooping round David’s that is Circe’s or what am I saying Ceres’ altar and David's 
tip from the stable to his chief bassoonist about the alrightness of his almightiness’ (P 223; U 
622). His separation in the Portrait of art ‘from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from 
sound and shape and colour which are the prison gates of our soul’ is mocked here by THE 
CAP which dissolves the soul into “matter”; exclaiming a negatory ‘Ba!’ that is also, 
however, the soul that survived after death in ancient Egypt, THE CAP replies ‘It is because 
it is. Woman's reason. Jewgreek is greekjew. Extremes meet. Death is the highest form of 
life. Ba!’ (224, 622). 
The Brunian coincidence of contraries that THE CAP refers to in order to disband 
the rhythm of Stephen’s thought, exposes Stephen’s dismissal of “the rite” as a consequence 
of his desire, like Bruno, for the ‘absolute act, which is identical with absolute potency’ 
(Cause, Principle, Unity 68). To explain ‘The coincidence of this act with absolute potency’, 
Teophilo, like Stephen in Nestor, refers to psalm 139, ‘described by the divine spirit’ and 
therefore making the original author irrelevant: ‘David’s that is Circe’s or what am I saying 
Ceres’ altar and David's tip from the stable to his chief bassoonist about the alrightness of his 
almightiness’, as ‘Tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te. Nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Sicut 
tenebrae eius, ita et lumeneius’ [Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth 
as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee]’ (Cause, Principle, Unity 68). 
Although Stephen is unable to make ends meet: ‘The reason is because the 
fundamental and the dominant are separated by the greatest possible interval which ....’, the 
absolute act that he desires is messianic; it is a power that ‘is made perfect in weakness’: ‘No 
voice. I am a most finished artist’ (623; 2 Cor. 12:9; 634). ‘The bird that can sing and won’t 
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sing’, Florry interprets. 61 As the Bacchae is transformed into Aristophanes’ Frogs - ‘Hik! 
Hek! Hak! Hok! Huk! Kok! Kuk!’ - the drama that is staged is Bloom’s masochistic fantasy 
at the hands of Bello, ending with his loss of willpower and memory (637). But while the 
appearance of the nymph appears to announce the end of desire: ‘Only the ethereal. Where 
dreamy creamy gull waves o’er the waters dull’, the stain that appears on her robe ends this 
brief static interlude (661). ‘To have or not to have that is the question’, Stephen replies to 
Bloom who desires to retrieve his potato (663). Stephen’s trinitarian metaphysics are 
increasingly close to Bruno’s dualist philosophy, as the coincidence of Bloom and Stephen 
into Shakespeare illustrates. 
Stephen’s own performance of ‘parleyvoo’ to entertain his audience by ‘gabbl[ing] 
with marionette jerks’ ends like Bloom’s with a ‘Dance of death’ (672, 680). But whereas 
Bloom’s fantasy is followed by the loss of his willpower and memory before his grandfather 
and an ‘Exuberant female’, the usurper in Stephen’s case is the ghost of his mother, who 
appears asking him to repent (642). Reminded of his commitment to freedom, his refusal to 
“serve”, Stephen smashes the chandelier and beats the ground as a mark of his revolt against 
both chthonic and heavenly gods. In the absence of ‘The word known to all men’, the 
absolute word that requires “weakness”- prayer which is ‘allpowerful’ but which Stephen 
refuses as a form of sacrifice, here in the reduction of the sign to nothing - ‘Nothung!’ - that 
is required in tragedy, as Hölderlin argues, to allow ‘original matter, the hidden foundation 
of any nature’ to ‘present itself’, Stephen refuses mediation: ‘With me all or not at all’ (682; 
Hölderlin 89; 683). In his inability to solve the mystery of the simultaneous unity and 
division of mind and body, language and thought, he turns to violence and power. His ideal 
“stasis” takes the form of an insurrection as the episode ends in an uprising. His dualism 
which allows only opposites is parodied in the inversions of the black mass that Haines and 
Mulligan celebrate. As in his attempt in “Oxen” to explain the mystery of the incarnation, in 
the absence of ‘the third person of the Blessed Trinity’, he refuses ‘subsubstantiality’ having 
turned the female body into a ghoul: ‘Entweder transubstantiality oder consubstantiality but 
in no case subsubstantiality’ (511). Stephen ultimately refuses the coincidence of matter and 
form. His desire to ‘discuss’ rather than act once again exposes him as a ‘morbidminded 
esthete’, as he taps his head telling Bloom ‘in here it is I must kill the priest and the king’ 
(688, 550). His denial of ‘arbirtration’, however, is not only a consequence of his 
metaphysics, but is historically grounded in his position as a servant of two masters: 
‘Struggle for life is the law of existence but human philirenists, notably the tsar and the king 
of England, have invented arbitration’ (688). 
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iii. The chaste fancy of the Holy Writer  
 
While “Circe” enacts a largely Bloomian fantasy, “Oxen of the Sun”, the ‘idea’ of 
which Joyce described to Budgen as ‘the crime committed against fecundity by sterilizing 
the act of coition’, is a fantasy of the ‘embryo philosopher’ Stephen (Letters I 138-9; U 550). 
The mystery of language takes precedence over the mystery of life, as the paradigm for the 
birth anticipated is the Immaculate Conception. The genealogical endeavour undertaken with 
Aristotelian fastidiousness is complicated and undermined by the exhaustive typology of this 
chapter which is based on the Renaissance pantheistic cosmology of Cusa and Bruno 
whereby ‘Everything is in everything, because spirit or soul is in all things, and therefore out 
of anything may be produced anything else’ (McIntyre 126). The system building and 
mathematical method that characterised Renaissance philosophy in its attempt to organise 
this chaos of infinite relations - an endeavour ‘to simplify the complex’ which this chapter 
reflects in its catalogue of styles - is set against the semantic instability resulting from the 
humanistic preoccupation with the historicity of language and consciousness of the need to 
create ‘new words’ for ‘new theories’ in the coincidence of potency and act in this novel 
cosmos (OCPW 94; McIntyre 106).  
The chapter is described as a ‘museum of prose styles’ by Kenner while Spoo draws 
attention to ‘a claustrophobic quality’ of the styles of “Oxen”, ‘a sense that life has been 
covered over by the fabric of textuality’ (Dublin’s Joyce 319; 150). In the exhaustive drive 
of the Renaissance philosopher who has taken over the organisation of the ‘multiplicit 
concordance’ of history in this chapter, not only the structure - ‘the action proceeds through 
nine parts, but without divisions’ Budgen notes - but language too, as MacCabe argues, ‘has 
now become pure system’ (U 514; 223; Revolution of the Word 126). The self-consciousness 
of the narrative idiom is so prominent and obstructive to “meaning” that for Leo Bersani the 
chapter ‘initiates us to a radical separation of interpretation from the phenomenology of 
reading’ (173). The narrative indeed appears to be tracing an intellectual history that 
coincides with the history of language. Mediated through the word, the simultaneity of the 
past and the present creates an effect of timelessness, a mythical time that draws attention to 
the strenuous timelessness of the creative process.  
As thought and reality are one for Bruno, this chapter takes place wholly in the mind 
of its narrator; there is no distinction between his encyclopedic mind and the narrative 
action. As Kenner argues, ‘“Coition”, as Joyce is exploiting it in these pages, is the basic 
Aristotelian and Aquinatian metaphor for the intercourse between mind and things. … The 
word “conception” unites biology and epistemology. We start with sensory beguilements, 
	   176	  
	  
whether in begetting or cognizing; we end with an articulated concept, a begotten Logos, 
word; an affirmation that this or that exists’ (19). ‘Bloom is the spermatozoon, the hospital 
the womb, the nurse he ovum, Stephen is the embryo’, Joyce explains his parable of creation 
(Letters I 139).  
Philosopher and philologist converge in this tale of the birth of the Word in the 
figure of the Holy Writer. No longer a creator or a bard, the author in this chapter is merely a 
scriptor and exegete of the Author: ‘“I interpret the killing of the sacred oxen as the crime 
against fecundity by sterilising the act of coition. And I think my interpretation is as sound as 
that of any other commentator of Homer”’, Joyce proudly told Budgen (220). The 
philosopher comes to terms with his ‘nightmare’ through the narration of a theological 
version of history, while spirit and matter are reconciled in the Word. The fertility 
incantation that opens this chapter prefigures the birth of the Word at the end of the chapter 
which concludes with a testimony of the fulfillment of its scripture: ‘Pflaap! Ut implerentur 
scripturae. Strike up a ballad’ (561). 
These mythical origins come under scrutiny by an enlightened historian who, 
highlighting the significance of ‘acumen’ for the ‘prosperity of a nation’, tries to put some 
order to the mixture of ‘sapience’ and ignorance in history (500). He echoes strikingly the 
opening of Cusa’s Catholic Concordance- an ‘elaborate outline of the hierarchical structure 
of the universe and of the church’: 
 
Since anyone endowed with the slightest intelligence can draw the proper 
conclusions if he knows the basic principles, I will begin with a few words 
concerning the underlying divine harmony in the church. Concordance is the 
principle by which the Catholic Church is in harmony as one and many – in one 
Lord and many subjects. Flowing from the one King of peace with infinite 
concordance, a sweet spiritual harmony of agreement emanates in successive 
degrees to all its members who are subordinated and united to him. Thus one God is 
all things in all things. (xix, 5) 
 
While the narrating scholar’s learnedness coincides with his “ignorance” in its 
magniloquence, and the role of language in communication is set aside - ‘Universally that 
person's acumen is esteemed very little perceptive concerning whatsoever matters are being 
held as most profitably by mortals with sapience endowed to be studied who is ignorant of 
that which the most in doctrine erudite…’ - the narrative nevertheless traces philologically 
the “history” of the word in the “progress” of language through its eminent authors, 
perverting the traditions the scholar revives through his “scientific” outlook- his mixture of 
biology, epistemology and scholarship (500). In a parody of Joyce’s scholastic schooling that 
had endowed him with ‘a grocer’s assistant mind’, the chapter catalogues dialects and idioms 
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in a travesty of “style”; ‘divine harmony’ gradually disintegrates into chaos and drunken 
disorder (JJ 28).   
Seemingly a “phenomenologist” like Bloom, the narrator rhetorically questions the 
relation between ‘exterior splendour’ and ‘the surface of a downwardtending lutulent 
reality’, as he searches for ‘basic principles’ for ‘every most just citizen’ through language, 
history but also metaphysics, attempting to draw some conclusions through his mathematical 
“method” (500). Like Cusa, he sees knowledge in terms of ‘a kind of analogy or 
“proportion”’: ‘as the ends and ultimates of all things accord in some mean and measure 
with their inceptions and originals that same multiplicit concordance which leads forth 
growth from birth accomplishing by a retrogressive metamorphosis that minishing and 
ablation towards the final which is agreeable unto nature so is it with our subsolar being’ 
(Whittaker 439, U 514). 
The divinely inspired Holy Writer of this chapter, however, is faced with the even 
more arduous task as a chronicler and interpreter of the company of ‘right witty scholars’ 
who hold a “symposium” while waiting for the birth of the Word (507). His endeavour to 
construct a ‘concordance’ is disturbed by this bawdy company that constantly presents its 
narrator with new hermeneutic challenges with its ‘aresouns’. Cusa’s devout attempt to 
systematically trace and piece together the outlines of the phenomena of the work of God in 
the world is interrupted by a Brunian symposium, as the evolution of language has to 
contend with the disrupting voices of this drinking party. The challenge that history and 
language present to the philosopher is presented through the antagonism between 
philosopher and scholar - or ‘sacrilegious pedant’ - that characterises Bruno’s philosophical 
banquets (Cause, Principle, Unity 29). While the subject of these discussions is the 
philosophy of the Nolan who ‘has freed the human mind and the knowledge which were shut 
up in the strait prison of the turbulent air’, the philosopher Teophilo who tries to enlighten 
his company is confronted by pedants who see knowledge as a means of self-promotion (Ash 
Wednesday Supper 87-8). The discussions take place among a barage of abuse that is 
exchanged between the philosopher and the scholar; through a ‘salad’ of proverbs that shows 
off their learning, and ultimately exposes their similarities- their shared understanding of the 
significance of language in communicating the truth of this universe (Cause, Principle, Unity 
50).  
Combining these two roles, the narrator of “Oxen” similarly tries to strike a balance 
between composition and interpretation. While Stephen’s credentials in metaphysics are on 
display in this drinking party, the “philosopher”, however, ironically is Bloom. As a 
phenomenologist, he is once again a victim of grandiloquence, proposing in vain the truth of 
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the phenomena of nature to a group of drunken scholars narrating, acting and arguing over 
mythical tales. Stephen on the other hand seeks again to legitimise his role as an artist 
through “theories”. Assuming the role of the ‘vicar of Christ’ in his heretical celebration of 
the Eucharist, he refers to the mystery of the Trinity and of the Virgin’s relation to her Son, 
to draw attention to himself as a creator of words through a contrast between physical and 
metaphysical creation (510). Interpreted by Aquinas in terms of the relationship between 
speech and thought, the Trinity has little relevance to the biological process of birth- the 
‘successive anastomosis of navelcords’ that is a consequence of the fall of man (511). Even 
the Incarnation is undermined through Stephen’s heretical and irreverent theories that probe 
analytically the mystery of the Immaculate Conception. 
By “proving”, however, his genetic relation to the word as an artist, he distances 
himself from reality; the artist’s reality is ‘postcreation’. Exposed by ‘a hubbub of 
Phenomenon’ as a ‘braggart boaster’ in the absence of ‘the tube Understanding’, his 
philosophical credential are shaken (516). Only after the birth of the word, only by proving 
the “reality” of the word can he reclaim that title. Only if language is the reality can he be 
both Author and philosopher. As a Holy Writer the narrator can lay claim to such 
coincidence of reality and language: ‘in the biblical revelation of Holy Scripture’ with which 
William Franke links Joyce’s work, ‘language becomes the medium of a disclosure of 
human life in its full and final meaning’ (156). Such coincidence allows communion rather 
than communication through the word; a communion, however, through the ‘soul’s 
bodiment’, as the ‘chaste fancy’ of the narrator - as of Stephen - ignores the significance of 
the body as a medium for knowledge and understanding (510, 533). 
In Budgen’s account of the development of this chapter, the prose disintegrates into 
‘a torrent of living, and therefore, except to those present, half-incomprehensible speech’ 
(223). As the reader lands along with the characters in “the present”, the narrative dramatises 
the event of the Incarnation. In Gadamer’s account of the Incarnation, this is the “first” 
historical event: ‘The uniqueness of the redemptive event introduces the essence of history 
into Western thought, brings the phenomenon of language out of its immersion in the 
ideality of meaning, and offers it to philosophical reflection. For, in contrast to the Greek 
logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)’ (418). The 
incomprehensibility of the language of the present at the end of “Oxen” highlights this 
emptying of ‘the ideality of meaning’ of the word through its corporeality. The “epiphany” 
of the meaning of the word can only be achieved in a moment of “stasis”, in an “arrest” of 
time: ‘“To be” and “to understand” are not the same in us’, as they are in God, as Aquinas 
remarks (Summa Theologica q. 34, a. 2). The historicity of the word is exposed in the 
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hermeneutic valences it undergoes; but its final transformation in “Oxen” emphasises also its 
corporeality; as the characters get drunk, so does language. The narrative consciousness is 
dispersed both in language and in the body. 
While for the Holy Writer the language of the Bible communicates an eternal truth, 
language is ‘the house of Being’ in modernity because being is historical (Heidegger 217). 
Hermeneutics is no longer a “method” as it is for the Holy Writer but closer to Heidegger it 
is presented as an ontological problem; history and interpretation are concurrent. This 
coincidence does not need to be seen as ‘a model of interpretive nihilism’, although it is 
modeled on a ‘redemptive’ event, as Bersani argues (175, 178). This redemptive event may 
“glorify the Father”, but it also highlights the significance of experience and of the body as a 
medium for both knowledge and communication. In order to be a participant in the feast that 
celebrated, rather than an indifferent theorist the experience of the reader’s encounter with 
language must take the form of a perpetual resurrection. In Finnegans Wake we are indeed 
led ‘to Joyce’s mind’, to ‘his cultural consciousness’, but in order to witness the “perversion” 
of the Author and his all-consuming desire to make his body signify; without its denigration, 
however, through martyrdom (175-6). 
In his emphasis on the idea of language as an event that the Incarnation introduces, 
Gadamer refers to Aquinas’s reply to the question ‘Whether Word in God is a personal 
name?’, a question that is implicit also in “Oxen” in the presentation of language through 
specific literary models (Summa Theologica q. 34, a. 1). In his answer, Aquinas highlights 
the complexity and diversity of the hermeneutics of the word: ‘first and chiefly, the interior 
concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the 
interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a 
word’. Through this trinity of interpretations, Aquinas emphasises the processual character 
of the word; ‘Word’ is a ‘personal’ name because it ‘signifies something proceeding from 
another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine 
persons are distinguished by origin’. ‘Person’ relates not to individuality, but to the ‘personal 
terms in God’- to the procession of the persons of the Trinity. The ‘word’ similarly ‘signifies 
that which emanates from another’. Since for God ‘it signifies an emanation of the intellect’, 
it is also “the same”, as one of the many narrators of the pub tales in Finnegans Wake 
ponders: ‘whereom is man, that old offender, nother man, wheile he is asame’ (356). This 
paradox of emanation finds its “human-all-too-human” interpretation through Molly’s 
‘perfectly sane full amoral fertilisable untrustworthy engaging shrewd limited prudent 
indifferent Weib’ when her admission ‘I thought well as well him as another’ at the end of 
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Ulysses is presented as a celebration of life rather than as a philosophical riddle (Letters I 
170; U 933). 
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Chapter 5: The Age of Hermeneutics 
 
I. Critic 
i. The work of art: ef thes es whot ye deux, then I'm not surpleased ye want that bottle of 
Sauvequipeu [FW 222.9] 
 
The temporary disfigurement of ‘wideawake language, cutanddry grammar and 
goahead plot’ in order to implement the ideal “stasis” that is necessary for esthetic 
apprehension in Stephen’s theory in the Portrait- to allow ‘language to sleep’ while 
instigating a hermeneutical insomnia, was from the moment of reception of the very first 
fragments of this nightwor(l)d that Joyce circulated among a select group of benefactors, 
seen as artistic suicide (JJ 584-5, 546). 62 His ‘experiment in interpreting ‘the dark night of 
the soul’’ appeared to his oldest and most experienced reader Stanislaus as a ‘nightmare 
production’; his ‘drivelling ringmarole’ as a sign of ‘the beginning of softening of the brain’ 
(CH 387). Stanislaus’s interpretation of these fragments - that Joyce assured Harriet Shaw 
Weaver would in time ‘begin to fuse themselves’ - as ‘the witless wandering of literature 
before its final extinction’, highlighted the self-destructive - and prophetically the de-
constructive - nature of such an enterprise (Letters I 204; CH 387). ‘I am made in such a way 
that I do not care much for the darknesses and unintelligibilities of your deliberately-
entangled language system. It seems to me you are wasting your genius’, Weaver protested 
at being presented with Joyce’s “inhuman” novel literary ‘recipe’ (JJ 590; Letters I 258). 
‘Nothing would be worth plowing through like this, except the Divine Vision - and I gather 
it’s not that sort of thing’, Pound replied declining the honorary position proffered to him as 
an exegete of the Holy Scripture, while H. G. Wells castigated Joyce for having ‘turned [his] 
back on common men, on their elementary needs and their restricted time and intelligence’: 
‘Your last two works have been more amusing and exciting to write than they will ever be to 
read’ (JJ 585;  Letters I 274). 
On his part, Joyce felt a victim of ‘the indignant hostility’ directed against him 
(Letters I 258). Retaliating against this condemnation, he emphasised that rather than being 
‘amusing’ or divinely inspired, his Work in Progress demanded immense labour: ‘[T]hey say 
it is meaningless. Now if it were meaningless it could be written quickly, without thought, 
without pains, without erudition; but I assure you that these twenty pages [of the ALP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 ‘When morning comes of course everything will be clear again … I’ll give them back their English 
language. I’m not destroying it for good’ (JJ 546).  
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chapter] now before us cost me twelve hundred hours and an enormous expense of spirit’, he 
told Valery Larbaud (JJ 598). He proudly drew attention to his ‘punctuality as an engine 
driver’: ‘I have taken this up because I am really one of the greatest engineers, if not the 
greatest, in the world besides being a musicmaker, philosophist and heaps of other things’, 
he argued explaining his new vocation to Weaver (Letters I 251). The distinction that George 
Moore would draw in his letter to Louis Gillet in 1931 between his own artistic temperament 
and Joyce’s diversion into metaphysical realms of abstraction, indeed appears justified 
insofar as Joyce’s youthful ‘delusion’ that he was ‘an artist by temperament’ is dispelled: his 
temperament is now shown to be ‘balanced by the temperament of a philo[lo]gist’ and 
‘theologian’, among others (JJ 618; Letters II 110). 
Relinquishing his title of distinction, he accedes to the contemptuous vocation of the 
man of letters, ‘a mere mailman of peace’, that he had distinguished from the divine calling 
of the artist in his first encounter with Yeats (FW 408). ‘I am quite content to go down to 
posterity as a scissors and paste man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust description’, 
he professed when discussing the composition of an opera based on Byron’s Cain for 
Sullivan (JJ 626). Claiming that he ‘would never have the bad manners to rewrite the text of 
a great English poet’, he offered instead his editorial suggestions for this project. With 
comparable humility, he presented himself as a craftsman to Weaver in 1926: ‘A rather 
funny idea struck me, that you might ‘order’ a piece and I would do it. The gentlemen of the 
brush and hammer seem to have worked that way’ (Letters I 245). The emphasis was now 
laid on the “method” of construction- a ‘radical technique’ according to Ellmann, who 
describes it as ‘working in layers’ (JJ 546). ‘I feel like an engineer boring into a mountain 
from two sides’, he told August Suter (Budgen 354). 
The heterogeneity of the range of “skills” that he was displaying risked his honorific 
status in culture and society as a Poet, but it was making him “modern”: ‘I wanted to take up 
several other arts and crafts and teach everybody how to do everything properly so as to be 
in the fashion’ (Letters I 252). The modernity of the model(s) of authorship that such 
representation of his vocation suggests is reflected in the fissure of art’s links to truth that the 
emphasis on construction rather than creation implies. ‘When the poet depicts the various 
callings – such as those of the warrior, the silk-weaver, the sailor – he feigns to know all 
these things thoroughly, to be an expert. […] In so far he is an impostor’, Nietzsche warned 
of the artist’s role-playing proficiency (Human, All-Too-Human 280). ‘The more bewildered 
the reader is as to whether you are painter, sculptor, civil servant, sailor, postman etc. the 
better as the same applies to Ulysses’, Joyce advised Budgen, linking such deceit with his 
hero- and his work (JJ 665). Contrasting his role as an artist with ‘the political, 
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philosophical, ethical zeal and labours of the brilliant members of Pound’s big brass band’, 
he claimed that the sole instrument that aided his constructions was a fanciful and fantastical 
‘magic flute’ (JJ 609). 
The ancient contest between poetry and philosophy is revived in modernity, 
although scepticism denies both disciplines their claim to truth. Closer to Hegel rather than 
Plato, moreover, Joyce sees this “end” of art as a historical consequence rather than 
epistemological, associating the degeneration of poetry into ‘arts and crafts’ with modern 
‘fashion’. ‘Art in the age of work’ is a ‘matter of leisure, of recreation and we consecrate to it 
the residue of our time and strength’, Nietzsche protested; a prejudice that Shaun the 
‘worker’ and “maker” as a ‘tombstone mason’ will proffer against his artist-brother ‘the 
poorjoist’- a bourgeois, but poor in his failure to be an active member of the economy 
(Human-all-too-Human 450; FW 113). As a craftsman, an engineer, an editor, translator, 
advertiser, and printer- ‘nichthemerically’ of his own work, and as an advocate of the rights 
of authors and promoter of upcoming artists, Joyce was not only publicizing his 
“fashionable” interpretation of the role of the artist and vindicating his vocation, but 
simultaneously usurping the entire scaffolding that supports the weight of art in society and 
legitimises its cultural standing (185). As this debasement of art, moreover, was in 
Nietzsche’s psychological analysis ascribed to the expenditure of ‘too much artistry in our 
dreams’- ‘symbolic concatenations of scenes and images in place of a narrative poetical 
language’ which led to our being ‘poor in artistry in the daytime’, Joyce’s ‘esthetic of the 
dream’ foregrounded and exposed the nightwork of the artist in unravelling this ‘bungled 
piece of work’ (461; JJ 546). 
The “impractical” creative act becomes problematic and is subsumed by production; 
creativity is superseded by activity. The air of curious mystique that surrounds the “act” of 
the author that obscures ethics and economics, exiles him from modern culture. Whereas 
‘Writers own their texts as one owns one’s property’ as Nehamas argues, ‘Authors by 
contrast, own their works as one owns one’s actions. Their works are authentically their own 
(eigentlich). They cannot be taken away (that is, reinterpreted) without changing their 
authors, without making the characters manifested in them different or even unrecognizable. 
Authors cannot be taken apart from their works’ (Nehamas in Cascardi ed. 288-9). 
Defending the “Moral Right of Authors”, Joyce both acknowledges and challenges this fine 
line of division: ‘while unprotected by the written law of copyright and even if it is banned, a 
work belongs to its author by natural right’, arguing that the law should be able to ‘protect an 
author against the mutilation and the publication of his work just as he is protected against 
the misuse that can be made of his name’ (OCPW 216). The artist is both eternally culpable 
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in the indissoluble connection between ethics and aesthetics, and impoverished in his 
inability to indemnify his creations. 
Modernity’s entanglement in methodology is for Agamben symptomative of ‘a crisis 
of poetry, of poiesis’, a consequence of the obfuscation of the distinction between the ‘three 
kinds of human doing’ ‘In the Western cultural tradition’- ‘poiesis, praxis, and work’: ‘If the 
death of art is its inability to attain concrete dimension of the work, the crisis of art in our 
time is, in reality, a crisis of poetry, of poiesis. Poesis, poetry, does not designate here an art 
among others, but is the very name of man’s doing, of that productive action of which 
artistic doing is only a privileged example, and which appears, today, to be unfolding its 
power on a planetary scale in the operation of technology and industrial production’ (in Kul-
Want ed. 252; The Man Without Content 69). Whereas the “genetic” distinction that 
Aristotle ascribed to art - ‘every art is concerned with giving birth’ - indicated that art ‘has 
both its end and its limit outside itself’, this end and limit are in modernity ‘identified with 
the act of production itself’, in an incestuous manner that is thematised and theologised in 
Finnegans Wake (73). 63 
Modern art is poised between such “perversion” and nihilism for Agamben: ‘The 
original unity of the work of art has broken, leaving on the one side the aesthetic judgment 
and on the other artistic subjectivity without content, the pure creative principle’ (37). Art is 
threatened with complete meaninglessness in the absence of this emphasis on endless 
productivity and potentiality: ‘art is the annihilating entity that traverses all its contents 
without ever being able to attain a positive work because it cannot identify with any content. 
And since art has become the pure potentiality of negation, nihilism, then attains an 
inexpressible deeper zone than that in which aestheticist and decadent poetics move’ (56). 
The deception that the poet practices by affecting proficiency in ‘several other arts and 
crafts’ assumes an ontological urgency insofar as it is preferred as a defense against death.  
Agamben resumes Heidegger’s quest in The Origin of the Work of Art, reiterating 
Heidegger’s question ‘is the work ever in itself accessible?’ (165). Heidegger had identified 
the idea of creativity- ‘the work’s createdness’ which ‘can obviously be grasped only in 
terms of the process of creation’ and compels the critic to ‘consent after all to go into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Rabaté’s interest in genetics in Joyce’s esthetic emphasises this reversal or “perversion”: 
‘Psychology and aesthetics are both underwritten by what could be called a genetic reason. Aesthetics 
cannot become a “science of the concrete” or a “science of the particular” without accounting for the 
genesis of the perception of beauty and therefore its own genesis’ (Palgrave Advances 4). In the 
Wake, however, while the desire to witness this genesis is pervasive- as well as perverse, the cyclical 
form of the narrative refuses an epiphany; ‘the acquaintance of Mister Typus, Mistress Tope and all 
the little typtopies’ is ‘not yet endlike’ (20). In this sense, aesthetic theory is indeed “abandoned”, as 
deconstruction has argued: when ‘maker mates with made’, the audience says ‘O my’; the desire is 
dramatised (261). 
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activity of the artist in order to arrive at the origin of the work of art’, as an obstacle to this 
possibility of freedom from the ‘technical-theoretical exactness of concepts’ (183, 219). 
Whereas ‘of everything present to us, we can note that it is’, ‘In a work, by contrast, this 
fact, that it is as a work, is just what is unusual. The event of its being created does not 
simply reverberate through the work; rather, the work casts before itself the eventful fact that 
the work is as a work, and it has constantly this fact about itself’ (190). The ‘work’s workly 
nature’ should not be taken as an “invitation” ‘to consideration of it by means of thought’, as 
an indication that the work of art is fated to become an object of critique, Heidegger argues, 
reiterating Hegel’s objection to the ‘perverse idea’ of art as ‘a useful instrument in the 
realization of an end having substantive importance outside the sphere of art’ and emphasis 
on art’s ‘vocation of revealing the truth’ (165; Aesthetics 61). Art as a ‘becoming and 
happening of truth’, however, suggests that it ‘arise[s] out of nothing’, a notion that 
Heidegger affirms with the qualification that ‘by nothing we mean the sheer “not” of 
beings’- what challenges our view of ‘the being as something at hand in the ordinary way’ 
(196). The price paid for originality, for “creativity” and modernity, is this fundamental 
threat of extinction. Thematised and parodied in the Wake through the myth of the Fall, it 
becomes a cornerstone of creativity allowing the artist to review, reassess, redraft, rehearse 
and parody the role- or “function”, vocation, personality and public image of the author, 
while also probing deep and exposing the ‘sobsconcious inklings shadowed on soulskin’ of 
the ‘fleshlumpfleeter’ (FW 377). 
 
 
ii. Sifted science will do your arts good. [FW 440.19] 
 
Although a philosophical system provided the schema for the Wake, Joyce distanced 
himself from its ideological implications; Vico’s historical cycles, he told Padraic Colum, 
were useful to him simply ‘as a trellis’ for construction (JJ 554). ‘I would not pay overmuch 
attention to these theories, beyond using them for all they are worth, but they have gradually 
forced themselves on me through circumstances of my own life’, he warned Weaver after 
enquiring as to her progress on the reading he had recommended to aid her comprehend - or 
at least appreciate - his Work in Progress (Letters I 241). Autobiographical “coincidences” 
rather than philosophical “truth” linked his work with that of Vico, and he hinted that a 
mutual fear of thunderstorms connected him with this early modern philosopher. His 
brother’s counsel- ‘I, for one, would not read more than a paragraph of it, if I did not know 
you’, appears to have been heeded in such biographical exposition (CH 387).  
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‘I don’t believe in any science’, he told the Danish translator of Eliot’s verse, ‘but 
my imagination grows when I read Vico as it doesn’t when I read Freud or Jung’ (JJ 693). 
His identification of imagination with memory was indeed distinctly Viconian. 64 In response 
to those who like Weaver lamented that he was wasting his genius ‘on a mere curiosity of 
literature’, he confessed that he lacked artistic inspiration: ‘Why regret my talent? I haven’t 
any. I write so painfully, so slowly. Chance furnishes me with what I need. I’m like a man 
who stumbles: my foot strikes something, I look down, and there is exactly what I’m in need 
of’, he told Jacques Mercanton (599, 661). Like the Mookse, although he is seen to have 
‘gaddered togodder the odds docence of his vellumes’ in support of his ‘widerproof’, he 
simply ‘luckystruck blueild out of a few shouldbe santillants’ (155). 
‘[L]ikelihood’ mixed with ‘Unlikelihud’, takes the place of inspiration, while 
‘definite rules which are capable of being learned and which must be closely followed’ 
substitute the ‘innate mental aptitude’ of the genius (12, 21; CAJ 168). The design of the 
Wake was so mechanically constructed that it could be completed by another, Joyce told 
Weaver, and suggested James Stephens: ‘If he consented to maintain three or four points 
which I consider essential and showed him the threads he could finish the design’ (Letters I 
254). His choice of his successor was indeed not based on any special talent he possessed, 
but rather on account of his initials which suggested Joyce’s favourite drink: ‘JJ and S (the 
colloquial Irish for John Jameson and Son’s Dublin whiskey) would be a nice lettering under 
the title’. Otherworldy inspiration is substituted for a different kind of spirit for this ‘all too 
unwordy’ ‘mailman’ (FW 408).  
Although such unassuming self-assessment of his artistic prowess might seem at 
odds with Joyce’s youthful egoism and contradict his early interpretation of his role as an 
artist, it corresponded with and indeed echoed the grating comments of his reviewers, among 
who the question “is it Art?” resounded. ‘Mr Joyce’s power is not shown in any special 
inventiveness’, Francis Hackett remarked as early as 1917; Virginia Woolf reproved ‘the 
comparative poverty of the writer’s mind’; the Dublin Review described Ulysses as ‘the 
screed of one possessed’ rather than inspired: ‘This may, or may not, be literature. It is 
certainly good cataloguing’; Henri Fluchére concluded upon the publication of Joyce’s Work 
in Progress that ‘The author is only an editor’ (CH 95, 126, 201-2, 529). A book that was 
‘impossible to read, and in general undesirable to quote’ suggested to Shane Leslie ‘that a 
gigantic effort has been made to fool the world of readers and even the Pretorian guard of 
critics’, while John Englinton like Stanislaus expressed his concern for the author’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ellmann notes that ‘he often agreed with Vico that ‘Imagination is nothing but the working over of 
what is remembered’, and said to Frank Budgen, ‘Imagination is memory’’ (661). 
	   187	  
	  
wellbeing: ‘There is an effort and strain in the composition of this book which makes one at 
times feel a concern for the author’ (207, 271-2). 
Joyce’s steadfast commitment to craftsmanship, to “work”, bewildered the critics of 
Work in Progress: ‘He is doing an intellectual and imaginative labor gigantic in its 
proportions, obdurate in its persistence, with no practical end in view whatever, not even that 
of communicating experience, but solely to perfect himself in the art of playing by himself in 
public’, Max Eastman remarked in 1931 (CH 418). The intersection of poiesis and praxis 
“exposed” the artist and created a perverse situation. What distinguished the artist’s creation 
from the craftsman’s production in Kantian aesthetics, according to Gadamer, was that while 
‘The completeness of everything else that is made or produced is measured by the criterion 
of its purpose – i.e., it is determined by the use that is to be made of it’, the work of art 
‘offer[s] to pleasure and contemplation an inexhaustible object of lingering attention and 
interpretation’ (81). Following the collapse of the distinction between work and art, the 
lingering gaze of the reviewer or reader finds itself a witness of an indecorous act. ‘It is quite 
possible that Mr. Joyce is trying to do too much: that there is a limit to the suggestive power 
of literature. But this thing brings us back to the realm of aesthetics. What concerns us at the 
moment is method in Work in Progress’, Leon Edel argued, attempting to separate ‘method’ 
from ‘aesthetics’ (CH 408). 
Undertaking “An Analysis of the Mind of James Joyce”, his ‘everdevoted friend’ 
and ‘everdevoting fiend’ Wyndham Lewis published a solution to this paradox, exposing the 
strange pastimes of this author that were disguised as hard work (JJ 595; FW 408). ‘He is 
genial and comic; a humorous writer of the traditional English School’, he explained, and 
‘has the technical itch of the ‘sedulous ape’ (Time and Western Man 74). Describing Ulysses 
as ‘an immense exercise in style, an orgy of ‘apeishness’, decidedly ‘sedulous’’, ‘an 
encyclopaedia of english literary technique, as well as a general-knowledge paper’, he 
detects ‘The schoolmaster in Joyce’: ‘what moves Joyce to churn up the english tongue in a 
mock-elizabethan frenzy, is the burning question still of his shabby-genteel boyhood, 
namely, To be a ‘toff’, or not to be a ‘toff’’ (74, 106). A ‘poet of the shabby-genteel, 
impoverished intellectualism of Dublin’, his strange representation of the role of the artist is 
symptomatic of his Irishness: ‘florid personal aplomb’ has distinguished Irish artists for 
Lewis (75). His deformity, however, is also philosophic: he is a ‘space-timeist’, having been 
lured by the ‘nineteenth century mechanistic belief’. But he is neither a philosopher nor a 
poet: ‘what Joyce is above all things, [is] essentially the craftsman’ (88). ‘I do not mean by 
this that he works harder or more thoroughly than other people, but that he is not so much an 
inventive intelligence as an executant’, he explains:  
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What stimulates him is ways of doing things, and technical processes, and not 
things to be done. Between the various things to be done he shows a true 
craftsman’s impartiality. He is become so much a writing-specialist that it matters 
very little to him what he writes, or what idea or worldview he expresses, so long 
as he is trying his hand at this manner and that, and displaying his enjoyable 
virtuosity. Strictly speaking, he has none at all, no special point of view, or none 
worth mentioning. It is such people that the creative intelligence fecundates and 
uses; and at present that intelligence is political, and its stimuli are masked 
ideologies. He is only a tool, an instrument, in short. That is why such a sensitive 
medium as Joyce, working in such a period, requires the attention of the 
independent critic. (88) 
 
Lewis authorises himself as an ‘independent critic’ by exposing the ideologies 
behind the ‘overcharged façade’ of technique that had mystified so many of Joyce’s critics 
(93). The critic must resist the temptation to “interpret” Joyce’s “scaffolding”, but the ‘god 
of the scuffeldfallen skillfilledfelon’ must be brought down, in the parallelism that is set up 
between the god who fell from the scaffold and the felon who skilfully constructed a 
skeleton (FW 355). Disquiet about the author who appeared ‘to be, or to be posing as, stark, 
staring mad’ was indeed accompanied by alarm with regard to his victims (CH 507). The 
criticism of Work in Progress by Pound and Weaver echoed that of Joseph Collins in 1922, 
who, complaining that only ‘A few intuitive, sensitive visionaries may understand and 
comprehend Ulysses’, suggested that ‘It should be companioned with a key and glossary like 
the Berlitz books’ (222). ‘As in some dream, we ourselves are unaccountably detached not 
only from the incidents narrated but also from practical interest of every kind’, Scofield 
Thayer prophesied Joyce’s sequel in 1918 (174). 
While Thayer suggested a new plane of consciousness was necessary to interpret 
Joyce’s work, others suggested more pragmatically that a question of genre was at stake. The 
general consensus was that it was neither literature nor language and this suggested to many 
of its critics that as it was “unreadable”, it should be compared to music- or noise less 
favourably; the Saturday Review proposed ‘a telephone directory’, while the TLS 
commended that it ‘has a value in advertising’ (507). ‘[N]ot sane enough to be literature’, 
Joyce’s work nevertheless ‘raises almost very possible kind of problem in the philosophy 
and psychology of aesthetics’, O’Faolain argued in response to AE’s review in the Irish 
Statesman. Louis Gillet asserted - with more admiration than Moore - that Joyce’s ‘epic’ was 
‘a metaphysics and an ontology’ (566, 727). 
For Marcel Brion, however, while Joyce was essentially a ‘a director, a constructor’, 
he still possessed ‘genius’ in his ‘freedom from the constraint of rules’: ‘he orders and 
constructs according to his own laws and without bothering about traditions or customs. And 
	   189	  
	  
this is the prodigiously innovating impetus of the genius which offers us the dazzling 
spectacle of a Genesis’ (428). Richard Ellmann similarly precedes his account of Joyce’s life 
after the publication of Ulysses by highlighting that ‘With Joyce the reading of proof was a 
creative act’ (JJ 513). But whereas his more sympathetic readers insisted that his artistic 
merit was simply more “philosophical”, most of his critics and many of his former 
supporters struggled to estimate the artistic value of Joyce’s scholarship and scholasticism, 
to which indeed he attributed his constructive proficiency, telling August Suter that his most 
prized reward from his Jesuit upbringing was ‘How to gather, how to order, and how to 
present a given material’ (Budgen 352). While Joyce’s emphasis on construction demystified 
artistic creation, the self-consciousness of this architect and the highly intellectualised nature 
of his design intimated that the role of the artist had been exchanged for that of the man of 
letters: the ‘schoolmaster’, or more scathingly, the ‘toff’. Lacking “righteousness”, 
‘tighteousness’ had finally driven the aspirant artist to resort to spending ‘his sober moments 
in correcting the grammatical errors of the more illiterate among the rugged geniuses’ (FW 
5; S. Joyce 248). 
In the lingering suspicion that the author is merely posing as a craftsman in order to 
conceal his pretension to scholarship, the Hegelian prophecy is corroborated and dramatised; 
discovering that ‘We are above the level at which works of art can be venerated as divine, 
and actually worshipped’, the “priest of the eternal imagination” is forced to accept the 
humble role of the exegete as ‘the impression which they make is of a more considerate 
kind, and the feelings which they stir within us require a higher test and a further 
confirmation’ (Aesthetics 12). Although an aesthetic theory is “abandoned”, like Stephen 
Dedalus the author - and also to a large extent the narrator - is presented in the Wake as 
‘someone whose most interesting and complex contributions are theoretical rather than 
artistic’ (Mahaffey, “Wagner, Joyce and Revolution” 241). 65 The ancient bifurcation of 
poetry and philosophy, inspiration and techne is presented as a juxtaposition of conscious 
creation with a study of the unconscious: an ‘experiment in interpreting ‘the dark night of the 
soul’’ which allows the artist to become an “expert” (Letters I 258). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The language of abandonment describes the role of artist in the Wake for deconstruction as the 
antithesis of the ‘illusory mastery over texts and meanings’: the author is now seen ‘abandoning his 
rights over language’ (Rabaté Authorized Reader 183; Cixous in Post-structuralist Joyce 20). For 
Rabaté, ‘Finnegans Wake signals the abandon of Joyce’s aesthetic discourse as such’ as ‘there can be 
no hope of holding a discourse describing the function of the artist or creator: the versions and 
perversions are so numerous, parodies of all kinds abound, all the critical approaches are alluded to 
without ever allowing one to stand out’ (179). Similarly, Norris argues that Joyce ‘abandons aesthetic 
theory … to ideological manoeuvres that lead artistic self-reflexivity, and contemporary theory 
grounded in its rhetoric, to negate history’ (68). Negative dialects displace aesthetic theory. 
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The threat to art posed by its “theory” - a threat that Romanticism had discerned and 
tried to quell through the coincidence of philosophy and poetry - is resurrected and 
dramatised in modernism. Understanding and interpretation are not only inseparable, but 
also interminable. In the contemporary philosophy of Heidegger, hermeneutics does not only 
designate ‘a way of knowing but also of being’: ‘A “circle of reasoning” cannot possibly lie 
in the formulation of the question of the meaning of Being, because in answering this 
question it is not a matter of grounding in deduction but rather laying bare and exhibiting the 
ground’ (Weinsheimer 7; Heidegger 49). As the protagonists of Finnegans Wake are 
painfully aware, interpretation becomes synonymous with exposure rather than exposition. 
But while the world-disclosive capacity of hermeneutics is exalted in this focus on the 
ubiquity of the problematics of interpretation, both the poet and the philosopher are relegated 
to the ranks of a ‘scriptor’ who bears within him an ‘immense dictionary from which he 
draws a writing that can know no halt’ (Barthes, Image-Music-Text 147). The penman is 
engaged in an interminable rereading- indeed of a dictionary, as the instability of meaning 
brings language as both system and historical monument to the forefront.  
This ‘age of hermeneutics’ is for Stanley Rosen an ‘age of decadence’ insofar as 
writing ‘comes to be more and more like reading: art deteriorates into criticism’ (in Cascardi 
ed. 211, 213). The ‘history of literature is to become the history of critical problems’ in the 
‘drive toward historical actuality’ and ‘tendencies to place research on new foundations’, 
Heidegger had prophesied (51). The contemplation of the ‘carefully folded ham-sandwich’ 
of philosophy and philology was becoming very appealing, as Beckett warned Joyce’s 
readers; ‘soothing’ like ‘a pair of nigger minstrels out of the Teatro dei Piccoli’ who 
masquerade as artists, in an age that views ‘the word’ as ‘The real metaphysical problem’ (6; 
Jolas in Beckett et al. 40). Although critics have been hesitant to refute Beckett’s insistence 
that Joyce’s ‘position is in no way a philosophical one’, Joyce’s ‘enormous and incidental 
contribution to philology’ makes it harder to deny his distinction as a philologist (3; Paul in 
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iii. An Easyathic Phallusaphist [FW 72.14] 
 
Philology in the beginning of the twentieth century was indeed “in the fashion”, as 
both a philosophical and scholarly subject, but also archaeological, historical, 
anthropological, technological, political, psychological, ethical and aesthetical, in a 
segregated expansiveness that is indeed indicative of the ‘specialized culture’ that the 
twentieth century inherited from the Enlightenment and identified by Habermas as being at 
the root of the hermeneutic crisis in modernity: the ‘differentiation of science, morality, and 
art’ which ‘has come to mean the autonomy of the segments treated by the specialist and at 
the same time letting them split off from the hermeneutics of everyday communication’ 
(“Modernity versus Postmodernity” 9). Similarly, while the Enlightenment - distinguished as 
an ‘epoch of “philosophical historiography”’ - had turned to history which ‘knows nothing 
really identical, nothing that ever recurs in the same form’ as a weapon against dogmatic 
belief, this ‘critical-historical spirit’ and ‘terrible historical need of our unsatisfied modern 
culture’ had been identified as a cause and sign of the estrangement of culture and art in 
modernity and as a form of dogmatism in disguise (Cassirer, Philosophy of the 
Enlightenment 209, 231; BT 85). Myth, ‘the most vigorous and wholesome nourishment 
changes into “history and criticism”, Nietzsche remonstrated, arguing that ‘only a horizon 
encompassed with myths … rounds off to unity a social movement’.  
While interest in Vico’s philosophy had been rekindled, the ancient contest of poetry 
and philosophy had more controversially been revived at the turn of the century by 
Nietzsche- a philologist turned philosopher who objected to the Enlightenment’s “reduction” 
of ‘philology to the form of a science’, identifying what Vico had called the ‘conceit of 
scholars’ as a manifestation, if not cause, of the demise of art (Vico 5, 77). While 
Romanticism at its peak had looked to the Greeks as both ‘rivals’ and ‘models’ - ‘remarkable 
people’ who succeeded in ‘uniting at once fullness of form and fullness of substance, both 
philosophising and creating, both tender and energetic, uniting a youthful fancy to the virility 
of reason in a glorious humanity’ - the emphasis later shifted to the diagnosis of the cause of 
the disintegration of this ideal ‘humanity’ (Schiller in C. Eliot 220). In his Aesthetic 
Education, Schiller had identified the ‘antagonism of forces’ as ‘the great instrument of 
culture’, but as a path rather than a goal: ‘as long as this antagonism lasts, man is only on the 
road to culture’, prophesying that ‘experimental beauty will be eternally double’: 
‘equilibrium remains always an idea that reality can never completely reach’. The “arrest” of 
this antagonism, was therefore an indication of decadence. Located historically and 
geographically in the cosmopolitan city of Alexandria, the consequence of this decadence 
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was examined by Wagner in The Artwork of the Future and dramatised by Nietzsche in The 
Birth of Tragedy; and closer to home, by Wilde in “The Critic as Artist”. 
Warning the modern ‘theoretical man’ - the protagonist in Nietzsche’s tragedy - 
against the nihilistic dangers of allowing ‘Thought’ to ‘look upon itself as its original cause’, 
‘the Philosopher’ to come ‘before the Man’, Wagner elicits the ‘humiliating sense of the 
impotence of our frivolous culture … before the art of the Hellenes’ (83). The Hellenes, he 
argues, should provide ‘the outlines for the Art-work of the Future’:  
 
Art has become the private property of an artist-caste; its taste it offers to those alone 
who understand it; and for its understanding it demands a special study, aloof from 
actual life, the study of art-learning. This study, and the understanding to be attained 
thereby, each individual who has acquired the gold wherewith to pay the proffered 
delicacies of art conceives to-day that he has made his own: if, however, we were to 
ask the Artist whether the great majority of art's amateurs are able to understand him 
in his best endeavours, he could only answer with a deep-drawn sigh. But if he 
ponders on the infinitely greater mass of those who are perforce shut out on every 
side by the evils of our present social system from both the understanding and the 
tasting of the sweets of modern art, then must the artist of to-day grow conscious that 
his whole art-doings are, at bottom, but an egoistic, self-concerning business; that his 
art, in the light of public life, is nothing else than luxury and superfluity, a self-
amusing pastime. (89, 182) 
 
The critic in Wagner’s account is an adversary not only of the artist but also of the very 
value of art and its “appearance” in society; as his influence in society is usurped by the man 
of letters, the lonely artist can only ‘prefigure’ the Art-work ‘to himself’ (88). Poetry is a 
future orientated project the accomplishment of which awaits the birth of ‘the Folk’. In the 
future perfect tense of Wagner’s parable, ‘With Aristophanian laughter, the Folk 
relinquished to these learned insects the refuse of its meal, threw Art upon one side for two 
millennia, and fashioned of its innermost necessity the history of the world; the while those 
scholars cobbled up their tiresome history of Literature, by order of the supreme court of 
Alexander’ (136). The “end of art” is a consequence of Alexandrian scholarship which 
marked the end of the civilisation as well as ‘the art of the Hellenes’; a dissolution that is 
indeed a prerequisite for the birth of poetry.  
Seeing Socrates as the ‘Philosopher’ who finally came before the ‘Man’, Nietzsche 
staged the final epilogue of Greek drama. The “annihilation” of myth by ‘optimism of 
science’ was similarly set in Alexandria: ‘Our whole modern world is entangled in the net of 
Alexandrian culture’, he diagnosed: 
 
Our art reveals this universal trouble: in vain does one depend imitatively on all the 
great productive periods and natures; in vain does one accumulate the entire “world-
	   193	  
	  
literature” around modern man for his comfort; in vain does one depends imitatively 
on all the great productive periods and natures; in vain does one accumulate the 
entire “World Literature: around modern man for his comfort; in vain does one place 
one’s self in the midst of art-styles and artists of all ages, so that one may give names 
to them as Adam did to the beasts: one still continues eternally hungry, the “critic” 
without joy and energy, the Alexandrian man, who is at bottom a librarian and 
corrector of proofs, and who, pitiable wretch, goes blind from the dusty books and 
printers’ errors. (BT 61, 64-5, 67)  
 
In contrast, the ‘more nobly and delicately endowed by nature’ spectator of art, is the 
recipient of an ‘unexpected as well as totally unintelligible effect’ (84). 
Like Vico, Nietzsche denied that it is possible ‘for anyone to be both a sublime poet 
and a sublime metaphysician’, although Vico’s emphasis on philology as a “science” and the 
creative ‘mind of providence’, were in Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy of human authority’ 
substituted by the “will” rather than a “theory” of power (375, 489). Vico had presented this 
synthesis as above all a historical impossibility, whereas in Nietzsche the rejection is more 
proscriptive and the consequence of the coincidence is so grave that it is presented as a 
violence against nature. Nietzsche’s denial, moreover, was linked with a rejection of the 
multiculturalism of Alexandria, and the obstacle that the ‘sophistication of life’ of ‘abstract 
man’ in this ‘abstract state’ presented to the realisation of the ideal Artwork composed by the 
Folk- a reflection of a model nation (Bury et al. 100; BT 85). In Alexandria, William Tarn 
remarked in 1927, ‘though the Greek spirit was still of supreme importance, it can no longer 
be said that every fruitful idea was Greek; for, quite apart from religion and astronomy, the 
single greatest creation of the age, the Stoic philosophy, originated with one who, whether he 
had some Greek blood or not, was certainly to his contemporaries a Phoenician’ (3).  
Wagner’s ideal “Fellowship of Artists”, however, was a reality rather than a future 
ideal in Alexandria: ‘Authors of every kind abounded, and the literary man, as a distinct 
type, is a creation of this epoch. From one end to another of the Mediterranean men were 
busy expressing themselves in writing; on the other hand there was no lack of readers, since 
education was more widely if more thinly spread than in earlier periods’ (Bury 33). As 
Gilbert in Wilde’s “The Critic as Artist” argues, even ‘the inartistic temperaments of the day 
busied themselves also in matters of literature and art’; and while Gilbert admits that ‘the 
accusations of plagiarism were endless’, he censures the detractors rather than the fraudulent 
artists: ‘such accusations proceed either from the thin colourless lips of impotence, or from 
the grotesque mouths of those who, possessing nothing of their own, fancy that they can gain 
a reputation for wealth by crying out that they have been robbed’ (Intentions 118-9). 
The paradoxical coincidence of Socialism and Individualism in Wilde’s The Soul of 
Man Under Socialism, is indeed modeled on this nation of art critics: art does not need to 
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‘try to be popular’ as the public is seen ‘try[ing] to make itself artistic’ (30). As ‘Sheer 
invention was unnatural to the Greek turn of mind’, the creative and the critical spirit were 
not incompatible; contrary to the catastrophic and apocalyptic language that has been used to 
described their conglomeration in Western philosophy, their alliance gave birth to new 
genres of art (Bury et al. 45). While Wagner had deplored the divisions of genres and 
separation ‘from the proud and heaven-soaring tree of Drama’ which he compared to the 
confusion that ensued after the fall of the Tower of Babel- ‘when all national solidarity had 
split into a thousand egoistic severalities’, Gilbert paid homage to the diversity of art forms 
that ‘the critical spirit of Alexandria’ produced (105; 124). The revision of the epic genre 
reflected this rapport between criticism and creativity, science and art: ‘Although ‘no 
inspired writer appeared able to fashion current history into a great epic … in their search for 
new poetic material they tried to combine something of the old mythology with the history 
or pseudo-history fashionable in their own age’ (Bury et al. 45). 
The collective implication that distinguished Alexandrian art was reflected in the 
dialectal changes that are recorded in both literary and non-literary documents: ‘almost 
without exception these men were either careless of the form in which their thoughts were 
expressed or at the least quite unskilled in the graces and subtleties of the Attic style as 
understood by the Neo-Atticists’ (34). ‘Greek of the κοινη διαλεκτος’ [the popular dialect], 
Barber notes in this collection of essays, ‘was now being written by many persons of non-
Hellenic or at least mixed descent. The Semitic origin of several prominent Stoic 
philosophers has often been noted’; but concurrent with this “vulgarisation” of language, 
was an evolution in ‘the vocabulary of educated men’ which had become ‘enormously more 
technical’. While ‘It is true, no doubt’, he argues, ‘that in some ways an increase in technical 
terms marks an advance in thought (if it were not so, the twentieth century might well 
despair of itself!)’, ‘the habit among these writers goes far beyond what is necessary. Simple 
verbs are abandoned for compounds without any gain in expressiveness; abstract terms are 
found everywhere, and so on’. 
Barber’s account of the reader’s exposure to this technical vocabulary, is all-too-
familiar to the reader of Finnegans Wake: ‘After a short experience of writing, such as we 
find for instance in Polybius, we begin, I will not say to approve, but at least to understand, 
the reaction of the Atticists’. Not only does HCE number among the ‘long list (now feared in 
part lost) to be kept on file of all abusive names he was called’ that of an ‘Easyathic 
Phallusaphist’: a combination Asia and Attica, philosopher and poet [of the Alexandrian 
period- Sappho] and heralding procreation rather than destruction, but also the very attempt 
‘to attax and abridge’ is presented as an act of ‘violence, virulence and vituperation’ in the 
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Wake (72, 97). The accusations of deceit and hybridity are indeed repeatedly framed through 
references to Asia. Shem’s ‘house O’Shea or O’Shame’ is similarly derogatorily nicknamed 
‘Asia in Ireland’ and filled with the ‘stolen fruit’ that the ‘Vulgariano’ rapaciously seized 
‘Instead of chuthoring [tutoring but also authoring] those model households plain 
wholesome pothooks (a thing he never possessed in his Nigerian own)’ (181).  
 
 
iv. A learned scholarch [FW 31.21] 
 
The absence of the narrator in the first seven chapters of the Wake is indeed felt 
through the prominence and prevalence of an erratic but commanding scholarly voice. The 
reader is made privy to the tedious rereading and re-viewing of a punctilious but 
disinterested theorist who impersonally imparts and interprets a familiar (hi)story that has 
been heard, read and witnessed one too many times already. His ‘commodious vicus of 
recirculation’ appears to be linked to his repetitious scrutiny of the objects of his 
investigation (3). The narrative begins in media res rather than ab ovo as a result of this 
perusal, as a kind of bibliomancy replaces the invocation of the Muse. A ‘slav to 
methodiousness’, capturing the reader’s attention is not one of this scholar’s concerns; the 
reader catches him instead in the midst of his study of the ‘Countlessness of livestories [that] 
have netherfallen by this plage’- a page of his book as well as a beach, that appear to him 
romantically as to Gabriel at the end of “The Dead”, ‘flick as flowflakes, litters from aloft, 
like a waast wizzard all of whirlworlds’ (159).  
Distancing himself from the pagan rituals of the ‘you’ who ‘would quaffoff his 
fraudstuff and sink teeth through that pyth of a flowerwhite bodey’, the modern theorist is 
more interested in gazing – inappropriately: ‘let wee peep, see, at Hom’ - at a ‘terricolous 
vivelyonview’ [the book of life - ‘biblion biou’ (gr) and view from a book], a ‘fadograph of a 
yestern scene’ [a fading photograph], ‘woebecanned and packt away’ [woebegone and well-
known - wohlbekannt (ger)] in the ‘museomound’ (7, 6, 7, 18, 7, 8). Calling on the modern 
‘abcedminded’ reader - a ‘gentlemien’ - to reverentially ‘Stoop’ ‘to this claybook’- the 
‘allaphbed’ [alphabet but also riverbed] and its ‘curios [curious and masterful - ‘kyrios’, the 
Greek onomastic for God] of signs’, following the difficulty of the modern reader to ‘rede … 
its world’ [read and speak – Rede (ger)] as a consequence of modern subjectivism - ‘since 
We and Thou had it out already’, the exegete is both fascinated and repulsed by the 
‘middenhide hoard of objects’ he discovers (18, 20-21, 18, 19). Lifting his eyes from ‘the 
tome of Liber Lividus’ he ponders ‘sober serious’ on the ‘babbelers with their thangas’: his 
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Babelian ancestors that ‘vain have been (confusium hold them!) … were and went’, as 
‘thigging thugs’ [thinking things but also begging thugs] (14, 29, 15). The ‘meanderthalltale’ 
[meandering and Neanderthal] with ‘an end in view of squattor and anntisquattor and 
postproneauntisquattor’ that ‘unfurl[s]’ before him, is below the ‘ban’ of his ‘infrarational 
senses’ (18, 20). Rather than inspiring awe for rosyfingered Dawn, this narrator foretells the 
‘rubrickredd’ arrival of ‘Gutenmorg’ ‘with his cromagnom charter, tintingfast and great 
primer’ (20). ‘To say to us to be every tim, nick and larry of us, sons of the sod’, he protests 
following the discovery of his ‘anartful’ origins (19, 378). 
Like Gabriel, moreover, he distances himself from the act of storytelling; his role is 
merely to record and examine the events. His ineptitude at storytelling is exposed through 
his inappropriate use of dramatic irony; the plot is divulged in the very first page through a 
series of provisional negatives. The prankquean tale is narrated by him as a specimen of ‘the 
first peace of illiterative porthery’ and the clichéd morals that he appends at the end betray 
the confusion he shares with the reader faced with this prehistoric version of the Oedipal 
riddle and mystery of the Eucharist [‘why do I am alook alike a poss of porterpease?’] (23, 
22). Struggling to understand the language of the ‘mousterious’ [mysterious and mousterian] 
looking Jute and in turn bewildering the Jute who can ‘beuraly forsstand a weird from sturk 
to finnic in such a patwhat’ that his ‘rutterdamrotter’ [a version of Wagner’s 
Götterdämmerung, or a twilight of rotters, dumps, bellowing and animal sexual activity] 
seems to speak, he oratorically and evangelically seeks to authenticate his tale by presenting 
himself as a witness to and participant in the events he chronicles, as the recurrent transition 
between “we” and “they” reveals (15, 17). Although a surveyor of an archaeological site, 
tourguide, chronicler of historical events and Biblical exegete, his theoretical viewpoint is 
compromised by what sounds to him like croaks of Aristophanian frogs, and he presents 
himself as a choric member in a dramatic performance in the face of the ‘Onheard of and 
umscene’ events unfolding before him, concealing himself among ‘the ombre players’ (17, 
24). 
Corroborating but also throwing Nietzsche’s genealogy in The Birth of Tragedy into 
doubt, the ancient clashes ‘of wills gen wonts’ are interpreted as Bacchic croaks by the 
‘unquiring’ modern theorist with a ‘hauhauhauhaudibble’ sense of hearing who undertakes 
the quest ‘well to the west’ to solve the mystery of the Fall (4, 3, 16, 3). The struggle for 
power of these ‘thonthorstrok’ Viconian primitive poets [thunderstruck by Thor similarly to 
the mythological Ragnarökr] is not manifested as divine hubris, nor as an ‘astoneaged’ 
ecstatic desire for oneness with nature, but rather like the Aristophanean comedy it is a 
squabble between artists for the claim to fame: an endeavour of the ‘Baddelaries partisans’ 
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[the Baudelairean baddy artists], to ‘mathmaster’ [master through maths and learning - 
mathē (gr)] the ‘Malachus Micgranes’ [Malachi Mulligan and the “soft” - malax - 
intellectuals with a migraine who are merely “messengers”] (3). The theoretical questions 
that such sounds elicit indeed echo Wagner’s drama: ‘But was iz? Iseut? Ere were sewers?’ 
(18, 4). The ‘pharce for the nunce’ that is a consequence of the ‘Phall’, degeneration and 
decandence as well as fertility and procreation, sees the grandiose tragic performance 
replaced with the farce, identified with Alexandria through reference to its lighthouse 
[pharos], with the present age [the nonce], and Christianity [the nun] (4). 
The Wagnerian “perfect Artwork” is ironically realised in the confusion of tragedy 
and comedy amid these epic clashes. In this “common Artwork” - in the implication of 
everyone in the story of the Fall and ‘innate poetic faculty’ of Vico’s ‘first people’ - 
nationality is both a cause and consequence of the work of art; the idea of the nation is both 
created and subverted through dramatic performance (145). The ‘conceit of scholars’ and the 
‘conceit of nations’ who think themselves initiators and inventors is exposed through 
anachronisms borne through language; the primitive past that Nietzsche had turned to as an 
antidote to the idealism of German Romanticism and the ‘mute or wordless’ ‘age of gods’ 
that Vico demarcated in order to demonstrate the ‘innate poetic faculty’ that gave birth to 
metaphysics cannot be freed from the gaze of the modern theorist (76-7, 22). An epitaph to 
the dead hero as well as a homily to living, the scholar and the “ideal spectator” of German 
Romanticism coincide in the peripeteia of the Wake: the quest for the ‘agentlike’, the agent 
who in truth [eigentlich (ger)] ‘brought about that tragoady’, but also the actor who made 
this performance possible (5).  
The choric voice of the Wake, moreover, an emblem of an ideal community for 
Wagner and an ideal unity with nature for Nietzsche, is far from univocal; the modern 
‘hierarchitectitiptoploftical’ coryphaeus turns against the ‘shebby choruysh of unkalified 
muzzlenimiissilehims that would blackguardise the whitestone ever hurtleturtled out of 
heaven’, ‘the hoolivans of the nation, prostrated in their consternation and their duodisimally 
profusive plethora of ululation’ (5, 5, 6). The collective Artwork composed by the 
‘Fellowhip of all the Artists’: ‘plumbs and grumes and cheriffs and citherers and raiders and 
cinemen too’ sounds to the modern scholar like a din made by ‘Agog and magog and the 
round of them agrog’ and performed with ‘the shoutmost shoviality’ (Wagner 196; FW 6). 
Unity, the ‘search for tighteousness’, is inspired by the search for truth - as ‘Drouth is 
stronger than faction’ - and for the true author: ‘the reise [reason, journey and traveler – 
Reise (ger)] of our fortunes and the faunayman at the funeral’ (5, 336, 25). Identified with 
‘Priam Olim’ [the last king of Troy, the breechless ballad hero Brian O’Linn, and the prime 
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seer, poet and professor - Priomh Ollamh] the author is both the subject and the object of the 
investigation; its cause and consequence (6). Lying in ‘A verytableland of bleakbardfields’, 
‘Under his seven wrothschields’ - the seven families that want to prosper by relating 
themselves with him genealogically (like Homer’s seven birthplaces) - and covered by ‘the 
remains of the outworn gravemure where used to be blurried the Ptollmens of the Incabus 
[the corpses - ptōma (gr) - of the Ptolemies, megaliths, evil demons and ancient civilisations] 
this ‘Lumproar’ [emperor and uproar], is indeed the archetypal poet and ‘theatrocrat’ 
‘worthy of the naym’ [the name and the denial] (10, 10, 13, 10, 29). 
 
 
v. The comicalbottomed copsjute and the gobblydumped turkery [FW 110.26, 118.22] 
 
The prophecies and misgivings of Nietzsche and Wagner regarding Alexandrian 
culture were symbolically and materially confirmed at the close of the nineteenth century 
with the archaeological discoveries in the colonised regions of that great empire. The ‘nillohs 
dieybos’ [those days (in illis diebus) of fictional time beyond time (nullus) in the Nile] when 
there was ‘no lumpend papeer in the waste’, came to an end, once again, at the close of the 
nineteenth century (FW 19). While on a ‘bushman’s holiday’ in the Egyptian town of 
Oxyrhyncus in 1896, the papyrologists Grenfell and Hunt from Queen’s College in Oxford, 
witnessed during their excavation in a ‘fatal midden or chip factory or comicalbottomed 
copsjute (dump for short)’ - a Homeric ‘limon’ [meadow - λειµῶν (gr)], “throwing up” ‘a 
few spontaneous fragments of orangepeel, the last remains of an outdoor meal by some 
unknown sunseeker or placehider illico way back in his mistridden past’: ‘Despite their 
understanding of the possibilities of rubbish mounds, Grenfell and Hunt hoped for Ptolemaic 
literary finds from the town’s cemeteries, and for three weeks they persisted in hopeful but 
hopeless poking around there. Then they – or rather their native diggers – stuck their spades 
in a rubbish mound, and they opened a papyrological floodgate’ (FW 110; Coles in Bowman 
et al.  3-4). 66 
‘They could and did find’, Coles explains, ‘almost anything that might have landed 
up in an ancient waste-paper basket: known literature, lost literature, government documents, 
legal documents, private correspondence’; and while ‘The bulk of all this was in Greek, 
which had become the administrative language of Egypt since the time of Alexander the 
Great’, ‘Various other languages are represented from time to time, notably Coptic’. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 ‘The Sirens, like Calypso, had a λειµῶν ἀνθεµόεντα’, a ‘mead’ which ‘is the Greek version of the 
Semitic root abel and is used to describe the ‘‘soft meadow of violets and parsley’ which surrounded 
Calypso’s home’, Gilbert explains in his analysis of Ulysses (219). 
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dream discovery of modernism in the search for origins and originals was fulfilled through 
an “invention”, a ‘foenix culprit’, in ‘despondful surroundings’ (110). The irony of these 
discoveries, Coles highlights, is that ‘the papyri that have survived for us are not those that 
the ancients tried to keep, but those that they threw away – on rubbish dumps, or left in 
abandoned houses, or indeed buried in tombs’ (3). The ‘remains of the outworn gravemure 
where used to be blurried the Ptollmens of the Incabus’ were unearthed through this 
archaeological excavation in the form that modernist literature would present its own work 
of cultural disinterment, preservation, innovation and dissemination: as exhumed fragments 
and “holey” holo-grams both detrimental to the unity of culture and a strategy of survival- 
shored against its ruins (FW 13).  
This ‘polyhedron of scripture’ had shared a similar fate to the acclaimed ‘relique[s] 
of ancient Irish pleasant pottery’ of ‘the Golden Age of Ireland’ which preserved and 
revitalised the ‘art of illumination’ that had ‘originated in Byzantium’, but had themselves 
been buried in the ‘Heated residence in the heart of the orangeflavoured mudmound’ (111, 
110; Flood 1, 110; FW 111). The Ardagh Chalice, one of ‘The most beautiful specimens of 
their art that have been preserved’, according to Flood, showing ‘the same exquisite skill and 
taste’ of the designs of the manuscripts, was discovered by accident by ‘a boy digging 
potatoes’, while both its artist and ‘the king or ecclesiastic for whom [it was] wrought’ have 
‘remained topantically [both romantically and completely - το παν (gr)] anonymos’ (112; 
FW 134). The Book of the Dun Cow had been ‘a spoil of war and held for ransom’, and 
‘While being vigorously corrected by its early editor, holes were rubbed in its vellum leaves’ 
(Slavin 3). The Book of Lismore which ‘contains the most ancient detailed narrative we have 
about Fionn Mac Cumhail and the Fianna’, was ‘Lost and gnawed by rats inside a castle 
wall, found in 1814 only to then be pillaged of its pages’ (68). 
A ‘museomound’ as well as a rubbish mound full of ‘spoiled goods’, like the 
gnarlybird’s bag ‘laden with the loot of learning’, such ‘bootifull’ findings bewilder their 
‘entychologist’ [finder and reader - ἐντυγχάνω (gr), etymologist and specialist in luck - τύχη 
and walls - τοίχος], and beguile ‘the hardily curiosing entomophilus’ [the lover of insects - 
έντοµα, and cuttings things into pieces - έντοµος] ‘scraping along to sneeze out a likelihood 
that will solve and salve life’s robulous’ among the ‘middenhide hoard of objects’ (FW 8, 
11, 108, 11, 59, 107, 12, 19). Having undertaken the ‘quest of his tumptytoes’ ‘well to the 
west’, these English “Sunfellas” ‘got rhinoceritis from haunting the roes [fish eggs] in the 
parik’: ‘The rubbish mounds that yielded Oxyrhynchus’s [the ‘city of the sharp-nosed fish’] 
Greek papyri are scattered out well to the west [of Grenfell and Hunt’s rough site plans], and 
especially in a zone to the north-west’, according to Coles (11). They did indeed find his 
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tump, however: ‘The first Egyptological event to create a media circus is often said to be the 
discovery of Tutankhamun’s tomb in 1922’, Montserrat notes (28). 
In their account of the The Hellenistic Age published in 1923, the contributors to this 
collection of essays on ‘aspects of Hellenistic civilization’ drew attention to the significance 
of ‘the discovery of a mass of contemporary documents, inscriptions, and still more papyri’ 
‘Within the last generation’, that ‘has given a powerful stimulus to the study of the period’, 
and to the similarities of the nature of the society of this age with that of modern Europe 
(Bury et al. 3). Challenging the ‘notion prevalent that the Greeks were already decadent in 
the third century’ which ‘has perhaps hardly died out yet, and has probably been the 
principal cause of the neglect of the post-Demosthenic age’, the Irish historian, classical 
scholar and biographer of Saint Patrick, J. B. Bury, underlined the detrimental consequence 
of this neglect:  
 
For anyone who is interested in exploring the history of European civilization and 
finding out how the past is stored in the present, this period of Hellenism may be 
said in a certain way to count more than the age of the independent city states; for it 
was through this period that the earlier age exerted its influence. It was in this period 
that the culture of Rome was semi-hellenized and it was through Rome that Greece 
leavened the civilization of Western Europe. We must remember that when a Roman 
went to Athens or Rhodes or Alexandria he imbibed the ideas and culture of the 
living Greece of the time; this training would include a knowledge of her past, but 
the past would be seen by him as by a native Greek through the glasses of the 
present. (2-3)  
 
Noting that while ‘for a good many years past a number of savants have been engaged on an 
intensive study of the political, economic, and social life under the Macedonian monarchies’, 
Bury adds that ‘the results of their work have so far hardly penetrated beyond learned circles 
into the general knowledge of the educated public’ (3-4). 
But Bury’s attempt to highlight the significance of this relatively unknown age had 
been greatly aided by the papyrological discoveries in Egypt: ‘Bernard Grenfell, Arthur 
Hunt, and others associated with the Oxyrhynchus digs wrote lively accounts of their 
discoveries for the popular illustrated press, scholarly articles for more sober periodicals 
such as The Times and Athenaeum, catalogues of public exhibitions of the small finds, and 
lectures, illustrated with magic-lantern slides, that gave not only tantalizing glimpses of the 
literary riches yielded by the rubbish mounds of the city but also a feel of the romance of 
digging in Egypt’ (Montserrat in Bowman et al. 28). But while Grenfell and Hunt were 
searching for literary finds, the ‘long, anecdotal reviews’ that they received revealed the 
allure that ‘the human immediacy of the non-literary papyri’ had for the public. 
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In an account of their findings published in 1910, the writer draws attention to the 
‘large number of private letters which, like all true letters, are often of the most self-
revealing character, and throw the clearest light upon the whole domestic and social 
relationships of the people’ (qtd by Montserrat in Sex and Society 4). And while the contents 
of these letters are not ‘of special interest’, the writer admits that ‘it is impossible not to feel 
the arresting charm of these frail papyrus messages, written with no thought of any other 
public than those to whom they were originally addressed, and on that very account calling 
up before our minds, as more elaborate documents could never have done, the persons alike 
of their senders and recipients’. The papyrus fragments that were discovered, Montserrat 
argues, ‘were seen as enabling the modern reader to come face to face with the ‘living’ 
members of a dead society in a way which one papyrologist has recently compared to a 
Woolfian epiphany, almost a ‘moment of being’. The literary potential of such epiphanies 
attracted the interest of ‘the first generation of writers exposed to collections of published 
papyri’, who like Joyce, saw such fragments giving ‘tantalising glimpses, like flesh seen 
through a torn garment; but no more’, as ‘a vehicle for eroticism, either for what they might 
contain, or for what they might leave unsaid’ (5). 
The ‘erotic potential of the papyrus fragment’ piqued the imagination of ‘decadent 
fin-de-siècle writers’ in particular, as Wilde’s tale of intrigue and seduction that influences 
the movement of the intellectual discussion in “Scylla and Charybdis” and exposes the 
kinetic desires of Stephen’s theories, indicates. Textual and sexual ambivalence and 
ambiguity, error and errancy, are similarly linked and confused in the Wake. The 
‘improbable possibles’ that these fragments arouse reveal a different fount of inspiration, 
carnal rather than intellectual or metaphysical (110). The ‘hardily curiosing entomophilust’ 
discerns that the exhumed letter in the litter is a ‘sexmosaic of nymphosis’ exposing both the 
desires of its author(s) and the predilections of its reader and interpreter (107). The everyday 
‘kitchernott darkness’ of the letter stirs these desires, and ‘we must grope on till Zerogh hour 
like pou owl giaours as we are would we salve aught of moments for our aysore today’ 
(107). Desire for meaning is inseparable from desire for intimacy and communication. 
The quest to discover ‘who in hallhagall wrote the durn thing’, and to picture him 
and ‘peep, see [him], at Hom’, ‘Erect, beseated, mountback’ while closing our ‘blinkhard’s 
eyes to the ethiquethical fact’ of the ‘radiooscillating epiepistle’, is similarly shown to be 
driven by the desire to ‘glypse at [glimpse and lick – γλείφω (gr)] and feel for ourselves 
across all those rushyears the warm soft short pants of the quickscribbler’ and ‘the uniform 
matteroffactness of a meandering male fist’ (107-8, 6, 108, 109, 108, 122, 123). The 
separation of the ‘coincidental parts’ of ‘the enveloping facts’ by the ‘deft hand of an expert’ 
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is also exposed as driven by an expectation of a primal disclosure ‘under the pudendascope’ 
(109, 115). The ‘Closer inspection of the bordereau’ is stimulated by the expectation that its 
characters will become anthropomorphic, ‘reveal[ing] a multiplicity of personalities’; the 
scrutiny of ‘the overcautelousness [cautiousness, craftiness and scorching – καυτός (gr)] of 
the masterbilker’, 67 by the prospect that ‘some prevision of virtual crime or crimes might be 
made by anyone unwary enough before any suitable occasion’ (107, 111, 107). If the letter 
was to be declared anonymous, it would also be ‘anomorous’ (112). The breathless catalogue 
of the characters of the letters is an extravagant refutation of this claim and a parodic 
resurrection of the past through a ‘dummpshow’ (and of Sullivan’s narrative style in his 
description of The Book of Kells) (120). The need to establish the authenticity or historicity 
of the document, the ‘importance in establishing the identities in the writer complexus’ is 
asserted by the ‘grisly old Sykos’ ‘who have done [their] unsmiling bit on ‘alices when they 
were yung and easily freudened’, and warn that ‘Some softnosed peruser might mayhem take 
it up erogenously’ (114, 115).  
‘Papyrologists’, Montserrat suggests, ‘may be scopophiles upon antiquity, people 
who enjoy reading other people’s mail’; ‘Reading a papyrus letter is like overhearing one 
side of a telephone conversation’- a fixation and transgression that the Wake both excites and 
deflates, exposing its libidinous derivation that intellectual ardour and religious enthusiasm 
cannot extricate themselves from (Sex and Society 6). 68 These ‘tompip peepestrella[s]’, 
however, ‘receive very little gratification for their intellectual voyeurism’: ‘Most papyrus 
letters are formulaic, composed of epistolary clichés, enquiries after health and requests for 
commodities to be sent’ (FW 178; Montseratt 6-7). The revelation of the letter in the Wake, 
an ‘oldworld epistola of their weatherings and their marryings and their buryings and their 
natural selections’, registers a similar disappointment, exposing the epiphanic expectations 
that determine the parameters of our encounter with a work of art (117). The letter unearthed 
by the ‘original hen’, an act observed by ‘keepy little Kevin’, is a telegram on ‘a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Insisting in a letter to Harriet Shaw Waver in 1919  that ‘The elements needed [for the composition 
of Ulysses] will only fuse after a prolonged existence together’, Joyce explained that ‘The word 
scorching has a peculiar significance for my superstitious mind not so much because of any quality or 
merit in the writing itself as for the fact that the progress of the book is in fact like the progress of 
some sandblast. As soon as I mention or include any person it it I hear of his death or departure or 
misfortune: and each successive episode, dealing with some province of artistic culture (rhetoric or 
music or dialectic), leaves behind it a burnt up field’ (Letters I 128-9). 
68 The significance of the parallel that Joyce draws between the published text and the postcard, ‘a 
public document, deprived of any privacy, and which furthermore, by this fact, falls under the scope 
of the law’, has been examined by Derrida in terms of ‘the virtual totality of experience, of sense, of 
history, of the symbolic, of languages and writings, the great cycle and the great encyclopaedia of 
cultures, of scenes and affects, the sum total of sum totals in sum’, and the attempt to go beyond 
language as ‘tautological’, ‘narcissistic’, or ‘egological’ (in A. Mitchell and Sam Slote eds. 44, 68, 
76). 
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goodishsized sheet of letterpaper’ from ‘the last of the first’ - an apocalyptic interpretation of 
the signature at the bottom of the letter - ‘to Dear’, inquiring about ‘allathome’s health’, 
giving an account of a public event attended, referring to ‘a beautiful present of wedding 
cakes’, closing with more ‘how are you[s]’ and ‘hopes soon to hear well’, and coming to an 
end with a teastain (110, 111). Like the deflation that characterises the Joycean epiphany - 
arousing the expectation of a phenomenological revelation but instead presenting a 
description of a commonplace situation or overheard conversation and splintering if not 
dissolving the vehicles of its promised transcendence- words and their meaning, through 
pauses in thought into linguistic fragments - the mystery of the letter is punctuated by clichés 
and blunted by a teastain. 
The hermeneutical paradox that distinguished the epiphanies is dramatised in the 
Wake, and the focus of attention indeed shifts to the ‘man of letters’ who has the seemingly 
simple task of ‘recording’ the ‘average everydayness’ of these inscrutable events (SH 216; 
Heidegger 59). Having to obey, however, the ‘compulsion’ of the dream in the ‘nightinveils’ 
of the Wake to mould these events ‘into a single whole’, this act of rememberance is 
accompanied by the obstinate expectation that the ‘contraries’ of the ‘traits featuring the 
chiaroscuro’ will be ‘eliminated’ ‘in one stable somebody’ (Freud, Interpretation of Dreams 
82; FW 541, 107). These ‘spatialist[s]’ are faced with the insurmountable paradox of 
reconciling the license of everyday life - the ‘unfettered’ Irish daily independence’ - with the 
‘unbrookable script’ [unbreakable and unendurable] of ‘our plumsucked pattern 
shapekeeper’, necessary to assert ‘its genuine authorship and holusbolus authoritativeness’, 
which in turn holds together the ‘wee free state’ (149, 118, 123, 118, 117). Their excellence 
indeed is displayed through the theories they create to overcome this difficulty. While the 
exegete of the letter overcomes this contrast through psychoanalysis of the individual letters 
diagnosed with ‘ulykkhean or tetrachiric or quadrumane or ducks and drakes or debts and 
dishes perplex’, the ‘photoist’ - a sophisticated photographer, as Hunt was during the 
Egyptian excavation - explains scientifically the decomposition of the ‘negative of a horse’ 
into a ‘a positively grotesquely distorted macromass of all sorts of horsehappy values and 
masses of meltwhile horse’ (123, 111). 69 Even the vivisective ‘paper wounds’ caused by the 
‘ire’ of the modern exegete, ‘acůtely profčššionally piqučd, to = introdůce a notion of time’ 
are presented as forms of eucharistic homage to the ‘ancestral pneuma’ of ‘the writing chap 
of the psalter’ (124, 125). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 In his defence of the possibility of The Interpretation of Dreams, the work of the dream interpreter 
is related by Freud with the attempt to read a ‘a graith uncouthrement of postmantuam glasseries’: 
‘Like some letter in cipher, the dream-inscription when scrutinised closely loses its first look of 
balderdash and takes on the aspect of a serious, intelligible message’, he quotes the remarks of J. 
Sully (FW 113; 46). 
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II. Bard 
The Annexandreian captive conquest: the quest for the true Homer [FW 318.11] 
 
The “death of the Author” as well as art that the abundance of authors and 
pretenders in Alexandria intimated and foretold, was concurrent with the formulation of the 
pivotal question of authorship that destabilised the ideal unity of culture that the Greeks 
symbolised; a question that continues to both divide and preserve the critical and cultural 
industry. ‘The zenith of the historico-literary studies of the Greeks, and hence also of their 
point of greatest importance - the Homeric question - was reached in the age of the 
Alexandrian grammarians’, Nietzsche argued a few years before his publication of The Birth 
of Tragedy (Homer and Classical Philology 8). The ‘horizon defined by myths’ was broken 
up by ‘the Chorizontes’- the scholars of Homer ‘who represented the extreme limit of the 
scepticism of a few detached individuals of antiquity rather than antiquity itself considered 
as a whole’ and who ‘were tirelessly on the lookout for discrepancies’ that were attributed 
not to Homer, but ‘to those who committed his words to writing and those who sang them’ 
(8-9). 
The coincidence of the one and the many was dissolved with this question: the 
cultural and national unity that Homer had represented was now challenged by the 
transhistorical dissemination, division and revision of his work. The novel asymptotic 
paradox, reflective of ‘a logic of disavowal’, is explicated by Paul Bishop through reference 
to Thomas de Quincey’s acerbic remark: “Some say, ‘There never was such a person as 
Homer.’ – ‘No such person as Homer! On the contrary’, say others, ‘there were scores’” 
(13). While prior to this age ‘an immense flood of great epics had been identified with the 
name of Homer’ - a misconception reflective of ‘the inability to create a personality’ that 
distinguished the mythical thinking of the primitive mind - following the conception of the 
question of the personality of Homer ‘a certain standard of inner harmony [was] everywhere 
presupposed in the manifestations of the personality’: everything ‘below this standard and 
opposed to this inner harmony [was] at once swept aside as un-Homeric’ (Nietzsche, Homer 
10). 
Nietzsche’s conception of the role of the philologist and his relation to that of the 
philosopher as well as the artist, is reconfigured through his answer to but also reformulation 
of this question. Similarly, Vico’s New Science opens by highlighting the grave consequence 
of the disregard of this question: ‘Our previous ignorance of the true Homer kept hidden 
from us the true origins and institutions in three ages’; an enigma that philology- ‘the science 
of everything that depends on human volition’ is singularly qualified to solve (4). The 
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‘mockers’ of philology who consider it to be ‘merely a useless, harmless, and inoffensive 
pastime, an object of laughter and not of hate’ are defied by Nietzsche by highlighting the 
momentousness of this question that must be raised despite [Romantic] protests against the 
‘spirit of negation’ of ‘scholastic barbarism’ that ‘has become a destructive and iconoclastic 
principle’, ‘scatter[ing] Homer's laurel crown to the winds’ (2, 5, 6, 5, 4).  
However, while Nietzsche emphasised like Vico the significance of the critical 
‘method of evaporating apparently concrete personalities’ and ‘recognis[ing] condensed 
beliefs in the apparently firm, immobile figures’, he also admired ‘the wonderful capability 
of the soul of a people to represent the conditions of its morals and beliefs in the form of a 
personality’ (7). The ‘real “Homeric question”’, Nietzsche argued, is ‘the central problem of 
the personality’: ‘Was the person created out of a conception, or the conception out of a 
person?’ (11). The paradox of the coincidence of the one and the many and Vico’s 
“negative” philology are overshadowed by the mystery of the personality; a mystery that 
Nietzsche compares to the law of gravity: ‘As it is difficult for us at the present day, and 
necessitates a serious effort on our part, to understand the law of gravitation clearly … it 
likewise costs us some trouble to obtain a clear impression of that wonderful problem which, 
like a coin long passed from hand to hand, has lost its original and highly conspicuous 
stamp’ (11). ‘To conclude purely negatively from the positive absence of political odia and 
monetary requests that its page cannot ever have been a penproduct of a man or woman of 
that period or those parts is only one more unlooked-for conclusion leaped at’, the scholar of 
the letter in the Wake similarly cautions, pointing out like Nietzsche ‘another cant to the 
questy’ by suggesting the ‘longly’ inspection of ‘a quite everydaylooking stamped addressed 
envelope’ (108-9). 
Vico’s ‘search for the true Homer’ among ‘the multitude of the Greek peoples’, is 
rejected by Nietzsche as merely ‘a bridge over this problem’ (12). The death of the author 
that Vico like Spinoza hinted at by problematising the notion of authorship- the authorship of 
Scripture in particular, is not only a consequence of history for Nietzsche, but also an omen 
of the dawn of “aesthetics”. 70 The mythical unity and concreteness that disregards the 
individual in a world of becoming rather than being, mystically embraced by the name of the 
author, is replaced by aesthetic wholeness. While Nietzsche acknowledges that ‘in Homer 
the modern world, I will not say has learnt, but has examined, a great historical point of 
view’, he underlines the confusion of history and aesthetics in the treatment of this question: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 ‘The aim of Book III of the New Science, “Discovery of the True Homer” is, in common with the 
aim of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise, to undermine the authority of Scripture’, James 
Morrison argues in his comparison of the use of history by these two philosophers (55). 
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‘Homer as the composer of the Iliad and the Odyssey is not a historical tradition, but an 
aesthetic judgment’ (7, 18).  
The contrast between ‘Poetical works, which cause the hearts of even the greatest 
geniuses to fail when they endeavour to vie with them, and in which unsurpassable images 
are held up for the admiration of posterity’ and ‘the poet who wrote them with only a hollow, 
shaky name’ is similarly presented by Nietzsche as a consequence of the confusion of history 
and aesthetics and of a conception of personality that stipulates unity, following ‘the 
surprisingly rapid development of the Greek feeling for beauty’ (11, 19). ‘The design of an 
epic such as the Iliad is not an entire whole, not an organism’, Nietzsche argues, ‘but a 
number of pieces strung together, a collection of reflections arranged in accordance with 
aesthetic rules’: ‘The Iliad is not a garland, but a bunch of flowers’- a ‘buncskleydoodle’ (20; 
FW 258). ‘Those, therefore, who look for the “original and perfect design” are looking for a 
mere phantom’- an anthropomorphic phantom that haunts aesthetics (Homer 21). ‘The 
infinite profusion of images and incidents in the Homeric epic’ intimates for Niezsche ‘that 
such a wide range of vision is next to impossible. Where, however, a poet is unable to 
observe artistically with a single glance, he usually piles conception on conception, and 
endeavours to adjust his characters according to a comprehensive scheme’ (20). ‘Bygmester 
Finnegan’ may have ‘lived in the broadest way immarginable’, but as a poet- a ‘man of hod, 
cement and edifices’, he ‘piled buildung supra buildung pon the banks for the livers’ (FW 4). 
 ‘[T]he real Homeric deed, the real Homeric epoch-making event’ is not that of ‘that 
stringing together of some pieces’, Nietzsche argues, distinguishing the ‘designer’ from ‘the 
real poet’: ‘everything which was created in those times with conscious aesthetic insight, 
was infinitely inferior to the songs that sprang up naturally in the poet's mind and were 
written down with instinctive power’ (20-1). Drawing the author away from rationalism and 
unwilling to identify him with an ‘ideal eternal history’, or even a ‘history of human ideas’, 
the death of the author in Nietzsche’s account personifies the surrender of the philologist’s 
rights to language. Homer, he concludes, ‘sacrificed his name on the altar of the primeval 
father of the Homeric epic, Homeros’; the genius like the philologist is a “hostage” to 
language: ‘neither a Muse nor a Grace, but a messenger of the gods’ (22, 24). 
In a final act of surrender, Nietzsche’s “theory” is submitted to philosophy, ‘in 
which everything individual and isolated is evaporated as something detestable, and in which 
great homogeneous views alone remain’, and to its ideal ‘community’: ‘Now, therefore, that 
I have enunciated my philological creed, I trust you will give me cause to hope that I shall no 
longer be a stranger among you: give me the assurance that in working with you towards this 
end I am worthily fulfilling the confidence with which the highest authorities of this 
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community have honoured me’ (25). Like the Professor who pleads with his listeners 
following his delivery of the fable of the Mookse and the Gripes to ‘insure me that I am a 
mouth’s more deserving case by genius’, ‘As I have now successfully explained to you my 
own naturalborn rations which are even in excise of my vaultybrain’, the philologist is the 
“genius” of modernity in his search for origins and ‘naturalborn rations’ (FW 159). But the 
inability or perhaps unwillingness of both the artist and the critic to disappear within the 
‘wrunes’ of language - Shem’s ‘corrosive sublimation’ and the professor’s “enunciation”, 
like the ‘assumptinome’ of the Allmookse - exposes their artifice (184, 153). 
The quest for the author in the Wake similarly begins philologically with a search 
among the ‘bynames’ that ‘was put under him, in lashons of languages’ ‘in the presurnames 
prodromarith period’ (29, 30). Invoking the authority of ‘the best authenticated version, the 
Dumlat [Talmud for those not used to reading boustrophedon]’ to repudiate ‘once for all 
those theories from older sources’, the narrator of the second chapter distinguishes himself as 
a Holy Writer (30). Endeavouring to unearth, outline and report the ‘genesis of Harold or 
Humphrey Chimpden’s occupational agnomen’, his task is riddled with the paradoxes of the 
dual genealogy of Christ: his divine descent from “a transcendent multitude” that disrupts 
the ideas of “difference” and “otherness” and deconstructs but does not dispense with the 
idea of the “person”, and his human descent- an ‘abramanation’ [an abomination as well as 
an emanation from Abraham] that requires the exegete’s negotiation of moral, legal, national 
and denominational questions (30, 26). 
As an exegete of the ‘longawaited Messiagh of roaratorios’ and ‘vilest bogeyer but 
most attractionable avatar the world has ever had to explain for’ - Hosty prior to his 
Eucharistic sacrifice, before he was ‘viersefied and piersified’ and ‘hoisted’ in the ‘chalice 
for the Loud Fellow’ - he is also faced with the philological version of the paradox of this 
coincidence of the one and the many that the figure of Homer presented to the Alexandrian 
scholars: the difficulty of reconciling language, style, content, history, tradition and morality, 
but also ascribing these to a single individual (41, 42, 31). ‘[H]umile, commune and 
ensectuous from his nature’, Harold or Humphrey like Christ and Homer embodies the 
metaphysical paradox and the coincidence of contraries in the mythical symbol (29). 
The ‘aim of Hellenistic criticism’, as a later Homeric scholar, Friedrich Wolf, 
protested, had not been the ‘preservation of the text as a historical document’ but 
‘improvement of the text as a literary masterpiece’: ‘they worked harder to ensure that he 
never seemed inconsistent or weak, often removing verses, elsewhere adding polish where 
none belonged’ (Grafton 112). The successors of the Alexandrians, indeed became aware 
that not only had the Homeric epics been altered by ‘those who committed his words to 
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writing and those who sang them’, but also that ‘the Athenian written text had been further 
altered, emended, cut and added to by early revisers, or diaskeuastai, and above all by such 
Hellenistic critics as Zenodotus, Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus’, and therefore 
‘A modern editor could only hope to restore the Alexandrian vulgate. He could never know 
which sections really went back to Homer’ (110).  
The “real” Homer for Wolf as for Nietzsche is not the hero ‘in a greak esthate 
phophiar’- the Greek decadent and feeble aesthete: ‘the songs that sprang up naturally in the 
poet’s mind and were written down with instinctive power’ have disappeared behind a 
‘poisoning volume of cloud barrage’ (Homer 21; 343). As ‘all they who heard or 
redelivered’, ‘are now with that family of bards and Vergobretas himself and the crowd of 
Caraculacticors as much no more as be they not yet now or had they notever been’, the saga 
of ‘poor Osti-Fosti’ is pronounced ‘all falsetissues antilibellous and nonactionable’ (48). 
Modernity mourns the loss of tradition while simultaneously doubting both its consequence 
and authenticity. In the absence of its original actors, the ‘zouave players of Inkermann’, the 
historian reluctantly turns to aesthetics: to ‘the persins sin this Eyrawyggla saga’ and their 
‘fishabed ghoatstory of the haardly creditable edventyres’ (48, 51). The theorist not only 
struggles in ‘slopperish matter, given the wet and low visibility’ of the tales ‘to idendifine 
the individuone’, but is also faced with a host of popular bardic orators who dress with 
‘mythical habiliments’ and ‘spectral appealingness’ ‘Our Farfar and Arthor of our doyne’ 
with the ‘Dyas in [their] machina’, and ‘timesport’ their audience with the popularity of the 
journalist of Sporting Times, ‘across the yawning (abyss)’ (51, 52, 56, 52, 55, 56). 
The modern audience, however, is not so easily ‘sinduced’ by tales of ‘some lazy 
skald or maundering pote’, seeking rather ‘the pragma’ and the ‘formal cause’, conscious 
that ‘the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our certitude, the 
evidencegivers by legpoll too untrustworthily irreperible where his adjugers are semmingly 
freak threes but his judicandees plainly minus twos’; the numbers do not add up and ‘We 
have grown out of Wilde and paradoxes’, as Mulligan tells Haines (3, 56, 57, U 21). 
Growing tired of the ‘pseudojocax axplanation[s]’ of the ‘gentlewriter’ and calling for him to 
‘roll away the reel world’, ‘the real Us’ suspects forgery: ‘We seem to us (the real Us!) too 
be reading our Amenti in the sixth sealed chapter of the going forth by black’ (FW 63, 64, 
62). ‘Come on, ordinary man with that large big nonobli head, and that blanko berbecked 
fischial ekksprezzion Machinsky Scapolopolos, Duzinascu or other. Your machelar's leg's 
getting musclebound from being too pulled’, the common reader is warned (64). 
In his relentless endeavour to ‘analectralyse that very chymerical combination’, the 
modern exegete, a scholar of scholars like Wolf, reveals the historical bias of his own 
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methodological ideals: the “Higher Criticism” of German Biblical scholarship in the 
eighteenth century that focused on the historical reconstruction of Scripture (67). 71 While in 
Vico’s philological analysis - the study of ‘the history of words in various languages’ which 
correspond to ‘the sequence of human institutions’ - historical knowledge was what the 
Homeric epics disclosed (rather than philosophical), history became the object of an 
epistemological investigation for historicism (98). While ‘the priority of the spiritual sense’ 
guided the method of the patristic and medieval commentator, the modern demand for and 
debate regarding the historical authenticity of Scripture complicates the task of the modern 
interpreter; truth must correspond with facts for the ‘factferreters’ who examine the events 
with ‘intouristing anterestedness’ (Minnis 47; FW 55). The exegete of Haromphrey is 
plagued with the historical ‘kersse of Wolafs’, and his “method” similarly amalgamates the 
Jewish and the Greek traditions (319). The ‘fata which we read in sibylline’ [the facts but 
also fate, face and speech - fatum], however, must still reflect an ideal balance and draw a 
clear line of distinction ‘between the fas and its nefas’ - the lawful and the unlawful; a 
dualism that demarcates both narrative and historical time (31). 72  
Although a ‘homogenius man’ according to ‘a pious author’, H.C.E.’s Dionysian 
‘onesomeness’ gets him into trouble; ‘conceive[d]’ by ‘his detractors’- ‘an imperfectly 
warmblooded race’, as ‘a great white caterpillar capable of any and every enormity in the 
calendar recorded’, he is identified with Wildean profligacy (34, 33). The dubious historical 
authenticity of the text in the Wake and suspect methods of the ‘biografiend[s]’ are as in 
Wilde’s tale of the quest for the true Mr W. H. linked with deviancy and corruption, but are 
also skillfully deployed to absolve the ‘besieged’ author of the crimes that his creations - ‘an 
inversion of a [Alexandrian] phallopharos’ - are synonymous with (55, 75, 77). The sacrifice 
of the author’s humanity in order to conserve and reveal the truth - historical, philosophical 
or theological - that as Wilde’s story had dramatised the nature of the quest compels, is 
refused. 73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Drawing attention to the significance of Jewish Bible exegesis in Alexandria, Maren Niehoff 
highlights that this dialogue between the two cultures had much earlier roots: ‘Homer’s epics as well 
as well as Moses’ Torah were foundational texts, irrespective of whether their canonicity was 
precisely the same, and as such prompted a large corpus of minute interpretations in their respective 
communities of readers. The hermeneutics developed in both contexts emerged in a similar historical 
environment and followed surprisingly similar rules’ (3). 
72 A two-fold question is asked: ‘Are those their fata which we read [during] the fas and its nefas’, and 
‘Are those their fata [that are placed] between the fas and its nefas’. 
73 The endeavour of exegetes ‘to establish the priority of the spiritual sense … over the historical or 
literal sense’ resulted according to Minnis in the neglect of the humanity of the authors of Biblical 
writings: ‘The notion of the auctor as an agent engaged in literary activity was submerged; the truth of 
the Bible was maintained at the expense of its human contributors’ (47, 72).  
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In the rejection of sacrifice and dramatisation of the “hesitency” between necessity 
and convention, ‘accidental manners and humours’ and ‘the everlasting hopes, desires and 
hates of us’, Joyce like Wilde positions his drama on the borders between comedy and 
tragedy, individualism and socialism (OCPW 23-5). With the aid of Vico’s philological 
investigation and his Brunian solution to this debate in his claim that the ‘Greek peoples 
were themselves Homer’, Joyce like Vico ‘acquit[s] [the author] of all the charges which 
critics have brought against him. Particularly the following: base and uninspired statements, 
boorish manner, crude similes, local idioms, metrical liberties, dialectical inconsistencies, 
and his portrayal of men as gods and gods as men’ (382, 384). 
But although Joyce allows the author to get ‘lost in the multitude’ and relinquish his 
divinity, his absolution does not necessitate his renouncement of either his humanity or his 
philosophical credentials, although it does require a revision of the notion of subjectivity and 
authorship. In the ‘abnihilisation of the etym’, destruction and reconstruction of etymology 
[language and hermeneutics], the atom [the individual] and the etymon [the truth] are 
concurrent and interdependent operations (FW 353). The problematic notion of agency that 
the sinful human nature of authors had presented to the medieval exegetes and had been 
resolved by way of penitence and through a revision of the classical notion of inspiration - 
by means of an excision of ‘its Bacchic and irrationalist connotations’ - is reflected in the 
complexity and confusion of the genealogy of the Holy Writer in the Wake and in the pattern 
of fall and resurrection, appearance and disappearance (Burke, Authorship 7).  
Aware that authorship entails accountability as well as distinction, the narrator 
distances himself from the accounts that he chronicles, quoting the claims of other more 
‘learned scholarch[s]’: ‘the facts of his nominigentilisation as recorded and accolated in both 
or either of the collateral andrewpaulmurphyc narratives’, directing the reader to his 
“sources” (31). But lacking credible sources and witnesses, he has to contend like Vico with 
the author’s ‘barbarous’ contemporaries ‘who have the mental weakness of children, the 
vigorous imagination of women, and the seething passions of violent youths’ (355). The 
author, moreover, shared their ‘savage feelings and customs’, taking ‘much pleasure in wine’ 
and ‘comfort in drunkenness’, spending his time ‘inventing old wives’ tales, suitable for 
children’, creating ‘capricious gods and heroes’, ‘bloody battles’ and ‘great variety of 
extravagantly cruel kinds of slaughter, which constitute the particular sublimity’ of primeval 
aesthetics and raise ‘doubts’ in Vico’s scientific mind about the ‘sublime and esoteric 
wisdom’ of this ‘folksforefather’: a ‘practical jokepiece and retired cecelticocommediant in 
his own wise’ (358, 356, 355; FW 33). 
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Unable to reconcile ‘so many refined customs with the many wild and savage ones’, 
Vico concludes that ‘the Homeric epics were composed and revised by several hands in 
several ages’ (359, 363). In the absence of aesthetic unity, Vico seeks ‘the outlines of an 
ideal eternal history’ (5). Vico’s historical method and his presentation of history as ‘a direct 
expression of the truth’, however, relies on an idea of nationality and community - a 
“conscienza” - that the modern author has to ‘forge in the smithy of [his] soul’ (366; P 276). 
The ‘singleminded supercrowd’ among which the hero gradually disappears, is as fictional 
as the portrait of the artist that is painted (42). Haromphreyld’s [három is three in Hungarian, 
McHugh observes] ‘biografiend’ does not go so far as to identify him with the populace, 
although he credits ‘the truly catholic assemblage’ with his ‘universalisation’ through its 
interpretation of his signature: ‘the sigla H.C.E’ as ‘Here Comes Everybody’ (31, 55, 32). 
The endless catalogues of reports, the web of tales, rumours and gossip, the mythical and 
evolutionary metamorphoses that are recorded, the perpetual performances that are staged 
and the riotous nature of the assemblage that always has a battle or a bottle ‘in the 
baccbuccus of [its] mind’, frustrate both the quest for the true author and any stable notion of 
a community that seeks to set ‘the laurel of genius’ upon its ‘empty heads’ (118; Nietzsche, 
Homer 15). ‘There's a cabful of bash indeed in the homeur that meal’, we are warned; in any 
indictment of the author and any attempt to “measure” his ‘amossive’ [massive, but also 
amusive and mossy] proportions (FW 34, 33). Like the ‘proteiform’ of the author and his 
‘graph’, community and nationality are continually reconstituted rather than ‘stolidly 
immobile’ (107, 163). 
As H.C.E.’s successors and interpreters are busy trying to ‘reamalgamerge’ him and 
“hypostasise” ‘by substintuation [his] axiomatic orerotundity’ through philosophical 
theories, quarelling and despairing about the ‘falsemeaning adamelegy’ they are faced with 
and ‘the facts of his nominigentilisation as recorded and accolated in both or either of the 
collateral andrewpaulmurphyc narratives’, ‘that patternmind, that paradigmatic ear’, has to 
himself assume the task of composing ‘while he mourned the flight of his wild guineese a 
long list (now feared in part lost) to be kept on file of all abusive names he was called’ in 
order to preserve his ‘the canonicity of his existence’, aware of the mythical potency of his 
name (49, 55, 77, 31, 70, 71, 100). While remaining ‘Wholyphamous’, the poet is also 
‘nobodyatall’ for his modern skeptical audience and its ‘Nichtian glossery which purveys 
aprioric roots for aposterious tongues’ - a language emptied of both aesthetic and historical 
wholeness (72, 81). 
Dismissing ‘the fallacy, as punical as finikin, that it was not the king kingself but his 
inseparable sisters, uncontrollable nighttalkers, Skertsiraizde with Donyahzade, who 
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afterwards, when the robberers shot up the socialights’ became ‘amusers’ in ‘a pantalime’ 
[pantaloon and pantomime], the chronicler of H.C.E. struggles, nevertheless, to discern not 
only the nature of the ancient theatrical performance that he “records”- documents and 
remembers, but also to distinguish between the spectators and the protagonists (32). 
Haromphrey grows so large that he is not only the protagonist - ‘our worldstage's practical 
jokepiece’ - but also takes up the whole audience: ‘on every point far outstarching the 
laundered clawhammers and marbletopped highboys of the pit stalls and early amphitheatre’, 
in an even more ‘cecelticocommediant’ version of Stephen’s early dramatic performance as 
both witness and protagonist in his own wake (33). The ‘shomers’ are indistinguishable from 
both the Homers and the showmen; the song “A Nation Once Again” from the nation that 
‘wants a gaze’ (34, 43). 74 
Like Nietzsche’s philological analysis of the fate of art in modernity, the modern 
tragedy of the rupture of the unity of culture is both mythologised and dramatised. In the 
repeated disintegration of the tragic plot into farce, the cultural malaise discerned by 
Nietzsche is thematised but also exposed as a “recognition” that the structure of the play 
staged itself elicits; the prominence of repetition over recognition discloses the metaphysical 
ground of art. Rather than a vehicle for a philosophic recognition, the meaning of art is 
inseparable from its ‘eternal recurrence’ - historical as well as mythical - through 
performance and interpretation. This “meaninglessness” of art, however, that is reflected in 
the ‘Nichtian’ language of the Wake, is not nihilistic through its very refusal of a revelation 
(81). 
Transience, which distinguishes modern art entangled in ‘the enormous driving-
wheel of logical Socratism’, and modern philosophy ‘In disclosing time as the ground hidden 
from self-understanding’, is also what separates comedy from tragedy (BT 47; Gadamer 86). 
Whereas ‘In tragedy the eternal substance of things emerges victorious in a reconciling way, 
because it strips away from the conflicting individuals only their false one-sidedness, while 
the positive elements in what they willed it displays as what is to be retained, without 
discord but affirmatively harmonized’, ‘In comedy there comes before our contemplation, in 
the laughter in which the characters dissolve everything, including themselves, the victory of 
their own subjective personality which nevertheless persists self-assured’, in Hegel’s genre 
distinction (Lectures on Fine Art 1199). The subject both ‘persists self-assured’ and is 
revealed as ‘self-dissolving’ in comedy, as in Joyce’s ‘pantalime’ (FW 32). In the ‘infinite 
light-heartedness and confidence’ of comedy, the subject is released ‘above his own inner 
contradiction’- a release that ‘A narrow and pedantic mind is least of all capable of … when 
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for others his behaviour is laughable in the extreme’ (Lectures on Fine Art 1200). But even 
though the ‘petty and futile aims’ of comedy allow the subject to escape unscathed - 
‘because what the individual willed was something inherently trivial, he is not ruined in fact 
when his purpose fails but can surmount this disaster with cheerfulness undisturbed’ - the 
end of comedy itself is not insubstantial: ‘In a comic action the contradiction between what 
is absolutely true and its realization in individuals is posed more profoundly. Yet what is 
destroyed in this solution cannot be either fundamental principle or individual character’ 
(1201). This is indeed what distinguishes comedy from Romantic irony: while the comic is 
‘limited to bringing to nothing what is in itself null, a false and self-contradictory 
phenomenon; for instance, a whim, a perversity, or particular caprice, set over against a 
mighty passion’, ‘The ironical, as ‘genial’ individuality, consists in the self-annihilation of 
what is noble, great, and excellent’ (Aesthetics 73).  
Joyce’s extraction of such ‘contradictory contrasts’ upon which ‘the comical rests’ 
from Bruno’s philosophy as a ready-made formula ‘to explique to ones the significat of their 
exsystems’, allows both the deferment of the resolution of contrasts and the dissolution of 
the profound realisation through the comprehensive applicability of the theory (FW 147). 
Cusa’s coincidence of nothing with everything, with God Himself, moreover, allows the 
evasion of the nihilistic implications of the perpetual dissolution that Joyce borrows from 
Vico’s system. Bruno’s philosophy, moreover, is central to Joyce’s interpretation of the 
philosophical either/or of the philological question of authorship, highlighting the confusion 
of philology and philosophy in the formulation of the question. The “modern” philosophy of 
Bruno had similarly exploited and exploded the “hesitency” dramatised in the paradox of the 
philosophical genre of tragedy: the sacrifice of the ‘insignificant, without effect’ ‘sign’ for 
the revelation of ‘original matter’ ‘in its weakness’, through the dissolution of the dualism of 
the One and the many (Hölderlin 89). Himself a dramatist, an ‘Academico di nulla 
academia, detto il fastidito in tristitia hilaris, hilaritate tristis’, as Bruno had described 
himself in the preface to his comedy “The Torchbearer”, he presented the transgression of 
limits as a principle of creativity and ‘absolute possibility’, and refused to allow ‘the term 
‘person’’ to be subsumed by a metaphysical abstraction- ‘a quidam’ ‘topantically anonymos’ 
that Enlightenment philosophy reinvented as “Truth” (McIntyre 19, 172; Rowland 58; FW 
33, 34). 75 
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 Homer for Joyce, as for Samuel Butler, is synonymous with humour- ‘homeur’, and 
therefore the question of “the personality” of the author that philology has ‘effectually 
concealed behind [an] impenetrable hedge of dullness’, focusing on ‘the force of the 
zeugma, and of the enclitic particle yε’ is central to his work (FW 34; Butler 53). In the 
absence of the author who ‘morphomelosophopancreates’ and his ‘intimologies’, it is indeed 
the ‘hilariohoot’ that takes over (88, 101, 92). In an inversion of Nietzsche’s paradigm, 
moreover, the ‘luciferant’ ‘stage thunkhard’ who is unable to understand, pronounce and 
remember ‘in his secondmouth language’ ‘the bigtimer’s verbaten words’ as ‘the hour of the 
twattering of bards in the twitterlitter’ has passed as a modern theoretical man, and is instead 
seen ‘accompanied by his trusty snorler and his permanent reflection verbigracious’ 
‘studying castelles in the blowne’, ‘studding cowshots over the noran’ and trying to 
‘reamalgamerge’ ‘the centuple celves of [his] egourge’, is not distinguished by his “cheerful 
optimism”, as his interest in Bruno and Cusa also highlight (35, 49, 37, 49). But both his 
encounters with his bardic ‘folksforefather’ and the ‘musaic dispensation’ [Mosaic, mosaic, 
musical, and inspired by the muses] that ‘he spat in careful convertedness’ having ‘musefed 
with his thockits’, are the catalyst of countless ‘tales within wheels and stucks between 
spokes’, “inspiring” the ‘gossiple’ of the ‘Messiagh of roaratorios’ that ‘resnored alcoh 
alcoho alcoherently’ while ‘the shavers in the shaw the yokels in the yoats or, well, the 
wasters in the wilde’ are busy polishing their relics - ‘furbishing potlids, doorbrasses, 
scholars’ applecheeks and linkboy’s metals’ - becomes the ‘lay of the vilest bogeyer but 
most attractionable avatar the world has ever had to explain for’ (32, 37, 247, 38, 41, 42). 
 
 
ii. Dies is Dorminus: How our myterbilder his fullen aslip [FW 609.28, 377.26] 
 
A prudent chief not always must display 
His pow’rs in equal ranks, and fair array, 
But with th’ occasion and the place comply, 
Conceal his force, nay, seem sometimes to fly. 
Those oft are stratagems which Errors seem,  
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream. 
(Pope, Essay on Criticism, Part I, 175-180) 
 
The reader of the Wake, however, is more likely to agree with ‘ahorace’, who admitted that 
he too gets annoyed when the great Homer nods off: ‘et idem / indignor quandoque bonus 
dormitat Homerus’ (FW 325; Ars Poetica 354-60). Although the bardic ‘folksforefather’ is 
awakened and resurrected recurrently throughout the Wake, as language has been put ‘to 
sleep’ his wake is the cause of more confusion (33; JJ 546). Revived in II.3 through the 
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‘enginium’ of modern science, the ‘mysterbolder’ is ‘eclectrically filtered for allirish earths 
and ohmes’ through a ‘tolvtubular high fidelity daildialler’, ‘so as to lall’ even ‘the bygone 
dozed’ (309-10). His ‘howdrocephalous enlargement’ successfully ‘pinnatrate[s] inthro an 
auricular forfickle’, ‘lill the lubberendth of his otological life’- if not ontological, and he 
‘immerge[s]’ like Shakespeare in “Circe” as ‘a mirage in a merror’: ‘myrioheartzed’ rather 
than myriadminded (310, 332). 
As Hayman notes, the ear of this bard appears to be both ‘loudspeaker and 
receptacle’- ‘a vitaltone speaker’, unfortunately also ‘capable of capturing skybuddies, 
harbour craft emittences, key clickings, viaticum cleaners’, but also both ‘public and private’ 
(in Crispi and Slote eds. 26; FW 309). The tales emitted from the ear of ‘this ale of man’ as 
‘a movement of catharic emulsipotion’, are like all narratives that take place in a pub in 
Joyce’s work “inspirited” by alcohol and therefore are a collective production of 
‘Porterfillyers and spirituous suncksters’: ‘Group drinkards maaks grope thinkards’ (371, 
313). As it is uncertain, moreover, whether the tale narrated ‘was not before athwartships’, 
like the “Oxen” chapter of Ulysses, the voice of the Author is inseparable from that of the 
Holy Writer(s); the tale is a joint effort of the bard and his scholiasts, aided also by 
mechanical devices that are given a voice as in “Aeolus”: ‘were it not for that dielectrick, 
were upon the point of obsoletion’ (322). The ‘tolk’ [an interpreter in Danish] is 
simultaneously its interpretation; everything that is repeatedly “sagd” in this telling is part of 
the saga that is threatened by an ‘Annexandreian captive conquest’ (317, 332, 318). Even the 
bard is challenged to ‘show you’re a skolar’ by giving drinks to his customers [a skaal is a 
toast in Danish, McHugh notes] (326). Even ‘if that he hids foregodden has nate of glozery 
farused ameet [passed among] the florahs of the follest’, as the dramatist of the play of Butt 
and Taff remarks, ‘his spent fish’s livid smile giving allasundery [all and sundry and 
Alexandrian] the bumfit of the doped’; the Homeric question that casts doubt on his night of 
glory as well as his glossery tricks his interpreters, although by giving them through his fishy 
discovery at Oxyrhynchus the benefit of the doubt, he also provides them with creative 
opportunities (339). 
The division of history by Vico into three ages and his use of ‘the etymologies of 
native words’ to show that they ‘contain the history of the things they signify following a 
natural order of ideas’ is challenged by the synthetic language of the chapter (15). As the 
‘old relogion’s out of tiempor’ in the cyclical narrative of this epic - Iliad-like in its endless 
conflicts - all ages dissolve into a mythical present tense (317). Vico’s claim, therefore, that 
it is historically impossible that Homer was a philosopher is denied through language that 
‘motophosically’ contains all ages: ‘plinary indulgence makes colleunellas’- plenary, but 
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also viewing historical actors as models of universal truths (319). As the ‘drema’ of this 
‘lewdningbluebolteredallucktruckalltraumconductor’ takes place within language, the hero 
of this tale emerges ‘like the dud spuk [a spook and a joke in Norwegian (spøke)] of his first 
foetotype’ (69, 378). 
Both the form and the content of the narrative also become increasingly more 
theatrical and like the symposium in the National Library in Ulysses, the ‘dielectrick’ turns 
recurrently into a play (322). The customers turn into the ‘Chorus’ and witness the tragic 
‘Scaald[ing]’ of ‘ahorace’ (324-5). The teller and the witness indeed become, in a Biblical 
manner, indistinguishable ‘under all the gaauspices’ (332). The resurrection of the bard that 
turns into a reenactment of his ‘sulphuring’, moreover, like the phantasmagoria of “Circe” 
becomes a liturgical celebration, in the ‘methylogical’ [methy - drunkeness (gr)] mission of 
the pub Host to provide drinks and tales for his customers as ‘a parrotsprate’s [parish 
priest’s] cure for ensevelised [uncivilized] lethargies [liturgies]’ (353, 373, 334). As the 
stage is ‘set by ritual rote for the grimm grimm tale’, the ‘cyclums cyclorums’ become 
liturgical; with ‘enterellbo add all taller Danis’, the celebrant enters both the altar and 
language (Danish)- philosophically, as the reference to Kierkegaard suggests (335). 
Transported through the eloquence of the teller: ‘We are once amore as babes 
awondering in a wold made fresh where with the hen in the storyaboot we start from 
scratch’, the listeners of the epic tales become witnesses of the original event, and indeed 
also participants; they become true “theorists” (336). As Gadamer explains, ‘the concept of 
sacral communion’ ‘lies behind the original Greek concept of theoria’: ‘Theoros means 
someone who takes part in a delegation to a festival’ (121). The customers indeed become 
heroes through their positioning as witnesses of ‘a theogamyjig incidence’ (FW 332). In the 
Christian epics, Balsamo argues, ‘the experience of the individual subject’ is similarly 
presented ‘as a definitive revelation of the ultimate reality of human existence and thereby 
also of divinity’ (Tradition of Christian Epics 15). This is made possible, as William Franke 
explains, through a ‘phenomenological reduction’ that ‘identifies the real with what appears 
in experience’ (156-7). But in the Wake it is the ‘anononously’ [ever and anon and 
anonymously] multivalent language that makes this revelation possible, without the aid of 
phenomenology (367). As ‘There’s a split in the infinitive from to have to have been to will 
be’, as the children learn in their grammar lesson, the ‘photognomist’ ‘Nolan of the 
Calabashes’ is both a photographer and a protagonist (271). Shem indeed notes in the margin 
that in ‘The Eroico Furioso’ the Nolan was himself both hero and theorist, as the confusion 
with Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso highlights (336). 
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As this modern audience, however, is not so easily impressed by the feats of the 
mythical heroes - ‘what matter what all his freudzay or who holds his hat to harm him’ - and 
demands ‘the truce, the old truce and nattonbuff the truce’, the tale has to be recast as a 
romance in order to capture their attention (336). A (kinetic) “object” of aesthetic 
contemplation is presented to them: ‘Imagine twee cweamy wosen. Suppwose you get a 
beautiful thought and cull them sylvias sub silence. Then inmaggin a stotterer. Suppoutre 
him to been one biggermaster Omnibil. Then lustily (tutu the font and tritt on the bokswoods 
like gay feeters's dance) immengine up to three longly lurking lobstarts’ (336-7). Still not 
impressed, they call for a pantomimic performance to be ‘teilweisioned’ (345). Butt and 
Taff, the performers of this production dramatise the confusion between teller and 
protagonist, witness and audience, and as Hayman observes, the stage directions further add 
to the confusion as they ‘function more as asides than instructions. Like those in “Circe” but 
more so, they record what the protagonists might be imagining rather than what we might 
actually see on a television screen’ (How Joyce Wrote Finnegans Wake 274). Even the 
workings of the television screen become part of the drama: ‘Spraygun rakes and splits them 
from a double focus: grenadite, damnymite, alextronite, nichilite: and the scanning firespot 
of the sgunners traverses the rutilanced illustred sunksundered lines’ (349). 
As well as enacting the heroic tale, Butt and Taff become the incarnation of ‘Bud 
Budderly boddily’ as the increasingly carnal ‘longuewedge’ reflects (337, 339). The question 
of authorship merges with the question of the historicity of Christ, reflected in the 
concurrently historical and corporeal nature of language; Taff is pursued by both 
‘psychophannies’ and ‘psuckofumb[l]ers’ (340). The Shaun-like invective against a 
‘grandoper’ who ‘salubrate[d] himself with an ultradungs [orthodox] heavenly mass’, a 
‘potifex miximost’, is a parallel to the tale of the fall and the Passion (341, 345). Drama, 
history and theology become indistinguishable in the ‘howorodies’ [tragedies / Herodotus] 
that take place in language and the many spectacles that are staged (341). With all the 
‘awlphul omegrims’ [Alpla and Omega and awful migraines] that he goes through, Butt 
becomes a version of the Oedipal riddle: ‘in his difficoltous tresdobremient, he feels a 
bitvalike a baddlefall of staot but falls a batforlake a borrlefull of bare’ (348) He embodies 
the battle itself, the event that takes place, not just its actors. The incarnation of the Word 
gives way to an indiscriminate incarnation of words, and historical personages are turned 
into new words, like ‘Mr. Twomass Nohoholan’ who becomes an embodiment of his theory 
by merging with Aquinas (341). 
The drama of Buckley’s lack of ‘arts’ - ‘a marrer of act’ - to shoot the Russian 
General following the exposure of his ‘basemiddelism’ turns into a series of testimonies that 
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attempt oratorically by ‘passing the uninational truthbosh’ to gain the approval of the 
audience (344-5). The advent of the bardic progenitor who emerges through the television - 
‘Down the photoslope’ and ‘through the inconoscope’ - puts an end to the ‘druidful’ 
antagonism of Butt and Taff (349). Preceded by a ‘gaspel truce’, a photograph of ‘the figure 
of a fellowchap in the wohly ghast’ [fellowship of the Holy Ghost] appears like the 
apparition of Virag in “Circe” ‘Amid a fluorescence of spectracular mephiticism’ (349). This 
‘idolon’, an idol and spectre, ‘exhibisces the seals of his orders’, among which the ‘band and 
bucklings of the Martyrology of Gorman’ (349). An officiate ‘for the castomercies mudwake 
surveice’, his anticipated benediction and prophecy is rather a confession. Like Yawn who is 
wakened by the mamalujo to answer all their burning questions, the speech of this bard on 
the ‘hellscyown days’ when he went ‘hand to hand’ with a ‘jiggilyjugging’ ‘Homard 
Kayenne’ [Homer and Omar Khayyam], is a Wilde-like defence of ‘Mr Lhugewhite 
Cadderpollard’ against accusations that simultaneously exposes his culpability (349-50). 
Following this diversion for revelation of the sins of the father, the sketches of Butt 
and Taff that follow are distinguished by their attempts to find a fitting solution for the riddle 
that the confession of the ambiguous crime of the ‘panthoposopher’ generates (364). Taff 
‘effaces himself in favour of the idiology’ ‘in an effort towards autosotorisation’; the radio 
announces ‘The abnihilisation of the etym’; a Hegelian philosopher announces that Butt and 
Taff as ‘desprot slave wager and foeman feodal unshackled’ are ‘now one and the same 
person’; a theologian concludes as a critic of their performance that even though ‘he sung 
dumb in his glass darkly’, ‘speech lit face to face on allaround’; an ardent reader and admirer 
of ‘natural sins’ rather than ‘manmade Eonochs Cunstuntonopolies’, who is ‘enlivened 
toward the Author of Nature’ ‘on the lamatory’, reinterprets and redeems the “sin” of the 
Russian General, exclaiming upon contemplating his ‘naked I, for relieving purposes’, ‘I, my 
good grief, I am, I am big altoogooder’ (352, 353, 354, 357-8). But these fragmentary 
reflections from the ‘Holophullopopulace’ that follow the play are ended with the arrival of 
the mamalujo, the bard’s official interpreters: ‘a sixdigitarian legion on druid circle’, as the 
four turn into the twelve customers (342, 362). 
The ‘peeptomine’ of the four follows the radio interruptions that re-establish a 
connection with the outside world (361). This ‘fearsome foursome’ that for Budgen ‘is 
certainly one of the most astonishing of all Joyce’s grotesque inventions’ is presented as a 
very awkward blinkered chorus that is ‘Synopticked on the word’, rejecting the 
heterogeneity of ‘sorratelling’ (338; FW 367). The ‘foreretyred schoonmasters’ 
[schoolmasters and beautiful (schoon) in Dutch] arrive as witnesses, judges and interpreters 
and distinguish themselves by their detached theoretical perspective, masking their 
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‘lunguings’ under ‘the deprofundity of multimathematical immaterialities’ and a 
‘higherdimissional selfless Allself’ (395, 396, 394-5). The pistol that turns into an epistle is 
transformed by these scholars into ‘Epistlemadethemology [epistemology and theology] for 
deep dorfy doubtlings’ (374). The narrative accounts are ‘anononously’ presented from the 
perspective of the ‘greatgrandgosterfosters’ who appear to tautologically ‘splane splication’ 
for the ‘sublation of compensation in the radification of interpretation’, searching for 
‘Aletheometry’ although ‘none none in the house his geust has guest’ (368-70). 
Performing a ‘glutany of stainks’ [a version of a litany of saints] for the trinitarian 
fellowship of ‘Porterfillyers and spirituous suncksters’, they put an end to his ‘methylogical 
mission’: ‘Stop his laysense. Ink him!’ (371, 373). They tear him apart Eucharistically like 
Osiris to demonstrate ‘how your mead of, mard [a man in Persian and a reference to a 
nursery rhyme in McHugh’s explication], is made of’, as he ‘canseels under veerious 
persons’ (374, 373). Once their ‘myterbilder [master, mitre, myth and mother (µήτηρ) 
builder] his fullen aslip’, his ‘flemsh’ is Eucharistically ‘toastified’; while his ‘sobsconcious 
inklings shadowed on soulskin’ are scrutinised as ‘thruming through all to himself with 
diversed tonguesed through his old tears and his ould plaised drawl’, his speech remains 
incomprehensible (376-7, 381). ‘[T]he gift of tongues’ that Joyce had ascribed to art is 
shown to be inaccessible under the shadow of the ‘their ouldmouldy gods’ (WD 86; FW 
382). Their shortcomings will be exhibited in the next chapter through their monologic 
“rememboring” that they proffer as a substitute of the bardic art, collapsing all temporal 
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III. Philosopher 
i.The nightly quisquiquock [FW 126.6] 
 
While German Romanticism reproved the ‘spirit of negation’ of Alexandrian 
scholarship - ‘the continually more and less intermisunderstanding minds of the 
anticollaborators’ that had ‘scattered Homer's laurel crown to the winds’ - the Alexandrians 
distinguished themselves as custodians of art, preserving the classical tradition for future 
generations, even at the cost of their own (Nietzsche, Homer 4; FW 118). But although 
universal implication in artistic matters characterised this society, ‘there have survived down 
to our own day comparatively few examples’ of their creations; ‘It is a somewhat ironic 
stroke of fate’, Barber observes, ‘that the generations which preserved and handed on to 
future ages the literary works of Classical Greece should have been unable to ensure the 
survival of their own writings, especially when those writings were to be numbered by 
thousands’ (in Bury et al. 23, 33).  
The excavations of Grenfell and Hunt unearthed in 1928, however, ‘large portions’ 
of the poetry of the most renowned Alexandrian lyric poet of this period, Callimachus 
(Schmitz 151). The discovery of the prologue to his longest poem- Aetia (Causes), ‘a series 
of aetiological legends connected with Greek history, customs, and rites’, presented a new 
set of ‘historical and biographical problems’ to his scholars who ‘gaddered togodder the 
odds docence of [their] vellumes’ ‘onto the lapse of his prolegs’ [prologue, insect leg and 
foretelling - prolexis (gr)] to identify Callimachus’ fictional opponents: ‘The malignant 
gnomes who write reviews in Rhodes’, ‘tone-deaf ignoramuses out of touch with the Muse’ 
and ‘brood of cirrhotic adepts’ who criticise Callimachus, as he claims in his poem, ‘because 
I have not consummated a continuous epic / of thousands of lines on heroes and lords / but 
turn out minor texts as if I were a child / although my decades of years are substantial’ 
(Pulbrook 44; FW 155; Callimachus 65). Admonishing such critics not to ‘snoop around here 
for a poem that rumbles’, he consolidates the proficiency of his method by claiming to have 
been visited by Apollo who joined him as a fellow poet ‘who love[s] / the cricket’s high 
chirping, not the noise of the jackass’.  
Although in his prologue he distinguishes his role as a poet from that of thundering 
Zeus – ‘for me delicate wings, dewsip in old age and bright air for food’ – he appears to 
confuse his role as a poet with that of the philosopher in his poem which both in term of 
form and content is philosophic. The poem ‘develops out of προβλήµατα: prose questions 
and answers in various fields of knowledge’, and with a modern self-consciousness of 
literary form, ‘Central to Callimachus’ enlarged conception are knowledge and the relations 
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between the narrator and his characters’ (Hutchinson 48). The objects of the inquiry, 
however, ‘are not philosophical but scholarly and entertainingly abstruse’. In an inversion of 
the form of the Platonic dialogue, which is ‘mostly driven by the wish of the superior partner 
to work out ideas’, ‘the inferior's desire for knowledge’ is the driving force in Callimachus’s 
poem.  
The introduction of the figure of the writer in the Wake is similarly philosophically 
framed- fittingly for a Joycean artist. Shem appears in chapter six of Book I as host and 
director of the ‘nightly quisquiquock of the twelve apostrophes’, but it is his ‘briefdragger’ 
that is given the role of Callimachus: ‘The echo is where in the back of the wodes; callhim 
forth!’ (126). While Joyce’s artist-hero Stephen is famous like Callimachus for ‘turn[ing] out 
minor texts’ [a villanelle] as a child, following the publication of Ulysses the Joycean artist 
shares more similarities with Callimachus’s arch-rival, the epic poet Apollonius of Rhodes 
who rivaled Homer’s Odyssey with his Argonautica. 76  The relationship between the 
participants gradually surfaces in Shem’s general knowledge quiz like that of Callimachus, 
overshadowing and dramatising the quest for knowledge, and registering similarly ‘an 
opposition between searches and struggles by characters for knowledge of information, 
tactics, and so forth, which are of great practical importance to them, and the narrator's 
searches for obscure scholarly facts’ (Hutchinson 49). The questioning subjects and the 
objects of inquiry collapse into one another, and the quest for knowledge assumes 
metaphysical dimensions in the unreasonable task set ‘to idendifine the individuone’, as the 
light of ‘philophosy’ is eclipsed by the Cloud of Unknowing of negative theology- or rather 
Shem’s ‘cloud Incertitude’: ‘Who do you no tonight lazy and gentleman?’ (51, 118, 178, 
126). 
The quiz opens with the question of authorship enigmatically reproposed and 
reformulated by Shem through a prodigious list of contraries, reflective of the 
‘drummatoysed’ ‘myther rector’s ‘illformation’: his literary ‘eatupus complex’ and 
theological ‘pentecostitis’ (133, 126, 128, 131). The allure of the mystery of the personality 
of the author- ‘the handwriting on his facewall, the cryptoconchoidsiphonostomata’, is 
reflected in the breadth of the ‘truly prural and plusible’ question that overshadows the 
‘disghost[ing]’ answer (134, 138, 136). Formulated with great difficulty in the boundlessness 
of the ‘variously catalogued, regularly regrouped’ subject, the question allows Shem to 
display his artistry in his presentation of this literary riddle and metaphysical mystery of 
‘apersonal problem, a locative enigma’ (129, 135). The quest to discover the true author is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Perhaps as a nod to Apollonius, the “Wandering Rocks”, Joyce’s supplementary chapter in Ulysses, 
is the route that Jason in the Argonautica chooses. Like the Argonautica, moreover, Finnegans Wake 
includes a love story in its journey and epic battles. 
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for Shem a creative opportunity in the combination of ‘truth and untruth’ that is necessary, as 
Shaun will admit in his own portrait of the artist (169). 
Art’s relation to truth and knowledge, the dominant enigma and obstacle in 
Stephen’s quest to become an author, is revisited through yet another philosophical dialogue 
and discussion in which the artist exploits the Socratic elenctic method. In a dramatisation 
and parody of this method, however, the staged dialectic is Brunian rather than logical, both 
in its use of coincidences of contraries as a method for determining identities and 
discovering facts, and in the rambling wrangles that break out between the interlocutors, 
diverting the line of inquiry. Although the form of this chapter also shares many similarities 
with the catechism of “Ithaca”, the quest for knowledge through the ‘use of raisin’ is not 
only exploded through the excess of information contained in both the questions and the 
answers, but also through the rivalries of the participants and the grievances voiced by the 
audience that becomes frustrated with the reluctance of the ‘aucthor’, more interested in the 
‘rison’, ‘to explique to ones the significat of their exsystems with [his] nieu nivulon lead’ 
(130, 146, 147).  
In the absence of an epiphany in the ‘Nichtian glossery’ of the Wake, Issy indicts the 
artist for perversion and ‘eggoarchism’ in his frustration of desire and dialogue: ‘Tell me till 
my thrillme comes!’, she pleads (81, 147). His (re)creation of ‘poestries from Chickspeer’s’ 
ignores her sensual desires that the play of appearance in art both excites and veils in eternal 
‘loveliness’: ‘Always, Amory, amor andmore!’ (145, 148). Like the distortion that takes 
place in a dream according to Freud - dreams he emphasises are ‘absolutely egoistical’ - 
whereby a ‘wish-fulfillment is disguised beyond recognition’ as ‘an act of censorship’, the 
literary distortions of ‘remnants of trivial experiences’ of the author appear as a way to 
disguise suppressed desires (Interpretation 161, 68). The ‘sudden spiritual manifestation’ of 
the epiphany is replaced with the more carnal and carnivalesque ‘queeleetlecree of joysis 
crisis’ (FW 395). In Freud’s account of Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious, the two 
moments are indeed related: ‘A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a 
notion that has occurred to us ‘involuntarily’. What happens is not that we know a moment 
beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it then needs is to be clothed in 
words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I can best compare with an ‘absence’, a 
sudden release of intellectual tension, and then all at once the joke is there – as a rule ready-
clothed in words’ (207).  
The ‘perversity and capriciousness of the interpretation of the external stimulus’ in 
Joyce’s ‘nightynovel’ that is related to the ‘quieting of the mind and senses’ in negative 
theology, appears as a nihilistic subversion of the very notion of art (Interpretation of 
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Dreams 131; FW 54; Jaurretche 6). As a result of the ‘radical separation of interpretation 
from the phenomenology of reading’, Joyce for Bersani presents ‘a model of interpretive 
nihilism’ (174-5). In the absence of the fusion of sense and spirit that Hegelian 
phenomenology has marked as the particular distinction of art - transforming the work of art 
into ‘a question, an address to the responsive heart, an appeal to affections and to minds’ by 
presenting the sensory phenomenon as ‘the point at which the content and the mind of the 
spectator meet’ - the exhortation, presented in the form of riddles, is exposed as artificial and 
conceited, reflective of the ‘naïve self-centred being’ of the nature of the author who refuses 
communication (Hegel, Aesthetics 78, 167). 
Shaun similarly revolts against Shem’s artificially constructed appeal to the ‘tragic 
emotion’ to gain sympathy for the ‘wee skillmustered shoul’ of the modern artist, ‘a poor 
acheseyeld from Ailing’ rather than an ‘Ubermeerschall’ (P 222; FW 149, 133). 77 He finally 
has enough of Shem’s ‘countrary’ complex and evoking Stephen’s youthful arrogance, he 
rejects the ethical appeal of art: ‘So you think I have impulsivism?’ (149). Denying that he is 
‘wrong parcequeue out of revolscian romanitis’ [Romanticism and Romanism], he turns like 
Stephen to “theory” and ‘sophology’, ‘from the blinkpoint of so eminent a spatialist’ in order 
to solve the ‘tantumising state of affairs’ of art in the age of the ‘hairs theorics of Winestain’ 
[the mixture of history and theory] (151, 149). Like Stephen who needed to be plugged into 
‘the tube Understanding’ to hear and whose role as an author appeared to hinge on his 
successful exposition of a theory, this learned scientist needs first to be ‘reassured by ratio’ 
in order to ‘believe heartily in my own most spacious immensity as my ownhouse and 
microbemost cosm’ (U 516; FW 151). 
Revisiting Stephen’s designation of quidditas as the end of aesthetic apprehension in 
his attempt to define the ‘Talis and Talis’ and resolve the controversy over the question of 
authorship by means of his ‘quantum theory’, he turns as Stephen had in his youth to the 
‘determinised case of chronic spinosis’ presented by Enlightenment philosophy (149-50). 
Viewing his delivery of his theory - as Stephen had - as a way of asserting his mastery, he 
dismisses the influence and immortality of the archetypal bard: ‘His everpresent toes are 
always in retaliessian [the Book of Taliessin, McHugh notes, is a book on sixth century 
Welsh poetry] out throuth his overpast boots. Hear him squak!’, and he refuses to pay the 
debts of his ancestors: ‘I need not anthrapologise for any obintentional’ (151). Like 
Nietzsche’s theoretical man, Socrates, the genre of art that he prescribes is the Aesopian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 ‘Joyce is neither of the militant ‘patriot’ type, nor yet a historical romancer’ but simply ‘very 
‘irish’’, Lewis had argued (76). 
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fable, and he instructs his ‘genial and comic’ student Bruno Nowlan to ‘take [his] tongue out 
of [his] inkpot’ (Lewis 74; FW 152). 
In a parodic portrait of the artist as a young man but also a satire of Lewis’s criticism 
of “The Mind of James Joyce”, Joyce exploits Lewis’s identification of the author with his 
fictional alter-egos - his claim that Joyce is ‘a ‘young man’ in some way embalmed’ - and 
rewrites both this portrait and the history of its reception (90). Through a recreation of an 
‘orgy of ‘apeishness’’- Lewis’s interpretation of Ulysses, and a parody of ‘the intensive 
dictatorship of Space-time - the god of Professor Alexander’ that ruled over Joyce’s art for 
Lewis, Joyce employs Lewis - a ‘spatialist’ in exposing the ‘florid personal aplomb’ under ‘a 
very complex, overcharged [philosophical] façade’ - to help him solve the mystery of 
authorship, but also to expose the interests that motivate the quest for the true author and the 
truth of art (74, 82, 150; FW 149; Lewis 75, 93). Referencing various Professors to help him 
substantiate his theory, like Lewis criticising the saturation of Joyce’s art with the “time 
philosophy” by an intricate juxtaposition of another “theory”, this ‘schoolmaster’ with ‘the 
technical itch of the ‘sedulous ape’, turns to his ‘easyfree translation of the old fabulist's 
parable’ as ‘a more expletive method’ of explaining his complex ideas to his ‘muddlecrass 
pupils’, hoping like Lewis had of Joyce that they might become ‘a very valuable adherent’ 
(74; FW 151; Lewis 87).  
Like Vico’s digression to elucidate the myths of Proteus and Cadmus - poetic 
archetypes that reveal to the modern scholar the inability of primitive men to ‘conceive 
rational categories of things’ - the scholar’s fables of the Mookse and the Gripes and Burrus 
and Caseous are an exposition by means of his ‘naturalborn rations’ of the notion of 
subjectivity and the law of non-contradiction that ‘this [de]graded intellecktuals’, like Bruno, 
cannot understand (93; FW 159, 161). The primitive Gripes, a ‘brooder-on-low’ to the 
Mookse, exemplifies like Proteus ‘the extreme coarseness and ignorance of early people’ 
who ‘as children try to grasp their own reflection when they look in the mirror’, ‘thought 
they saw an ever-changing person in the water when they beheld how it altered their own 
features and movements’: he is unable to descry ‘whose o’cloak you ware’ following his 
meeting with the Mookse (153; Vico 310-11; FW 155). While the Mookse gazes 
narcissistically upon his own image even in ‘the most unconsciously boggylooking stream he 
ever locked his eyes with’, the Gripes is seen ‘having the juice of his times’ and ‘quickly for 
getting the dresser's desdaign on the flyleaf of his frons’ much to the ‘contemption’ of the 
Mookse and the modern narrator of the fable (153, 155). 
The ‘lac of wisdom’ of the ‘older sisars’ who fail like Joyce to answer the ‘burning 
question’ ‘To be a ‘toff’, or not to be a ‘toff’’, unable to understand the law of non-
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contradiction - ‘that I cannot now have or nothave a piece of cheeps in your pocket at the 
same time and with the same manners as you can now nothalf or half the cheek apiece I've in 
mindunless Burrus and Caseous have not or not have seemaultaneously sysentangled 
themselves, selldear and soldthere, once in the dairy days of buy and buy’ - are 
‘irruminate[d]’ to the scholar’s modern ‘heeders’ by means of a mathematical exposition of 
his historical parable, like Vico’s elucidation of the myth of the “letter carrier” of antiquity 
who veiled the vulgar history of the invention of letters (162; Lewis 106; FW 161, 167, 160). 
Refuting ‘the learned ignorants of the Cusanus philosophism’ and ‘the heroicised furibouts 
of the Nolanus theory’, the orator proffers a Trinitarian liturgical ‘sermo’ - ‘Exaudi facts!’ - 
by introducing Nuvoletta and Margareena as a ‘a third man or horse’ to bridge the gap 
between the Platonic ‘ideal and the individuals’ (163, 152; Metaphysics XI.1). Although 
Nuvoletta fails and instead makes ‘up all her myriads of drifting minds in one’ in the fable, 
for the ‘wholesome criticism’ of the ‘seemsame home and histry’, ‘we feel we must 
waistfully woent a female to focus and on this stage there pleasantly appears the cowrymaid 
M. whom we shall often meet below who introduces herself upon us at some precise zero of 
the babbling pumpt of platinism’, the exegete adds in a what appears to be a criticism of both 
the Trinitarian pretensions of the author of Ulysses and the theological structures of 
interpretation (FW 151, 163, 161, 164). 
In the ‘dreariodreama setting’ of ‘this nightly quisquiquock’, however, the 
expression of ‘the alternative ‘either – or’’ is more difficult than this theorist thinks: ‘there is 
not really an alternative in dream-thoughts’, Freud warns, ‘but an ‘and’ – a simple addition’: 
‘The attitude of dreams to the category of antithesis and contradiction is very striking. This 
category is simply ignored; the word ‘No’ does not seem to exist for a dream’ (Interpretation 
200, 202). The ‘tremendous work of condensation’ that devastates logical relations in the 
dream, moreover, has an impact on language as well as the sequence of events in the Wake. 
In the difficulty to ‘no’ anyone in the ‘hueful panepiphanal world spectacurum’ of the Wake, 
Stephen’s disregard of language in his epiphany theory is vindicated, as it becomes clear that 
language is not the vehicle for an epiphany, but like the work of art for Gadamer, ‘an 
experience that changes the person who experiences it’ (FW 126, 611; 103). Failing to 
establish identity, the ‘changeably meaning vocable scriptsigns’ of the Wake intimate ‘the 
continually more and less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators’ (118). 
In the retelling of Aesop’s tale, the historical, philosophical, political and theological 
‘meinungs’ of the tale are borne not only through but also in language; the truth that the 
scholar wants to communicate through art is inseparable from the language that transports it 
(151). Delivered through the ideologies of Western culture, the fable of the Mookse and the 
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Gripes exposes through its ‘tootoological’ language their coincidences, despite the scholar’s 
quest to assert the distinction of his own theory (468). The coincidence of the one and the 
many is not only a theory that the deviant student Bruno Nowlan applies to language, but 
also reflects the phenomenon of language. The ‘phemous themis race’ [famous but also 
spoken - phemis (gr), supplanting Bruno’s protean goddess of choice Thetis with Justice] 
that this scholar attempts to run by means of his “edictum” of the mystery of the Trinity, 
beating ‘so lon’, Vico’s ‘sage of esoteric wisdom’ by means of his ‘unchanging Word’, was 
indeed completed by medieval theologians through their presentation of a parallel in the 
relation ‘between human speech and thought’ and ‘the divine relationship of the Trinity’ 
(167; Vico 165; 167; Gadamer 419). Like Shaun’s arrangement of ‘the rite words by the rote 
order’, they were linked through their comparably processual character (167).  
In an ironic refutation of Lewis’s claim that Joyce is not ‘a tragic writer’, the quiz 
ends with a sacrifice: ‘Sacer esto? Answer: Semus sumus!’ (168). But Shem’s assertion of 
his identity through language [We are Shem as well as the same] simultaneously refuses this 
sacrifice and dissolves the opposition between comedy and tragedy, as eschatology is 
substituted by ‘escapology’- and in the next chapter scatology (74; FW 168, 427). While for 
the scholar ‘The speechform is a mere sorrogate’, it is through linguistic ingenuity that the 
artist manifests both his “genius” and his craftsmanship when he takes off his ‘white toff’s 
hoyt’ (149, 536). Refusing to allow philosophy- ‘the historical self-penetration of spirit’ for 
Hegel, to ‘carr[y] out the hermeneutical task’, the artist turns to language which allows the 
mediation of speech and thought, sense and spirit ‘nichthemerically’- daily in the nightmare 
of history (Gadamer 161; FW 185). While Shaun turns to his sacred ‘unchanging Word’’ to 
‘expound, to vend and to velnerate’, his logical arrangement of ‘the rite words by the rote 
order’ exposes his disregard of temporality and occasionality, having refuted the ‘dime and 
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ii. The apophotorejected artist: a shuddersome spectacle [FW 251.7, 179.24] 
 
While the attempt to “rescue” Joyce the genius has been associated with the 
humanistic inclinations of his critics, it can also be viewed as a response to the growing 
professionalisation of his image. 78 Rather than a reactionary protest against the ‘perpetual 
flight of the [philosophical] subject’ in modernity, Arnold Bennett’s complaint that apart 
from ‘at most a dozen other bizarre human beings’ ‘Work in Progress will not be read, 
because it cannot be read by any individual normally constituted’, is an admonition 
concerning the scholarly allure of Joyce’s work: ‘I regard it as a bad sign that an unfinished 
work should be the subject of an exegetical volume (200 pages) by 12 ardent disciples’ 
(Post-structuralist Joyce 10; CH 409). Beckett’s challenging remark in this collection of 
essays that ‘Mr. Joyce has desophisticated language’ is indeed itself a “sophisticated” 
argument (10). 79 But ironically, the decision that Joyce made to publish this ‘exegetical 
volume’ that bolstered the charge of elitism could be seen as an attempt to dissociate his own 
role as an artist from that of the critic and/or scholar. 
While the subject of Beckett’s essay is the significance of the authors who are so 
prominent in Joyce’s latest work- authors famous for their “theories”, the objective of his 
argument is to convince the reader that Joyce’s ‘position is in no way a philosophical one’, 
and to preserve the delicate balance required to distance Joyce from their ideas and 
ideologies while also presenting him as a legitimate member of this Fellowship of Artists 
(7). Beckett’s own discomfort at having to assume the role of the critic is evident throughout 
the essay. Alerting the reader to the predilection of literary criticism for the ‘carefully folded 
ham-sandwich’ of Philosophy and Philology, he begins with a confession that he too is 
equipped with a ‘handful of abstractions’ and is therefore also prey to the hubristic 
temptation of ‘self-extension in the world of Mr. Joyce’s ‘Work in Progress’’ (6). His 
description of Vico’s philosophy with clear but implicit links to Joyce’s work in his 
emphasis on the significance of Vico’s ‘science’ founded on ‘Necessity’ which was ‘an 
outrage against tradition’, and on Vico’s ‘empirical investigation’ and role as an ‘innovator’, 
is paused to highlight that his philosophical system ‘is clearly adapted by Mr. Joyce as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 In his outline of a ‘reputation history’, Joseph Kelly argues that ‘Joyce the Genius, the omniscient, 
omnipotent grand artificer, derives from the evolving structures and practices of English departments 
between the early 1940s and 1970’ (181). Such distinction, however, is also a response to the early 
interpretation of Joyce’s role as that of a highbrow intellectual.  
79  ‘At first it would seem that the problem lies with the modern reader’s tendency to 
overintellectualize Joyce’s work and not with Joyce’s poetic language at all. Yet the criticism of Work 
in Progress, as Beckett reports it, constantly alludes to the obscurity of Joyce’s language and to the 
unfamiliarity that the reader feels when confronted with it. One would suppose that if Joyce had 
indeed desophisticated language the modern reader, like the primitive ancestor, should also have no 
difficulty in taking Joyce literally at his word’ (Verdicchio 534). 
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structural convenience – or inconvenience’, as for Joyce structure is replaced with ‘endless 
substantial variations’ (6-7). 
Turning to Vico’s views on poetry and the poet, he is less cautious in his remarks, as 
he reveals and extols - without directly associating this claim with Vico - that ‘Poetry is 
essentially the antithesis of Metaphysics’, rather than a Romantic ham-sandwich of the two 
(8). Having deposed philosophy with the aid of Vico, he is then able to examine the poetic 
consequence of Vico’s philology: his “findings” on language from his scholarly quest. 
Poetry, language, and myth all attest to the ‘spontaneity’ of the human mind for Vico, 
Beckett argues, echoing with remarkable similarity Cassirer’s argument in his Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms published in 1925: ‘Language, myth, art – each produces from itself its own 
world of forms which can be understood only as expressions of the spontaneity of the spirit. 
But because this spontaneous activity is not carried out in the form of free reflection, it is 
hidden from itself. In creating its mythical, artistic forms the spirit does not recognize itself 
in them as a creative principle’ (9; 217). ‘Here it is not so much the case that the I is 
reflected in things, the microcosm in the macrocosm’, Cassirer explains, ‘as that the I creates 
for itself a kind of opposite in its own products which seem to it wholly objective. And it can 
contemplate itself only in this kind of projection’. 
Having distinguished the Brunian dialectic of Work in Progress from rationalist 
‘stiff interexclusiveness’, Beckett identifies the ‘threefold intellectual operation’ involved in 
allegorical interpretation with the “decadence” of the ‘Ladies and Gentlemen’ who can attain 
only ‘dribbling comprehension’ from their ‘copious intellectual salivation’ (9). Dissociating 
mythos from logos by highlighting repeatedly the ‘early inability to abstract the general from 
the particular’ and ‘to conceive the abstract idea of ‘poet’ or ‘hero’, Joyce’s role as an artist 
is differentiated from that of the ‘dozen incredulous Joshuas prowling around the Queen’s 
Hall, springing their tuning-forks lightly against finger-nails that have not yet been refined 
out of existence’ (9-10). The paradox that Vico presents through the prototype of Homer- 
that although he was not a philosopher ‘he was the source of all Greek philosophies’, 
manifests itself for Beckett in the figure of Joyce (386). Through his emphasis on Joyce’s 
mythical rather than metaphysical language and thought, Joyce the Poet is shielded from ‘the 
usual volley of cerebral sniggers’ (10). 
The ‘new world of the logos’, Cassirer argues, ‘arose through “critique”, a κρίσις 
within the concept of being itself’ (2). This “separation” or “crime” transpired by means of 
the ‘fork, of à grave Brofèsor; àth é's Brèak – fast – table; ; acůtely profčššionally piqučd, to 
= introdůce a notion of time [ůpon ŕ plane (?) sů ' ' fŕç'e'] by půnct! ingh oles (sic) in 
iSpace?!’ (FW 124). As it was through the ‘idea of the atom’ - in contrast to the 
	   229	  
	  
‘indifference’ in mythical thought ‘between the whole and its parts’ - that the concept of 
causality developed, the unity of authorship in modernity is a consequence of ‘copious 
intellectual salivation’ (Cassirer 50; Beckett 10). Both the search for and the death of the 
author is immaterial for poetry as ‘the first operation of the human mind’, as not only is the 
whole indistinguishable from its parts, but there is also ‘no clearer distinction between life 
and death than between sleeping and waking. The two are related not as being and nonbeing, 
but as two similar, homogeneous parts of the same being’ (Cassirer 36). ‘If all reality is 
taken only as it is given in immediate impression, if it is regarded as sufficiently certified by 
the power it exerts on the perceptive, affective, and active life, then a dead man indeed still 
“is”, even though his outward form may have changed, even though his sensory-material 
existence may have been replaced by a disembodied shadow existence’. 
Like Joyce’s ‘Nichtian glossery’, ‘mythical consciousness’, in Cassirer’s analysis, 
‘resembles a code which is intelligible only to those who possess the key to it – i.e. for 
whom the particular contents of this consciousness are merely conventional signs for 
something “other”, which is not contained in them’ (81, 38). But ‘Where we see mere 
“representation”, myth, insofar as it has not yet deviated from its fundamental and original 
form, sees real identity. The “image” does not represent the “thing”; it is the thing; it does 
not merely stand for the object, but has the same actuality, so that it replaces the thing’s 
immediate presence’. For mythical thinking ‘Word and name do not designate and signify, 
they are and act’. Joyce’s ‘drunk’ words are similarly ‘alive’ in Beckett’s exposition: ‘They 
elbow their way on to the page, and glow and blaze and fade and disappear’ (11). Such 
‘linguistic ambivalence’- or ‘restlessness’ in Beckett’s description, is in Cassirer’s analysis 
‘The source and origin of all mythology’: ‘myth itself is a kind of disease of the mind, 
having its ultimate root in a “disease of language”’ (22). 
Resembling Vico’s invective against the ‘savage feelings and customs’ that 
distinguished “Homer” - a trinitarian ‘highly nutritius family histrionic’ in his embodiment 
of ‘the mental weakness of children, the vigorous imagination of women, and the seething 
passions of violent youths’ - Shaun’s ‘violence, virulence and vituperation’ by means of 
which he seeks to ‘attax and abridge, to derail and depontify, to enrate and inroad, to ongoad 
and unhume’ his brother who ‘prediseased’ him ‘with the whooping laugh at the age of the 
loss of reason’, is to a large extent an effort to deny his philosophical credentials; to expose 
the apparent ‘sublime and esoteric wisdom’ of the ‘poetesser’- a poetaster who poses as a 
philosopher (356; FW 230; Vico 358; 97, 423, 232). The disease of the language of the Wake 
is similarly linked to the ‘middayevil’ mind of its savage author, a ‘somatophage merman’ 
and beastly ‘hybrid’ in his primitive inability to understand the law of non-contradiction and 
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draw the ‘dividing line between mere “representation” and “real” perception, between wish 
and fulfillment, between image and thing’ (423, 171, 169; Cassirer 36). 
‘How can we qualify this general esthetic vigilance without which we cannot hope 
to snare the sense which is for ever rising to the surface of the form and becoming the form 
itself?’, Beckett asks, and refers the reader to Stephen’s exposition of the esthetic 
apprehension (10). The Wake proffers the figure of Shem; ‘lodging on as many boards round 
the panesthetic at the same time as possible’, he suffers from the phenomenological 
predicament of primitive man according to his brother (173). His struggle like Stephen with 
aesthetics has repercussions for his role as an artist. Shem’s inability to comprehend the 
significance of time - to discern like Gripes ‘whose o’cloak you ware’ - denies him the title 
of the genius as he is shown to be ‘in his bardic memory low’ (155, 172). Growing 
‘megalomane of a loose past’ he is shown instead ‘unconsciously explaining, for inkstands, 
the various meanings of all the different foreign part of speech he misused, and cuttlefishing 
every lie unshrinkable about all the other people in the story’, but ‘leaving out’ 
‘foreconsciously, the simple worf and plague and poison they had cornered him about’ (179, 
173). Without understanding the law of causality he cannot narrate a story that captures the 
attention of his audience: ‘various subconscious smickers’ ‘drivel slowly across their fichers’ 
(173). His penchant for ‘treasuring with condign satisfaction each and every crumb of 
trektalk’ that he uses to fill rather create ‘his inkbattle house’, exposes him as both a forger 
and a hoarder (193, 176).  
His ‘shortartempa’ and ‘lapsis linquo’ that threatened to ‘wipe alley english spooker, 
multaphoniaksically [metaphorically, multi-phonetically and in many ways phonily] 
spuking, off the face of the erse’, however, are also linked to a theological and dramatical as 
well as a philosophical ‘fortunous casualitas’ (178, 175). As with the philosophical 
‘exclusion of all temporal determinations’ ‘the mythical concept of fate for the first time 
passe[d] into the logical concept of necessity’, the ‘tragic jester’ who ‘prayed to the cloud 
Incertitude’ “slips” both as a dramatist and in the eyes of Divine (and earthly) Law by 
disregarding Necessity (Cassirer 131; 171, 178). Rather than a creator of art, this 
‘unremuneranded national apostate’ who is ‘categorically unimperatived by the maxims’, is 
shown to be a ‘semidemented zany’ with noxious compulsions and psychotic fixations: ‘By 
that rosy lampoon's effluvious burning and with help of the simulchronic flush in his pann (a 
ghinee a ghirk he ghets there!) he scrabbled and scratched and scriobbled and skrevened 
nameless shamelessness about everybody ever he met’ (171, 176, 179, 182). Not only does 
he make himself the hero of his drama - he narcissistically ‘used to stipple endlessly 
inartistic portraits of himself in the act of reciting old Nichiabelli's monolook interyerear 
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Hanno, o Nonanno, acce’l brubblemm'as, ser Autore, q.e.d.’ - but also refuses to end his 
tragedy with a sacrifice: ‘With the foreign devil's leave the fraid born fraud diddled even 
death’ (182, 172). 
Exasperated with the elusiveness of the author who poses like Odysseus as 
‘Niscemus Nemon’ and refuses to ‘psing his psalmen with the cong in our gregational’, 
Shaun turns the author himself into a ‘shuddersome spectacle’ for ‘gropesarching eyes’ (175, 
167, 179, 167). Exposing the commercial ‘mystery of himsel’ of the ‘whirling dervish’ 
written ‘in furniture’ in the face of ‘copriright’ as a satanic concoction, Shaun, like Allen 
Upward, shows the ‘Pagan wizard’ - the forefather of the Genius and ‘ghem of all jokes’ - to 
be ‘wiser [more perverse in Shem’s case] than the Christian one, because he knows that there 
are limitations to his psychical powers, and ekes it out by the use of drugs’ (184, 185; 
Upward 32; FW 193). ‘[B]rooled and cocked and potched in an athanor’, the myth of the 
‘Primum opifex, altus prosator’, is shown to be artificially concocted (184, 185). Bottled up 
in his ‘Haunted Inkbottle’, ‘with his penname SHUT sepiascraped on the doorplate and a 
blind of black sailcloth over its wan phwinshogue’, ‘noondayterrorised to skin and by an 
ineluctable phantom’, ‘Tumult, son of Thunder’, is exposed as a ‘phonemanon’ by his 
modern interpreter: simply language as a vowel- phonēen (gr) and a phoney rather than a 
phenomenon, but also voice- phone (gr) and utterance- phonema (gr) and indeed god through 
his appropriation of the vowels (182, 184, 258).  
The ‘vanessance of his lownest’ of this ‘mental and moral defective’ dramatises his 
“forged” esthetic (177). In the face of the complexity of esthetic apprehension, the 
‘apophotorejected’ artist turns to occultism (251). In an amalgamation of the katharsis of 
classical drama and the kenosis that the liturgical drama reenacts, Shem ‘winged away on a 
wildgoup’s chase across the kathartic ocean and made synthetic ink and sensitive paper for 
his own end out of his wit’s waste’ (185). Shem’s Incarnation through his Christological 
“abasement” of ‘His costive Satan’s antimonian manganese limolitmious nature’, ‘cloaked 
up in the language of blushfed porporates’ by Shaun who exposes his Mangan-like ‘exotic’ 
vices, is sacramental in the double sense of ‘the holy and the accursed or forbidden’- 
‘something consecrated and set apart’ (184, 185; OCPW 54; Cassirer 79). A fulfilment of 
Stephen’s dream of becoming a celebrant ‘in a church without worshippers’ - ‘a clerical 
party all to yourself’, as Shaun scoffs - Shem’s “epiphany” to the world through ‘corrosive 
sublimation’ is a dramatisation of Stephen’s reluctance ‘to go forth to encounter reality’ (P 
172; FW 190, 184). The liturgical substantiation of the efficacy of his art through 
transaccidentation is a remedy for the aestheticism of this ‘alshemist’ whose experiment 
renders him ‘doriangrayer’ (185, 186).  
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This ‘reverse kenosis’ which allows Shem to become simultaneously ‘author, 
enactor, interpreter and script’, is also a transfiguration of the ‘unveiling practice of 
interpretation’ of Aquinas ‘that frees the Word from the thickly epic, or mythopoietic, façade 
of wars, covenants, genealogies, love affairs, infatuations, and subterfuges (in one word, 
form common and ordinary experience)’ (Balsamo, Tradition of Christian Epics 117; 
Joyce’s messianism 116, 120). The transcendence characteristic of religion - ‘What appears 
to the common, profane world view as the immediately given reality of “things” is 
transformed by the religious view into a world of “signs”’ - is denied through Shem’s 
mythical, mystical and sacramental subsumption of ‘the “otherness” of empirical-sensuous 
existence’: the ‘dividual chaos, perilous, potent, common to allflesh, human only, mortal’ 
(Cassirer 255-6; FW 186). In a reversal of ‘the development of language’, ‘determined by its 
tendency to cling to the sensuous and yet strive beyond it, to surpass the narrow limits of the 
mere mimetic sign’, Shem’s word becomes- narcissistically, pure mimesis (Cassirer 256).  
Shem’s ‘squirtscreen[ing]’ of his ‘squidself’ links his phenomenological 
predicament with his ‘mousterious’ relation to language (186). As son of Thunder he is like 
Upward’s Divine Man ‘the incarnate Word of the Thunder-God’, using his ‘unheavenly 
body’ to signify (6; FW 185). As an ‘an antinomian’ who couldn’t ‘be true to type’- both 
language and typology, he is presented as an actor rather than an author in his primal but also 
narcissistic [and drunken] inability to draw the line between the real and the ideal which 
allows him to claim ‘that he was avoopf (parn me!) aware of no other shaggspick, other 
Shakhisbeard, either unlike his polar andthisishis or procisely the seem’ (172, 177). Rather 
than an instrument of communication, the creation of language in Shem’s Eucharistic 
transformation into the word as ‘one continuous present tense integument’, is presented as a 
theatrical production (185, 186). The ‘corrosive sublimation’ by means of which he refuses 
sacrifice - a magical trick performed ‘by the dodginess of his lantern’ rather than ‘by the 
light of philophosy’ - moreover, transforms the drama of Christianity into a comic 
performance (186, 184, 118). Following the ‘destruction of representation’ - or the fact that 
the artist has been denied the light of wisdom - the reader’s relation to language is indeed 
“revolutionised”, as s/he becomes a participant in a ‘wickeday perfumance’ (MacCabe, 
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iii. The funnaminal world of art [FW 244.13] 
 
Joyce’s mythologisation of the mystery of artistic creation exposes the idealism of 
modernism’s search for origins. Although Shem as ‘Primum opifex’ secures mythologically 
the efficacy of his word, when the ‘Big Storey’ is told ‘authorways’ in The Mime, the 
philosophic foundation of the drama of the ‘phonemanon’ is highlighted (185, 219). In this 
ritual ‘wickeday perfumance’ ‘in the semblance of the substance, for the membrance of the 
umbrance with the remnance of the emblence reveiling a quemdam supercargo’, Glugg, ‘that 
lost-to-lurning’ is ‘at his thinker's aunts’ to guess ‘the calour of [Isod’s] brideness’ (219, 220, 
222, 224, 223). The drama becomes a play of appearance focused around ‘that which is one 
going to prehend’ (223). Emerging as a “dreadful bard”- a ‘trapadour’, Glugg is shown 
‘sinking how he must fand for himself by gazework what their colours wear as they are all 
showen drawens up’ (224). This ardent theorist has to acquire knowledge ‘by gazework’ of 
the colour of girls’ pants, and he decides to ‘reloose that thong of his art’ (223, 224).  
The Romantic idealisation of drama as a philosophical genre that identified the end 
of art with the philosophic quest for truth in a ‘tragedy of appearance’ requiring the sacrifice 
of the individual for the manifestation of the Absolute, is parodied and subverted in Joyce’s 
‘perfumance’ in ‘Feenichts Playhouse’- a ‘billed’ production in which nihilism and the 
cyclical resurrection of the Phoenix coincide (Dastur in Sparks 83; 219). The figure of the 
artist is once again presented as a distraction from the quest for truth. Emerging with the 
prophecy of ‘overlusting fear’, the ‘oathword science’ of Glugg’s ‘visible disgrace’ takes 
centre stage (224, 226). ‘With nought a wired from the wordless either’- lacking inspiration, 
Glugg is seeped in ‘that limbopool which was his subnesciousness’ [subconsciousness and 
below not knowing (nescientia)] (223-4). His oathfull language, ‘A darktongues, kunning’, 
highlights the consequence of language for the revelation he seeks from the ‘pierceful’ 
‘sojestiveness’ of the girls: ‘The howtosayto itiswhatis hemustwhomust worden’ schall’; the 
world of becoming [worden (Dutch)] has to be revealed through words [woorden (Dutch)] 
(223). ‘If he’d lonely talk instead of only gawk’, Isod offers her advice to ‘gooseys gazious’ 
(225, 227). 
In parallel to this quest to ‘prehend’, however, runs the personal drama of Glugg to 
expose ‘the whole plight troth’ about the ‘satiety of arthurs’ to ‘the old sniggering publicking 
press and its nation of sheepcopers’ (223, 229). The conflict between necessity and freedom 
in this tragedy, however, is unending. The ‘split’ of this hubristic artist is followed by 
repentance rather than sacrifice: Glugg resolves to ‘make one of hissens’; the play ends with 
the ‘prophitable’ prophecies ‘And he war’, ‘And he deed’ (228, 240, 258). The truth he 
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wants to expose, moreover, is personal, fictitious and a forgery, as the reference to Samuel 
Roth suggests: ‘Just a Fication of Villumses’ (241). Rather than revealing the truth, 
destroying the ephemeral sign for the manifestation the Absolute, this ‘feastking of shellies’ 
who poses as a tragic protagonist wants to replace it with his own: to ‘fire off, gheol ghiornal 
[the Jail Journal of the Irish nationalist John Mitchell and a newspaper- giornale (it), as 
McHugh notes], foull subustioned mullmud [the Talmud through Wilde’s pseudonym 
Sebastian Melmoth], his farced epistol to the hibruws’ (231, 228). ‘It is so easy for people to 
have sympathy with suffering. It is so difficult for them to have sympathy with thought’, 
Wilde had warned the ardent seeker of ‘the intellectual ideal’ (Intentions 181). 
As the drama deteriorates into a sentimental romance inspired by Edouard Schuré’s 
Woman: the Inspirer, the abatement of the ‘angskt’ of this ‘wagoner’ ‘reading off his 
fleshskin and writing with his quillbone’ to ‘bare to untired world of Leimuncononnulstria’ 
the ‘great big oh in the megafundum’ of his father and the ‘microchasm as gap as down low’ 
of his mother, while finding ‘the best and schortest way of blacking out a caughtalock [a 
catholic catalogue] of all the sorrors of Sexton’ through the ‘errorooth of his wisdom’ in a 
‘mouthfull of ecstasy’, reveals ‘another cant to the questy’, as the ‘mything smile’ of the 
narrator and ‘Old grand tuttut toucher up of young poetographies’ before the ‘handmades for 
the lured’ betrays (224, 229, 230, 109, 238-9, 242). The truth of the ‘ekonome world’ of the 
human artist, a ‘poetesser’ with ‘his pitcher on a wall’ and ‘his photure in the papers’ [photo 
and future], cannot be separated from his public image, but also from his carnal desires and 
passions (230, 232-3). As the children learn in their nightlessons, ‘her minnelisp extorreor’ 
and ‘his moanolothe inturnedmonoloathe inturned’ are reconciled when ‘your panto’s off’ 
(254, 257). The search there among the ‘fingures’ [fingers and figures] to ‘rite and reckan’ 
[also right and recant] for the ‘whome of your eternal geomater’ and ‘paradismic perimutter’ 
[paradigmatic and paradisiac voice], reveals language as ‘the site where the intellectual and 
erotic converge’ (282-3, 296-8; Devlin 41). 
Set in the ‘pressant’, the Mime is an unrepeatable but also an unpresentable 
performance that indeed soon turns into childrens’ games (221). There are no spectators in 
this ‘daily dubbing of ghosters’ and insofar as the players are merely acting out parts, they 
are interchangeable (219). As the children’s’ play becomes more self-involved, moreover, its 
meaning becomes more private and it appears to be emptied of any discernible significance. 
The emphasis falls on performance that seeks hermeneutic simultaneity through the idiolect 
that the performance engenders. In the self-involved world of play of the children that opens 
with ‘a community prayer, everyone for himself’ and ‘a chorale in canon, good for us all for 
us all us all all’, the ‘instinct of play’ of the ideally aesthetically educated man that strives 
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according to Schiller ‘to suppress time in time to conciliate the state of transition or 
becoming with the absolute being, change with identity’, is dramatised, thematised and 
parodied (222; C. Eliot 248). 
Attempting to dissociate the concept of play from its Romantic connotations of 
subjective enjoyment, Gadamer, noting that ‘The being of all play is always self-realization, 
sheer fulfilment, energeia which has its telos within itself’, highlights the consequence of the 
‘“presentation” (Darstellung) of the work of art (112, 103). ‘The performance of a play, like 
that of a ritual’, he argues, ‘cannot simply be detached from the play itself, as if it were 
something that is not part of its essential being, but is as subjective and fluid as the aesthetic 
experiences in which it is experienced. Rather, it is in the performance and only in it – as we 
see most clearly in the case of music – that we encounter the work itself, as the divine is 
encountered in the religious rite’ (115). As the games turn into a liturgical celebration, this 
emphasis on the contemporaneity and fusion of change and identity, becoming and being 
that the work of art elicits is further highlighted, but also subverted through the historicity of 
language. ‘The timid hearts of words all exeomnosunt’ [exeunt - exiting, a stage direction in 
Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, McHugh notes] betray their ‘histrionic’ origins, denying 
simultaneously the ‘thaurity’ [the aura of authority] of historical and theological facts and 
truth (258, 230, 359). 
Giving the example of the festival whose nature ‘is to be celebrated regularly’ and 
therefore ‘its own original essence is always to be something different (even when celebrated 
in exactly the same way)’, Gadamer argues that ‘An entity that exists only by always being 
something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to 
history. It has its being only in becoming and return’ (121). Gadamer, moreover, notes that it 
was to ‘the mode of being of the day and of Olympic games, and hence of the festival’ that 
Aristotle turned to in order to explain - and refute - the idea of infinity. Aristotle, who argued 
that infinity is ‘better defined as a part than as the whole’, ‘the accompaniment of the process 
of dichotomy, always in the making and never made’ and ‘the open ‘possibility for more’’ - 
‘not that ‘beyond which there is nothing’, but that of which there is always more beyond’ - 
indeed seems to have influenced the ‘dimeshow’ of the Wake (Physics 255, 257, 227, 247; 
FW 163). The space-timeist of the Wake, sees time like Aristotle as ‘entirely made up of the 
no-longer and the not yet’ (373). The eternal recurrence of the same is punctuated with the 
momentousness of an infinite present that refuses ‘to retire to the saum’- to the same and to 
the margin [Saum (ger)], exposing the ‘hairyoddities’ of history [its authors (Herodotus) and 
its oddities] (FW 249, 275). 
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‘A festival’, in Gadamer’s definition, ‘exists only in being celebrated’; ‘To be 
present’ in such an ever-changing performance ‘means to participate’, and therefore 
‘watching something is a genuine mode of participating’ (121). While the ‘highly nutritius 
family histrionic’ of the Wake is distinguished by its implication with ‘a manyfeast 
munificent more mob than man’, and both feasting and manifesting exhort not only 
participation but also incrimination - ‘the watchful treachers at his wake’ are soon embroiled 
in the crime - the ‘comedy nominator’ [the common denominator and comedy instigator] in 
the ‘pamtomomiom’, as the ‘fingures’ of the Nightlessons highlight, are the ‘charictures in 
the drame’: language (230, 261, 75, 283, 285, 302). Unlike the mathematical ‘fickers which 
are returnally reprodictive of themselves’, the ‘mythelated’ [full of myth and drink] language 
of the Wake ‘far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible’: 




i. The phost of a nation [FW 409.6] 
 
While the serial progression of Vico’s three ages is lost in the dissipation of the ‘reel 
of funnish ficts’ [facts and deceptions - ficta (l)] of ‘our horyhistoricold’ within language in 
the ‘sequentiality of improbable possibles’ that is staged, the evolution towards ‘modeln 
times’ is registered through the increasing prominence of questions of subjectivity, identity, 
individuality, personality and originality (288, 382, 110, 289). The pranquean’s riddle, ‘the 
farst wriggle from the ubivence’, becomes increasingly Oedipal and is presented to those 
who have ‘raced Messafissi’ [metaphysics, Mass and Mississippi] following the coincidence 
of Butt and Taff as ‘whereom is man, that old offender, nother man, wheile he is asame’ 
(356). This inflation of the ego is largely associated with the character of Shaun who steals 
the limelight from his brother in the third book. Usurping the models of authorship of 
Joyce’s artist-heroes, he presents himself as a sublimation of the artist through his 
hermeneutic skills: he appears (predominantly) as a philosopher and scholar in III.1, as a 
theologian, celebrant, apostle and even Christ in III.2 and as a bardic genius in his 
manifestation as Yawn in III.3. 
His role as ‘the phost of a nation’ [both ghost and light - phos (gr)] is distinguished 
by its theatricality (409). He emerges through the fog following an elaborate description of 
the setting through references to A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Macbeth by the four who 
squabble for the role of prime theorist and witness of this scene. It is finally ‘the poor ass’ 
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who wakes up like Dante in ‘somepart in nonland’ to witness the beatific vision: ‘in very 
similitude’ the ‘belted lamp’ of ‘Whom we dreamt was a shaddo’ appears in ‘unliteness’ 
[alētheia - “unconcealment” in Heidegger’s translation] amid objects ‘nonviewable to human 
watchers’ that seem to be ‘garments of laundry’ (403-4). The dream of modernity, he is a 
‘picture primitive’, and his phenomenal revelation is preceded by sounds of Dionysian 
revelry: ‘dancetongues of the woodfires and the hummers’; although modern engines and 
machines can be heard too, and he is also described as a stage Irishman (404-5). Appearing 
‘in proper person’, however, this ‘Spickspookspokesman of our specturesque silentiousness’ 
bridges the mythical world with the Christian (405). In contrast to the darkness that haunts 
the ‘squidself’ of Shem who is ‘kuskykorked’ in his ‘inkbattle house’, Shaun arrives like the 
Word as ‘light’; he is the light that shines in darkness, and is ‘lightseyes’ [also lifesize] (186, 
176, 404). His witness even “sees” through ‘deafths of durkness greengrown deeper’ his 
‘voce’, ‘vote of the Irish’, in one of the many confusions of ear and eye; Shaun is a national 
Saviour as well as the Messiah (407).  
Assuming the role of a celebrant, he is seen enjoying a huge meal ‘in anticipation of 
the faste [fast and feast] of tablenapkins’ (406). His ‘handpalm’ that ‘gested’ announces a 
liturgical celebration that like Shem’s oxymoronic Eucharist is intensely egocentric. 
Absorbing ‘all marryvoising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history’ onto his own body, 
Shem’s Eucharist is Nietzschean rather than Christian; whereas ‘The uniqueness of the 
redemptive event’ of the incarnation ‘introduces the essence of history into Western 
thought’, freeing the logos from its spirituality, as Gadamer remarks, Shem’s attempt to 
signify through his body with ‘a word that would not pass away’ is closer to Nietzsche’s 
proclamation ‘At bottom I am all the names of history’ (FW 185; Gadamer 418; FW 186; 
qdt. in Haar 34). By waning ‘chargreenoldand doriangrayer’ Shem enacts the ramifications 
of this declaration: the realisation, as Michel Haar argues in relation to Nietzsche’s scattered 
identity following his identification with history, ‘that language cannot shatter the principle 
of identity without shattering itself, and yet cannot submit to this principle without 
renouncing the effort to bring the depths of Being to words’ (186; 34). While for 
deconstruction Joyce’s writing displays the ‘dispersion of the subject’ ‘in a plurality of 
possible positions and functions’, the ‘splintering of identity in the play of same and other, 
repetition and difference’, the prominence of the Eucharist in Joyce’s work dramatises the 
consequence of this modern dualism - either the subject or language - that is proffered as a 
(dis)solution of metaphysical antitheses (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 60, 39).  
Although the Joycean subject is certainly dispersed in language, Joyce also enacts its 
perpetual resurrection. The contradiction of ethics and aesthetics is not only dissolved in 
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language, but also further dramatised in the catastrophic ramifications that this dissolution 
has on language. The character of Shaun exposes the perversion of this eschewal of 
metaphysics by means of a different kind of sacrifice that is modelled on the Eucharist. The 
‘all too unwordy’ Shaun is not oppressed by this modern dilemma that ‘the real metaphysical 
problem’ of modernity- ‘the word’, as Jolas argued, presented (in Beckett et al. 40). His 
‘lithurgy’, ‘a general address rehearsal’ that sees him ‘addressing himself ex alto and 
complaining with vocal discontent’ before ‘a houseful of deadheads’ - like Stephen in the 
Portrait ‘acting before the innumerable faces of the void’ - is a monologue on the subject 
that interests both himself and his audience- his self: ‘the autobiography of [his] softbodied 
fumiform’ (432, 407; P 90; 413). He defines himself through his work and actions and 
through contrasts with his brother; his ‘other’ who he views narcissistically as his 
‘owelglass’ (408). ‘[A]ll too unwordy’ and ‘a mere mailman of peace’, he elicits the pity of 
his audience (408). His lot is tragically ‘hairydittary’, and he is undeservedly punished: ‘it 
should of been my other with his leickname’ [nickname and corpse - Leichnam (ger)], he 
argues (410, 408). 
A ‘bearer extraordinary of these postoomany missive on his majesty's service’, he is 
a custodian of culture and is indeed Eucharistically sacrificed in order to secure its safe 
delivery: ‘Poumeerme! My heaviest crux and dairy lot it is, with a bed as hard as the 
thinkamuddles of the Greeks and a board as bare as a Roman altar’ (409). Improved and 
updated on ‘the Thinker’s Dam’ by ‘a pair of men out of glasshouse’ with new progressive 
ideologies, ‘making me beliek no five hour factory life with insufficient emollient and 
industrial disabled for them that day o’gratises’, he distinguishes himself also as a modern 
theorist (409). He declares his wish to quit his job and ‘to isolate i from my multiple Mes’, 
like Wilde conflating socialism and individualism (410). His intellectual and moral 
excellences are also intertwined, and like Wilde again he struggles to prove that ‘Your 
diogneses is anonest man’s’ - in a denial as well as a defence as a non est man - that he is 
both a philosopher and a theologian, and he refers to the prophecies of his ‘scripchewer’, 
delivering another parabolic fable - ‘one from the grimm gests of Jacko and Esaup’ - to 
substantiate his claims (411, 412, 414). His role as an orator resembles - as it did in the tale 
of the Mookse and the Gripes - that of Father Arnall during his delivery of the retreat 
sermon, although the tale of the Ondt and the Gracehoper is like Shaun himself modernised 
to appeal to his audience. 
While the tale of the Mookse and the Gripes relied on theological references to 
convey its “moral”, this tale is engendered through modern philosophy and philosophers. A 
master of ‘entymology’, Shaun ‘spinooze[s]’ his tale by displaying his proficiency as a 
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scientist and philosopher though the accretion of entomological words and names of German 
philosophers (417, 414). The names of these authors, however, do not only betray ‘the 
Ondt’s bourgeois philosophy of life’, as Tindall notes, but they are also used to contrast the 
Ondt’s abstract ideas and despotic ideologies with the ‘artsaccord’ and ‘bilking’ of the 
Gracehoper (229-30; FW 415, 416). While the Gracehoper is ‘a schelling in kopfers’, the 
Ondt is ‘a weltall fellow, raumybult [roomy, Raum (G) - space and Roman] and 
abelboobied’ and has his hegemony also theologically sanctioned (416). Whereas the 
Gracehoper and his ‘jigging’ are described through a host of philosophers, the Ondt rises 
‘aristotaller’ as he is identified primarily with Egyptian gods, and broader as he feasts on ‘his 
comfortumble phullupsuppy of a plate o'monkynous’; he is associated with the two pivotal 
philosophers of antiquity whose philosophy provided the foundations of Christian theology 
(414, 417). 
Shaun’s vilification of his brother that follows the ‘esiop’s foible’, indeed turns into 
an invective that relies on individual authors to expose and indict Shem (422). While the 
Gracehoper is portrayed as scattering and dissimulating himself among a swarm of roles- 
personas and persons, ‘ameising himself hugely’, like the Ondt, Shaun, condemning Shem’s 
‘stolentelling’ and ‘lowbrown schisthematic robblemint’ [Joyce’s “The Day of Rabblement” 
is declared a forgery and schismatic- but also systematic], claims to have both ‘Outragedy of 
poetscalds’ and ‘Acomedy of letters’ in his ‘mine’s I’ and declares his intention to compose 
‘the authordux Book of Lief’ (417, 424, 425). Exposing the ‘idioglossary’ of ‘jameymock 
farceson’- Shem’s artificial language by means of which he had ‘squirtscreened’ his 
‘squidself’ and refused the sacrifice of the individual, Shaun presents himself as the true 
(intellectual) Incarnation of the Word through his identification with language (423, 186). 
This ostensible dissolution of the self in language, however, is not only rather a dissolution 
of language in a ‘wideheight’ [wijsheid is wisdom in Danish, McHugh notes] self, but also 
renders creativity inconsequent; although I could easily compose ‘a work of merit’, Shaun 
argues, ‘I would never for anything take so much trouble of such doing. And why so? 
Because I am altogether a chap too fly and hairyman for to infradig the like of that 
ultravirulence’, like Gilbert in “The Critic as Artist” claiming that ‘creation is doomed’ as ‘It 
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ii. A panromain apological [FW 469.25] 
 
After Shaun ‘spoorlessly disappaled and vanesshed, like a popo down a papa, from 
circular circulation’, however, his role as a modern theorist gives way in the next chapter to 
that of a theologian (427). While Joyce disclosed his liturgical composition of Shaun’s ‘via 
crucis of 14 stations’ - ‘in reality it is only a barrel rolling down the river Liffey’, he added - 
it is in his manifestation as Jaun that Shaun is presented as a ‘lover of lithurgy’ (Letters I 
214; FW 432). A ‘bigmouthed poester’ with a ‘cothurminous’ leg, he is again a theatrical 
figure in his role as a clergyman who arrives to deliver a sermon to twenty-nine schoolgirls 
by means of his ‘eroscope’ (429, 431). In a criticism of the Catholic Church, but also a 
parody of Stephen’s attempt to mask his desires with the outward forms and spectacles of 
Catholicism and sublimations of theology, the language of Jaun’s sermon- an incarnation of 
the Word, betrays his carnal desires and turns into a seductive address. In a parody also of 
the movement of the “religion of art”, the paradigm of the artist as priest is desublimated.  
Rather than drawing parallels between the role of the artist and that of the priest, 
Shaun’s sermon turns into a recrimination of the artist. Whereas in the previous chapter he 
had presented himself as a man of letters, he is now an antagonist of art; he threatens to 
‘burn the books that grieve’ his sister in ‘an allassundrian bom pyre’ (439). His sermon is a 
catalogue of warnings against the dangers of the ‘Secret satieties and onanymous letters’ of 
art (435). As ‘jeune premier’s appearance in the beginning of the chapter is contrasted to the 
Odysseus-like ‘comestabulish Sigurdsen’ who ‘repelled’ the ‘twentynine hedge daughters’ 
who were playing games in a garden, Shaun is presented as a new type of hero: ‘Jaun, by the 
way’, the narrator remarks, ‘was by the way of becoming (I think, I hope he was) the most 
purely human being that ever was called man, loving all up and down the whole creation 
from Sampson’s tyke to Jones’s sprat and from the King of all Wrenns down to infuseries’ 
(430, 431). 
Much to the dismay of the artist, the ‘priested peasant, with a brother a policeman in 
Dublin and a brother a potboy in Moycullen’ usurps the cultural prestige and celebrity status 
of the artist, as Stephen bitterly protested in the Portrait (240). The seductive powers of the 
spectacles of Catholicism that Joyce had unveiled in “Nausikaa” by synchronising ‘Secret 
satieties’ with ‘onanymous letters’, are here exposed in the ‘mielodorous’ language of Jaun’s 
oratory (FW 435, 412). “Inspired” by the romance surrounding Mariolatry - ‘the fragrant 
names of her who was conceived without stain of original sin’ - as Stephen also is in his 
composition of the villanelle, Gerty surrenders herself to Bloom like ‘Our Blessed Lady 
herself’ who ‘said to the archangel Gabriel be it done unto me according to Thy Word’ (U 
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467). Imagining, moreover, her relation to Bloom in terms of the men’s supplication to the 
Virgin in the church, she sees her surrender as an act of charity on her part. 
Stephen becomes exasperated during his composition of the villanelle that despite 
the fact that he has fabricated his role as an artist as a sublimation of an ecclesiastic- ‘a priest 
of the eternal imagination’, Emma still chose to ‘unveil her soul's shy nakedness, to one who 
was but schooled in the discharging of a formal rite’ (P 240). Warning Issy against the 
‘pulcherman’ who will attempt to seduce her by asking her to ‘be an artist's moral and pose 
in your nudies as a local esthetic before voluble old masters’, her ‘pettest parriage priest’ is 
indeed shown to deny this unveiling (FW 434, 458). ‘There you'll fix your eyes darkled on 
the autocart of the bringfast cable’, he prophesies, ‘but here till youre martimorphysed please 
sit still face to face’, Jaun advises her in an inversion of the Pauline parable, worried about 
the desires she will arouse ‘if the shorth of [her] skorth falls down to his knees’ (434). 
Pictured ‘comepulsing paynattention spasms [penitential psalms and struggling with his 
attention span] between the averthisment for Ulikah's wine and a pair of pulldoors of the old 
cupiosity shape’, poetry is indeed shown as offering ‘the timorous lover aesthetic 
compensation for frustrated physical desire’ (434, Henke 62) But Joyce here also appears to 
hold accountable the morality of religion and the commodification of desire for delimiting 
the male artist’s knowledge of the ‘bat-like’ soul of women. 
Through the effeminacy of Jaun and of ‘the four dear old heladies’, Joyce employs 
‘The image of the Catholic Church as both socially transgressive and ambiguous in terms of 
gender and sexuality’, that as Killeen notes, ‘was one constantly rehearsed in Victorian 
England’, to highlight the seductive power of its “mysteries”, but also to expose the 
romanticisation of the artistic vocation- their mutual ‘praxis [of] oval owes and artless awes’ 
(386; 42; 459). The antagonism that is staged between the artist and the priest indeed soon 
gives way to the customary coincidence of contraries. Beginning to think ‘like thauthor’ 
following his Improperia, Shaun declares that while he is gone his ‘altar’s ego’ and ‘darling 
proxy’ ‘Dave the Dancekerl’ will have to take care of her (462). The charge of dubious 
authorship laid against King David, unites the brothers. Through the parallels as well as the 
antitheses that are drawn between the artist and the priest, Joyce does not only censure the 
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iii. A drama parapolylogic [FW 474.5] 
 
While in his manifestation as Yawn Shaun is presented as the sleeping bard woken 
up by his inquisitive exegetes who want not only the question of authorship answered but 
also like Stephen in “Circe” seek ‘The word known to all men’ and meaning of the world it 
is thought to contain, during his ‘starchamber quiry’ this celebrant turned celebrity rehearses 
role after role (FW 475). As he is both an inspired genius and a mere mouthpiece as a bard, 
the voices of the whole family are heard through him, moreover, as ‘everybug’ is his 
‘bodiment’: he is himself pure spirit, ‘spancelled down upon a blossomy bed’ (475). The 
mystery of the inspired genius lures the experts- the ‘stenoggers’, the ‘solons’ and the 
‘psychomorers’ who ‘set ward about him, doing obedience, nod, bend, bow and curtsey, like 
the watchers of Prospect, upholding their broadawake prober's hats on their firrum head’, 
liturgically ‘circuiting that personer [a prisoner as well as a persona] in his fallen’ (476). A 
‘holy messonger’, Yawn is indeed Yeats’s ‘ideal reciter’: ‘a “messenger” of the poet’ (405; 
Schuchard 216). 
In a version of Yeats’s trance-like state while chanting a poem- ‘conducting the 
living voice with the hieratic movement of arm and hand’, ‘Mesmer’s Manuum, the hand 
making silence’ is proffered by ‘the thurrible mystagogue[s]’ ‘gawking on him, for the 
issuance of his pnum [pneuma (gr) - breath/soul] and softnoising one of them to another one’ 
(135; FW 476, 477, 476). Searching for ‘a young stepschuler of psychical chirography’- 
gifted with automatic writing like Yeats’s wife, with their ‘chromous gleamy seiners’ nets’ 
they try to catch and ‘descry’ his ‘scheining’, his phenomenal [Erscheinung] being [Sein] 
(482, 477, 475, 528). The “pentalectic” between the four and Yawn, however, which begins 
misleadingly by adhering to novelistic conventions - the ‘drear writer’, the ‘temptive 
lissomer’, the ‘fuming censor’ and the ‘slipping beauty’ who compose the audience that the 
narrator addresses - is soon dissipated as the speakers soon become indistinguishable (476, 
477, 476, 477).  
The return of the address to the reader - who appears to simply be one of the four - 
hints nevertheless that as the day is dawning we have moved closer to modern times. This is 
indeed confirmed through the prominence of the question of identity and personality. The 
‘momentary “presence”’ that distinguishes the principle of causality in mythical thought has 
been replaced by the ‘psychous of the Real Absence’; we have moved from mythical 
symbols to the signs of religion that reflect the ‘opposition between “meaning” and 
“existence”’ of religious logic (Cassirer, Symbolic Forms 239; FW 536). The ‘new world of 
logos’ is introduced through the ‘critique’ of the four that Yawn perceives as a quest to 
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incriminate him; the question of authorship becomes an ethical question (Cassirer 2). The 
narrative once again becomes dramatic, but the protagonist is distinguished as an ethical 
subject ‘an independent agent, responsible for his acts’ (199). The subject of the drama is 
‘the traumaturgid’; necessity that distinguishes dramaturgy links the thaumaturgy with 
trauma (FW 496).  
Yawn becomes a tragic hero; this bard is a ‘sinted sageness’ (482). He refers to the 
seven cities that claim to be the birthplace of Homer in order to remove himself from the 
original sin that the “true” author is identified with. Philosophy, philology, psychology, 
theology, history are employed to solve this paradox of identity. But every time he gets 
‘psychoanolised’, Yawn is also ‘psoakoonaloose[d]’ (522). While the speaker tries to 
distinguish his identity from his ‘namesick’, he finds that he is also his ‘shembable’ (489). 
The multivalency of language refuses both their coincidence and their complete separation. 
Original sin, moreover, is the new bond of universality: ‘By him it was done bapka, by me it 
was gone into, to whom it will beblive, Mushame, Mushame!’, even though it entails 
personal responsibility: ‘It looks like someone other bearing my burdens. I cannot let it’ 
(481, 536). The search for the identity of the author is repeatedly hindered as Yawn both 
wants to win acclaim: ‘I, a self the sign’, and to dissociate himself from authorship, as it 
comes with accountability: ‘What cans such wretch to say to I or how have My to doom with 
him?’ (483). ‘We have caught oneselves, Sveasmeas, in somes incontigruity coumplegs of 
heoponhurrish [he upon her] marrage [marriage and mirage] from whose I most 
sublumbunate [must subliminate / sublumbo (l) - under the loin]’, the chorus that takes over 
in the next chapter, discerns (607). Without the I, without the author’s ‘monumentalness as a 
thingabolls’ [a symbol] the sign is in danger of ‘Sangnifying nothing’ (543, 515). The 
‘illscribed’ sign betrays the sins of the author who has been ‘inchanting causeries’ 
[philosophical causes and discussions but to enchant his audience] (496, 543). A 
‘Shamwork’ has been ‘in our scheining’: St. Patrick’s shamrock - used to enchant pagan 
Ireland - and the work of Shem have been presented as truth, as an epiphany- Erscheinung 
[appearance] (613).  




Dressing the character. Celebrant or celebrity?  
 
‘[T]he form in which a man goes into the shadows is the form which he moves 
among his posterity’, Joyce had prophesied in 1903 about the eternal image of Ibsen, and 
just like ‘Ibsen the romantic’ was to be forgotten, his own posterity has similarly overlooked 
that as well as an engineer and philologist Joyce had presented himself in the same letter as 
‘an engine driver’, ‘a musicmaker, philosophist and heaps of other things’ (OCPW 71; 
Letters I 251). Explaining these roles in a later letter, he admitted that this paradoxical 
combination made him unique: ‘There is no such absurd person as could replace me except 
the incorrigible god of sleep and no waster quite so wasteful though there is one much more 
so’ (245). Joyce had certainly radically departed from his claim made in 1905 that he was 
exclusively ‘an artist by temperament’, unlike ‘excellent writers’ whose temperament, 
however, is tempered by other professions (Letters II 110). While he preserved his own 
distinction, artistic economy had turned into profligacy. 
Having risen through notoriety as well as literary prowess to “celebrity” status, 
compelling with renewed radiance in every movement of criticism, Joyce has increasingly 
become a suspect figure for critics of cultural studies. Disrupting the Wake that 
deconstruction has staged, they highlight not only that Joyce as a “popular” figure is very 
much alive, but also that he was actively engaged in fabricating and promoting this figure in 
order to sell books; to widen his audience for commercial rather than ideological reasons. 
Wanting ‘to demonstrate how Joyce uses the logic of mass-mediated fame to constitute his 
identity as the author of and in Ulysses’, Jonathan Goldman argues that while his stylistic 
experiments do not ‘refer to the vicissitudes of consciousness’, they nevertheless ‘shift the 
text onto a register of meaning that we equate with “the author”’: ‘Joyce uses typography 
and visual style to fashion his text into an object of the gaze, fashioning himself in relation to 
that object, as “transcendent in regard to languages”, in Foucault' s words’ (84, 87, 88). But 
for Goldman Joyce was uneasy with the implications of this celebrity image; like Stephen’s 
‘fantasy of self-production’ in “Scylla” detaches ‘the author from messy matters of the 
body’, Joyce’s own removes him ‘from the equally messy problem of cultural visibility 
brought on by celebrity’ (94). While with his publication of the Ulysses schema Joyce 
wanted to create ‘authorized readers to publicize the novel’, this ‘primer explaining all the 
mysteries of Ulysses’ - in the words of George Moore - acted also as ‘an affirmation of the 
cultural capital of difficulty, elevating both readers and author above the plebian reader and 
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infusing Ulysses with value by virtue of the restricted community in which it circulates’ (CH 
566; Goldman 97).  
Referring to what Benjamin has called ‘the “spell of the personality”, the phony 
spell of a commodity’ that was conjured following ‘the shriveling of the aura’ of the work of 
art, these critics warn that the wake of the author might be premature and that he should be 
resurrected in order to examine his “embodiment” of ‘cultural capital’ (Illuminations 231). 
Examining a more literal exposition of the “image” of the author, Maurizia Boscagli and 
Edna Duffy study Joyce’s poses in photographs published in Time magazine, where ‘Joyce 
“makes a spectacle” of himself as a commodity’ by ‘intentionally stag[ing] his image as an 
advertisement’ (Dettmar 133-4). While his posture betrays that he is ‘deeply uneasy with his 
self-display’ and ‘attempt[s] to defuse and deny his self-fetishization through strategies of 
self-distancing’, his image is still haunted by ‘the aura of the fetish-presence of the star’: 
Joyce’s ‘physiognomy bears no longer the inscription of the logos, but…rather, it provides 
the elements that allows a commercial logo to be composed’ (134, 157). The “death of the 
author” is for Boscagli and Duffy a “tragedy” staged by capitalism: ‘The tragic element that 
Joyce’s image speaks for Freund [Joyce’s photographer] is the (humanist’s) necessary 
renunciation of the self, and the equally tragic loss of signification to the arena of commodity 
aesthetics’ (157). 
The theatrical nature of this paradoxical “image” of the writer in Joyce’s work - as a 
‘celebrand’, ‘celebridging’ as well as ‘celescalating’ his ‘galloroman cultous’ - and of the 
parallactic theorists of Finnegans Wake who are made to admit that they ‘cannot say aye to 
aye’ nor ‘smile noes from noes [noesis]’ in the discrepancy between ‘You, allus for the kunst 
[alles voor de kunst (Dutch) - all for art] and me for omething with a handel to it [Georg 
Friedrich Handel & trade (German)], that leads to the conflict between the ‘cerebrated’ 
[cerebral / berated] and ‘CelebrAted’ brother in Finnegans Wake, was highlighted also by 
earlier critics (484, 305, 5, 288, 295, 421). Robert Scholes had identified in 1973 the 
‘problem of self-portraiture’ as ‘the central problem’ that ‘Joyce faced in his work’: 
‘Looking at Joyce's work as a whole it appears as if he needed an image of himself in every 
work as a way of verifying its reality, as a measuring gauge for the validity of his other 
portraits, real and imaginary’ (“In Search of James Joyce” 7). The intersection of life and art, 
however, led to a theatrical drama: ‘the great esthetic questions were not the purely formal 
ones’, but ‘had to be solved finally in concrete ways - by performance’. 
Joyce was indeed fascinated with the ‘nice collection’ of ‘legends’ that increasingly 
circulated about him, as Finnegans Wake reveals, although he was also anxious to distance 
himself from them by highlighting how “monstrous” and theatrical, fake and ultimately false 
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‘this hybrid actually was like to look at’ (Letters I 166; FW 169). Even prior to the 
‘somatophage merman’ Shem, the introduction and prominence of Bloom in Ulysses could 
be seen as an attempt on the part of Joyce to distance himself from this mythical figure and 
emphasise the importance of ‘establishing the identities in the writer complexus’, that are not 
only a celebration of modern selfhood as a ‘heterogeneous self-plenitude’ but also a result of 
celebrity culture and the ease and speed with which gossip circulates through the growing 
number of media of communication and expanding audiences (171; D. Brown 36). Listing 
these legends in detail in a letter to Weaver in June 1921 ‘to show you how conflicting they 
all are’ in response to her concern that he was drinking to excess, he concludes that ‘The 
truth probably is that I am a quite commonplace person undeserving of so much imaginative 
painting’ (Letters I 166). Distinguishing ‘a further opinion that I am a crafty simulating and 
dissimulating Ulysses-like type, a ‘jejune jesuit’, selfish and cynical’, as an impression that 
‘has some truth’, he highlights that no “portrait” can encompass the diversity and 
contradictions of his character: ‘it is by no means all of me (nor was it of Ulysses) and it has 
been my habit to apply this alleged quality to safeguard my poor creations, for on the other 
side, as I stated in a former letter, I removed so much of any natural wit I had that but for 
your intuitive help I should be destitute’. The portraits are both wildly imaginative and not 
inventive enough, restricted by the very form of the “portrait of the artist” that should be, he 
wrote in 1904, ‘not an identificative paper but rather the curve of an emotion’ (WD 56). 
His awareness of the marketing significance of these ‘legends’, however, is evident 
in the concern he voices in the same letter about his “anonymity” in Paris: ‘I have been a 
year in Paris and in that time not a word about me has appeared in any French periodical’ 
(Letters I 166). He holds his reticence and detachment accountable, but refuses exposition: ‘I 
never go to any of the various weekly reunions as it is a waste of time for me at present to be 
cooped up in overcrowded rooms listening to gossip about absent artists and replying to 
enthusiastic expressions about my (unread) masterpiece with a polite amused reflective 
smile. The only person who knows anything about it is Mr Valery Larbaud’. Conscious of 
how wearisome and distracting from his artistic work his fabrication and display of a public 
image is, he finds that his very attempt to describe his “true character” and detach himself 
from these legends is a ‘pose’ that ‘begins to remind me of a preface by Mr Bernard Shaw’. 
All he succeeds in doing is giving ‘an example of my emptiness’ and he goes on to 
corroborate his confession that he is in fact even more of a “fraud” than is supposed: ‘I have 
not read a work of literature for several years. My head is full of pebbles and rubbish and 
broken matches and lots of glass picked up ‘most everywhere’. 
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He has not been “trained” for the occupation that he is famous for as a non-erudite: 
‘I don’t even know Greek though I am spoken of as an erudite’; but he has been transformed 
by the nature of ‘The task I set myself technically in writing a book from eighteen different 
points of view and in as many styles, all apparently unknown or undiscovered by my fellow 
tradesmen’. The “work” of art itself shapes his role as an artist and the nature of his 
profession, creating the need for ‘legends’ to explain it in his departure from his ‘fellow 
tradesmen’. This occupation is so demanding that it becomes self-destructive: ‘that and the 
nature of the legend chosen would be enough to upset anyone’s mental balance’. While he is 
employed as an artist, wastefully spending himself, he cannot fit into society with his 
‘Inconvenient’ economics: ‘I want to finish the book and try to settle on my entangled 
material affairs definitely one way or the other (somebody here said of me ‘They call him a 
poet. He appears to be interested chiefly in mattresses’). And in fact, I was’ (FW 172; Letters 
I 167). His Greek “scholarship” is exposed as “superstition” with regard to the Greeks who 
bring him ‘luck’. Unlike the scholar’s search for origins and an illustrious tradition, Joyce 
‘spoke or used to speak modern Greek not too badly’ and ‘spent a great deal of time’ with 
living ‘Greeks of all kinds from noblemen down to onionsellers, chiefly the latter’. 
Hugh Kenner concludes his comprehensive analysis of the many traditions and 
figures that have shaped Joyce’s work in Dublin’s Joyce with the diagnosis that ‘Joyce spent 
his life playing parts, and his works swarm with shadow-selves’- ‘shadowstealers’ as they 
are called in the Wake (354; 560). ‘Parody was the medium of his art, and he played these 
parts that he might better write them’ (354). His departure from Ellmann’s autobiographical 
analysis of the relation between Joyce and Stephen through his emphasis on Joyce’s parodic 
stance - by ‘suppos[ing] that Joyce could not bear his own hero’, as Ellmann remarked 
bitterly - allowed criticism’s circumvention of these paradoxes between high and low, 
content and form, authorship and language, renamed by deconstruction as a “play of 
différance”- a play of identity and language; a ‘perversion’ that was ‘Joyce’s way of 
avoiding the aporias of “high modernism”’ (JJ 145; Authorised Reader 186). Kenner, 
nevertheless, admitted that Stephen is ‘more than comic’, detecting also a ‘tragic’ element 
that distinguished him in his relation to his audience: ‘There is a tragic necessity in the 
spectacle of the aesthete’s being fused to the young sensitive’s flesh: the necessity, for a 
provincial artist deprived of any respectable traditions, of becoming the enemy of his society 
in ways incompatible with remaining in touch with human wisdom’ (79). It is in his 
detachment from his audience that Stephen is characterised as ‘tragic’ for Kenner, in the 
dilemma between self-integrity and self-sacrifice, exile and servitude. 
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For Joseph Brooker, Kenner is the first ‘counter-humanist’ of Joyce’s critics, whose 
‘vision of a mechanical “mind of the text”’, set against ‘the humanist reading of Joyce 
developed by Ellmann’ and Budgen who draw parallels between Joyce and his characters, 
‘has had a broader influence through David Hayman’s notion of the “Arranger”’ (Joyce’s 
Critics 127, 126). The ‘growing emphasis on the role of technology in modernism’ is what 
brings the death of the author for Brooker; a tragedy that historically precedes post-
structuralism: ‘The shaping effects of style and discourse on experience, and the consequent 
impossibility of objective metalanguage, is the burden of Joyce’s Voices, published as 
poststructuralist theory was arriving in the literary academy’ (126-7). Brooker admits, 
however, Kenner’s “disavowal” of this distinction as forefather of “theory”. The very title of 
Kenner’s later work manifests a very clear discrepancy; ‘Joyce has many voices but no 
“style”, as T.S. Eliot discerned long ago’, Kenner argues, and whereas Brooker links Joyce’s 
representation of the author as a ‘cyborg’ to Flaubert, Kenner emphasises Joyce’s distinction 
from ‘pseudo-Flaubertian “scientific” detachment’ parodied in “Ithaca”: ‘we are in the 
presence not of an exercise in nineteenth century pessimism but of a tribute to the 
unpredictable creative leaps of the human soul’ (Dublin’s Joyce 12, 126, 241, 10).  
‘The Joycean world for Kenner is one of artifice, quotation, acting’, Brooker argues, 
linking its theatricality with the ‘deorganicization of the text’ (127-8). While theory appears 
to have been displaced by praxis in Ulysses, the ‘activity of assemblage’ that distinguishes 
Joyce’s writing for post-structuralism - an activity in which ‘the writing subject itself is 
dispersed in a plurality of possible positions and functions, read within the others of 
discourse’, like the association that Brooker makes between acting, artifice and quotation - is 
an “act” that has little to do with praxis as a political or ethical act, or even the purposive 
venture of a “producer”, and is instead closer to “kinesis” as the reverse of “stasis” (Heath in 
Post-structuralist Joyce 39). This “useless” activity indicates the disappearance of the 
storyteller who has been replaced by an ‘arranging presence’, Hugh Kenner argued in 1980: 
‘Some mind, it is clear, keeps track of the details of this printed cosmos, and lets escape from 
its scrutiny the fall of no sparrow. The intrusion of this consciousness is perhaps the most 
radical, the most disconcerting innovation in all of Ulysses. It is something new in fiction. It 
is not the voice of the storyteller: not a voice at all, since it does not address us, does not 
even speak’ (Ulysses 64-5). This ‘Arranger’, ‘something between a persona and a function, 
somewhere between the narrator and the implied author’, ‘subtly penetrating the fabric of the 
narrative’ for David Hayman, in Kenner’s earlier description had not nullified but 
transformed the role of the bard: he ‘enjoys a seemingly total recall for exact forms of words 
used hundreds of pages earlier, a recall which implies not an operation of memory but access 
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such as ours to a printed book, in which pages can be turned to and fro’ (The Mechanics of 
Meaning 124, 122; Ulysses 65). 
While the arranger still ‘epitomises the Dublin knack for performance’ for Kenner, 
performativity for deconstruction is a characteristic of language: ‘only language acts, 
‘performs’, and not ‘me’’ (66; Barthes 143). In this “play of language” it is the (ideal) reader 
who becomes the actor: ‘The text is never closed and the ‘ideal reader’ will be the one who 
accedes to the play of this incompletion, placed in ‘a situation of writing’, ready no longer to 
master the text but now to become its actor’ (Heath, Post-structuralist Joyce 32). This 
modern and post-modern play is dissociated from the dramatic act that Joyce had defined 
‘with a naïf air of discovering novelties’ in the beginning of his career as an ‘interplay of 
passions’, ‘evolution, movement, in whatever way unfolded’; in contrast to the tautological 
‘dramatic drama’ that Joyce had championed, the dramatic act of post-modernism is 
oxymoronic (SH 81; OCPW 24). Like the ‘inhuman theorist’ of Stephen Hero, who as 
Jacques Aubert has argued, disregards ‘writing as act, the ethical dimension ... that remains 
implicit, veiled, in the very narrative of the experience’, the activity of the author as a 
mechanical arranger is similarly disembodied: ‘the text deliberately acts as if it were cut off 
from any single creative consciousness’ (22; Lawrence 9). ‘[T]he spectacular and the 
theatrical’ that Joyce had distinguished in 1900 from drama overshadows all activities 
(OCPW 25). The artist’s inability to participate in modern society that is dramatised in the 
Portrait, is remedied in Ulysses through a self-imposed monumental ‘task’ ‘enough to upset 
anyone’s mental balance’ (Letters I 166). Ironically, however, this all-consuming occupation 
threatens to alienate the artist even further from society and its ‘material affairs’, despite his 
interest in ‘mattresses’ (167).  
‘Drama, as Joyce uses the word’, Aubert argues, referring to Joyce’s early writings 
‘is a concept that formulates through art complexities and contradictions that he was 
discovering at the vital core of his experience – complexities insofar as he indicates, after 
Hegel, that drama formulates human passions in words (“The Drama is the highest form of 
Art in speech”) and through the Word; contradictions insofar as drama presents human 
bodies as images (i.e., meaning in praesentia) that can be analyzed into symbolic elements, 
or signifiers (i.e., in absentia)’ (34). The absence of the human body from the acts of 
language following Joyce’s short-lived career as a dramatist is so devastating that the text 
appears to be “orphaned”. The drama of Stephen in the Portrait largely revolves around his 
desire to “mirror” in words ‘perfectly’ an ‘inner world of individual emotions’, and his 
struggle to reconcile this portrait of perfection with his ‘ill clad, ill fed, louse-eaten’ body 
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(180, 254). In the absence of the ‘radiant body of everliving life’ of the author, necessary for 
communion with his audience, language takes the form of a silent monologue (240).  
A ‘drama of actors’ is for Kenner what is left following the ‘progressive effacement 
of the writer, from lyric through epic into drama, from Chamber Music to Exiles’, while the 
‘progression from Portrait to Finnegans Wake’ ‘leaves behind a drama of daftly autonomous 
words, language, not persons, in action, convoluting in a void of non-communication’ (150-
1). The departure of the author, however, exposes his faith in the ability of language to 
embody him in an “epic of the human body” dramatically structured to take place in one day 
and consummated through ‘das Fleisch das stets bejaht’ that pries apart the mystery of the 
Word and the singular ‘Ich bin’ of Stephen’s denying Geist (Budgen 21, 272). But refusing 
martyrdom through “metempsychosis”, his creation is ‘merely a satyric play, merely an 
epilogue farce’: a “comedy” [a komos (gr) - ‘revel’ of the aoidos (gr) - ‘singer’] that allows 
the author to reclaim his bardic title (Human-all-too-human 537). 
The “erasure” of the author in post-structuralism, who is transformed ‘from a 
methodological prescription to an ontological statement about the very essence of discourse 
itself’, as Seán Burke argues, obscures any possible distinction between the social and the 
existential “origins” of the crisis of authority and authorship; a confusion that Joyce’s work 
indeed elicits (The Death and Return of the Author 16). The artist’s detachment betrays 
Stephen’s self-alienation for Aubert: ‘The fight to be conducted is not with others, with 
society as a whole or individually with its members, but with the “ineluctable” Other in him 
... in the confrontation with essential weakness, physical and moral’ (51, 61). The warring 
twins of Finnegans Wake certainly imply that this nameless Other is ‘asame’, although an 
audience either as a chorus, a ceremonial congregation or a rowdy rabble is always at hand 
to commentate, complicate or overshadow the familial drama (FW 356).  
The dualism of the Romantic paradigm of ‘creative man’ as ‘a divided being, man 
and artist, a historical personage who merely serves as the medium through which the 
creative spirit manifests itself’, but also of the medieval ‘concern with authorial role or 
function – sometimes termed the author’s ‘office’ (officium)’, ‘manifested by two facets of 
the author’s individuality which the exegete sought to describe, his individual literary 
activity and his individual moral activity’, is challenged in modernity by a synchronous 
claim of impersonality and multiple personality disorder (Beebe, Ivory Towers 7; Minnis 
27). While Barthes upsets the authorial hierarchy with his presentation of the ‘modern 
scriptor’ who ‘no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but 
rather [an] immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt’, and 
Foucault goes further by examining and ‘await[ing] the fluid functions released by [the 
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author’s] disappearance’, Joyce is wary of the reductiveness of this apparent diversity that 
entirely subsumes the heterogeneity of Man under a variety of roles and functions (147; 
121). Kenner has emphasised that Joyce shows how these roles can become imprisoning 
rather than liberating, turning its actors into ‘walking clichés’, while Joseph Valente, linking 
the adverse effects of role playing to what Nietzsche calls ‘the problem of the actor, the 
figure who actually becomes the role he is to assume’ through complete surrender to ‘the 
flux of appearance’, argues that ‘the dramatic artist’ is the ‘solution’ to this problem that 
both Nietzsche and Joyce proffer (Dublin’s Joyce 11; 94). ‘Does the death of man 
necessarily imply the death of the author? Is the author simply a specific and regional 
instantiation of the philosophical anthropos?’, Burke interrogates deconstruction’s reductive 
trope of the author-as-a-Philosopher: ‘All author positions are subsumed under an essentially 
nineteenth century theocentricism, a tactic which naturally lends to the death of the author a 
greater urgency, a more direful necessity’ (104, 26). 
Going beyond a search for the ‘funnyman's functions’ that ‘characterize the 
existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society’ for Foucault, 
Joyce does not let the reader forget that s/he is ‘up against a right querrshnorrt of a man’; 
both a queer sort of man and a product of the German periodical Der Querschnitt (FW 509; 
124). As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has argued, while theory is engaged in formulating and 
answering the question “What is an author?”, the literary response to the question “Who is an 
author”, should not be forgotten (in Cadava 159). Literature for Labarthe has the means to 
formulate the paradox of ‘a name without a name’, avoiding ‘the fall of who into the 
sacrilization of the name’ but also warranting ‘the effort of sounding that call: “who?”’ ‘so 
that the feeling “that there is someone” can tremble again’, through a pun, made famous by 
Ulysses: ‘“no one” (in Greek oudeis)…is his proper name (Odusseus) which he only slightly 
deforms’ (159, 155). Acknowledging that ‘the question “who?” is always necessarily a 
political one’, but also entangled with the “metaphysical question” “who is man?”, Labarthe 
highlights the significance of literature’s capacity to address this implication (159).  
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